Case Information
*1
Before P OSNER R OVNER , H AMILTON , Circuit Judges . H AMILTON Circuit Judge . Plaintiffs Cindy Ol son appeal district court’s dismissal their civil suit chal lenging Mr. by local officials Illinois. allege two police detectives violated Mr. Fourth Amendment rights causing without cause. dismissed the suit for failure to state claim, finding that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity the de tectives entitled to qualified immunity because they warrant Olson’s arrest. The district then declined supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising out of the same events.
We reverse the dismissal the federal claims remand the to consider both the federal law claims. prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity because the plaintiffs allege he swore the truth facts obtain warrant Olson. In swearing facts, acting as witness, not as advocate state, so protected absolute prosecutorial immunity. Kali na v. Fletcher 129–30 (1997). Neither detec tives nor are entitled dismissal on qualified immunity. allegations complaint permit rea sonable inference two detectives, prosecutor, all three gave false information judge who issued warrant arrest. allege detectives exhaustively investigated theft trailer lawn mowers but found evidence witnesses linked crime. fact arrested anyway based on from defendants plau sibly suggests defendants gave information, entitled qualified they lied ob tain warrant.
I. Factual Procedural History
We recount alleged second amended we must accept plaintiffs’ allegations true when reviewing dismissal under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Parish City Elkhart ‐ (7th Cir. 2010); Parish City Chicago 551, 2009).
A. Investigation and Arrest This suit stems from an exhaustive police investigation in burglary Marie Buhr’s property Royal, Illinois, a town located Champaign County. On October 6, 2008, Ma rie Buhr and her grandson, Christopher Buhr, reported Champaign County Sheriff a red trailer lawn mow ers stolen from Buhr property.
Also October Cindy Olson noticed their neighbor, Vilven Tire Company, had placed eight ‐ foot ‐ long trailer on Olsons’ property just outside Royal. Mr. concluded trailer abandoned. trailer deteriorated had lights license plate. planned fix up abandoned trailer give his daughter son law, Brandy Brent Vinson. He painted trailer placed brackets anchor boards on it. He left trailer on property where it could seen from road. Three days after he completed these repairs, trailer disappeared. did file a police report care if someone took it.
On October a detective working Cham paign Sheriff, defendant David Sherrick, discovered black trailer flat tire abandoned ditch on country road near Ogden, Illinois. Sherrick took fingerprint samples from trailer. In police report, wrote ob served tire marks looked riding lawn mower had been transported trailer. He saw bean stalks on trailer. concluded trailer been driven through a field transport the lawn mowers that re ‐ ported stolen from Buhr property.
Another investigator Sheriff’s office ran finger ‐ prints from trailer through database but found no match, which was documented December report. Sherrick nevertheless suspected Ronald Olson had stolen trailer and lawn mowers, so June applied and received search warrants authorized collection of DNA samples fingerprints from Ronald Olson, well search Olsons’ property. Sherrick searched prop erty defendant Stuart Shaw, another detective working Champaign Sherriff. searches allegedly yielded nothing confirm Sher rick’s suspicions. A June laboratory report Illi nois State Police found match between Ronald DNA or fingerprints samples collected from trail er any other Buhr building. Even after searches, there “lack any forensic evidence [or a] statement any witness connecting Ron Olson [any way] Buhrs, their trailer, their property any other matter would lead reasonable police officer believe there probable cause believe Ron Olson committed crime.”
Despite lack any evidence implicating Olson, Detec tives Shaw allegedly told assistant state’s torney, defendant Steven Ziegler, should arrested charged stealing trailer lawn mowers. allege “Officers provided statements cause charges Ron Assistant State’s Attorney Steven [that] resulted filing which re quired Ron Olson.”
On June 11, 2009, Ziegler filed information in charging with felony burglary Buhr property. personal knowledge in ‐ vestigation into burglary. He swore facts set forth in information were true, relying on statements made Shaw. alleges those ments false. information sets forth charges against Mr. contains section where person signs swear truth facts in information: State’s Attorney said charges:
That on about OCTOBER 2008, Cham paign County, RONALD L. OLSON committed offense BURGLARY CLASS FELONY said defendant, one whose con duct legally responsible, without authority, knowingly entered building Marie Buhr, lo cated [address], Royal, Illinois, tent commit therein theft, violation Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/19 1(a). s/ Julia R. Rietz, State’s Attorney undersigned, being duly sworn, states up information belief set forth foregoing true. s/ Illegi
ble, Asst. State’s Attorney, SWORN TO before me June s/ Linda S. Frank, Circuit Clerk
6 12 3742 signature of swearing truth of in information, which marked “Illegible” in certified copy in record in case, belongs Ziegler.
