Lead Opinion
Opinion
Petitioners Leonard Ross, Joe Crivello, Larry Dean, Ole Olsen and Russell Papenhausen, members of the Plumas County Board of Supervisors, seek review of a judgment of the Sacramento County Superior Court finding them guilty of contempt for wilfully violating a court order requiring the payment of retroactive welfare benefits. The supervisors challenge the judgment of contempt on a number of grounds, claiming (1) that, as nonparties to the original court action, they were not bound by the earlier order; (2) that the contempt proceedings were improperly instituted because the complaining parties failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy prior to seeking the contempt sanction; and (3) that the judgment is invalid because the record does not affirmatively reflect that the trial court applied the appropriate burden of proof in finding them guilty of contempt. As we explain, we have determined that none of the contentions is meritorious, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.
1. The facts.
This contempt proceeding arises in the aftermath of this court’s decisions in California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian (1974)
On July 28, 1975, the superior court entered judgment in the Cooper v. Obledo action, granting plaintiffs the relief sought in their amended complaint. With respect to the payment of retroactive welfare benefits, the injunctive order issued by the court provided: “The defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees will restore to plaintiffs and the class they represent the AFDC benefits unlawfully withheld pursuant to [the regulations invalidated in Brian and Cooper] through the following procedure: [If] “a. . . . County welfare departments will redetermine AFDC eligibility and make restitution of grant amounts unlawfully withheld ... [II] d. Within 60 days after entry of this Judgment, or as soon thereafter as administratively possible, the Department of Benefit Payments will notify all county welfare departments of the terms of this judgment and the rights of claimants, and will instruct the counties to aid and assist claimants in obtaining restitution as appropriate including reviewing every case record ... to determine if the AFDC grant was improperly reduced by application of [the invalid regulations].”
Pursuant to this judgment, on September 18, 1975, the Department of Benefit Payments sent an “all-county letter” to each county welfare director, ordering the counties to' compute and pay the retroactive welfare grants as mandated in the court order; the department attached a copy of the judgment in Cooper v. Obledo to the letter. Mona Green, the Plumas County Welfare Director, received this letter shortly thereafter and, at the November 11, 1975, meeting of the Plumas County Board of Supervisors, she informed the board of the contents and effect of the letter and the court judgment. The board immediately instructed Green not to make the retroactive payments and adopted a motion, resolving “that Plumas County not comply with the court order, as this would be an unanticipated expense for which no county funds are available.”
The Director of Benefit Payments, real party in interest Marion Woods,
Thereafter, on December 3, 1975, real parties in interest Woods, Cooper, Wilks and Lott filed a motion in the Sacramento Superior Court urging that petitioners be held in contempt for wilfully violating the Cooper v. Obledo order; an affidavit of Director Woods accompanied the motion. At the hearing on the contempt motion held on January 22 and 23, 1976, real parties in interest adduced evidence establishing the above facts. In addition, real parties in interest presented the testimony of Ann Patton, the Plumas County Auditor-Controller, who stated that as of the date of the contempt hearing “around $100,000” remained in the county’s “contingency appropriation” for the current fiscal year; Mona Green, the county welfare director, estimated the cost to Plumas County of the retroactive welfare payments mandated by the Cooper v. Obledo order at between $10,000 and $20,000. Petitioners did not challenge the accuracy of these officials’ testimony.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudged petitioners guilty of contempt, specifically finding that petitioners had actual knowledge of the court order, that “funds were and are available ... with which to comply” and that petitioners nonetheless wilfully refused to comply with the judgment.
Petitioners initially contend that the judgment of contempt is invalid because they were not bound by the injunctive order which the trial court found they had wilfully disobeyed. Petitioners emphasize that neither Plumas County nor they, as individuals, were named defendants in the Cooper v. Obledo action, and that they received no notice and were afforded no opportunity to defend that action. Under these circumstances, petitioners urge that they were denied due process by being held in contempt for violating the injunctive order issued in that case.
The United States Supreme Court faced and explicitly rejected an almost identical due process contention over three-quarters of a century ago in In re Lennon (1897)
In Berger v. Superior Court (1917)
In the instant case, of course, the injunctive order in the Cooper v. Obledo action was directed at “agents” of the defendants, and the judgment contemplated that individual counties would be bound by the order. As we have seen, the judgment specifically provided that “defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees will restore to plaintiffs and the class they represent the AFDC benefit unlawfully withheld,” and the procedure for repayment established by the judgment explicitly stipulated that “[cjounty welfare departments will redetermine AFDC eligibility and make restitution of grant .amounts unlawfully withheld” pursuant to the invalid regulations.
