4 Nev. 455 | Nev. | 1868
Lead Opinion
By the Court,
Defendant Treadway appeals from an order made in the District Court of the Second Judical District, overruling his motion for a new trial, and from the judgment of the Court against him.
The action was to recover fifteen acres of land, portion of a larger tract, claimed by plaintiff under a patent of the United States. Defendant in possession pleaded that he was entitled thereto, and to a deed from plaintiff, by virtue of an agreement that plaintiff should obtain title to the entirety from the Government of the United States, and thereafter deed to defendant the fifteen acres in controversy, in consideration that defendant should refrain from presenting his rightful claim to the larger tract, and should pay the purchase money of the smaller, which was within his inclosure.
The question of fact in dispute is, what was the agreement ? Plaintiff claims that he was not to deed unless defendant first ob
The allegations of defendant’s answer are clearly proven, unless a certain paper in evidence is to be taken as the real agreement. This paper is in the following words :
“ George L. Gibson is to convey to Jacob H. Rose, on demand, after pre-emption by warrantee deed, (or to give bond for perfect title in fee simple upon reception of patent) all that portion of northeast quarter of southeast quarter of section 7 of township 15, range 20, which lies west of said Rose’s east fence. On demand, after A. D. Treadway shall procure for Rose a perfect title in fee simple to all that portion of west half of northeast quarter of said section 7 lying south of said Rose’s north fence, and that portion of southeast quarter of southeast quarter of said section 7 lying west of said Rose’s east fence, said Rose is to convey, by warrantee deed, (or give bond for deed on reception of patent) all that portion of west half of southeast quarter of said section.7 lying south of Tread-way’s north fence, marked on plat ‘ log fence.’ Meanwhile all parties to occupy according to present inclosures.
“ Signed March 2d, 1865.
“ A. D. Treadway,
“ Georse Gibson,
“ By Chas. E. Flandrau, their Attorney in Fact.
“Jacob H. Rose,
“ By Geo. A. Nourse, his Attorney in Fact.”
Plaintiff, defendant, and Gibson all testify that they never authorized nor Avere aware of its execution. It can then have no validity as an agreement. Defendant, Chapman, Gatewood, and Gibson all testify to the agreement substantially as set forth in defendant’s answer; and the only contradiction thereof is on part of plaintiff, who testifies that he did not understand that he was to deed to defendant unless defendant obtained for him his possessions claimed by others.
The evidence is conclusively in favor of defendant, especially when considered in the light of the undisputed facts: First. That
The contract was valid, and neither in contravention of the preemption laws of the United States, nor within the Statute of Frauds.
The object of the laws of Congress is certainly fully attained when each settler secures the precise lands which he has occupied, cultivated, and improved; and when under an agreement similar to that between plaintiff and defendant legal title has vested by the issuance of the patent of the United States, a trust results which Courts of equity will enforce against the patentee. (McCoy v. Hughes, 1 Iowa, 371, (Greene) ; Brooks v. Ellis, 3 Iowa, 527, (Greene) ; Bryant v. Hendricks, 5 Iowa, 258, (Clarke) ; Snow v. Flannery, 10 Iowa, 318; Stephenson v. Smith, 7 Mo. 619; Grove's Heirs v. Fulsome et al., 16 Mo. 549 ; Doyle v. Willy, 15 Ill. ; Franklin v. McFlyn, 23 Ill. 91.)
Defendant prays a decree for a deed from plaintiff. His pleading does not entitle him to it. He alleges no demand for nor refusal to give a deed. Under the practice in this State a defendant claiming affirmative relief must plead as fully as if plaintiff.
The order of the District Court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with leave to defendant to amend his answer.
Concurrence Opinion
By
concurring.
This was an ordinary action of ejectment for a certain parcel of land in Ormsby County. The defendant, Treadway, answering a complaint in the usual form, negatived the averments of such complaint, and subsequently, by supplemental answer, set up an additional defense of an equitable character — that a contract had been made between him and plaintiff for the land in controversy, ‘and that having complied with the terms of the agreement on his part, he is entitled to, and by way of cross action, prays a specific performance.
The defendant here makes no allegation of a demand for a deed. As the case stands, is such an allegation necessary ?' The general rule seems to be that a vendee, in addition to the payment or tender of the purchase money, must demand his deed before he can maintain an action for a breech of the covenant. (Gray et al. v. Dougherty et al., 25 Cal. 279, and cases there cited.) This general rule, however, has its exceptions. “ The chief office of a request,” says Sanderson, C. J., (Id. 280) “ is to perfect the breach and put the vendor in default, and this result may follow from other causes and circumstances as well as from a refusal to comply with an express demand. As, for instance, if the vendor refuses to receive the purchase money when tendered, thereby repudiating his contract, or by his own act prevents the vendee from performing his part of the agreement, or by any adversary steps makes it known that he does not intend to observe and perform his covenant, except upon compulsion, thus in effect .refusing in advance of a demand, neither law nor equity imposes upon the vendee the observance of a ceremony thus made idle and fruitless. Uuder such circumstances a Court of ‘equity will go so far as to interpose and compel specific performance before the vendee has complied with the contract on his part, when it would be inequitable and uncon-
Accepting this as a fair statement of the law bearing upon the-question in hand, and within these rules, if Treadway had brought suit directly against Rose to compel a specific performance, on the precise grounds set forth in his supplemental answer here, the want of a demand upon Rose for a deed before suit would be fully compensated in the pleading, by stating in effect that Rose claimed to be the owner and entitled to the possession of the premises in controversy, and was prosecuting an action to obtain possession of the same. But when the position of the parties, as in this instance, is reversed — Rose is first the actor, claiming in his complaint the ownership and right of possession to the land, and brings suit to eject Treadway from the premises — thus by his declarations and acts demonstrating beyond cavil that a demand upon him for a deed would be but an idle ceremony — so thoroughly supplies the adversary pleading and proofs upon the question of demand as to render entirely needless either such an avennent in the answer or evidence as to the fact on the hearing of the case.
Entertaining the views expressed herein, it follows that in my judgment, in respect to the matter of demand, no amendment of the answer is necessary.
Upon the other questions discussed I concur in both the reasoning and conclusions attained in the opinion of my associate. I also concur in the order reversing the judgment of the District Court.