Vernon Lee ROSE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 05-85-01136-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Dec. 1, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 7, 1987.
We have no reason to believe that the district judge will fail to overrule the plea in abatement with regard to determining parent-child relationship issues upon the receipt of this opinion. For this reason, a preemptive writ of mandamus will be issued only in the event that the trial judge should not proceed to take jurisdiction for determining matters involving the parent-child relationship as anticipated. The writ of mandamus is conditionally granted.
Kerry P. Fitzgerald, Dallas, for appellant.
John Nation, Dallas, for appellee.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
STEWART, Justice.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, and the jury assessed punishment at confinement for life in the Texas Department of Corrections. He contends in two points of error that the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) admitting evidence of extraneous offenses occurring at the time of appellant‘s arrest; and (2) charging the jury on the law of parole pursuant to
The sufficiency of the evidence is not disputed. It shows that on the afternoon of October 17, 1984, appellant and two other men entered complainant‘s textile company in Dallas, robbed him at gunpoint, and left him tied up on the floor. Appellant took complainant‘s pistol and approximately $160 in cash. Shortly before noon, eight days later, Officer Reno was at an apartment complex in Ennis when he saw a goldish-yellow Pontiac Sunbird that the police were seeking. He observed appellant and his companion, George Fitch, Jr., get
I. EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES
Appellant‘s first point of error complains of the trial court‘s admission of evidence that he assaulted the police officers at the time of his arrest. He contends that these extraneous offenses are irrelevant to any material issue in the case at bar and also that the inflammatory and prejudicial potential of this evidence clearly outweighs any relevancy value that the evidence may have had. Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). We disagree. The State is entitled to prove the circumstances surrounding a defendant‘s arrest, unless such evidence is “inherently prejudicial and has no relevance to any issue in the case.” Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). The issue on appeal is whether the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in admitting the evidence. Hernandez v. State, 484 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
Appellant‘s possession of the stolen pistol at the time of his arrest connects him to the aggravated robbery under prosecution. In addition, evidence of appellant‘s escape from custody and flight to avoid arrest is admissible to prove his guilt of the offense charged. Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). We conclude that appellant‘s assault on the police officers was part and parcel of appellant‘s flight. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence proof that appellant assaulted two police officers. We overrule appellant‘s first ground of error.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PAROLE LAW CHARGE
Having overruled appellant‘s first point of error, we must address the constitutional issue he raises. Appellant contends in his second point of error that
Appellant concedes that he failed to object to the trial court‘s parole law and good conduct time instructions; consequently, he necessarily contends that giving these instructions to the jury at the punishment phase constitutes fundamental error. Fundamental error in the court‘s charge is error so egregiously harmful that it deprives defendant of a fair and impartial trial. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (On State‘s Motion for Rehearing). Because a contention of fundamental error incorporates a defendant‘s due process rights as guaranteed by
With respect to the separation of powers argument, it is clear that this statute and these instructions potentially offend only the governmental powers of the State of Texas. Therefore, we overrule appellant‘s contention that the instructions violate the separation of powers doctrine of the United States Constitution.
Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the sentence imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-third of the sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than six years, he must serve at least two years before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities.
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant.
You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the presumption that the statute is constitutional. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Courts should seek an interpretation that supports the constitutionality of legislation. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Before a court can set aside a statute, its validity must clearly be unsupported by a reasonable intendment or allowable presumption. Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Courts should not assume that the legislature would intend an unreasonable result if the statute is capable of a construction that would prevent such a result. Wade v. State, 572 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Courts will not declare an act unconstitutional unless it is clearly made to appear in its enactment that the legislature has exceeded its powers. Lyle v. State, 80 Tex.Cr. 606, 193 S.W. 680 (1917).
With these principles in mind, we address the separation of powers issue under the Texas Constitution.
Moreover, the parole laws themselves were not the legislative concern; rather, the legislature sought to address and remedy the problem of jury discussion of the parole laws. The legislative history to
Background information
There has been an outcry from public citizens serving as jurors that the sentences that have been handed down have differentiated greatly from the sentences actually served. Jurors have indicated in some instances that they were recommending even longer sentences in order to compensate for the time which would be knocked off the sentence by the combination of good time credit and eligibility for parole.
