MARIO ROSALES ET AL v. JIM LEWIS ET AL
CIVIL DOCKET NO. 1:22-CV-05838
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
Filed 08/29/25
JUDGE EDWARDS; MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES
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Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to
Because the Complaint states a facially plausible claim that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiffs, and because qualified immunity does not apply, both Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings should be DENIED.
I. Background
In the Comрlaint, Plaintiffs Mario Rosales (“Rosales“) and Gracie Lasyone (“Lasyone“) (collectively “Plaintiffs“) named as defendants Officers Jim Lewis and Samuel Terrell in their individual and official capacities; former Chief of Police Ronney Howard in his official capacity; and the City of Alexandria (who employed Officers Lewis and Terrell and Chief Howard). Plaintiffs seek both declaratory and
Defendants answered, and subsequently, the City Defendants and Lewis filed their motion. ECF No. 70, 78.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Rule 12(c) Standard
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
A motion for judgment on the plеadings under Rule 12(c) “is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Garza v. Escobar, 972 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2020).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has clarified that the same standards apply when a court considers a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and, as here, the opposing party raises the defense of qualified immunity:
When confronted with a qualified-immunity defense at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff must plead facts which, if proved, would defeat the claim of immunity. The pleading standards remain the same when a motion to dismiss is based on qualified immunity. The crucial quеstion is whether the complaint pleads facts that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants are liable under § 1983 and would overcome their qualified immunity defense. At the motion to dismiss stage, it is the plaintiff‘s burden to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate.
Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The court also detailed the standards governing our qualified immunity analysis:
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
We undertake a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, inquiring: (1) whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant‘s alleged misconduct.
Courts exercise their sоund discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first. A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. The Suрreme Court has repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular
conduct is clearly established. This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Accordingly, the analyses of each count below necessarily includes findings about both plausibility and about whether Plaintiffs allegations, if proved, would overcome the qualified immunity defense.
C. The Terry Framework
“Traffic stops are deemed seizures for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. den., 546 U.S. 1222 (2006). “The legality of a traffic stop is analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” Id. Under the Terry framework, a court must ask whether an officer‘s action was: (1) “justified at its inception,” and (2) “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20).
For a traffic stop to be justified at its inceрtion, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. Id. As the Fifth Circuit has explained,
[r]easonablе suspicion exists when the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.” Reasonable suspiсion is a low threshold; it is not probable cause. Certainly, then, if officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, then there is also reasonable suspicion to stop the vehiсle.
D. The Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings
The Complaint contains six separate counts, four for different types of alleged unreаsonable searches and seizures, and two arising from officers’ alleged refusal to allow Plaintiffs to record the encounter.
1. Count 1 – Initial Stop
For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have “objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle.” Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430. Here, the Complaint alleges that Mario signaled his left turn and legally turned left at a green light. Defendants claim the stop was justified under
The attached video evidence appears to show Mario aсtivating his turn signal before turning. The video evidence does not definitively establish whether Mario signaled for the required 100 feet, however. Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and accepting the factual assertion that Mаrio did use his turn signal, the Complaint states a facially plausible Fourth Amendment claim challenging the validity of the initial traffic stop. The particular merits of the claim,
Moreover, the law was clearly established that officers cannot stop motorists without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As this Court noted in the underlying case, “it was well established at the time of the traffic stop that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the fabrication of traffic offenses against innocent persons as a pretextual reason to detain them, and no reasonable officer would believe otherwise.” See generally Bates v. Normand, 703 F. Supp. 3d 775, 790 (W.D. La. 2023). Plaintiffs have thus pleaded sufficient facts to establish that this claim is both plausible (meaning, if proved, adequate to warrant relief) and sustainable (meaning that it could potentially overcome the qualified immunity defense). And this finding also indicates that, as to all remaining counts, the same issues must be considered separately.
2. Count 2 – Extension of Stop
The Fourth Amendment prohibits prolonging a traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to addrеss the traffic violation and attendant safety concerns. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 357 (2015). “Authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. at 354.
The Complaint alleges that Officers Lewis and Terrell improperly expanded the stop to: (1) investigate drug crimes through extensive questioning, (2) frisk Mario without reasonable suspicion he was armed and dangerous, and (3) “coercing” Mario
3. Count 3 and 5 - Terry Frisk and Search
To appropriately conduct a frisk under Terry, officers must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “armed and presently dangerous.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
The Complaint alleges that, in following “unconstitutiоnal policies,” officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Mario was armed and dangerous. As to this point, the present record does not support dismissal under
Similarly, the alleged search of Mario‘s pockets—by directing him to empty them—raises Fourth Amendment concerns. Whether Mario‘s compliance constituted valid consent involves factual questions about the totality of circumstances that are inappropriate for resolution at the pleadings stage.
4. Counts 4 and 6 – Recording
It is well-settled that the First Amendment protects the right to record police officers performing their official duties in public, subject only to reasonable time,
The Complaint alleges that Officers Lewis аnd Terrell prohibited Mario and Gracie from recording the encounter, despite requests and assurances that recording would not interfere with officers’ activities. If proved, and assuming that other circumstances do not alter thе analysis and that plaintiffs demonstrate they could use phones safely and non-disruptively, this instruction may not have satisfied the requirements to avoid a First Amendment claim. Thus, at this stage, Plaintiffs have asserted a plausible and sustainable First Amendment claim.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Samuel Terrell, Ronney Howard, and the City of Alexandria (ECF No. 70) and the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Jim Lewis (ECF No. 78) be DENIED.
No other briefs may be filed without leave of court, which will only be granted for good cause. A party‘s failure to timely file written objectiоns to this Report and Recommendation will bar a party from later challenging factual or legal conclusions adopted by the District Judge, except if the challenge asserts “plain error.”
SIGNED on Friday, August 29, 2025.
JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE