delivered the Opinion of the Court.
William Newton Rose (Rose) appeals a September 13,1991 opinion and order of the Third Judicial District, Powell County, which dis *348 missed his petition for declaratory judgment requesting that he be designated a nondangerous offender for parole eligibility purposes. We affirm.
We rephrase the issues presented on appeal as follows:
Did the District Court err when it determined that Rose could not be designated as nondangerous and therefore must serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole under § 95-2206.16, R.C.M. (1947)?
Rose was convicted by a jury of burglary in 1978. At the time he committed this offense, he was оn parole. The District Court sentenced Rose to twenty-five years imprisonment and held thаt he was ineligible for parole “because of his (Defendant’s) past criminal recоrd and his conduct while released on parole or furlough,” under § 95-2206(3)(b), R.C.M. (1947).
In 1984, the Sentence Reviеw Board amended Rose’s sentence to ten years for burglary and fifteen years for bеing a persistent felony offender, these sentences to run consecutively, and remоved his designation of being ineligible for parole.
Both the original sentence and amended sentence were silent as to whether Rose was to be designated as a nondangerous offender. Because neither sentence designated him as nondangerous, Montana Prison Warden Jack McCormick (McCormick) determined that he must serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole under § 95-2206.16, R.C.M. (1947).
In February 1991, Rose pеtitioned the District Court for declaratory judgment alleging that McCormick improperly designаted him as a dangerous offender because he had never been charged nor sеntenced as a dangerous offender. In an opinion and order dated September 13, 1991, the District Court dismissed Rose’s petition holding that because Rose was convicted of two felony offenses in a five-year period, he could not be designated as nondangerous and therefore must serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole under § 95-2206.16(l)(a), R.C.M. (1947).
Thereafter, Rose filed an objection to the District Court’s opinion and order. The District Court did not rule on Rose’s objection. Rose then filed this apрeal.
Did the District Court err when it determined that Rose could not be designated as nondangеrous and therefore must serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole under § 95-2206.16, R.C.M. (1947)?
*349 In 1978, an offender was required to serve one-half of his or her sentence less good time allowance before becoming eligible for parole. A nondangerous offender designation required an offender to serve one-fourth of his or her sentence less good time allowance before becoming eligible for parole. See § 95-3214(1), R.C.M. (1947).
In 1978, § 95-2206.16, R.C.M. (1947), provided in pertinent part: (1) The sentencing court shall designate an offender a nondangerous offender for purposes of ehgibility for parole under 95-3214 if:
(a) during thе 5 years preceding commission of the offense for which the offender is being sentenсed, the offender was neither convicted of nor incarcerated for an offense committed in this state or any other jurisdiction for which a sentence to a term of imрrisonment in excess of 1 year could have been imposed; or
(b) the court has detеrmined, based on any presentence report and the evidence presented at the trial and the sentencing hearing, that the offender does not represent a substantial danger to other persons or society."
In 1979, an Attorney General Opinion interprеting § 95-2206.16, R.C.M. (1947), then recodified as § 46-23-201(1), MCA, determined that unless an offender is expressly designated as nondаngerous, that offender must serve one-half of his or her sentence before parоle eligibility. 38 Op. Att’y Gen. 33 (1979).
Rose argues that the District Court erred when it failed to designate him as a nondangerous offender because he was never charged nor sentenced as а dangerous offender. He argues that even though § 95-2206.16, R.C.M. (1947) and the 1979 Attorney General Opinion required the court to expressly designate him a nondangerous offender, subsequent amendments to this statute mandate that he now be designated as nondangerous.
We hold that § 95-2206.16, R.C.M. (1947), the statute in еffect at the time of Rose’s sentencing in 1978, is the statute applicable to these facts.
See State v. Gone
(1978),