Problem(s) that the bill addresses:
Public citizens serving as jurors from across the State have indicated that they need to be informed that the defendant may, but will not necessarily, be incarcerated for the full length of the sentence imposed; and the guidelines that are used to reduce the sentences through parole and good time credit.
HOUSE COMM. ON JURISPRUDENCE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex.S.B. 37, 69th Leg. (1985). The instructions mandated by
Appellant contends that the instruction enables and encourages the jury to apply the parole law in assessing punishment. It has long been held that jury application of the parole laws when assessing a defendant‘s punishment is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, because the application of the parole law was left exclusively to the executive branch. Scaling v. State, 499 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Meyers v. State, 418 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Crim.App.1967); Moore v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 182, 346 S.W.2d 349 (1961). Appellant complains that giving the jury the precise parole formula theoretically provides them the information necessary to calculate and assess a sentence that thwarts the effect of the parole laws. However, in the final analysis, we must read the statute as written.
These instructions explicitly order the jury not to consider the parole law and good conduct time in assessing punishment for the individual defendant on trial. Appellate courts must presume that the jury follows the trial court instructions. Ainsworth v. State, 517 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Chief Justice Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court has stated, “The rule—indeed, the premise upon which the system of jury trials func-
To conclude that jurors will fail to comprehend the court‘s explanation that eligibility for parole does not guarantee parole and that no accurate prediction can be made as to how good conduct time or parole may be applied to a particular defendant is an assumption we are unwilling to make. Further, to conclude that jurors are likely to disregard the court‘s instruction not to consider the award or forfeiture of good conduct time nor how “the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant,” would, in our opinion, be an indictment against the integrity of individual jurors and the jury system itself. We refuse to become a party to any such indictment.
Patton v. State, 717 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth, 1986) (emphasis original). We approve both observations.
Appellant has not alleged that the jury discussed, much less applied, the parole laws here. Even if he did, it would be the jury‘s misconduct in failing to obey the instruction, not
In addition, appellant contends that the instructions enable the judicial branch to encroach upon the legislative as well as the executive branch by authorizing the jury to adjust the statutory range of punishment. Because the statutory range of punishment for any particular crime is set out explicitly, a sentence greater or less than the statutory range would be readily recognized by the court as error and no violation of the separation of powers doctrine would occur. Consequently, we assume appellant is contending that a jury, by applying the parole law, eliminates the lower range of punishment—e.g., where the statutory range is ten years to life, the jury adjusts the range to thirty years to life. We are not persuaded. Whether jurors will secretly use the parole law formula in assessing punishment is a matter of pure conjecture. Only if the necessary effect of this instruction is unconstitutional should we rule it unconstitutional. The mere possibility of jury misconduct stemming from an unconstitutional use of the information provided in the charge is not sufficient to render the statute itself unconstitutional. Statutes should be upheld unless clearly unconstitutional, and this Court cannot indulge in conjecture to determine otherwise. See Judkins v. Robinson, 109 Tex. 6, 160 S.W. 955 (1913). We hold that the legislature did not exceed its constitutional powers over parole when it enacted
Appellant also contends that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because the instructions are self-contradictory and misleading in that they require the jurors to distinguish between the existence of the parole law in general terms and the manner of its application to the case of an individual defendant. There is nothing inherently contradictory or confusing about this distinction or the way it is described in the statute. We must not underestimate the ability of the average juror. The final instruction is no more complex or abstract than other portions of the charge in a criminal case, e.g., the application of the law to the facts. We hold that the required jury instructions present no irreconcilable conflict—they clearly tell the jury “not to con-
Appellant also argues that instructions are given to aid the jury in applying the law to the facts, but here there are no admissible facts to which parole law applies. The giving of admonitory instructions by the trial court, in order to discourage jury misconduct, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. York v. State, 566 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Guarding against the jury‘s consideration of parole falls within this rule. O‘Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). Nor does anything in the Texas Constitution, either express or implied, prohibit the legislature from enacting a law requiring a judge to give the jury a particular instruction on parole and good time. In fact, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure includes other sections that provide for mandatory jury instructions, e.g.,
Experience has shown that although instructed not to discuss or consider the parole laws when assessing punishment, juries have sometimes speculated upon and attempted to apply the parole law in the punishment phase. Judge Clinton of the Texas Court of Appeals proposed a solution to this problem:
Let us accept that jurors are reasonable and sensible persons who can be trusted to follow their oath and instructions from the trial court when they are made to understand the reason they are not to discuss parole.
