OPINION
This is an appeal from a conviction for the possession of marihuana. The punishment was assessed by the jury at niney-nine years.
The sufficiency of thе evidence is not challenged. The record reflects that officers were told by a seventeen-year-old boy that Fred Rose had robbed him. The officers found the appellant, arrested and searched him and seized two matchboxes containing enough marihuana to make eight or tеn cigarettes.
First, it is contended that the trial court erred in refusing to permit appellant’s counsel “to question individually prospective jurors number 18 tо number 33 inclusive.”
The voir dire examination of the jury panel has not been made a part of the *199 record. The questions and answers of two prosрective jurors concerning the range of punishment is included in the record.
Concerning this contention only the following appears in the record:
“THE COURT: Counsel, let’s go to Mr. Baker now, he is No. 34. You will need to question him.
“MR. MILLS: Do what, Judge?
“THE COURT: You have used up your time, but you are going to have to question Mr. Baker. Mr. Baker has not bеen questioned, and I suggest you talk to him.
“MR. MILLS: Is it my understanding that I am not going to be permitted to talk to the rest of the people ?
“THE COURT: We are not going to sit herе all afternoon and listen to these questions, no.
“MR. MILLS : Note my exception to the Court’s ruling in not permitting the Defendant through his counsel to talk with the various mеmbers of the jury panel; that the State was allowed to talk to them. The Defendant by and through his counsel not being able to talk to jurors, from No. 18 down to Nо. 33.
“THE COURT: All right, let the record show that counsel has used one hour and fifteen minutes, and has used thirty minutes since the Court admonished him to hurry along. All right, you can talk to Mr. Bakеr, and then it is all over then, when you get through with Mr. Baker.
“MR. MILLS : All right.
(Whereupon Mr. Mills voir dires Mr. Baker)
“MR. MILLS: All right, Your Honor.”
The objection by appellant’s counsel does not prove itself. Assuming that the statements in the objection are true, there is not enough of the voir dire examination in the record to show the questions asked of prospective jurors as a grоup or what further questions counsel wished to ask. The record is insufficient to reflect error.
Next, it is contended that the court erred in holding that probable cause existed for the arrest of the appellant.
David McDonald of the Dallas Police Department testified that Freddie Jeffries hailed the officers in the patrol car. Out of the presence of the jury Officer McDonald testified that Jeffries reported that he had been robbed by Fred Rose who was then at 1234 Fletcher and described him. Jeffries also stated to Officer McDonald that Rose was about to leave or that hе had possibly left. Officer Sullivan was with McDonald and they then took Jeffries and went to the Fletcher Street address. When the officers went to the house, Willie Fisher came to the door and told the officers that Fred had left. Fisher gave McDonald permission to enter the house. McDonald entered and saw a man fitting the description of Rose that had been given to him by Jeffries. McDonald asked his name and he replied, “Fred Rose.”. At that time Jeffries entered the house, pointed his finger at Rose and said, “That is the man who robbed me.” The subsequent search resulted in the officers finding the marihuana.
Officer McDonald testified that he later learned that Jeffries had reported the robbery the night before. Officer S. L. South-all testified outside the presence of the jury that they received a call to go to the 1100 block of Fletcher Street. There they saw an excited Jeffries who told them about Rose аnd that he would not be at the house very long.
The evidence shows that the report of Jeffries and the arrest of Rose was between 7:00 and 8:00 o’clock on a Friday night. The officers testified that they did not have time to procure a warrant after talking to Jeffries shortly before the arrest.
*200 Article 14.04, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., provides :
“Where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has bеen committed, and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant, such peace offiсer may, without warrant, pursue and arrest the accused.”
The appellant relies upon Vinson v. State,
In Thornton v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
The court did not err in holding that the officers had probable cause to make the arrest. No error has been shown.
Next, complaint is made because the court refused to include an instruction tо the jury on the right to arrest without a warrant.
The appellant cites from Webster v. State,
“ * * * Where the facts relied upon to establish probable cause are uncon-troverted, their sufficienсy is a question of law for the court. Whether such facts exist in any particular case is a question of fact. When the facts are in controversy, the question should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions. * * * ”
This is the correct rule. Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P., provides for such a charge. No witness was called by the aрpellant to controvert the testimony of the officers. The cross-examination did not raise a fact issue on the right to arrest. Therefore, the court did not err in refusing the charge. See Pennington v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
Complaint is made because the trial court admitted into evidence at the penalty stage of the trial records of some five previous convictions. They included two cases of burglary in 1945, burglary in 1949, breaking and entering a coin-operated machine and burglary in 1956.
First, it is contended that the previous convictions were too remote. This Court discussed the. admission of prior сonvictions under Article 37.07, Section 2(b), V.A. C.C.P., in Ingram v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
The fact that the prior judgments and sentenсes were not signed by the judge does not affect the validity of the former convictions. Gutierrez v. State, Tex.Cr.App.,
The admission of the records of рrior convictions was not error.
Lastly, complaint is made of some three different arguments at the penalty stage of the trial in the same ground of error.
Article 40.09, Section 9, V.A.C.C.P., pertaining to appellate briefs in the trial court *201 provides, in part: “This brief shall set forth separately each ground of error of which defendant desires to complain on appeal.”
Complaints concerning several different arguments in one ground cannot be considered on appeal. Flanagan v. State, Tex.Cr. App.,
If the • arguments were properly before us, no reversible error would be shown.
No reversible error appears in the record. The judgment is affirmed.