Also on June 11, 2009, judge issued warrant arrest of Olson. That warrant reproduced its entirety here, omitting only certain identifying personal information:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, ILLINOIS
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, STATE OF ILLINOIS TO: ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS WHEREAS , verified information by Cham paign County State’s Attorney has been made before me DEFENDANT: Ronald L. …
At within Champaign State aforesaid, on about October 2008, commit offense Burglary ‐ class felony violation Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/19 1(a). YOU ARE COMMANDED order said Court said L. bring him/her forthwith before me, or in case of my absence inability act, before nearest Associate Circuit Judge Magistrate within said County, answer said complaint and be dealt according law.
Bail for foregoing offense(s) hereby fixed $50,000.00.
Issued th day of June, A.D. 2009, County of Champaign, State of Illinois.
s/ Richard P. Klaus, Judge said Circuit Court/Associate Circuit Judge Olson was arrested on June 11, 2009. alleges Sherrick Shaw liable “obtaining arrest” Ronald Olson. Fifteen months later, on September circuit dismissed charge against on mo tion prosecutor.
B. Procedural History Federal Civil Case Olsons filed suit June 2011. They sued Detec tives Shaw their individual capacities; Dan Walsh, Sheriff Champaign County, his individual official capacities; Assistant State’s Attorney Steven Ziegler his individual capacity; Champaign itself. alleged violat ed Fourth Amendment right free from unreasonable seizure. This federal against local officials brought under U.S.C. § asserted against providing led attesting truth alleged information. Plaintiffs asserted law claims mali ‐ cious prosecution and against Sherrick, Shaw, and Ziegler for their roles in arrest, as well as against Sheriff Walsh based on respondeat superior liability for actions of and Shaw. Champaign County was joined as nec ‐ essary party because it obliged by law pay judgments against employees acting within scope their employ ment. Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9 ‐ 102. The Olsons sought damages for Mr. Olson’s brief detention, bond restrictions requiring him stay Illinois, Cindy inconven ience being unable travel outside Illinois with her hus band. district court dismissed Olsons’ first amended
complaint failure but granted leave file another. district court then dismissed second amended well entered final judg ment defendants. district court dismissed all claims five different
reasons. First, court concluded entitled qualified immunity because they arrested Ol son pursuant issued judge. Second, concluded entitled abso lute acting his capacity ad *9 9 3742 vocate state when signed filed charging ‐ formation. Third, court found complaint failed to state a federal claim against Sheriff Walsh a supervisor not liable under § subordinate’s violation a per ‐ son’s constitutional rights. E.g., Chavez v. Illinois State Police , F.3d (7th Cir. 2001). Fourth, failed state viable Monell claim against Champaign be ‐ cause not point municipal policy practice (or person policymaking authority) caused consti tutional injury. Monell v. New York City Dep’t Social Ser vices (1978) (explaining when local govern ment may liable under § 1983). Finally, after finding valid federal claims, declined accept supple mental jurisdiction over law mali cious prosecution claims. entered final judgment favor defendants. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
We review de novo court’s dismissal failure claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). E.g., Parish v. City Elkhart 2010). We reverse dismissal. complaint plausibly alleges defend ants unlawfully caused Olson. At stage proceedings, are not entitled qualified immunity, entitled absolute qualified immunity.
A. Legal Standard
To survive motion dismiss, plaintiffs’ need contain only “a short plain statement showing pleader entitled relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While specific necessary, Erickson Par *10 10 12 3742 dus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam), complaint must “‘give defendant fair notice what … claim is grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (omission original), quot ing Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
We must determine if allegations complaint a plausible for relief. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above speculative level … .” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555; see Brooks v. Ross , 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (plausibility requirement “‘simp ly calls enough to raise a reasonable expectation discovery will reveal evidence’ supporting plaintiff’s alle gations”), quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556.