.... It follows that jurors would be better informed and equipped to remove operation of parole laws from consideration during their deliberations if and when they are given a common sense reason for doing so. And the most practical reason from the perspective of a layman is that no one in this state can predict when an inmate will be released on parole, or whether one will ever be released on parole at all!
Keady v. State, 687 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (emphasis original). The legislature apparently reached the same conclusion as Judge Clinton when it determined that the jury should be given the correct law and should be told why they could not consider it in determining punishment. We hold that aiding the jury in understanding why they are prohibited from considering how the parole law may be applied is a proper subject for the court‘s instruction. O‘Bryan, 591 S.W.2d 464; York, 566 S.W.2d 936.
Appellant also argues that the trial court committed fundamental error when it submitted the jury instructions of parole under
The parole instructions given to the jury were based on
This inconsistency in the statute was apparently due to legislative oversight. During the 69th Legislative Session,
We hold that appellant was not denied a fair and impartial trial or due process of law by the mere submission of these instructions to the jury. Therefore, no error is presented.
The judgment is affirmed.
GUITTARD, C.J., and AKIN, STEPHENS, VANCE, DEVANY and MCCLUNG, JJ., join in this opinion.
SCALES, J., concurs in the majority opinion only to the extent that he concurs in the result.
WHITHAM, J., files a dissenting and concurring opinion in which HOWELL, MCCRAW, HOLLINGSWORTH and MITCHELL, JJ., join.
MCCRAW, J., files a dissenting and concurring opinion.
SCALES, J., files a concurring opinion.
HOWELL, J., files a dissenting opinion.
WHITHAM, Justice, dissenting and concurring.
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence proof that appellant assaulted two police officers. Therefore, I concur that we overrule appellant‘s first point of error. I disagree, however, with the majority in its disposition of appellant‘s second point of error. Thus, I respectfully dissent for the reasons below. Consequently, I would sustain appellant‘s second point of error and reverse and remand.
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court committed fundamental error during the punishment hearing when it submitted instructions to the jury on the law of parole. Appellant‘s second point of error involves constitutional issues. It is well settled that the constitutionality of a statute will not be determined in any case unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the case in which the issue is raised. Smith v. State, 658 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Since I find no merit in appellant‘s first point of error, I must address the issue of the constitutionality of
Separation of Powers
At the punishment phase of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury as follows pursuant to
Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the sentence imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-third of the sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than six years, he must serve at least two years before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities.
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant.
You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.
Regulation of Parole
Regulation of Good Conduct Time
Pursuant to
Separation of Powers
With this background, I reach the separation of powers issue. At the outset, I emphasize what the present case does not involve. The present case does not involve jury misconduct in discussing the parole laws. Therefore, we do not have before us the precise questions ably and forcefully addressed by the majority and dissenting opinions in Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Instead, we must decide whether, under the Constitution of the State of Texas, the trial court can advise the jury of certain aspects of the parole and good time laws, including time computations for eligibility for parole, then tell the jury that they may consider the existence of these aspects of those laws and yet order them not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to appellant.
From the Constitution of the State of Texas, we know that the people of Texas have divided the powers of government of the State of Texas into three departments. We know also that these three departments are the legislative, the executive and the judicial and that none of these departments can exercise any power assigned by the constitution to either of the others. As commanded by the people of Texas in
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.
The Legislature shall by law establish a Board of Pardons and Paroles and shall require it to keep record of its actions and the reasons for its actions. The Legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws.
In all criminal cases, except treason and impeachment, the Governor shall have power, after conviction, on the written signed recommendation and advice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, or a majority thereof, to grant reprieves and commutations of punishment and pardons; and under such rules as the Legislature may prescribe, and upon the written recommendation and advice of a majority of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, he shall have the power to remit fines and forfeitures. The Governor shall [have] the power to grant one reprieve in any capital case for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days; and he shall have power to revoke conditional pardons. With the advice and consent of the Legislature, he may grant reprieves, commutations of punishment and pardons in cases of treason.
