Having carefully reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused temporarily to suspend appellant’s child support obligation. See, e.g., Manning v. Manning,
We affirm the amended order entered on July 17, 1992, which reduced, but did not suspend, appellant’s child support obligation, because we conclude that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s action at the time that order was entered. However, we reverse the order entered on November 5, 1992, which denied appellant’s request to suspend his child support obligation until he found employment, and adjudged appellant to be in contempt of court for nonpayment of child support. -We remand with directions that the trial court enter an order suspending appellant’s child support obligation effective as of August 10, 1992, and until such time as appellant finds employment or the trial court determines that appellant is no longer making a good-faith effort to do so; and denying appellee’s motion for contempt.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.
