*1
(Tex.
(no
the County Attorney
County,
El
Paso
Cr.App.1990)
S.W.2d
321-22
against
Judge
provision
retired District
Edward
authorizing
appeal
law
state’s
Marquez (“Respondent”).
cases).
We conditional-
in bond forfeiture
ly grant mandamus relief.
Prior
decisions
this Court also hold
Respondent is a retired former elected bond
are
forfeiture cases
criminal
na-
judge
65th
District Court of El Paso
respondent
ture so the
to
erred
remove
County. He
to sit by assign-
continues
from
pur-
himself
the bond forfeiture cases
ment
the Presiding Judge
made
74.053(b).
Sellers,
to
suant
Section
See
Sixth
Region.
Administrative Judicial
The sitting three involving a similar bond case to an forfeiture cases in the 65th District V.T.C.A., 95-2187, assigned under judge Gov’t Court —cause numbers 74.053(d). Code, The Section surety 95-2193. defendant ob- See v. Lanford jected respondent sitting Appeals, to the in these Fourteenth Court respondent cases. (Tex.Cr.App.1993). The concluded Under our signed bond forfeiture cases civil and reasoning Lanford, are since Section 74.053(b) removing hearing from orders himself afford defendant not V.T.C.A., pursuant these cases to Govern- right” “a surety legal respon- clear to have Code, 74.053(b), pro- ment Section dent remove himself from the bond forfei- assigned hibits an judge hearing from a cases, relator ture then the is entitled to civil party if “a case to civil case files [the] respondent mandamus have relief to a timely objection assignment.” vacate his orders himself from removing Lanford, these cases. Cf. 847 S.W.2d at retired,
The relator assigned claims (relator judge entitled assigned to may a bond forfeiture case not because, pursuant authority among remove to mandamus relief himself other 74.053(b) granted litigants civil in Section respondent state had no “clear things, le- because a bond forfeiture case is criminal. gal right” to remove relator under Section respondent 74.053(d)). relator maintains the vio- duty by lated a ministerial removing him- custom, As is our we withhold issuance self from the bond forfeiture cases op- writ and accord respondent 74.053(b) adequate Section and he has no portunity to conform his actions to this remedy to seek from but mandamus relief Only opinion. if such action is taken this directing respondent Court va- will the writ of mandamus issue. removing cate his orders himself from these cases.
To obtain from mandamus relief (1) Court,
this relator show: usually “clear” right relief when ROSALES, Appellant, Michael F. judicial question conduct violates (2) duty, no adequate “ministerial” remedy at the alleged law redress harm. STATE Texas. Harmon, See Buntion No. 73163. (Tex.Cr.App.1992). The relator meets Texas, required showing the second prong Appeals of Criminal primarily has no right State En Banc. appeal in bond cases. Arti forfeiture See 13, 1999. Oct. (not 44.01(a), V.A.C.C.P., cle authorizing Rehearing Nov. Denied cases);
state appeal bond forfeiture V.A.C.C.P., 44.42, (authorizing Article appeal bond cases); Sellers,
forfeiture State
OPINION McCORMICK, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court which MANSFIELD, KELLER, HOLLAND, *3 KEASLER, JJ., WOMACK and joined. is capital
The offense murder and the sentence is death. Appellant raises seven points of error. We affirm.
Appellant voluntarily confessed mur- elderly dering victim the course of a burglary of apartment. Appellant’s her police confession came after the confronted him photographs bloody with of his cloth- ing. Shortly appellant after the murder apartment went to bed in another apartment complex. Appellant acted sus- piciously during police crime-scene in- vestigation. police He later led bloody weapons murder knife with a —a four-and-a-half-inch blade that was bent upward, a two-pronged kitchen fork with tongs backward, bent bloody pair of pliers. needle-nose A forensic pa- thologist testified the victim died multi- ple patholo- stab wounds the head. The gist testified the twenty- victim suffered wounds, one twenty-eight stab incised or wounds, cut thirty-four cutaneous blunt wounds, injury force thirty-one punc- ture appellant’s wounds. The blood on clothing was with consistent the victim’s blood. Other evidence showed bloody shoes made prints two shoe at the crime scene. point error, his first
claims the is legally insufficient to support his conviction. The evidence out lined to support above is sufficient substantive elements offense. See Malik v.