The majority seizes on the language of
The decision to parole, if and when made, is beyond the province of the courts (except, of course, complaints of denial of constitutional or statutory rights in consideration for parole may be raised by petition of the courts, e.g., by habeas corpus) and therefore of the jury, and is exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government, under proper regulation by
Heredia, 528 S.W.2d at 853, n. 4 (emphasis added). Thus, decisions with respect to parole are exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government. Therefore, the majority errs in holding that the present language of
You are further instructed that in determining the punishment in this case, you are not to discuss among yourselves how long the defendant will be required to serve any sentence you decide to impose. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Governor of the State of Texas and are no concern of yours.
(Emphasis added). I must insist that the majority is wrong in holding that the executive branch is divested of any power with respect to parole by the present language of
Moreover, I am not alone in my conclusion that decisions with respect to parole are exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government. In Williams v. State, 461 P.2d 997 (Okla.Crim.App.1969), the highest court of Oklahoma with criminal jurisdiction held a statute requiring trial courts to instruct the jury on parole law to be unconstitutional under the separation of powers provision of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. In the language of the Oklahoma court:
The State of Oklahoma, by and through its Attorney General, has filed a Petition for Rehearing in the above styled and numbered cause on the grounds that this Court, in its opinion, failed to pass on the constitutionality of 57 O.S.Supp.1969, § 138. In this contention the Attorney General is correct, and to make it crystal clear that an instruction should not be given under the provisions of 57 O.S. Supp.1969, § 138, nor should the District Attorney argue it as a part of his closing remarks to the jury, we specifically hold that the provisions of the statute making it mandatory for the court to give such an instruction is in violation of Article 4, Section 1, of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the some [sic] providing: “The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.”
Williams, 461 P.2d at 1001. Consider also, albeit dicta, the concern of the court in United States v. Scott, 793 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.1986) as to separation of powers in the federal system. “We have grave doubts whether the grant of judicial power in Article III of the Constitution extends to the relief granted by the district court in this case: Article II of the Constitution confers upon the President—the holder of executive power in our constitutional scheme—the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States.” Scott, 793 F.2d at 118.
Indeed, in the present case the State appears to concede that decisions with respect to parole are exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government. The State, however, insists that no separation of powers problem exists. First, the State argues that to allow jurors to consider the existence of parole and good conduct presents no constitutional problem because the existence of these factors is common knowledge among jurors. I disagree. I am unwilling to hold that asserted “common knowledge” of citi-
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-third of the sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than six years, he must serve at least two years before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
[S]usceptible of but one construction, that being ... a revolt by the jury against the commutation and good-behavior laws of this state and a denial to this appellant of the rights given him by those laws.
Salcido v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 173, 319 S.W.2d 329, 334 (1959) (Davidson, J., dissenting). I conclude that the immediately above-quoted instruction directed by
Furthermore, for reasons that follow, I cannot agree that the final directed instruction of
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the
manner in which the parole law may be applied to the particular defendant.
(Emphasis added). I am at a loss to understand how jurors are expected to distinguish between considering the existence of the parole law and the manner of application of the parole law. For the reasons I discuss below concerning a fair and impartial trial, I conclude that to instruct jurors to distinguish between existence of the parole law and application of the parole law creates an irreconcilable conflict and that this irreconcilable conflict misleads jurors as a matter of law. Indeed, the fact that the instructions so mislead the jurors illustrates the evil inherent in attempting to devise a scheme accommodating public outcry against the parole laws of this State. I cannot accept fiction and subterfuge to circumvent the Constitution of the State of Texas as it requires separation of powers. Consequently, I would hold that
Substantive Due Process—A Fair and Impartial Trial
Certainly one of the basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been to protect a person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that the courts must enforce. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966) (emphasis added).
The majority treats appellant‘s contention that he was deprived of due process under the
You are further instructed that in determining the punishment in this case, you are not to discuss among yourselves how long the defendant will be required to serve any sentence you decide to impose. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Governor of the State of Texas and are no concern of yours.
(Emphasis added).