Petitioners do not challenge the continued vitality of Berger’s conclusion that an agent is bound by an injunction issued against his principal (see, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. Board (1945)
After establishing the Department of Benefit Payments as the “single” supervisory agency in this field, the code goes on, in section 10800,‘to assign responsibility for the local administration of state welfare laws to county boards of supervisors, who are to establish county welfare departments, headed by a county welfare director.
Thus, the statutes establish an administrative hierarchy in which the state Department of Benefit Payments exercises ultimate supervisory authority over the payment of welfare benefits and the county boards of supervisors, acting through the county welfare departments, function as agents of the Department of Benefit Payments in administering such payments.
Petitioners attempt to avoid this extensive array of authority by asserting that the county is only a “special agent,” rather than a “general agent,” of the state welfare agency, and is consequently not bound by an injunctive order issued against the state agency. This argument is flawed on two levels. First, absolutely nothing in either the statutory provisions or the prior authorities supports the petitioners’ classification of counties as special agents. Civil Code section 2297 provides that “[a]n agent for a particular act or transaction is called a special agent [and] [a]ll others are general agents,” (italics added), and section 3 of the Restatement Second of Agency explains that “(1) A general agent is an agent authorized to conduct a series of transactions involving a continuity of service. (2) A special agent is an agent authorized to conduct a single transaction or a series of transactions not involving continuity of service. ” (Italics added.) Inasmuch as county boards of supervisors bear an on-going statutory responsibility for the local administration of welfare benefits, such boards of supervisors are clearly general agents of the state welfare agency with respect to such administrative duties.
Moreover, nothing in either the Berger decision or the numerous cases following Berger supports petitioners’ suggestion that a special agent is
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners’ contention that they are not bound by the injunctive order issued in Cooper v. Obledo is specious.
Petitioners secondly contend that even if they were bound by the injunctive order issued in Cooper v. Obledo, the trial court nonetheless erred in entertaining the contempt proceeding because the real parties in interest had assertedly failed to exhaust an available administrative remedy prior to seeking the contempt order. Petitioners present no authority which supports their contention that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies to contempt proceedings, and we have serious doubts that the availability of an alternative remedy would •necessarily deprive a court of the authority to punish wilful violation of its own orders through the contempt sanction. Even if we were to assume, however, that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine might be applicable in contempt proceedings under some circumstances, petitioners'’ invocation of the doctrine in the instant case is misguided for several reasons.
Petitioners argue that the real parties in interest should have pursued the remedy provided by Welfare and Institutions Code section 10605 before instituting the contempt proceeding at issue here. Section 10605 provides that if the Director of Benefit Payments “considers a county director to be failing, in a substantial manner, to comply with any provision of this code or any regulation,” the state director shall notify the county director to that effect, and if the county director does not give reasonable assurance within 60 days of such notice “that he is complying and will continue to comply with the laws and regulations,” the state director shall hold a hearing to consider the matter. If, after the hearing, the state director determines “that there is a failure on the part of the county to comply with the provisions of this code or the established regulations,” section 10605 authorizes the state director to (1) “withhold part or all of state and federal funds from such county,” (2) “[ajssume, temporarily, direct responsibility for the administration of any or all state-assisted aid programs in such county,” or (3) “[bjring an action . . . to compel compliance.”
Moreover, the remedy provided by section 10605 is, in any event, available only to the Director of Benefit Payments and not to individual aggrieved welfare recipients. Inasmuch as the contempt proceeding in this case was pursued by the individual Cooper v. Obledo plaintiffs as well as by the director it is clear that the proceeding was not barred by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.
The case of Diaz v. Quitoriano (1969)
Accordingly, we conclude that the exhaustion of remedies doctrine did not constitute a bar to the instant contempt proceedings.
4. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the trial court applied an erroneous burden ofproof standard in this proceeding.
For almost a century, our court has repeatedly emphasized that in California all contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and that, as a consequence, “an accused on trial for contempt must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Bridges v. Superior Court (1939)
Petitioners point out that the record in this case does not affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court applied the reasonable doubt standard in reaching his conclusion, and they contend that the absence of such an affirmative showing fatally flaws the judgment of contempt. Petitioners’ argument, in essence, is that in the absence of an explicit statement by the trial court indicating that he was applying the reasonable doubt standard, error must be presumed.