(Tex.Cr.App.1997) (evidentiary sufficiency against measured “the elements the of Duncan, Jr., Lubbock, David T. ap- fense”). pellant. Appellant nevertheless he claims Jackson, Atty., Wade Asst. Dist. Lub- acquittal to an appellate entitled
bock,
Paul,
Austin,
Atty.,
Matthew
State’s
alleged
the indictment
killed the victim
he
for the State.
“by stabbing
with a
[her]
knife
striking
object-the
[her] with hard
exact
nature of which is
unknown to the
error, appellant
In his second
failed to
prosecution
jury,” and the
assis-
the effective
was denied
“in
claims he
de
grand jury used due
1) his counsel
of counsel because:
tance
alleged
of an
termining the exact nature
”
aon
venire-
strike
peremptory
wasted
Hicks v.
object.’
generally
See
‘hard
challenged
have
he should
member
419, 424 (Tex.Cr.App.
2)
object to the trial
failed to
he
1998):
charge
authorized
court’s
alleges that the
an indictment
“[W]hen
or struck
if
stabbed
convict
inflicting
inju-
manner and means of
victim,
the indictment
whereas
ry
the evidence at trial
is unknown and
proved
guilty
State
weapon
type
not establish
does
struck the victim.
appellant stabbed and
used, prima
showing is
facie
made
disposition
our
*4
weapon
grand
was unknown
one,
is
merit.
the latter claim without
(Citation
However,
Omitted).
if
jury.
reviewing
The standard
object
at trial shows what
evidence
claim is
of counsel
ineffective assistance
injury,
then the
was used to inflict
Washington, 466
v.
set out in Strickland
prove
State must
2052,
668,
U.S.
S.Ct.
attempting
as-
used due
(1984).
Strickland, a defendant
Under
(Citation
weapon
used.
certain
attorney performance
must
deficient
show
Omitted).”
Strickland, 466
prejudice.
prosecution
satisfied the “due
de
687,
requires
This
overruled. through error four points of sev *5 en, appellant complains the trial error, court
In his third appel denying challenges erred in his for cause lant claims was process he denied due four To venirepersons. pre law different the Fifth and Fourteenth issue, appellant serve on this Amendments to the United States error Consti tution and of must to the assistance demonstrate on the record that he counsel under the Sixth and clear specific challenge Fourteenth asserted a for judge Amendments when the trial denied that he used a peremptory chal his motion to view the crime scene with his lenge on complained-of venireperson, Appellant counsel. argues the denial peremptory that all his challenges were his motion him tool denied a basic of his exhausted, that for request his additional defense which would have been available denied, strikes an objectiona was were he not indigent. juror State, jury. ble sat on the Green v. 92, 105 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), The appellant record reflects filed a mo- denied, 1200, 1561, cert. 520 U.S. 117 S.Ct. “requesting
tion
be
he
allowed to ac-
(1997).
record is silent if is harmed living apartment only peremptory former uses a strike to victim’s he go venireperson appellant when asked to there with his remove the and thereafter issue, Carley equivocated supports 1. The State claims on this record this assertion.
233
able,
jurors
“Prospective
be
from the
‘must
suffers a detriment
loss
sense,
both of a situation
to conceive
S.W.2d
strike. Demouchette
731
penalty
denied,
minimum
would be
which the
75,
cert.
