On January 29, 1994, after a three-day trial, a Virginia jury found Ronald Lee Fitzgerald guilty of murdering Coy White during the commission of a robbery, murdering Hugh Morrison during the commission of a robbery, abducting and raping thirteen year-old Claudia White, abducting and raping Tiffany Lovelace, and breaking and entering into Coy White’s residence. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended that Fitzgerald be sentenced to death for the murders of Coy White and Morrison due to his future dangerousness to the community and the vileness of the crimes. On May 10, 1994, the trial court imposed the death sentence. 1 After exhausting his state appeals, Fitzgerald petitioned the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied Fitzgerald’s petition. Because Fitzgerald has failed to “ma[ke] a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his application for a certificate of appealability and dismiss his appeal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c) (West Supp.1998).
I.
On January 29,1993, at approximately 6:00 a.m., thirteen year-old Claudia White was awakened in her Chatham, Virginia, home by a noise. Claudia, who was in her bed, looked up and saw a man wearing a mask over his face, standing in her bedroom doorway and pointing a gun at her. The man directed Claudia to take off her clothes and be quiet. She refused, and the man removed Claudia’s underpants and shirt. The man then removed the mask, and Claudia immediately recognized her assailant as Fitzgerald. She had seen Fitzgerald many times because he had dated her cousin, Amanda White. Fitzgerald took Claudia to another room and *361 began to rub her chest. Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald saw Coy White, Claudia’s father, drive into the driveway. When White entered the front door, he saw Fitzgerald and demanded to know what he was doing with his daughter. Fitzgerald told White to get on the floor. As White was doing so, Fitzgerald shot him in the neck, severing White’s spinal cord and killing him. Fitzgerald then pointed the gun at Claudia and ordered her to get her father’s wallet and ear keys. Claudia complied. Fitzgerald allowed Claudia to dress and then transported her in her father’s car to a rural area where he raped her. Fitzgerald then gave Claudia his jacket and shirt and locked her in the trunk of the car. Claudia later escaped from the trunk, ran to a nearby house, and called the police.
Meanwhile, at approximately 7:45 a.m. the same morning, Fitzgerald hailed a taxicab driven by Hugh Morrison in which Kathryn Davis was a passenger. Davis testified that after she arrived at her destination, Morrison drove off with Fitzgerald. At about 10:00 a.m. that morning, Douglas Shelton discovered Morrison’s body in a nearby creek.
Fitzgerald next appeared at Tiffany Lovelace’s home driving a taxicab. Lovelace knew Fitzgerald because he was a friend of her boyfriend, Girard Younger. Fitzgerald told Lovelace that Younger was on his way to her home and that he wished to wait for him. After a while, however, Fitzgerald told Lovelace to go into one of the bedrooms in her home. He followed her into the bedroom and threatened her with the pistol he had concealed. He then directed her to take off her clothes. When she refused, he fired the gun into the floor by her feet. Lovelace questioned Fitzgerald why he was doing these things. He responded that it was because Younger had raped his girlfriend, Amanda White. Lovelace eventually removed her clothes and sat on the bed. Fitzgerald, however, then told her to put her clothes back on and to get into the taxicab. Lovelace refused to leave her children and insisted on taking them with her.
Fitzgerald took Lovelace and her children to a motel in Altavista, Virginia. They arrived at approximately 9:00 a.m. When Fitzgerald, Lovelace, and the children entered the motel room Fitzgerald had rented, Fitzgerald ordered Lovelace into the bathroom where he raped her. Around 11:45 a.m., they left the hotel room. Fitzgerald spotted Sonya and John Covington, guests of the motel, and asked them for a ride. The couple agreed and took Fitzgerald, Lovelace, and her children to Lovelace’s home. Lovelace and the children got out of the car, but Fitzgerald asked the Covingtons to take him to the courthouse. When Fitzgerald and the Covingtons arrived at the courthouse, Fitzgerald pointed a gun into his mouth and pulled the trigger. The gun malfunctioned, however, and failed to fire. Sonya jumped out of the car, and John took the gun from Fitzgerald. Shortly thereafter, the police apprehended Fitzgerald.
On March 3, 1995, Fitzgerald’s convictions and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth,
II.
