In this personal injury action arising out of alleged sexual assaults upon a minor by his school teacher on off-school premises, plaintiff, as next friend of Gregory Keebler, a minor, appeals from an order filed on September 19, 1985, granting summary disposition to defendants Wayne Kaiser, Donald Berkley and Robert Duhan pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10).
Judy Rosacrans, mother of Gregory Keebler, a student in the seventh grade at Tecumseh Junior High, filed this action on January 23, 1985, alleging that James Kingon, a teacher at Tecumseh Junior High, assaulted and sexually molested Gregory in a shopping center parking lot in Adrian in October, 1983, and from November 5 through November 13, 1983, further assaulted and sexually molested Gregory at Kingon’s home in Tecumseh after going motorcycle-riding with Gregory and other school children. The action was filed against James Kingon, the Tecumseh Board of Education, the Tecumseh School District, and the three named school administrators. Defendant Wayne Kaiser was the principal of the elementary school where Kingon was employed; defendant Donald Berkley was the principal of the junior high school, and defendant Robert Duhan was the superintendent for the Tecumseh School District.
Plaintiff’s complaint contained four counts. Count i alleged that Kingon’s conduct constituted assault and battery and occurred as a result of the failure of defendants to properly supervise, moni *384 tor, and observe Kingon’s conduct. Plaintiff further alleged that the assaults and batteries were committed in the scope of Kingon’s employment as a school teacher. Count ii alleged violations of the Child Protection Law, MCL 722.621 et seq., MSA 25.248(1) et seq., and that the three named school officials had reason to suspect that Kingon had sexually molested Gregory Keebler and other Tecumseh school children. The school officials’ alleged failure to report Kingon’s conduct to the Department of Social Services exposed them to civil liability. Count in alleged that the individual defendants were negligent in their screening, hiring, and supervision of Kingon. Count iv alleged that Kingon’s conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and that defendant school officials were liable as Kingon’s employers.
Defendants, with the exception of Kingon who has pled guilty to attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct and is now incarcerated, filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10) on May 8, 1985. In plaintiff’s response, she conceded that her claims against defendants Tecumseh Board of Education and Tecumseh School District were precluded by our Supreme Court’s decision in
Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing),
The court based its determination upon a finding that the individual defendants were engaged in discretionary-decisional activities and, thus, under Ross, supra, were immune from liability. The *385 claim for violation of the Child Protection Law was dismissed on grounds that, based upon defendants’ affidavits, defendants had no reason to suspect that Kingon was engaged in sexually molesting Gregory Keebler and, based upon the information produced by plaintiff in response to defendants’ motion, defendants had no reason to know that Kingon had abused other children.
On appeal, plaintiff does not take issue with the trial court’s dismissal of all claims against the Tecumseh Board of Education and School District. Plaintiff’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing the negligence claim (Count in) and the claim for violation of the Child Protection Law (Count n) against the three named individual defendants.
CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
(COUNT III)
Relying primarily on
Regulski v Murphy,
Regulski
involved an eye injury incurred in a class where the student was not wearing protective glasses as required by MCL 380.1288; MSA 15.41288. The Supreme Court held that the director of the vocational arts and the instructor of the class could be held liable for violating the statute
*386
because the actual provision of the protective glasses was a "ministerial-operational” act.
Further, unlike in Regulski, all of the wrongful acts committed in the instant case occurred off school premises. This is not a situation involving supervision in a classroom. Instead, it involves supervision in the teacher’s home in the summertime.
Directly on point and holding contrary to plaintiff’s position is
Willoughby v Lehrbass,
In addition, plaintiffs’ second amended com *387 plaint merely alleges that defendants wilfully, recklessly, negligently and/or grossly negligently failed to supervise, train and discipline defendant Lehrbass. However, in order to establish bad faith under Ross, it would seem that based upon the policy of the qualified immunity doctrine a plaintiff would have to establish that the governmental actor engaged in malicious or intentionally unlawful behavior. Ross, supra, pp 632-633. Plaintiffs’ mere conclusory allegations that these two defendants wilfully or recklessly negligently failed to supervise Lehrbass simply are not sufficient to establish bad faith on the part of these defendants. Therefore, the second prong of the Ross analysis was satisfied.
Finally, because the superintendent and principal of a school are vested with broad powers and authority regarding the employment of teachers under the School Code of 1976, e.g., §§ 247, 248, 346, we hold that the principal and superintendent were engaged in discretionary acts in hiring and retaining defendant Lehrbass because they had the power of personal deliberation, decision and judgment. Ross, p 634. Therefore, summary judgment with regard to these two defendants was also appropriately entered pursuant to the doctrine of governmental immunity. [150 Mich App 347 -348. Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s grant of summary disposition as to plaintiffs count for negligent supervision should be affirmed. 1
CLAIM OF VIOLATION OF MICHIGAN CHILD PROTECTION LAW
(COUNT Ii)
In Count ii, plaintiff alleges violation of Michi *388 gan’s Child Protection Law, MCL 722.621 et seq.; MSA 25.248(1) et seq., which requires persons who have reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect to immediately make an oral report of such suspected abuse or neglect to the Michigan Department of Social Services. Failure to do so can result in civil liability. MCL 722.633; MSA 25.248(13). Defendants brought this part of their motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), and the court granted the motion under subsection (10). Therefore, under MCR 2.116(G)(5), the court was required to consider the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
Defendants supported their motion for summary disposition with their own affidavits and excerpts of Gregory Keebler’s testimony at Kingon’s preliminary examination. Keebler testified that he had not told anyone of Kingon’s conduct until mid-November, 1983. When he told his mother, she called the police and a few days later Kingon was arrested. Defendant Superintendent Duhan stated in his affidavit that he did not suspect nor did he have reason to suspect that Keebler had been abused prior to Kingon’s arrest. Defendant Principal Berkley stated the same in his affidavit. Defendant Principal Kaiser stated that he did not know Keebler because Keebler was never a student in his school. All defendants stated that they had dealt with the Lenawee County Department of Social Services on other matters of suspected child abuse.
Plaintiff did not offer any affidavits or other documents showing that defendants had reasonable cause to suspect Keebler had been abused. Therefore, because no genuine issue as to any material fact was raised regarding whether defendants had violated the Child Protection Law, the *389 trial judge properly granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint under MCR 2.116(I)(5) would not have been justified based on the evidence presented to the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim that defendants had violated the Michigan Child Protection Law is affirmed.
Affirmed. No costs.
Notes
But see