482
(Tex.Cr.App.1986),
in which
of a situation
appropriate
3197,
(1987). reflects that Because the record Omitted). (Citation What propriate.’ strikes ad received two extra (citation omitted) meant we stat granted dition to the fifteen to ac- jurors must be able prospective ute, of two he did not suffer loss that, question, cept for the offense Hence, to demon strikes. will legal ap- be punishment minimum error, thus, and, harm reversible
strate circumstances and the some propriate on challenges for cause must show ap- will legal punishment maximum were least three different veniremembers circumstances. propriate some erroneously Penny denied. words, jurors prospective must be other denied, (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. respect mind with keep open able L.Ed.2d 116 S.Ct. hear the evi- punishment until (1995); Martinez being tried.” dence in the case cert. denied, (Tex.Cr.App.1988), during question- The record shows (1994). defense coun- venireperson by ing sel, Mojica asked if he “would have counsel error, his fourth sitting you’re where problems his for cause appellant asserts murder, which asked to consider the lesser juror Mojica prospective Manuel against five [sentence] carries bottom Mojica granted should have been that he would years?” Mojica responded stated that he could not consider certain *6 have with scenario. problem not a mitigating. of evidence to be This types thereafter, Shortly defense counsel asked held on numerous Court has occasions Mojica giving could consider five- he entitled to voir dire not felony for the of year sentence offense jurors on whether could prospective “No, proba- Mojica responded, murder and types particular mitigating consider of evi court, by Upon not.” bly questioning during capital sentencing phase. dence could consider Mojica confirmed See, State, e.g., Raby S.W.2d punishment. full Given the range — denied, cert. (Tex.Cr.App.1998), answers, the trial judge veniremember’s -, 119 S.Ct. denying not abuse his discretion (1998). Furthermore, if a does allow on this is- cause appellant’s juror questions prospective Johnson, at 405-406. sue. partic states that he would not consider four overruled. Point mitigating, that type ular of evidence as pro- submits point, In his fifth juror be removed for prospective cannot juror Jo Ann was chal- spective Womack Hence, on that the trial cause basis. Id. would be able to lengeable because she appellant’s overruled chal properly court types of evidence consider certain Mojica on this issue. lenge appellant was not en- Because mitigating. types questions, these titled to ask asserts that Mo- overruling appel- did not err trial court he could
jica
challengeable on this basis.
challenge for cause
lant’s
range
punishment
full
not consider the
See,
at 3. Point of
e.g., Raby, 970 S.W.2d
trial,
In a
both
offenses.
criminal
of lesser
error five is overruled.
the defendant and
State have
the trial court did not
full
Because we hold
jurors
range
believe in the
to have
who
of the
regarding
its
two
abuse
discretion
punishment.
Johnson
challenges, appellant
eomplained-of
four
(Tex.Cr.App.1998).
S.W.2d
cannot show harm on appeal. Penry, su-
doubt be taken
having
some as
prece-
Therefore,
pra.
we need not address
dential value.
its
offering
reason
third
points
error six and seven
pertaining
overruling
error,
point of
prospective jurors Hallenbeck and Farm-
the Court
disavows
rule set
forth
er. Id.
(Tex.Crim.App.1998),
Hicks v.
denied,
t.
cer
1227,
judgment
of the trial court is af-
Then the says, “in Matson, tempting ascertain it. there is appel another reason to overrule Presiding Judge McCor (because lant’s of error. Id. mick, again writing majority for a disjunctive, charged suffi Court, single now disavows in a sentence cient victim killed with named Matson, forth in rule set weapon). Finally, majority gives yet represents nearly one years hundred third appellant’s point reason to overrule case law: (rule of error. argued controlling as merits “is longer light no viable” in rule in addition the cases like Hicks
Malik). Having resolved the issue [and Matson no longer ] is viable *7 argued by merits as appellant, the Court’s of our in decision Malik. second and third reasons for overruling op. 231. Majority explana- at No further necessary the of error are not to the tion given is for the sweeping Court’s disa- resolution of the case and therefore dicta. vowal of case law. Matson/Hicks Brabson, 182,186