Controlling legal principles, however, establish precisely the opposite result. Evidence Code section 664 provides that “[i]t is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed” and scores of appellate decisions, relying on this provision, have held that “in the absence of any contrary evidence, we are entitled to presume that the trial court . . . properly followed established law.” (Serrano v. Workman’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1971)
In support of their contention that the record must affirmatively reflect that the trial court applied the reasonable doubt standard, petitioners rely solely on this court’s recent decision in In re Arthur N. (1976)
After reaching this conclusion, we did reverse the juvenile court order at issue because the record did not affirmatively reflect that the court had applied the reasonable doubt standard in adjudicating the supplemental petition. In arriving at that disposition, however, we specifically relied
By contrast, the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard to contempt proceedings has, as noted above, been firmly established in a long line of California decisions, and thus in the instant case there is no reason to depart from the normal presumption that the trial court properly followed established law. Nothing in the present record suggests that the trial court was ignorant of the controlling decisions establishing the reasonable doubt standard or that the court had decided to depart from those decisions. Indeed, the record affirmatively reflects that the trial court was well aware of the quasi-criminal nature of contempt proceedings.
Conceding that the record does not reveal that the trial court utilized the wrong burden of proof standard, petitioners attempt to rebut the statutory presumption of regularity through an affidavit, filed by their attorney, which states that in an unreported conference in the judge’s chambers, the judge indicated that he was going to apply the “preponderance of the evidence,” rather than the “reasonable doubt,” burden of proof standard.
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
The amended complaint named Obledo and Jerry Prod, Director of Benefit Payments, as defendants.
Woods is the successor in office to Jerry Prod, one of the original defendants in the Cooper v. Obledo action. (See fn. 1, ante.)
The telegram read in full: “The policy of this administration is to carry out court orders even when we do not agree with them. Based on this policy, unless you act before 5 p.m., Thursday, November 20, 1975, to rescind action taken last week not to impliment [s/c] order in Cooper decision, I intend to seek an order holding you in contempt of court. Please advise your intention.”
As the record reflects, the trial court stated from the bench: “The court believes that there is enough evidence here to justify finding that the defendants are guilty of contempt.... I believe that the evidence showed, number one, that the defendants had been noticed of the judgment; number two, they wilfully refused to comply with the judgment; and number three, that funds were available and are available in the general fund with which to comply. So we have the three ingredients, actual notice, wilfull refusal to abide by the judgment and ability to comply. ... So, I find that the
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the court’s order does recite “sufficient facts, with sufficient particularity, to show that . . . contempt has been committed.” (Kroneberger v. Superior Court (1961)
Section 10800 provides in full: “Subject to the provisions of Section 11050 and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 12000) of Part 3, the administration of public social services in each of the several counties of the state is hereby declared to be a county function and responsibility and therefore rests upon the boards of supervisors in the respective counties pursuant to the applicable laws, and in the case of public social services for which federal or state funds are provided, subject to the regulations of the department.
“For the purpose of providing for and carrying out this function and responsibility, the board of supervisors of each county, or other agency as may be otherwise provided by county charter, shall establish a county department, unless otherwise provided by the county charter. Except as provided herein, the county department shall be the county agency for the administration of public social services and for the promotion of public understanding of the public social services provided under this code and the problems with which they deal.”
Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, petitioners’ status as elected members of a county board of supervisors does not insulate them from the force of all court orders or preclude the entry of a judgment of contempt against them. It is by now well established, of course, that administrative functions of a board of supervisors are not immune from judicial process and may be mandated or enjoined (see, e.g., Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975)
Although petitioners did not raise the argument before the superior court, they now briefly maintain that the Cooper v. Obledo case was, in part, incorrectly decided; petitioners contend that the portion of the judgment implementing this court’s unanimous decision in Brian is erroneous under the subsequent United States Supreme Court decision in Burns v. Alcala (1975)
Section 10605 provides.in full: “If the director considers a- county director to be failing, in a substantial manner, to comply with any provision of this code or any regulation, pertaining to the administration of aid, the director shall put the county director on written notice to that effect, and shall give a copy of the notice to the board of
“If within 60 days the county director fails to give reasonable assurance that he is complying and will continue to comply with the laws and regulations, the director shall order the county to appear at a hearing, before the director, with the State Benefits and Services Advisory Board, to show cause why the director should not take action to secure compliance. The county shall be given at least 30 days’ notice of such hearing. The director shall consider the case on the record established at the hearing, and the advice of the State Benefits and Services Advisory Board, and, within 30 days, shall render proposed findings and a proposed decision on the issues. The proposed findings and decision shall be submitted to the county, and the county shall have an opportunity to appear within 10 days at such time and place as may be fixed by the director, for the purpose of presenting oral arguments respecting the proposed findings and decision. Thereupon the director shall make his final findings and decision.
