Rondon v. State

RONDON, Appellant, Reynaldo Goria Indiana, Appellee.

STATE

No. 427. 1085 S

Supreme of Indiana. Court

March siding

damaged part had been 82-year-old off. about knocked Concerned Alarcon, police. called the Chestovich sit- found Alarcon officer and Chestovich blood, ting pool in the shower stall dead. Alarcon had autopsy

An revealed that times over stabbed at least fifteen all been his laceration of body heart cause of death. was the ear- Rosendaul testified that Linda 11, 1984, ly morning hours October walking home from friend’s house driving green car and noticed a four-door very closely slowly. her One of the and standing and wide car doors was wrecked passed slowly she open. The car while light purpose- and she stood under a street fully good look at the driver’s face. took ap- an in-court identification of She made being the the car. pellant as driver of police Alarcon hired Chestovich told had for yard Cuban man to do work small Richmond, Milan, appel- for Terrance W. him, same man also worked and the lant. police Fruit Market. Jansen told Jansen’s Pearson, Gen., Joseph N. Linley Atty. E. him, appellant for and he worked Stevenson, Gen., Indianapo- Atty. Deputy talking appellant Alarcon on observed lis, appellee. prior occasions. questioned Copeland, Eva who Police GIVAN, Justice. girl appellant’s live-in friend and appellant guilty of two juryA his When mother of two of children. and recommended counts of Murder they investigating the death told her were penalty, which was

imposition of the death Alarcon, emotion- of Francisco she became imposed. appel- al said she had two knives which and gave her. lant night The facts are: On the of October 10, 1984, George heard a loud Chestovich trial, Copeland At a con- testified about four loud engine, of an then three or roar appellant she had with and Eladio versation coming from his home on noises outside Occasionally concerning Alarcon. Martinez next Marquette in Lake Station. The Road paid Copeland to clean house. Alarcon property of day noticed that the Chestovich cleaning, Copeland Alarcon Once when Alarcon, Frank was in an neighbor, “play around” propositioned her and dislodged His gate state. unusual maybe get day her one would curtains, and his from the fence Cope- house, Copeland When but refused. usually He also open, were closed. were appellant, said story land related open and garage door was saw that get Alar- going that he was even with green Pontiac was Alarcon’s late-model con, then, appel- speaking Spanish, and missing. into plotted lant Martinez to break and door, Copeland asked saw Alarcon’s house. When the back

Chestovich went they they going do if them open it called out to Alarcon what that was caught, appellant said that he would got the were He noticed that but answer. kill Alarcon. garage and house were exterior of the acquaintance Witherspoon Everette Amiotte was an v. Illinois 391 U.S. appellant gave occasionally 510, who him rides 1770, 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 776. The because did not drive. theOn Witherspoon case was clarified in the case 10, 1984, evening gave of October Amiotte of Wainwright 412, v. Witt 469 U.S. appellant and Martinez a ride to a destina- 105 S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d 841. The Su- Marquette they tion near Road where said preme Court opinions stated that recent they to make a deal wanted with a friend. that Court show no ritualistic adherence to approximately p.m., At 11:00 Martinez re- requirement prospective juror said, turned to Amiotte’s car and “Let’s make unmistakably clear that he or she go!” Reynaldo” Spanish. “Dumb automatically against impo- vote nervous, Amiotte said Martinez looked capital sition punishment. The Court sweaty, upset and smelled “like death”. proper stated the standard determining They gas to a station drove prospective when a juror may be excluded up carrying walked shopping a K-Mart for cause because of his or her views on bag. Appellant told them the car had mal- capital punishment juror’s is whether that functioned drove down the street prevent views would substantially im- Pontiac which was dented one pair performance of his duties as a side. Amiotte took alley to an juror in accordance with his instructions off dropped Iowa Street and him off. and his oath. Police searched house at 3631 This standard require does not that a Iowa shopping Street found a K-Mart juror’s proved bias be with unmistakable bag in the attic chimney. behind the clarity. Deference paid must be to the trial bag contained an identification bracelet and prospective who was able to see the dog tags bearing the name “Francisco jurors responses and listen to their during Alarcon”, $8,000 cash, key and a to a voir dire. Id. opened lockbox which a box in the Bank of prospective jurors statements of the by Indiana rented Francisco Alarcon. The give were sufficient to the trial court the owner of the home which rented impression definite they be un- in a sock which looked $920 to be faithfully able to impartially apply and stained with blood. Therefore, law. Id. we find that the trial fingerprint A technician testified that the court did not its abuse discretion in dis- fingerprints latent recovered from the driv- charging jurors. these er’s side of finger- Alarcon’s car were the prints palm prints appellant. and that, We would note in addition to opposition penalty, to the pro death