E.g., State v. 976 S.W.2d appears its are assume actions (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(referring to dicta as by its obvious reference to Malik. “unnecessary [the Court’s] ultimate dis case).1 position of’ the Malik, erroneously trial court the I am constrained to comment some of in jury charge on included the instruction dicta, majority’s however, the it will as no on legality the deten- defendant’s J., See abo Blanco v. (Tex.Crim.App.1987)(McCormick, (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(defending Court’s deci concurring dissenting)(referring and to Sec against charge by saying sion that was it dicta opinion "totally tion of majority III as unnec Court's actions were “essential to determina essary to the instant resolution of the case” hand”); tion of the case in Brooks opinion" advisory stating and "an that and (Tex.Crim.App. appellant’s petition since merits of can "[t]he 1997)("[d]ue holding prior to its that the con disposed inquiry be of without an as [the offense, viction was an element its III], issue addressed in ... all the Section of holding alternative that enhancements must opin language majority III of the Section alleged be in the could be viewed indictment pure totally advisory”). ion is dicta and dicta”); Angel as mere do not line of cases tion, alleged neither a matter which was Matson/Hicks jury charge “mere error in deal with nor the indictment which the State was deal with error They do not submitted.” required establishing the ele- at cases jury charge in the all. These charged. Overruling crime ments of the proof allegations the State’s address of law in which we measured former case They stand for the indictment. made in jury sufficiency by alleges the State that when proposition given, suffi- charge actually we held that that the manner and in the indictment ciency of the evidence thereafter be would of the crime was means of the commission jury by “hypothetically a correct measured jury, there be grand unknown to the charge”: trial —2 allegation this proof support Hence, sufficiency of the evidence should proof just any as must be element there by measured the elements of be alleged in the in- consequence or fact of by the hypothetically offense as defined Because these cases address dictment. allegations in the jury charge proof
correct
for the case. Such
failure
State’s
indictment,
behind
made in the
the reason
charge
accurately
would be one that
sets
are not
Court’s declaration
law,
by the
out the
is authorized
indict-
Malik,
nothing
which had
viable
ment,
unnecessarily
not
increase
does
consequence alleged in
to do with facts of
proof or unneces-
the State’s burden of
indictment,
exactly
not
clear.
crystal
lia-
sarily restrict
State’s theories of
Perhaps
manner and
the Court views
bility,
adequately
par-
describes the
alleged in the indictment to
means when
ticular offense
which the defendant
jury,
grand
as some-
be unknown to
was tried.
not
in the
thing
either should
be
Malik,
emphasized
S.W.2d at
We
or,
indict-
indictment
if it is
new standard would ensure
ment,
in-
some reason not be
should for
judgments
acquittal
would be reserved
charge.3
correct
hypothetically
cluded in
“in
which there is an actual
situations
charge
Perhaps
that a
the Court means
proof
failure
the State’s
crime
manner and means unknown would
jury
indictment,”
rather
than a mere error
even
by
“authorized
indictment,
though alleged
submitted.”
or such
charge
grand
alleges
jury
2. When the
shows that the
fact
indictment
manner
trial
proof
in-
means unknown and the
at trial is
person
or could
know the name
means,
to the
conclusive as
manner
diligence,
have ascertained
reasonable
prima
showing
facie
is made that
manner
However,
nothing
[citations omitted]
where
grand jury.
and means
unknown
developed
suggest
investi-
trial to
But when the evidence at trial establishes
gation
could have ascer-
means,
prove the
the State has to
manner
from whom a defendant received
tained
attempting
due
used
property,
prima
there
facie show-
stolen
*8
reasoning
ascertain manner and means. The
name,
ing
party
the
from whom
that
consequence
to
of
cannot be said
that
fact
property was
the
received the
grand jury
defendant
the
unless
have been unknown to
ascertaining
diligence
jury, thereby sup-
it
it.
used due
to
unknown
the
consequence
facts of
are sometimes
Other
in the indictment.
porting such averment
pled
grand jury,
as unknown to the
and sub-
911;
see also
Cunningham, 484 S.W.2d
reasoning.
ject
Matson
to similar rule and
State,
136
Manley v.
138 Tex.Crim.
State,
Cunningham v.
relied on
State,
(1940);
131
Hunnicutt v.