“If the director determines that there is a failure on the part of the county to comply with the provisions of this code or the established regulations, or if the State Personnel Board certifies to the director that a county is not in conformity with established merit system standards under Part 2.5 (commencing with Section-19800) of Division 5 of Title 2 of the Government Code, and that administrative sanctions are necessary to secure compliance, the director may invoke any of the following sanctions:
“(a) Withhold part or all of state and federal funds from such county until the county shall make a showing to the director of compliance; or
“(b) Assume, temporarily, direct responsibility for the administration of any or all state-assisted aid programs in such county until the county shall provide reasonable assurance to the director of its intention and ability to comply with such laws and regulations. During such period of state administrative responsibility for county programs, the director or his authorized representative shall have all of the powers and responsibilities of the county director,, with the exception that he shall not be subject to the authority of the board of supervisors; or
• “(c) Bring an action in mandamus or such other action in court as may be appropriate to compel compliance. Any such action shall be entitled to a preference in setting a date for a hearing.
“Nothing in this section shall be construed as relieving the board of supervisors of the responsibility to provide funds necessary for the continued aid required by law.
“Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as preventing a county from seeking judicial review of action taken by the secretary pursuant to this section under Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or except in cases arising under Sections 10962 and 10963, from seeking injunctive relief when deemed appropriate.”
Some time after the present contempt judgments were entered, the Director of Benefit Payments promulgated regulations to allow him to invoke sanctions pursuant to section 10605 whenever a county refuses to obey a court judgment. The subsequent establishment of this remedy has no effect on the present case, of course, for a party is not required to exhaust a remedy that was not in existence at the time the action was filed. (See Eve Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967)
Petitioners, relying on broad statements in some earlier cases to the effect that “no intendments or presumptions can be indulged in aid” of a judgment of contempt (e.g., Hotaling v. Superior Court, supra,
On several occasions, the court specifically noted that “this is not a civil case; this is a quasi criminal [matter].”
The affidavit filed by petitioners’ attorney states in relevant part; “Judge Shreck concluded by stating that he was going to apply the civil standard of proof, a preponderance of the evidence, to the contempt proceeding.”
The three affidavits filed by the attorneys of the real parties in interest state in relevant part: (1) “Judge Shreck stated that on the basis of the exhibits and testimony received in evidence, he was prepared to find the petitioners guilty of contempt under either the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ or the ‘preponderance of evidence’ burden of proof rule of evidence.” (2) “[Petitioners’ counsel] then stated that he was concerned that
The record reflects that the refusal to comply with the court order at issue here was simply part of a larger, general policy of the Plumas County Board of Supervisors to refuse to participate in any federally or state-mandated welfare program. The record contains a copy of an official resolution unanimously adopted by the Plumas County Board of Supervisors on May 27, 1975, two months prior to the issuance of the Cooper v. Obledo judgment. That resolution states:
“Whereas, the economic condition of Plumas County is very depressed, and Whereas, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the taxpayers of Plumas County to support various Federal and State mandated programs by paying taxes out of their meager incomes, and Whereas, it is likewise increasingly difficult to adjust tax rates due to restrictions in the amounts that may be taxed which have been placed on counties such as Plumas by the State of California and Whereas, one of the largest State and Federal mandated programs from a tax standpoint is the sbcial services operations of the Plumas County Welfare Department, and Whereas, it appears to this Board of Supervisors that the only way to present a workable budget is to eliminate the County’s financial participation in said social services programs, Now, therefore, be it resolved, that effective July 1, 1975, Plumas County will no longer participate financially with the State and Federal Government in any social services programs mandated by the State or Federal Government.”
