48003 | Ohio Ct. App. | Nov 13, 1984
This case is before us on the following facts. Plaintiff-appellee, James L. Rose, was working for defendant-employer city of Westlake, on March 3, 1978, when he fell off a city-owned backhoe and suffered injuries to his neck and shoulder. His claim was allowed by the Industrial Commission, and the Bureau of Workers' Compensation paid all of his medical bills including his medication.
On January 2, 1979, plaintiff filed a request for determination of the percentage of permanent partial disability. The district hearing officer found that plaintiff had a twenty-two percent disability due to his injury. The district hearing officer also found that plaintiff could not participate under R.C.
Plaintiff filed an application for reconsideration. The application was denied by a staff hearing officer who affirmed the order of the district hearing officer.
Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to R.C.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. On January 19, 1982, the trial court granted defendants' motion. Plaintiff appealed that decision to this court, Rose v. Connors (Oct. 28, 1982), Cuyahoga App. No. 44988, unreported, in which we held that the trial court did have jurisdiction, and therefore the decision was reversed and the cause remanded for a decision on the constitutional question.
The case was reassigned to Judge Ann Dyke who held that the one hundred percent limitation on permanent partial disability, R.C.
Defendants have appealed this decision and assign the following as error:
"I. Section
"II. Section
"III. The trial court committed prejudicial error in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment by imposing the burden of proof on the defendants in violation of Civil Rule 56.
The court further found that the legislature has in effect created two classes of claimants under the statute, those who can receive a permanent partial disability award and those who cannot, in that they have already received permanent partial disability awards totalling one hundred percent. Although the court recognized that avoiding depletion of the workers' compensation fund is a "compelling government interest as well as a legitimate legislative purpose * * *," it stated that it was "not convinced that the workers' compensation fund will be depleted if judicial enforcement of the limiting provision is refused. * * *"
"In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some `reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification `is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' * * *" Dandridge v. Williams (1970),
The courts of Ohio have consistently applied the "rational basis" test in their analyses of alleged constitutional defects in the workers' compensation statutes. Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corp. (1975),
The concept of equal protection of the law is that "* * * `* * * no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place * * * under like circumstances' * * *."Roth v. Public Employees Retirement Bd. (1975),
The relevant portion of the statute coming under constitutional attack provides:
"No award shall be made under this division based upon a percentage of disability which, when taken with all other percentages of permanent disability, exceeds one hundred per cent. * * *" R.C.
The trial court found that this provision creates two distinct classes of claimants, those who are eligible to receive permanent partial disability benefits for a present injury because awards of permanent partial disability for prior injuries do not total one hundred percent, and those individuals who are not eligible to receive permanent partial disability benefits because they have received permanent partial disability benefits totalling one hundred percent or more due to previous injuries.
Arguably, the operation and ultimate effect of this provision will be that not every claimant will receive the same total percentage of permanent partial disability benefits prior to the invocation of the one hundred percent maximum cut-off. However, there is no way the state could equalize such benefits. The state has, however, applied the one hundred percent maximum to all claimants. In this respect plaintiff is treated no differently than any other person attempting to claim the benefits of the statute.
It cannot be said that there is no rational basis for such a limitation. The state of Ohio has a legitimate interest in maintaining the level of benefits payable to injured workers. The Workers' Compensation Fund is a self-supporting system in that it is funded by employers based upon a percentage of the employer's payroll. To open the state fund to an unlimited amount of permanent partial disability compensation would undermine the actuarial soundness of the system as well as upset the balance between the rights, duties, obligations and benefits of employers and employees.
It must be kept in mind that the workers' compensation systen is a product of a compromise between employers and employees. The court in Allen v. Eastman Kodak Co. (1976),
"The workmen's compensation laws of Ohio may well not be perfection in their attempt to compensate employees for their injuries, but they do indeed provide a reasonably equitable balance between the rights, duties and privileges of both the employee and the employer."
The court in Geduldig v. Aiello (1974),
The United States Supreme Court has also upheld a state administrative regulation which imposed a maximum limit on the total amount of aid which any one family unit could receive in connection with the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, finding too that the maximum grant regulation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Dandridge v.Williams, supra.
The court in Schweiker v. Wilson *303
(1981),
"* * * This Court has granted a `strong presumption of constitutionality' to legislation conferring monetary benefits,Mathews v. De Castro [1976], 429 U.S. [181], at 185, because it believes that Congress should have discretion in deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources. Awarding this type of benefits inevitably involves the kind of line-drawing that will leave some comparably needy person outside the favored circle. We cannot say that it was irrational of Congress, in view of budgetary constraints, to decide that it is the Medicaid recipients in public institutions that are the most needy and most deserving of the small monthly supplement. * * *" (Footnotes omitted.)
This court was faced with an equal protection challenge to the definition of compensable injury in Zaricki v. Laco Die CastingCo., supra. The court, at pages 3-4, found as follows:
"On applying the rational basis test to the challenged legislation and classification, which deny Workers' Compensation benefits for injuries occasioned solely by emotional stress, we find:
"1) The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-supporting nature of the Workers' Compensation fund;
"2) The State has a legitimate interest in distributing the available resources in a manner that keeps benefit payments at an adequate level for injuries that are covered; and
"3) The State has a legitimate concern in maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly burden participating employers."
The trial court herein stated in its opinion that, although avoiding depletion of the Workers' Compensation Fund is a compelling government interest as well as a legitimate legislative purpose, it was not convinced that the Workers' Compensation Fund would actually be depleted were the one hundred percent maximum not to be enforced.
The trial court has misapplied the rational basis test. The question is not one of whether the fund will actually be depleted but whether the legislature could rationally have decided that the one hundred percent limit should be imposed in order to avoid depletion of the fund. The United States Supreme Court inMinnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981),
The court further held, as indicated at paragraph 1(a) of the syllabus, that:
"The Equal Protection Clause does not deny Minnesota the authority to ban one type of milk container conceded to cause environmental problems, merely because another already established type is permitted to continue in use. Whether infact the statute will promote more environmentally desirable milk packaging is not the question. The Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if the Minnesota Legislature could rationally havedecided that its ban on plastic milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives. * * *" (Emphasissic.)
Therefore, there exists a sufficient rational basis to uphold R.C.
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington (1983),
"`* * * Since the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.' Madden v. Kentucky,
The court in State v. Perry (1972),
"In order to successfully challenge the constitutionality of R.C.
Thus, the plaintiff did not meet his burden "to negative every conceivable basis" which might support the statute. The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Appellants' third assignment of error is well-taken.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court declaring R.C.
Judgment reversed.
MARKUS and PRYATEL, JJ., concur.