These factual allegations must more than “[t]hreadbare recitals elements a cause action, supported mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. We “are bound accept true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly , U.S. (internal quota tion marks omitted), quoting Papasan v. Allain (1986). This a fine line, though, it is appropriate give chance amend a provide more factual detail, district court here after its first dismissal. See, e.g., Bausch v. Stryker Corp ., F.3d (7th Cir. 2010) (“Generally, if court dismisses failure claim, should give party one opportunity try cure problem, even skeptical about prospects success.”), citing Foster DeLuca 2008).
“The plausibility standard akin ‘probability re quirement,’ but it asks more than sheer possibility *11 11 12 3742 defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, quot ‐ ing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556. A claim should survive Rule 12(b)(6) motion dismiss contains well pled facts—that is, not just legal conclusions—that permit infer more than mere possibility misconduct. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679. In deciding reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we do ask these things happen; instead, “the proper question ask still ‘ could these things have hap ‐ pened.” Carlson v. CSX Transportation, Inc ., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014), quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A ., 400, 404–05 2010).
B. Claim Against Detectives Shaw claim detectives are liable arresting Ron without cause vio lation Fourth Amendment. dismissed after concluding officers could liable be cause so entitled qualified immunity.
We evaluate claims qualified immunity by stand ard objective reasonableness. Malley v. Briggs , U.S. (1986); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald , U.S. 818–19 (1982) (holding officials who act objectively reasonably, reference clearly established law, entitled quali fied immunity). This same standard applies de ciding whether suppress evidence criminal trial ob tained through invalid warrant, precedents regarding suppression rulings therefore provide guidance quali fied inquiry civil § suits. Malley U.S. citing United States Leon (1984). *12 12 12 3742
Officers do not act reasonably if intentionally or reck lessly provide false information to obtain warrant. Leon , 468 U.S. at 926; see United States v. Garcia , F.3d (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that criminal defendant can rebut presumption that officer acting good faith ap plying warrant “the officer dishonest reckless preparing affidavit”). A police officer not entitled to qualified submitting “an affidavit that con tained statements he knew to false would have known were false recklessly disregarded truth and accurate information sufficient to constitute probable cause attended false statements.” Lawson v. Veruchi , F.3d (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), quot ing Tyler 1985). This stand ard applies to officers “who provided information material to probable cause determination.” Leon n.24. plantiffs’ allegations allow reasonable inference Sherrick and Shaw provided false information obtain so entitled qualified immunity. plaintiffs allege Shaw lied Ziegler about having probable cause arrest Mr. Olson. states “Officers provided false ments cause charges Ron Ol son Assistant State’s Attorney Steven [that] resulted filing which required Ron Olson.” defendants respond bare legal conclusion fails give them notice against them light pleading requirements set out Twombly Iqbal .
They suggest were required specify what statements led arrest. But *13 13 alleged all of the facts they could reasonably be expected to know and have provided much more detail than the bare le ‐ gal conclusion that Sherrick and Shaw “provided false ‐ ments of cause.”
Plaintiffs’ “pleading burden should commensurate with amount information available them.” Bausch , F.3d at (citation and internal quotation marks omit ted). It is unreasonable require plead spe cific statements with more particularity when have knowledge specific falsehoods can learn them only through discovery. Olsons do know what false information purported basis arrest warrant itself is so conclusory. It refers only conclusory allegation that committed burglary. well pled facts complaint make it reasonable expect that discovery will reveal evi dence about precise statement that Olsons contest is that all that required at stage. See Brooks Ross , 2009) (complaint plausible it contains “raise reasonable expectation dis covery will reveal evidence” supporting allegations), quoting Twombly U.S. at 556. complaint recounts detail investigation leading
up Mr. absence evidence implicat ing him any theft lawn mowers trailer. Viewed whole, supports plausible inference lied about factual basis proba ble cause Olson. Twombly 555–56. allege every step Shaw’s extensive investigation failed yield any evidence Mr. involved theft trailer lawn mow No. ‐ ers. officers found abandoned trailer that they lieved the trailer stolen from the Buhrs. They took fin gerprint samples from that trailer, had the samples analyzed, found no match their database. officers then ob tained search the Olson residence well Mr. Olson’s DNA fingerprints. They executed both searches but allegedly found nothing linking Olson to the sto len trailer. DNA fingerprints did match sam ples collected from abandoned trailer samples from the Buhr property. And search Olson residence also turned up nothing implicating Mr. theft even linking him to Buhr property, scene crime. Olsons allege that police have any statements from witnesses that implicated Ron Olson.