In the instant case public officials testified that sufficient funds were present in the county’s budget to cover the cost of retroactive welfare payments mandated in Cooper v. Obledo, and on the basis of such testimony the court had little difficulty in finding that the county possessed the ability to comply with the court order. The strong showing made in the instant case, however, is by no means a prerequisite to a finding of contempt. In City of Vernon v. Superior Court, supra,
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent.
My dissenting opinion in Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975)
“I am compelled to make an embarrassing inquiry. How do my learned colleagues propose to enforce their order? [H] Naturally it is to be hoped that all good citizens will accept a final judicial determination of their rights and duties. But let us assume arguendo that the Glendale City Councilmen are intransigent, that they steadfastly refuse to vote to repeal [the offending ordinance] and to adopt another salary ordinance in its stead. Are my colleagues prepared to cite the entire legislative body for contempt of their order?”
The foregoing is no longer mere rhetoric; it now assumes monumental pragmatic proportions. The majority respond to my query about violating the separation of powers in the affirmative: they are indeed prepared to se.nd an entire legislative body to jail for noncompliance with a judicial order. Yesterday, in Glendale, it was a city council. Today it is a county board of supervisors. Tomorrow the state Legislature?
In Glendale the city council had a moral obligation to comply with an agreement made with representatives of municipal employees. Here the supervisors, out of respect for the judicial process upon which our form of government depends, have an equally clear moral obligation to comply with the directives of California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian (1974)
However misguided the actions of the Plumas County board may be and however the supervisors’ intransigence contributes to immobilizing orderly governmental processes, such persuasive moral imperatives do not invest the judiciary with the power to breach the wall of separation of powers. We simply cannot direct a legislative body to adopt a statute or
I find nothing in the circumstances of this proceeding to justify carving out an exception to the venerable doctrine of separation of powers, such as, e.g., when the very ability of the judiciary to function is at stake (see State ex rel. Edwards v. Murray (1976)
It is true, as the majority state, that the trial court judgment in Cooper v. Obledo, the underlying action, directed the named defendants therein and their agents to restore welfare benefits improperly withheld. The significant issue, however, is whether the supervisors, not a party to the action, automatically become agents of Obledo and other state defendants for the purposes of this litigation. In an attempt to bridge the gap the majority cite numerous Welfare and Institutions Code sections, including those relating to state supervision of aid (§ 10603), providing for administration of state welfare laws by county boards of supervisors (§ 10800), and establishment of county welfare directors who shall abide by lawful state directives (§ 10802). None of those sections, assuming they could do so, declare that county supervisors—as distinguished from the county as an entity and county administrators as ministerial officers—become agents of a state bureau head. Indeed, it is utterly incongruous to suggest that elected public officials of one governmental entity can, by, some ipse dixit, be declared agents of an appointed administrative officer of an entirely distinct branch of government, and thus be responsible for compliance with court orders made not to them but to their purported principal.
Authorities cited by the majority are not apposite, and the quotations are loose generalities taken out of context. San Francisco v. Collins (1932)
Admittedly there would be chaos if state welfare programs, such as those involved in Brian and Cooper, could be ignored or emasculated by the perversity of individual county administrators. The Legislature anticipated this untoward possibility in the adoption of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10605 (see ante, pp. 910-911, fn. 8 of majority opn. for the full text). The section provides for notice to the county director who is remiss, and for a hearing. Thereafter if the county continues its failure to comply with state laws and regulations, the state has three options: first, to withhold state and federal funds from the county; second, to assume direct responsibility for county administration—virtually to place the county in receivership; third, to bring appropriate court action. The court action, it should be noted, is authorized if the state considers a county director to be failing, not the board of supervisors.
Section 10605 does not provide an administrative remedy the exhaustion of which is a condition to judicial jurisdiction over contempt proceedings. But it does indicate there is a way out of an intergovernmental impasse short of resort to the compulsion of a jail sentence. There is, therefore, good reason why under these circumstances courts should abstain from invoking the draconian remedy of contempt against officials of a coordinate branch of government. (See Housing Authority v. City of Los Angeles (1953)
Chief Justice John Marshall said of the Constitution in his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders (1827)
1 would annul the order of contempt.
Clark, J., and Brown (G. A.), J.,
Petitioners’ application for a rehearing was denied. November 3, 1977. Bird, C. J., did not participate therein. Sullivan, J.,
Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