Appellant argues that he was denied a spective juror Johnson also stated that he prospective fair trial jurors when certain against County was biased the Lake Police During were dismissed after voir dire. Department because he felt questioning, Frieson, his son was jurors Chase, Hernan- unfairly treated dez when he was convicted of they op- and Johnson indicated were burglary. posed Thus Johnson’s actual imposition penal- to the of the bias and death position ty, capital punishment on and the trial court excused them for grounds prospective jury cause. The sufficient for his members were removal from the questioned jury. Hopkins (1981), Ind., emphatically each v. State 631; opposition their penalty to the death N.E.2d Ind.Code 35-37-1-5. § religious they reasons and stated that could Appellant argues further that he was penalty not recommend a pen- death denied a fair trial when the trial court alty phase of the by case. On examination denied his individually motion to voir dire counsel, they defense remained steadfast in prospective jury each out of member opinion. presence of the other members as to his or Prospective jurors may penalty. Appellant be excused her view of the death they if returning for cause will not by questioning prospec- consider contends that penalty. others, recommendation presence for the death tive members in the argues pretrial fully not him court. He person’s each views were lineup impermissibly sug- explored procedure so openly determination Wainwright gestive, could be thus the in-court identifi- under the standard witness’s cation of him was tainted. made. examination, Rosen- On direct witness The trial court has broad discre appellant early testified she daul saw regulating form tion in and substance 11, 1984, driving a on October late-model Hadley v. dire examination. voir green dented on the side. car which was Individualized passed slowly She noticed car as near circum voir dire required be when open. her because the back door was wide potentially highly are unusual or stances good defendant, said she took a look at the driver no She damaging he has but approximately 3 to 4 drove right separate juror absolute to have each per she a street Id. miles hour as stood under ly sequestered questioned. light. She then made an in-court identifica- As facts stated in the above as the tion driver of car. indicate, they group, in a though issue sat examination, On cross defense counsel independent juror gave his or her each police asked Rosendaul whether opinion .imposition about the death she could not officers October Appellant produced has not evi penalty. car, identify the of the and she said driver jurors dence which shows that yes. dishonestly or were silent when answered Id. Because duty speak. had a parties approached bench nothing highly potentially dam unusual counsel moved to strike her testi- defense brought aging to the defendant was excused, mony. temporarily court’s attention that would have re trial upon questioning further Rosendaul quired examination of the individualized upon stated that based her observations of Bur find error.

prospective jurors, we appellant on 11 she able to October (1984), Ind., ris v. State 465 N.E.2d 171. an make in-court identification. She added morning argues that on the she talked with that he was also denied gave description an equal process officers she accurate protection and due of law go but did further because court denied his motion to when get Upon afraid to involved. re- impanel prior penalty she was jury a new to the flection, she decided that it was her civic phase of the trial. He asserts it was duty police. to aid She then viewed a six- discharge, class, group a a error to lineup comprised Hispanic person of short jurors opposed imposition to the of the death men. Defense counsel had earlier asked penalty and contends that he had should have police suspect her whether told her that a jury penalty phase a new to hear the of his tri- in lineup, and at that time she was said al. However, in yes. jury when the re- This held Court has that when sorry she cess she said mis- involved, a same transaction and facts were herself, only and she was jury guilt could consider evidence in lineup that there six men were prejudice hear evi and then without description who matched the which she capital punishment. on Because the dence police. gave phase separate guilt not penalty a deter but is a continuation of the same mination testimony, we cannot Given Boyd proceeding, no new needed. procedure find that identification (1986), Ind., 284, cert. 494 N.E.2d suggestive give impermissibly so as to rise denied, 1046, 910, 93 479 U.S. S.Ct. very a likelihood of misidenti- substantial appel L.Ed.2d 860. We find merit fication. Inconsistencies evidence argument. lant’s witness, may credibility affect require suppression do not Appellant contends the but conflicts suggestive identify by permitting a of the identification based erred witness procedure. Hazzard v. State uphold sufficient evidence to his conviction. Ind. 413 N.E.2d 895. Owensby (1984), Ind., v. State pretrial