On appeal, Fitzgerald raises four claims: (1) that he was denied a fair and impartial jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) that the Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory information as required by
Brady v. Maryland,
Before we address Fitzgerald’s claims, we must determine the applicable standards of review. Because' Fitzgerald filed his federal habeas petition after enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA’s more deferential standards of review apply to his claims. The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect’ to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2264(d) (West Supp.1998). We recently interpreted subsection (1) to prohibit the issuance of the writ unless (a) the state court decision is in “square conflict” with Supreme Court precedent which is controlling as to law and fact or (b) if no such controlling decision exists, “the state court’s resolution of a question of pure law rests upon an objectively unreasonable derivation of legal principles from the relevant supreme court precedents, or if its decision rests upon an objectively unreasonable application of established principles to new facts.”
Green v. French,
A.
Fitzgerald contends that James Bradshaw’s presence on his jury deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Fitzgerald relies upon two bases for his claim. First, he asserts that Bradshaw’s failure to disclose certain relevant information during voir dire denied him the opportunity to strike Bradshaw for cause. Second, Fitzgerald contends that even if Bradshaw’s voir dire responses were truthful, Bradshaw’s statement during sentencing deliberations that he had no sympathy for a rapist demonstrates his bias against Fitzgerald. For the reasons that follow, we decline to grant Fitzgerald relief.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” U.S. Const, amend. VI. The right to an impartial jury is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Irvin v. Dowd,
In cases alleging juror dishonesty during voir dire, we apply the two-part test enunciated in
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,
that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.
Failure to satisfy the requirements of
Mc-Donough
does not end the court’s inquiry, however, when the petitioner also asserts a general Sixth Amendment claim challenging
*363
the partiality of a juror based upon additional circumstances occurring outside the voir dire. As Justice Blackmun emphasized in his concurrence in
McDonough,
“the Court’s holding [did] not ... foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury.”
Id.
at 556,
regardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias, or in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.
McDonough,
Turning to the specific facts of this ease, we find that during voir dire, the trial court asked Bradshaw if “[he] or any member of [his] immediate family [had] been the victim of a rape, robbery, or abduction?” Bradshaw answered “no.” (J.A. at 29-30.) The court later asked him if he knew of any reason that he could not give Fitzgerald a fair trial based solely upon the evidence presented and the law. Bradshaw agreed that he could render a fair verdict. Bradshaw subsequently was seated on the jury.
At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial, the jury voted to convict Fitzgerald of all charges, including the two capital murder charges. The penalty phase of the trial followed, after which the jury began its sentencing deliberations. The jury first unanimously agreed to recommend the death penalty for the two murder convictions and then began voting on all the other sentences. Upon arriving at the last conviction, the abduction and rape of Tiffany Lovelace, Bradshaw disclosed to the jury that he had no sympathy for rapists because his granddaughter had been molested as a child. He then made a motion that the jury impose a life sentence upon Fitzgerald for the rape of Tiffany Lovelace. The motion failed, however, and the jury imposed a forty-year sentence for the crime.
Some time after the jury announced its verdict and sentences but before the trial court imposed its sentence, the jury foreman reported the Bradshaw incident to the court. The trial court immediately conducted a post-trial hearing at which time both counsel and the court questioned Bradshaw regarding his partiality. 2 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court, satisfied that Fitzgerald suffered no prejudice from Bradshaw’s presence on the jury, denied Fitzgerald’s motion for a mistrial.
On direct appeal, Fitzgerald argued that he was denied an impartial jury because Bradshaw misled defense counsel when he deliberately failed to disclose that his granddaughter had been “touched in the wrong way” at the age of fourteen, thereby denying counsel the opportunity to strike him for cause.
See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth,
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we will presume the correctness of the state court’s finding that Bradshaw’s responses during voir dire were not only honest, but factually accurate. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). Because Fitzgerald has failed to present any evidence to the contrary, we will not disturb the state court’s factual determination. As a result, Fitzgerald has failed to satisfy the McDonough test. 3
To the extent that Fitzgerald asserts a general Sixth Amendment claim of juror bias in addition to a
McDonough
claim based upon allegations of juror dishonesty, this claim is also without merit. “[T]he remedy for allegations of jury partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”
Smith,
Apparently conceding that he failed to demonstrate actual bias during the post-trial hearing,
4
Fitzgerald urges this Court to
*365
imply Brad Shaw’s bias based upon the record before us.
See Smith,
“[T]he doctrine of implied bias is limited in application to those extreme situations where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such' that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances.”