In short, allege detail that Sherrick Shaw’s unusually elaborate investigation theft trailer revealed no evidence that Mr. anything do it. These well ‐ pled facts permit reasonable infer ence that Shaw knew that would sup port cause Olson. And yet allegedly gave statements that provided factual basis arrest. We can draw reasonable inference from these allegations whatever said Ziegler, it included led unlawful Olson. defendants rely heavily Burton City Franklin 1:11 cv ‐ JMS ‐ TAB, WL (S.D. Ind. July 2011), argue plaintiffs’ complaint deficient, we find it useful compare Olsons’ complaint complaint case. In Burton dismissed plaintiffs’ allegation search warrant was “[b]ased upon information” provided by police officers was conclusory supported by well ‐ pled facts that would give the defendants notice the claim. Id . at *4–5. problem the Burton complaint was that all the facts alleged showed that the police actually have probable cause. Before requesting the search warrant, two po ‐ lice officers had monitored an informant who made con trolled drug buys at Burton’s house. Id . at *2. Based on that allegation, the concluded that the search war rant the house had been supported by probable cause. only possible “false information” provided by the police was overstatement the quantity drugs bought the formant. Id . *5. But even that inference—itself “a strained reading Complaint”—was sufficient wrongful search facts complaint es tablish that police had probable cause seek search warrant even quantity drugs exaggerated. Id . None alleged facts could support reasonable infer ence defendants had violated any law, so had no choice but dismiss complaint failure claim. Id .
In contrast Burton complaint, complaint here al leges facts investigated Olson but turned up evidence linking him crime. Yet officers nevertheless told had probable cause believe stolen trailer lawn mowers, arrested burglary. These permit reasonable inference defendants inten tionally recklessly caused without cause. Viewing whole, have provided much more than “mere allegation search [was] based ‘false information.’” Burton WL *16 16 12 3742 2938029, *4. The factual allegations state a plausible against detectives for false arrest.
C. Claim Against Prosecutor Ziegler alleged that prosecutor Ziegler is liable for false arrest because he verified allegations charging information were true therefore was act ing as a witness. protests he entitled abso lute immunity because he was acting prosecutor signing filing information initiate prosecution for burglary. Both sides agree courts conduct functional analysis determine prosecutor has absolute immunity entitled absolute immunity only for conduct relates his role an advocate for state. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , U.S. 259, (1993); Burns v. Reed , U.S. (1991). A prosecutor’s immunity turns “the nature function performed, identity actor who performed it.” Forrester v. White U.S. (1988). question how categorize Ziegler’s conduct controlled by Kalina Fletcher (1997), where Court examined whether prosecutor entitled ab solute prosecutorial for “making statements fact an affidavit supporting an application an warrant.” Prosecutor Kalina initiated criminal proceed ing against Fletcher by filing three documents court. Two unsworn pleadings: an charging Fletcher burglary motion ar rest. third document affidavit summarized evidence supporting charge—a “Certification De termination Probable Cause” required law sup port warrant. “personally vouched for the truth of the facts set forth the certification under penalty of perjury.” Id . at 120–21. Fletcher alleged the prosecutor’s affidavit contained inaccurate statements, which caused him be arrested jailed violation of Fourth Amendment. Court ruled prosecutor entitled abso
lute for filing motion for warrant but could be sued personally swearing truth of facts supporting affidavit. Id . at 129–31. In executing certification under penalty perjury, she acted as a complaining witness not as a lawyer:
Testifying about is function wit ness, lawyer. No matter how brief succinct it may be, evidentiary component application an warrant is dis tinct essential predicate finding cause. Even when person who makes constitutionally required “Oath af firmation” lawyer, only function she performs giving sworn testimony witness. Id . Kalina performing essentially same function police officers who obtain swearing information, police officers can sued such actions under Malley Briggs U.S. (1986). Kalina 122.