The instructions that are eventually delivered to the jury should be clear, succinct, unambiguous and free from internal contradictions. Perkins v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 415, 37 S.W.2d 163, 164 (1931); McElwee v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 445, 165 S.W. 927, 928-29 (1914); Bennett v. State, 75 S.W. 314, 316-17 (Tex.Cr.App.1903);
I conclude that to instruct jurors that they may consider the existence of the parole law and thereafter instruct jurors that the parole law is not their concern, creates an irreconcilable conflict and that this irreconcilable conflict misleads jurors as a matter of law. Moreover, I conclude that to instruct jurors to distinguish between the existence of the parole law and the application of the parole law also creates an irreconcilable conflict and that this irreconcilable conflict misleads jurors as a matter of law. Consequently, I agree with appellant that the instructions given on the parole law are confusing and internally contradictory. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court‘s charge on the parole law denied appellant a fair and impartial trial on the punishment issues in violation of
Disposition
Finding trial court error, I reach the question of whether the error constitutes reversible error. I recognize that Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) instructs that whether objection to the charge was made or fundamental error claimed “the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Appellant did not object to the charge on any grounds. Thus, appellant asserts fundamental error. Fundamental error is error so egregious and creates such harm that an accused has not had a fair and impartial trial—in short “egregious harm.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Thus, we have two basic questions. First, whether anything conspicuously bad happened to appellant because the trial
Assaying the actual degree of harm in light of the entire jury charge alone, I conclude that the actual degree of harm to appellant requires that we reverse the trial court‘s judgment. In addressing the first basic question, I consider the consequences that must follow the effort to circumvent the separation of powers doctrine contained in the Constitution of the State of Texas. It is well established that under
In addressing the second basic question, I consider the consequences that must follow the confusing and internally contradictory charge on the parole law. Assaying the actual degree of harm in light of the entire jury charge alone, I conclude that the actual degree of harm to appellant
For the reasons expressed, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
HOWELL, MCCRAW, HOLLINGSWORTH and MITCHELL, JJ., join in this opinion.
SCALES, Justice, concurring.
For the reasons expressed in Justice Whitham and Justice McCraw‘s opinions, I would hold that
In Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
We hold that finding error in the court‘s charge begins—not ends—the inquiry; the next step is to make an evidentiary review along the lines of that described above in Davis, supra, as well as a review of any other part of the record as a whole which may illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused.
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To the extent that it holds any charge error requires “automatic” reversal, Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) is overruled, as are all other opinions inconsistent herewith.
Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174 (emphasis added). The court held that where there is no objection to the charge submitted to the jury, the appellant must show that he suffered egregious harm to obtain a reversal. Id. at 171. Consequently, because appellant did not object to the jury charge given in the present case, the trial court‘s charge does not constitute reversible error unless appellant can show that the charge caused him to suffer actual and egregious harm.
There is no evidence before us that the jury applied the parole information contained in the court‘s charge in assessing appellant‘s punishment. In light of Almanza, I will not speculate as to the actual effect, if any, that the parole information contained in the court‘s charge had on the jury‘s assessment of punishment against appellant. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174 (harm resulting from jury charge error must be actual and not just theoretical) (emphasis added). Rather, I would hold that appellant must affirmatively demonstrate, in the record, that the parole information actually affected the jury‘s assessment of punishment against him. See Lawrence v. State, 700 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (“[b]y failing to object
MCCRAW, Justice, dissenting and concurring.
I join in Justice Whitham‘s dissenting and concurring opinion. I, too, would hold that the mandatory jury instructions required by
I. Separation of Powers
A constitutional problem arises when the State executive or legislative branches interfere in a field that is constitutionally committed to the control of the courts.
It is mandatory under
II. Due Process
A fundamental principle of due process requires that a jury‘s verdict be based on evidence received in open court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); U.S. v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978). Although
This statutory instruction scheme created by the Texas legislature requires the courts to charge on good time and the parole law, allows jury consideration during deliberation, while statutorily prohibiting the defendant from introducing evidence on the operations of these laws. Such a statute allows a jury verdict to be based upon mandated law rather than upon evidence presented. I would hold that this is an unconstitutional infringement upon the appellant‘s due process rights and precludes a fair and impartial trial.
Since appellant‘s punishment was assessed by a procedure authorized by an unconstitutional statute, I would reverse this case and remand for new trial.
HOWELL, Justice, dissenting.
The heart of the constitutional infirmity in the statute under attack,
If there were a legitimate need for jurors to have these tools in hand, the statute might survive the challenge leveled at it by this appellant and by others similarly situated. However, the statute on its face admits the lack of any legitimate need to arm a criminal jury with this information for the statute itself requires a trial court, after charging a jury upon the provisions of the clemency laws, to further charge the jury, in effect: “Now that you have been advised of the particulars of the clemency laws, disregard them.”