S.W.2d 613
case,
(Tex.Crim.App.1972).
the
In that
(1936);
to this case because the line Matson/Hicks JJ., joined. of cases need apply not even for the here gives second reason the support join I opinion of the Court. overruling of appellant’s point of error. Today we broach the issue of reconsid- Alternative manner and means are our ering treatment of the allegation in the indictment —a manner and means indictment that the offense was committed (knife) (hard object known and unknown by means to the grand jury.” “unknown the exact nature of which was unknown to past requirement See ante 231. Our grand jury). In these circumstances allegation proved this be at trial is not manner and means unknown is neces justified. rights The substantial of sary proving appellant’s guilt since the could defendant that be denied prove State could either the known or allegation rights an are the to indictment unknown manner and means. Lawton See grand jury in a felony case1 and to (Tex.Crim. notice the nature and cause of the accu- App.1995)(State plead is allowed to alter requirements sation.2 These are for the native theories of manner and means pleading, State’s which are appropriately conjunctive proof theory and under one and raised decided before trial.3 rem- conviction), denied, will suffice for cert. edy grand jury’s for the lack discovering alleging and the means com- (1996); Scott sustain mitting the would an offense be (Tex.Crim.App.1987)(where indictment al exception to the indictment. notion theories, leged alternative and manner of fact allegation creates issue means unknown and named manner and proved trial jury be is close to
means, proof of either means suffi bizarre. cient). But the majority case law the now says is defunct did not address alternative JOHNSON, J., concurring filed a Thus, pleadings. majority’s disavowal opinion. rule context Hicks/Matson essentially upon instant case is dicta I points concur the first three error is, disavowing dicta. That of the rule join the majority opinion. otherwise (which is offered as an holding alternative one, appellant alleges of error dicta), it presented renders facts legally that the evidence was insufficient to inappli the instant case render rule every prove each element the of- (also dicta). anyway rendering cable it beyond Specifi- doubt. fense a reasonable
Appellant’s
first
cally,
complains
should be
the state
obli-
by gated
overruled
the second reason stated
that the victim was struck
1.14(b)
Judge
requirement
(objec-
Womack
views
3. See Tex.Code
Proc. arts.
Crim.
allegation
proved
be
indictment
at trial as
tion to
before date
indictment must
raised
Concurring op.
"close to bizarre.”
at 230. If
of trial or
is waived
forfeit-
bizarre,
anything
*9
the State contin-
ed), 28.01,
1(4) (pre-trial hearing
§
shall be to
allege in
ues to
the indictment that
man-
the
indictment), 28.01,
exceptions to
determine
Certainly
ner and means were unknown.
§
(preliminary
2
matters not raised seven
require
pleading.
do not
such
Matson/Hicks
days
pre-trial hearing
before
will not thereaf-
allowed,
shown),
except
good
for
ter be
cause
I,
§
1. Tex.
art.
Const,
may
(testimony
be obtained on matters
28.03
VI;
I,
2. U.S.
Const,
Const,
amend.
Tex.
art.
pleadings).
involved in written
§ 10.
point
asserts under
object
exact nature of
a hard
the
“with
was
because
jury” as
the evidence
insufficient
grand
unknown to the
which is
alleges
appellant
com-
alleged in the indictment. He asserts
the indictment
...
“by stabbing
it failed
murder
proof
capital
failed in
the state
its
mitted
by striking
diligence
used
a knife and
grand jury
to
the
due
FELDER with
show
...,”
object
(emphasis
the nature of
hard
to ascertain
with a
attempting
[her]
added)
charge allowed convic-
object in
whereas the
question.
the
striking her
stabbing
or
tion for
Felder
839,
State,
v.
819 S.W.2d
Matson
the
object. Appellant asserts that
an
with
we stated
(Tex.Crim.App.1991),
that:
thereby
charge
the
disjunctive language
alleges that
the
When an indictment
proof.
the state’s burden
lowered
utilized to inflict
manner or means
unknown and the
injury is
evidence
occasions
held on numerous
We have
object
type
trial does
show what
that,
may allege
an indictment
although
used,
exists
prima
showing
was
facie
committing capital
differing methods
object
the
the
was unknown to
conjunctive,
proper
it is
murder
the
If,
grand jury.
[Citations omitted.]
disjunctive
jury
charged in the
to be
however,
what
evidence at trial shows
alleged
any
method
conviction
object
injury,
used
inflict the
to
upheld
supported by
if it is
will be
respect
issue is raised with
to whether
69,
State,
v.
evidence. White
information,
it
jury
had
when
grand
v.