Even if Rosendaul’s identifi suspect, Appellant argues cation were the in-court identifica the trial court erred in permissible independent tion was if an ba fingerprint card, admission of a sis for the in-court identification exists. ashtray chrome and a chrome strip from a This look totality Court will of cir Appellant car. asserts that due to a break cumstances to determine if such an inde custody the chain of their admission was pendent exists. Lyons basis v. State erroneous. (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 813. trial, At Officer Wlekinski testified about Appellant believes his conviction should investigation of the victim’s vehicle be reversed due to the admission of certain which was found near 27th Lane and Van- prejudicial exhibits which were and of no derburgh in location, Lake Station. At that probative Cigarette value. butts which he strip found a chrome ashtray in the were found the victim’s home were ad- grass. car, When Wlekinski observed the mitted into evidence. objected strip the chrome ashtray missing ground on the were irrelevant to from the rear door. any However, issue the case. there was Officer regard Lach testified in to a smoke, evidence that the victim did not strip ashtray chrome he removed from appellant did. comparison purposes. vehicle for Lach pieces The court also admitted of brown said the kept according exhibits were glass throughout the victim’s home. security normal measures of the Lake Hair and glass blood were found on the County Laboratory. Crime fragments. The State introduced the ex- purpose of requiring the rule hibits to show that the victim was struck in showing custody of the chain of is to avoid whiskey the head with a prior bottle any substitution, claim tampering being Appellant objected stabbed. on the mistake. The doctrine requires an ade ground that it lacked relevance to the quate foundation to be laid which shows issues in the case. the continuous whereabouts the exhibit Evidence be admitted even beginning time it came into the only slight where there is tendency possession police. McAnalley v. State connect the defendant with the offense. (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 831. positive proof Lack of or authentication weight affects of the evidence and suscepti The less an exhibit is admissibility. its Sons v. State alteration, tampering, ble to substitution or Ind., 502 N.E.2d 1331. fungibility, strictly the less the chain-of- custody applied. Boyd, supra. rule is The hair and glass blood on the physical foundation for introduction of evi tend to struggle show a occurred in the dence, the characteristics of which can be glass victim’s home. Bits of brown by eyewitness identification, identified found in Considering the victim’s head. fulfilled when the witness is able to iden facts, these we find no abuse of discretion tify the item and the item has relevance to in the glass admission of the into evidence. the issues in the case. Id. prove State was to unable that cigarette butts court, were the same brand In Officer Wlekinski identi appellant smokes, which strip nor were able fied the chrome ashtray as those specifically to appellant connect them grass. to or which he in Officer Lach any way. the offense in Though the exhib made an in-court of identification the sec its lacked the required foundation strip ad ond chrome and ashtray exhibits as mission, their admission was not those reversible which he removed from the victim’s Appellant error. prejudiced by was not vehicle. eye Because the officers were their admission because there is otherwise witnesses and made in-court identifications items, supported on adequate conviction be nonfungible an

of these A circumstantial evidence alone. Follrad of was laid for the introduction foundation Ind., 451 N.E.2d 635. the evidence. Baker v. State refusing grant err in trial court did not to N.E.2d appellant’s motion for directed verdict. chain- Appellant makes the same this record There is sufficient evidence in argument concerning a State’s of-custody support jury. verdict of the fingerprint impres contained exhibit which argues Appellant the trial court erred trial, appellant. At an evidence sions his it denied motion for severance when finger he took a technician testified that He relies on Ind. from his codefendant. sample print appellant from at 35-34-1-11(b), which states that Code § 11. The technician stat station on October separate moves for a when one defendant appellant’s finger that after he obtained ed other defendant has made trial because the envelope them in a sealed prints he stored statement which refers an out-of-court He his opened he in court. identified which defendant, prosecutor moving must signature appeared on the ex own at which the state joint either elect trial fingerprints inside the en hibit and evidence, joint ment is not admitted into had from velope as those which he obtained used trial at which the statement He that appellant. further testified defendant after all reference the movant kept the normal course exhibit was deleted, separate or trial for the has been security County at the Lake Labo Crime moving defendant. ratory. custody was We find chain sufficient, and the admission of this exhibit appellant’s hearing A on motion was held proper. at which the State elected severance be tried that and Eladio Martinez trial erred contends the joint at a and Martinez’s statement trial grant his di- it failed to motion for when in the not be admitted into evidence He asserts that the evi- rected verdict. case-in-chief. support jury’s dence is insufficient to argues testimony He verdict. trial, phase of Mar- penalty At the given by Copeland Amiotte and admitted into evi- tinez’s statement was improbable inherently and so unreliable statement, day dated the dence. support could not conviction. arrest, he Martinez’s indicated that under- used stood that his statement could be testimony, appellant’s Amiotte’s codefendants, he against him and view, inherently unreliable because voluntarily, made the statement and that seeking pin Amiotte was the murder In he its contents. the state- understood else. The aware of someone was well ment, him he he said original charge for Amiotte’s the murder resisted, planned and if he to rob the victim Alarcon, his criminal record and the fact kill him. told in how he would He detail drinking night he on the had been planned gain entry into jury’s prov the murder. It is within home, described victim’s weigh these facts and ince consider being knives. He also denied involved did credibility of the witness. These facts being at the scene of the the murder inherently testimony unrelia not render crime at all. ble. examination, Martinez stated On direct in the tes that never his life he been Copeland’s The same is true of cross-examination, Mar- incriminating On timony. The the victim’s home. fact that tinez was asked whether Copeland conversation heard more dif going the to rob victim her it was that ficult for to understand because denied weight her kill him if he resisted. Martinez Spanish testi went incriminating giving the answers which mony inherently but did not make it unreli contained his statement. able. agree examining may that from the direct The trial court instructed that’s, fact, could prior statements be the occur- inconsistent evidence impeachment purposes rence, Well, only you may, used to that extent. not be used as substantive evidence you judgment.” could have make that appellant or Martinez. against either granting of a mistrial lies de A court has discretion to within the sound discretion of the trial necessary termine whether severance only upon court will be reversed trial, determination insure a fair and such showing of clear error. Bedwell v. State upon showing of only will be reversed (1985),Ind., A 481 N.E.2d 1090. mistrial is of discretion. To determine whether abuse remedy and is an extreme warranted discretion, its we will the trial court abused lesser-curative measures will not where actually occurred at consider events which occurred, if may suffice. Even error be allegations in not the the motion trial and sup if harmless the conviction is otherwise v. for a severance. Parr State ported by independent evidence. Wallace 504 N.E.2d 1014. (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 445. v. State Amend A defendant’s Sixth To establish trial court right of confrontation is violated ment by denying its discretion a motion abused extrajudicial state a codefendant’s when mistrial, appellant must demonstrate implicating the defendant is admitted ment prosecutor’s placed misconduct the defendant has no into evidence and grave peril. Cheney v. position him in a opportunity to cross-examine the codefend (1985), Ind., State Appel N.E.2d 508. However, confessing code ant. when prosecutor’s lant that the use of believes subjects by testifying himself fendant placed grave “torture” him in the word cross-examination, the de full and effective analogous peril, and that his case is right Amendment is not fendant’s Sixth (1983),Ind.App, 453 N.E. Johnson v. State if codefendant denies the even violated Appeals 2d 365 in which the Court Jenkins content of the confession. denying court erred in Johnson’s the trial Ind. motion for mistrial. available for cross- Because Martinez was case, only examination, In circum the trial we find no abuse of existed from which one appel its denial of stantial evidence court’s discretion was tortured. could infer that victim lant’s motion for severance. pro This Court has held that counsel the trial court errone- contends upon conclusions pound based ously denied his motion for mistrial based Cheney, supra. analysis of the evidence. During misconduct. final prosecutorial Considering the court’s admonishment “You can argument, prosecutor stated: establishing ap independent evidence man, quickly knife suppose, kill a I with a find that pellant’s guilt, we cannot else. help not need the of someone “torture” prosecutor’s mention of word somebody him without you torture Can grave peril placed appellant position in a said, holding he had “That’s him?” Earlier a mistrial. which warrants there.” to the neck not a lethal wound appellant’s objection, the trial After the trial court erred Appellant contends jury: stated to the penalty phase of his trial when during the testify con- police officer to it allowed a prosecutor used the word torture “The rape. prior charge cerning appellant’s argument. There’s no—there’s in his hearing, sentencing was tor- At that the victim direct evidence mitigating factor that brought forth as a thing that the the kind—of tured. That’s history prior crimi- significant looking he had no from jury has to decide conduct, Ind.Code pursuant present- nal has been physical evidence that 50—2—9(c)(1). introduction of At the offering The Prosecutor § ed. 35— testimony, ob- police officer’s physical interpretation of what that he was not grounds that jected on the you to the extent evidence shows 728 (1987), 137, 1676, background the U.S. 107

previously furnished with 481 S.Ct. 95 testimony, that had specifically, of the officer’s L.Ed.2d 127. More the Court prepare the disregard insufficient time to for officer’s that held the reckless for human testimony, testimony that implicit and the in knowingly engaging life in crimi- hearsay. objection, Over his the officer carry grave nal activities known to a risk testify appellant was allowed to and represents highly culpable of death a men- charged rape Martinez were in Illinois state tal be taken into account in dropped. charges that the were making capital sentencing judgment a natural, causes when that conduct its objects the Appellant now officer’s inevitable, though lethal Id. result. at testimony ground on the that arrests which 157-58, 1688, L.Ed.2d 107 S.Ct. at 95 do not result in convictions cannot serve 144. a of a criminal basis the enhancement punishment. the The court from evi plan, pursuant appellant dence to their

Appellant cannot base his current and Martinez arrived at the resi victim’s allegation objection of error on an made at express purpose robbing dence for the bears no to his com trial which relation killing 82-year-old the victim. plaint appeal. on Lewis v. State on head a victim was struck with bottle proper Without a sitting he on A while the couch. objection, this issue was waived. home search revealed that objected to appellant Even if $8,000 personal belongings and the victim’s testimony ground as now in appellant’s attic. The court also were serts, his claim would have been without found that both Martinez specified The trial court that the merit. multiple were home and the victim’s a mitigating circumstance of lack of the cold method of wounds were calculated significant history existed. There criminal no guarantying the victim could make iden fore, appellant prejudice. has shown tification. imposition Appellant argues that the supports We find that evidence unreasonable, unjust penalty death penalty upon appel- imposition of death inappropriate facts view of Murder While Commit- lant’s conviction irregularities proceed- of the the case and ting Robbery. The standard set forth ing. in this Tison has been met case. in argues first that' the evidence is He Appellant next that funda asserts that he sufficient find murdered the trial mental error occurred when court committing attempting to victim while ap one appointed translator both robbery. commit He asserts no direct pellant and Martinez when their interests appel which established evidence exists conflicting. complains that He robbery participation in the lant’s victim’s requested interpret the translator to murder, and that the death sentence testimony, Martinez's which left finding unless there cannot be inflicted of a translator. without benefit directly purposely and that the defendant the trans- reflects that when in the acts led to record participated which victim, interpreting the examination of lator was citing Lockett v. Ohio death testimony, 2954, the court L.Ed. Martinez and S.Ct. U.S. speak loudly be- the translator asked 2d 973. requiring his service cause Supreme Court recent- The United States ap- not reflect that The record does also. ly capital himself that a defendant any difficulty comprehending pellant had culpability, requisite degree must have proceeding. requirement is the defend- met when complaint Appellant also makes the in the major participant ant has been present for the de- was not committed, indiffer- the translator felony with reckless however, record, livery of the verdict. life. v. Arizona to human Tison ence