Person,
Furthermore, even if we conclude that Bradshaw’s presence on the jury was error, the principles of comity, federalism, and finality prevent us from overturning Fitzgerald’s convictions and sentence, unless we are convinced that “the error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the ... verdict,’ ”
Brecht v. Abrahamson,
At the time of Bradshaw’s statement, the jury had already voted to convict Fitzgerald on all counts and unanimously had agreed to recommend the death sentence for the murders of White and Morrison. In fact, the jury had agreed to all of Fitzgerald’s sentences except the rape charge when Bradshaw stated that he had no sympathy for a rapist and recommended that Fitzgerald receive a life sentence for the rape of Tiffany Lovelace. The jury declined to adopt Bradshaw’s recommendation and instead imposed a forty-year sentence for the crime. Also, during the post-trial hearing, Bradshaw stated unequivocally that his granddaughter’s experience did not affect his voting to convict or sentence Fitzgerald. Based upon the foregoing circumstances, combined with the overwhelming evidence of Fitzgerald’s guilt, his propensity for future dangerousness, and the vileness of his crimes, we are confident that Bradshaw’s presence on the jury did not result in actual prejudice to Fitzgerald.
See Brecht,
B.
Fitzgerald next maintains that the Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory information as required by
Brady v. Maryland,
On state habeas review, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Fitzgerald could have raised this issue on direct appeal, but did not, and therefore dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted under
Slayton v. Parrigan,
C.
Fitzgerald next contends that he was denied the opportunity to inform the jury regarding his ineligibility for parole in accordance with the Supreme Court’s mandate in
Simmons v. South Carolina,
During the penalty phase of Fitzgerald’s trial, defense counsel requested that the following instruction be given to the jury:
The court instructs the jury that under Virginia Law any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of murder, rape or robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon or any combination of the offenses of murder, rape or robbery when such offenses were not part of a common act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole.
(J.A. at 668.) The trial court denied the motion. In reliance upon
Simmons,
Fitzgerald challenged the trial court’s denial on direct appeal. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected Fitzgerald’s claim, concluding that (1) parole eligibility in Virginia is a question of law to be determined by the judge, not the jury, and (2) as a matter of law, Fitzgerald would have been eligible for parole because his crimes were part of a common act.
See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth,
Simmons
holds only that a state deprives a defendant in a capital case of due process if it “conceal[s] from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its noncapital sentencing alternative, namely, that life imprisonment mean[s] life without parole.”
*368 D.
Finally, Fitzgerald asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for faihng to request a competency hearing and for failing to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. Fitzgerald also contends that he is entitled to relief because his appellate counsel failed “to raise valid issues on appeal.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 27.) On state habeas review, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed all Fitzgerald’s ineffectiveness claims for lack of mérit. We conclude that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington,
Strickland
provides that a petitioner must demonstrate both that his trial counsel’s representation was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby.
See id.
at 687,
1.
Fitzgerald claims that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a competency examination after learning that Fitzgerald was “experiencing suicidal ideation, delusional thought processes, and auditory hallucinations” before trial. (Petitioner’s Br. at 24.) As the district court noted, however, on May 14, 1994, the trial court ordered that Fitzgerald be evaluated for competency and sanity at the time of the offense. This evaluation was performed by Dr. C. Robert Showalter. Subsequently, in July 1993, the court appointed Dr. Thomas V. Ryan, a clinical neuropsyehologist, to evaluate Fitzgerald. Dr. Ryan reported that Fitzgerald was borderline mentally retarded, but that he understood the roles of the participants in the criminal trial process and was not insane. Nothing in either Dr. Showal-ter’s or Dr. Ryan’s reports suggested that Fitzgerald was not competent to stand trial. In his affidavit, trial counsel stated that he decided that requesting another competency examination would be futile in light of the existing reports and counsel’s and the court’s own experiences with Fitzgerald. 8 Counsel further testified that he found Fitzgerald to be helpful and cooperative and that Fitzgerald actively participated in his own defense, in particular during jury selection. Based upon the foregoing, we cannot say that counsel was deficient in failing to move for an independent competency evaluation.
2.