(Tex.Crim.App.1994); Kitchens
indictment,
down the
as to
handed
(Tex.Crim.App.1991),
Only
object
[Citation omitted.]
used.
denied,
958, 112
cert.
case,
the State
prove
(1992).
A review of
See also McFarland
however, merely
recov
concerns officers’
challenged
and be-
should have
crime.
ery of
items used
several
object
the trial court’s
he failed to
cause
used
among
That
were
items
pliers
con-
charge which authorized
mean
were
necessarily
does not
if he
or struck
vict
stabbed
injuries.
inflict
item
the blunt force
used
victim,
the indictment
whereas
more,
was not
nothing
the state
Given
proved appel-
if the
guilty
state
prove that the
required under Matson to
struck the victim.
lant stabbed and
or
the manner
grand jury did not know
Washington, inflicting
injury or whether
Under Strickland
means of
2052,
individual’s Ake, capital mur- with liberty charged at appellant, his life or proceeding where der, accuracy of the in interest in the weighs heavily” an stake “obvious has obvious and that interest “is analysis. proceedings at at 1093. the Id. 105 S.Ct. heavily” analysis. The in the weighs state maintains an and
Given that the also verdict, interest the maintains an legitimacy of the state likewise interest in the result, although this case the accuracy the Court could Supreme the interest on the heavy a interest identify weighs presents an accused’s against safety maintaining public the part outcome is state’s interest accurate custody. Howev- judicial economy. Id. and keeping state’s concern er, interest 78-79, weight appellant’s given at The the at 105 S.Ct. 1093-94. Court the fact that in an result and judi the interest accurate concluded that state’s during his substantial, constantly guarded “not could be economy cial scene, inter- the time the crime interest of both State at compelling heavily more than weighs est somewhat disposi and the individual in accurate 79, 105 at 1094. tions.” Id. at S.Ct. the state’s. greatest Supreme placed The Court impor Addressing the third and most factor, emphasis discussing on the third analysis, the Ake tant in the consideration importance psychiatric testimony that a must make Court held defendant to the factfinder an understand- conveying sanity his showing that preliminary ing of defendant’s mental state and its trial. significant factor” at “likely to be potential impact his behavior at 1091-1092, 82-83, 86, 105 at Id. S.Ct. at 79-82, time of the crime. at S.Ct. Mississippi, 1098. Caldwell at that the 1094-96. Court concluded 1, 105 n. high risk of an inaccurate verdict was (1985), Supreme n. L.Ed.2d 231
where the defendant was not assisted petitioner’s Court declined entertain “help psychiatrist determine whether more Ake “offered little claim where he viable, present insanity defense is re undeveloped than assertions testimony, preparing and to assist be beneficial.” quested assistance would psychiatric cross-examination a State’s Here, at Rey, 897 339. See also at Id. at 105 S.Ct. witnesses.” presence that his appellant simply asserts Ake further stated where counsel might give at scene his the crime sanity likely is clear that the defendant’s actually unique insight into how events factor, may significant to be a “a defense no presents He transpired. psychi- of a be devastated absence analysis or in crime scene special expertise testimony; with atric examination and would be any subject knowledge assistance, might have of a helpful development defensive at chance of success.” Id. reasonable Furthermore, probable it is theory. 82-83, Rey v. may any insight he have of special (Tex.Crim.App.1995), we S.W.2d 333 to his coun be communicated crime could Ake non- analysis include extended just effectively through discussions sel as experts. psychiatric dia photographs of scene reviews Indeed, appel Rey, grams. any communication the defendants Ake and Unlike crime counsel lant had with his in the instant case did not seek confidential, probably not be (e.g., a scene would appointment expert of an crime safety would nevertheless, public demands of expert); his as the scene or forensic constantly of the state be require agent within request can still reviewed nearby. decision. As dis- framework of Ake more, appellant
Without has failed to *12 a sufficient showing pres-
make that his at the crime
ence scene was a “basic tool”
to which he was entitled Ake. did not err in overruling
motion, and this ruling deprive process due and the assistance
of counsel.
Based I foregoing, concur as to
judgment point of error three. HINOJOSA, Appellant,
Richard
The STATE of Texas.
No. 72932. Appeals Criminal Texas.
Oct.