The incongruity astounds. How can a statute possess social utility when it mandates the giving of a charge which must be disregarded? The offending statute contains a built-in legislative admission that the very information which it requires to be delivered to every criminal jury is wholly unnecessary to enable that jury to carry out its constitutional function.
The legislative admission of irrelevance is reinforced by the legislative history quoted by the majority (slip op. at 11). Was the statute really adopted to quell “outcry from public citizens serving as jurors“? Public outcry is the law of the lynch mob. Constitutional law is the bulwark that substitutes due process for public outcry.
Of course, if the underlying concern of jurors and citizens, as expressed (i.e., that prisoners are not serving a sufficient part of the sentences imposed) has validity, the Legislature has ample power under the Constitution to address that evil. Reduce good time credits! Those credits are fixed by statute and they may be enlarged or reduced, almost without limit, by the very body politic which promulgated them. Likewise, with parole eligiblity minimums. If they are too low, increase them!!
Assume that the problem really exists and that prisoners are not serving a sufficient part of their sentences. Assume that the majority is correct in its child-like declaration of faith in the proposition that every jury will inevitably perform exactly as instructed. It follows that the Legislature has addressed the problem in a wholly irrational manner because it has decreed that juries be instructed to disregard the problem; and, assuming fidelity to those instructions, the problem has been left wholly unresolved. The Legislature has heeded the clamor of the mob; it has cast an ineffectual placebo into the public arena; it has quelled the outcry but avoided an effective solution; it has committed legislative cowardice.
Assume on the other hand that Justice Whitham is correct in his dissenting proposition that juries are composed of fallible humans, that the statute contains an insidious invitation to offset the clemency laws, and that certain juries and certain jurors will heed that invitation and mete out increased sentences; the inevitable result is that those defendants tried before juries who are mindful of their instructions will escape proper punishment. Only those
Another hypothesis predicates that the existing statutory scheme of clemency laws is just and the administration thereof by the Board of Pardons and Paroles has been proper. As a matter of fact, there is a strong presumption to this effect until the contrary be shown. In such instance, the parole instruction statute here under challenge possesses the clear tendency to visit excessive punishment upon the accused wherever the admonition to disregard is not heeded. Under any hypothesis, the irrationality of the statute cannot be escaped.
Of course, the Legislature has the power to adopt clemency laws and to regulate the actions of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. However, the power to regulate does not encompass the power to abolish because that agency is a creature of the Constitution. Likewise, within limits the legislative power exists to regulate the courts and to fix the attributes of a criminal trial. However, in this entire area of regulation, the Legislature may not act in an arbitrary or irrational manner because it is creating restrictions upon the most basic of all freedoms—human liberty.
One power which the Legislature may not deny to the Board is the power to exercise its discretion—to apply the law to the facts of a specific case. Assume that the Board, in the exercise of its discretion, denies parole to a prisoner of some notoriety. May the Legislature thereafter adopt a statute declaring that John Henry Jones is hereby placed upon parole? Would the statute not be a gross invasion of the separation of powers—a direct usurpation of the Board‘s most fundamental function, the exercise of discretion, the application of the law to the specific case?
That which may not be done directly may not be done indirectly. The statute under attack contains a legislative decree that juries shall be provided with tools that are specifically designed to invade the discretion of the Board. The fact that juries are to be admonished not to use those tools does not obscure the fact that the tools are being furnished. The opportunity and the means to offset the clemency laws is being placed before every criminal jury in this state. It matters little whether or not the overwhelming majority of jurors will resist the obvious temptation to add a little extra to the sentence “to make sure that the defendant doesn‘t get out too soon.” The mischievous element of the statute—temptation—still persists. The mere fact that juries are being equipped with tools adequate to interfere with the discretion of the Board, coupled with the ever-present element of human temptation, particularly in view of the fact that juries have no significant need for such tools, constitutes a direct invasion of the constitutionally separate powers of the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
I dissent for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Justice Whitham and for the further reasons expressed herein. The statute must fall. The case must be reversed and remanded for new trial.
Vester RICHIE, et ux., Appellants, v. RANCHLANDER NATIONAL BANK, et al., Appellees.
No. 14575.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.
Dec. 3, 1986.
Rehearing Denied March 11, 1987.