729 ticularly reliable informant. He added that the translator was report whether does Spanish- appellant the verdict was should be tested a present or when absent objection to made no Appellant speaking psychometrics individual with delivered. object to Failure to the translator at trial. appellant’s of a more accurate evaluation of that results in waiver alleged error an functioning intelligence The sec- level. appeal, unless funda- purposes issue missing report ond doctor’s is from the v. State error occurred. Warriner mental record, presentence investigation Ind., (1982), 562. 435 N.E.2d report. prejudicial error is error so Fundamental appellant’s court considered The trial that he could not rights previous injuries, head and his claim of (1985), have a fair trial. Crose v. State testimony appellant’s former boss’s 763. Because we Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d praise- daily performance was reliable have no evidence worthy. found there to be no The court translator’s difficulty comprehending in of mental disease or defect. indication cannot find that funda- interpretations, we fur- Appellant now asserts that without ap- prohibited which mental error occurred denied his ther mental examination was receiving from a fair trial. pellant mitigating cir- right present evidence of argues that fundamental Appellant cumstances. the trial court failed occurred when error Subsec Ind.Code 35-50-2-9. to follow § right appeal, an To exercise his (d) if states that the defendant tion complete required present a appellant is trial, jury jury of murder convicted v. Smith reviewing court. record to the hearing. sentencing reconvene for the shall Ind., (1981), 422 N.E.2d 1179. With State this section re Appellant contends that record, reports in the we out doctors’ both entered on ver quires judgment to be intelligent complete cannot make an for the sen jury convenes dict before trial court’s determination review of the tencing hearing. appel competency. Failure of appellant’s guilty, returned its verdict jury report copy of the doctor’s provide lant to excused, reconvened for the sen- then alleged error. precludes our review correctly hearing. court tencing The trial 634, (1980), 401 Spears v. State 272 Ind. judgment of conviction 331. N.E.2d criminal In Indiana be the sentence. law, and “sentence” “judgment” terms that his death Appellant argues (1979), v. State Schalkle synonymous. are duplic vacated due to sentence must be 134, 384. cannot Ind. 396 N.E.2d We I of convictions. Count itous occurred on error find that fundamental him Murder and charged information this issue. Murder While charged him with II Count ap- denied that he was Appellant asserts Rob Committing Attempting to Commit mental state. of his propriate examination bery. returned verdict pen- the death jury recommended After the appellant guilty of Murder they found requested that he counsel alty, appellant’s asserts II. I and in Count Count competency to determine be examined for the murder multiple convictions that his appreciate the seri- he could and whether impact prejudicial single victim had of a noting the un- After of his case. ousness sentencing recom upon jury in their motion, court the trial timeliness jeopardy double and violated mendation psy- appointed two request and granted the facts of the jury knew the principles. The appellant, and their to examine chiatrists impact. prejudicial case. We see presentence part of the were a conclusions report. investigation occurred, one murder Because of both to convict it was error reports was psychiatrists’ of the two One v. Felony Murder. Sandlin Murder record, Berkson. of Dr. in the included 1116; Bean par- State not a appellant was He concluded 1981, lack nois but dismissed for 267 Ind. N.E.2d probable cause.” *>> * * * * * This cause remanded. expunge of to the conviction ordered sentencing at a later order continues Information, I the Murder under Count of following in point the words: merged having the the convic- same with following ag- the “The Court now finds Information, II of tion under Count the proved beyond gravating factor has been appellant’s death sen- to set the date when by a the State of reasonable doubt to be out. tence is carried Indiana: SHEPARD, C.J., PIVARNIK, J., ^[******] concur. mitigation, In the further finds the Court was to rebut ing in the United States. history of would lant and his codefendant were released be tencing hearing conduct.” I.C. lengthy hearsay objection, the defendant codefendant on an she was cause court to be she had arrested gating dissenting “has senting. been considered: fendant has no signed immigration papers, we know grate Cuban In Rondon “The In death DEBRULER, DeBRULER, J., concurring and Chicago policewoman. victim no purpose permitted criminal a no jailed DICKSON, J., not record of circumstance following mitigating significant sentencing afraid, prison with unsupported by probable prior proceed charge Cubans Castro an inference of “no of sentence conduct. Defendant is one United States. attempted serving her over the 35-50-2-9(c)(1). At the sen Justice, introducing and that separate opinion in before the prior appellant Rondon criminal conduct” which significant present history allegation was determined order the court states: with concurs. situation criminal seven stealing Standard: concurring and dis- charges ultimately appel the of She stated that released to emi- phone the defendant raise history judge, prior (7) factors of testimony of Through prosecution convictions significant years in a rape, testimony a Cuban is a criminal The de- because over cause. show by have miti pri- a trial court did like that some mitigating circumstance. Reason dictates reporting nution in tion. does case, history cago the officer weight should prosecutrix circumstances. or not. duct. criminal conduct”. cago nevertheless indicative of cant lant’s conviction Cuba Court’s Chicago, I do however laws. prior criminal conduct In the circumstance gravating circumstance. defendant significant history deciding no sentencing process arrest warrants ^[*****] arrest history I diminish the Court of criminal conduct was history finding that Having approach while weight what majority history of criminal describing and the what has further finds the of criminal conduct” were deciding hold mitigating setting aside that sentence. not indicative of a find of criminal conduct at I those in done am unable no significant of the trial weight consider that same outweighed by alleged weight integrity it did consider hearsay It is mitigator, so, hearsay whether prior complaints and his arrest in according to was to court, express victim had said improper statements of in the convic- criminal next court, appel- conduct, give aggravating conclude, “history statements significant in a mitigating history mitigator “signifi- the Chi- the step in assign death *>> dimi- con- Chi- our the all, un- ag- of of vehicle. He was also Government J., DICKSON,

charged rape County, Illi- concurs. Cook

Case Details

Case Name: Rondon v. State

Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court

Date Published: Mar 1, 1989

Citation: 534 N.E.2d 719

Docket Number: 1085 S 427

Court Abbreviation: Ind.