Fitzgerald further contends that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to present mitigating witnesses during the sentencing phase of the trial. Specifically, Fitzgerald asserts that there was significant mitigating evidence demonstrating Fitzgerald’s troubled mental state during his pretrial incarceration. While Fitzgerald fails to identify any witnesses to this Court or produce any affidavits from these purported witnesses, he apparently is referring to two individuals that allegedly reported him as delusional, suicidal, and hallucinatory while incarcerated. To the extent that we can review this claim, we hold that counsel’s decision not to present these witnesses was reasonable. First, counsel was entitled to rely upon Dr. Ryan’s assessment that Fitzgerald was sane and competent to stand trial and,
*369
therefore, counsel’s decision not to present additional witnesses was not unreasonable. Second, as the district court noted, counsel’s strategy to focus their case on Fitzgerald’s social and educational history, rather than his alleged mental problems in jail, was credible and, therefore, should not be second-guessed.
See Bunch v. Thompson,
3.
Fitzgerald also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to brief a claim that Fitzgerald’s sentence was excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar eases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Fitzgerald’s attorneys stated in their brief that Fitzgerald “relies upon this Court’s expertise in conducting the automatic review of the sentences of death imposed upon him which is required by Code § 17-110.1 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, and chooses to make no argument relative to this assignment of error.” Appellant’s Brief at 19,
Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth,
Counsel’s strategic decision to selectively brief and argue what, in his professional judgment, were Fitzgerald’s strongest claims does not render counsel constitutionally deficient under
Strickland. See Griffin v. Aiken,
III.
Finally, Fitzgerald contends that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing. He claims that he was entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel claims because he never received an evidentiary hearing in state court. We disagree.
Fitzgerald is entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing “only if the state court fact-finding process was deficient in some significant respect.”
Eaton v. Angelone,
IV.
In conclusion, we hold that Fitzgerald has failed to “ma[ke] a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.A. *370 § 2253(e) (West Supp.1998). Consequently, we deny his motion for a certifícate of ap-pealability and dismiss his petition.
DISMISSED.
Notes
. Adopting the jury’s recommendations, the trial court also sentenced Fitzgerald to life imprisonment for the two robberies and the abduction and rape of Claudia White; two forty-year sentences for the abduction and rape of Lovelace; and a thirty-year sentence for the breaking and entering conviction.
. We acknowledge that the common-law rule disfavors "any public or private post-trial inquisition of jurors as to how they reasoned, lest it operate to intimidate, beset and harass them.... 'If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation; to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.’
" Stein v. New York,
. On appeal to this Court, Fitzgerald contends that even if Bradshaw’s response to the voir dire question was truthful, the Virginia Supreme Court’s conclusion that juror dishonesty during voir dire is a necessary predicate to a new trial is an erroneous interpretation of the Supreme Court’s holding in
McDonough.
Fitzgerald posits that the correct interpretation of
McDonough
incorporates the concurring opinions to hold that a juror’s dishonesty is not a necessary predicate to obtaining a new trial, but only a factor to be considered in determining whether actual bias occurred.
See McDonough,
. In his brief, Fitzgerald requested an evidentiary hearing during which he could develop the factual basis for his actual bias claim. At oral argument, however, Fitzgerald agreed that he was unable to satisfy the AEDPA’s requirements for obtaining an evidentiary hearing. The Act provides that the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim unless the petitioner shows that
*365 (A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West Supp.1998).
. Even if we could review the Virginia Supreme Court’s application of
Slayton,
we would conclude that Fitzgerald’s assertion that the Virginia Supreme Court ruled upon his claim on direct appeal had no merit. Logic dictates that if the Supreme Court of Virginia had considered and rejected his Sixth Amendment claim on the merits, the court simply would have applied the procedural bar rule set forth in
Hawks v. Cox,
. To the extent that Fitzgerald’s vague reference at the conclusion of his brief that any procedural defaults should be excused due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel could be construed as an argument for cause, we reject it. To overcome procedural default, Fitzgerald must show that his counsel’s actions were constitutionally ineffective under
Strickland v. Washington,
. Virginia law provides as follows:
Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ii) rape or (iii) robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon, or any combination of the offenses specified in subdivisions (i), (ii) or (iii) when such offenses were not part of a common act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole.
Va.Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1994). As noted, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Fitzgerald’s crimes were part of a common transaction, rendering the above section inapplicable to Fitzgerald.
. Trial counsel also had Fitzgerald examined by Dr. Della Williams, a neurosurgeon, to test for the presence of any organic brain injuries. She found no evidence of injury.