Employing functional approach applying teachings Kalina here, we conclude enti tled absolute immunity. He performed same function police officer witness when swore facts. A police officer witness would not be entitled to absolute immunity swearing to information, so neither is Ziegler. His signature is below following statement: “The under signed, being duly sworn, states upon information and belief that facts set forth foregoing information true.” It is irrelevant that his affidavit separate piece paper. In signing that he stated “upon information belief that set forth” true, Ziegler converted that part information into own affidavit. resists this conclusion tries distinguish Ka lina by arguing that he attest truth allega tions information empowered by law verify information. Illinois law provides “an information shall be signed by State’s Attorney sworn by him another.” Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/111 3(b). This statute thus distinguishes between signing infor mation charging document, which “shall” be done by State’s Attorney, swearing facts, which may be done “by him another.”
All shows is Illinois law tracks distinction be tween roles initiating prosecution swearing facts—two roles Supreme Court took great care keep separate Kalina . An Illinois prosecutor who complies law “an shall signed State’s Attorney” using her professional judgment. Ka lina 129–30 (recognizing prosecutor acting an advocate preparing filing an information, drafting witness’s affidavit, deciding evidence strong enough find cause); see Thomas City Peo ria 638–39 2009) (recognizing absolute who filed warrant). A prosecutor who signs files an information, but does not swear to any facts contained it, is protected by abso lute immunity because she is acting as an advocate State.
But, Kalina explains, prosecutor does not act ad vocate when testifying to facts because her professional “judgment could not affect truth falsity factual statements themselves.” Kalina at 130. Accordingly, when goes beyond signing information initiate suit by swearing facts it contains, attor ney is longer absolutely immune from suit.
Ziegler briefly mentions seeks qualified alternative. We reject argument same rea sons discussed above regarding Shaw. facts alleged permit reasonable inference swore false information obtain led ar rest. It is unclear at stage if false information provided by Shaw, by Ziegler, even by all three defendants. That ambiguity does defeat Olsons’ plausible claims relief against three defendants. Olsons’ allegations sufficient claims proceed discovery, which likely shed light what allegedly provided, whom. Brooks (holding plausible alleged raise reasonable expectation discovery will yield evi dence supporting allegations).
D. Claims Against Sheriff Walsh Champaign dismissed claims against Sheriff Walsh Champaign County. dismissed Walsh supervisor liable under § subordi nate’s violation a person’s constitutional rights. Champaign County dismissed because plaintiffs failed state a Monell claim. But we believe district misunderstood Olsons’ claims. Olsons sue Walsh Cham paign County federal false arrest under § 1983. Olsons sued Sheriff Walsh under a theory re
spondeat superior as a supervisor liable a subordinate’s state law torts, in this case false malicious prosecu tion. After concluding Olsons’ failed state a federal claim, declined exercise supplemental jurisdiction under U.S.C. § 1367(c) over state law malicious prosecution claims. We reverse dismissal federal claims, so law claims against Walsh—and Sherrick, Shaw, Ziegler— should considered anew remand. sued Champaign County law
requires county indemnify Sheriffs their deputies damages torts committed scope their em ployment. See Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9 102. Champaign County necessary party suit against Sheriff under federal law. Carver Sheriff LaSalle 2003) (holding “a county Illinois nec essary party any suit seeking damages from an inde pendently elected county officer (sheriff, assessor, clerk court, so on) official capacity”), citing Fed. R. Civ. P. & 19. have sued Sheriff Walsh official capacity, so we reverse dismissal Champaign County. It necessary party suit long Sheriff Walsh re mains party. judgment REVERSED
case REMANDED further proceedings consistent opinion.
[1] As general rule, we may take judicial notice public records attached ruling motion dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). E.g., Geinosky v. City Chicago n.1 2012); see Papasan Allain, n.1 (1986). defend ants filed exhib its supporting their motion dismiss. Both documents certified cop ies public records.
[2] When Olsons first filed suit, joined their claims based on claims daughter son law, Brandy Brent Vinson. Vinsons sued various local officials local governments allegedly unlawful search their property Vermilion County, which adjoins Champaign County. That search took place June 2009, after search property. On February severed claims Vinsons into two separate lawsuits. For our disposition Vinsons’ claims, see Vinson Vermilion 2015).