This is аn appeal from judgments entered in a bifurcated trial brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for alleged constitutional deprivations suffered by the plaintiff, Ronald Heller, during his arrest by defendant Los Angeles police officer Craig Bushey. Heller filed his action against the arresting police officers, various Los Angeles government officials, and the City of Los Angeles. The individual government officials were dismissed from the case, and the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners and the Los Angeles Police Department were joined in their stead. The trial was divided so as to first try claims brought against police officer Bushey and thereafter to try claims raised against the municipal defendants. The jury returned a general verdict for Officer Bushey. The district court then dismissed the action against the municipal entities and entered judgment in their favor.
Heller does not challenge the verdict and consequent judgment in favor of Officer Bushey. He does appeal the district court’s substitution of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners and the Los Angeles Police Department for the individual defendants and the judgment dismissing his action against the municipal defendants.
We reverse the district court’s dismissal of the individual defendants and the substitution of the Board of Police Commissioners and the Police Department in their stead. We also reverse the judgment dismissing claims against the municipal defendants and remand the case for furthеr proceedings.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On June 10,1980, two Los Angeles police officers, Craig Bushey and Calvin Brasher, stopped Heller on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. The officers administered a series of field sobriety tests. Apparently dissatisfied with the results, the officers decided to take Hellеr to the sta *1373 tion to undergo a breath test. When notified that he was under arrest, however, Heller became belligerent. One of the defendants, Officer Bushey, attempted to handcuff him. An altercation ensued. In the course of the struggle, Heller fell through a plate glass window.
Heller brought an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both arresting police officers, Chief Daryl Gates of the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles May- or Tom Bradley, individual members of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, and the City of Los Angeles. In pretrial proceedings, Officer Brasher, Mayor Bradley, Chief Gates, and the individual members of the Board of Police Commissioners were dismissed from the action. The Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners and the Los Angeles Police Department were substituted as defendants in place of thе dismissed officials.
Without explanation appearing on the record, the district court, as already indicated, bifurcated the trial with the intention of first trying the claims raised against police officer Bushey and thereafter proceeding, if necessary, to the dispositiоn of claims brought against the City, the Police Department, and the Board of Police Commissioners. This bifurcation entailed no specific division of issues between the two phases of the proceedings.
Heller’s claim against Officer Bushey rested on the assertion that Hellеr’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest without reasonable cause and by the use of excessive force in effecting the arrest. As against the municipal entities, Heller contended, as required by the rule in
Monell v. Department of Social Services,
After the trial against Bushey alone, the jury returned a general verdict against Heller and in favor of Bushey. Concluding that this verdict precluded Heller’s theory of liability against the government entities, the district court did not allow Heller to present his case based on Monell. On its own motion, the district court dismissed Heller’s claims against the remaining defendants.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal of the Monell Claim
The district court’s dismissal of the claims against thе municipal defendants raises a question of law, which is reviewable
de novo. See Guillory v. County of Orange,
Appellees contend that the jury’s verdict constituted a finding that Heller suffered no deprivation cognizable under section 1983. If Heller suffered no injury, they argue, neither the City nor its agencies are liable to him, withоut regard to the nature of their policies. Were these policies unassailable on constitutional grounds, Heller, of course, would have no claim against the City or its agencies. Were they assailable on constitutional grounds, Heller, having suffered no injury, would lack standing tо sue. No “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III would exist. See generally 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3531, 3531.4 (1984) (constitutional standing requires injury in fact).
Heller, while not challenging these principles, contends that the jury verdict does not constitute a finding that he suffered no injury to his constitutional rights. It follows, he continues, that there is a “case or controversy” entitling him to challenge the policies of the City and its agencies. His position rests on the contention that the jury could have believed that Bushey, having followed Police Department regulations, was entitled in substance to a defense of gоod faith. 1 Such a belief *1374 would not negate the existence of a constitutional injury.
We believe there is merit in Heller’s position. To establish the liability of individual defendants under section 1983, a plaintiff must show, first, that he was deprived of an interest protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the defendants caused the deprivation while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982);
Harris v. City of Roseburg,
The appellant insists that this uncertainty entitled him to proceed against the government entities in accordance with Mo nell v. Department of Social Services. So long as the jurors used the Police Department “escalating force” policy to establish the reasonableness of the force that was used, the appellant’s suit should not be dismissed in its entirety without a dеtermination of the reasonableness of that policy. The transcript of the trial suggests that the jury could have used Department policy in that way.
During the trial, substantial testimony was presented demonstrating that Officer Bushey followed the “escalating force” policy of thе Police Department when arresting Heller. The transcript reveals that Officer Bushey used increasing amounts of force in an effort to restrain Heller and attempted to apply a choke hold to Heller before Heller fell through the plate glass window. The transcript also indicates that Police Department regulations authorized use of the choke hold in such situations.
The jury was not instructed on its use of this testimony in its deliberations. Since the jury instructions defined permissible force as the force necessary to effect arrest in light of “аll the surrounding circumstances,” we believe the jurors could have considered Officer Bushey’s compliance with the policy as an indication of either the reasonableness of Bushey’s use of force or the existence of immunity based on good faith.
We must conclude that the general verdict does not foreclose a finding that Heller suffered a constitutional deprivation. Hel *1375 ler’s Monell claim survived the general verdict. Dismissal of the City defendants was, therefore, improper. The jury verdict, of course, conclusively determined that there was рrobable cause to arrest Heller. On the other hand, it is equally clear that whether the application of force in accordance with Police Department regulations in this case exceeded constitutional limits has not been determined. Beyond this, we are not prepared to express an opinion regarding the scope of any doctrine of issue preclusion.
B. Dismissal of the Individual Officials and Substitution of the Board of Police Commissioners and the Police Department
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing from Heller’s action Mayor Bradley, Police Chief Gates, and individual members of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners. The Los Angeles Police Department and Board of Police Commissioners were then joined as defendants with the City of Los Angeles. On appeal, Heller challenges the propriety of the district court’s dismissal and the substitution of defendants.
The dismissal of the individual defendants by summary judgment is subject to
de novo
review on appeal.
Allen v. A.H. Robins Co.,
Government officials may be held personally liable in actions under section 1983 for acts conducted in their official capacities,
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
In his first amended complaint, Heller alleged that his constitutional injuries were caused by customs or policies to hire individuals with “vicious propensities” as Los Angeles police officers, and by customs or policies that authorized the challenged actions in his arrest.
In granting thе individual defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined that only those individuals who were in office at the time of the trial were suitable defendants with regard to allegations of individual liability. 4 The court also concluded that it would be proper to substitute the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, as a policy-making body, and the Los Angeles Police Department for the individual municipal officials. 5
These conclusions were unjustified. The proper individual defendants in this action are those officials who were in office before or at the time Heller was arrested and who may have adopted a plan or policy authorizing or approving the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
See Rizzo,
Having dismissed the individual officials as defendants, the trial court permitted Heller to amend his complaint nunc pro tunc to substitute in their place the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners and the Lоs Angeles Police Department. Because we hold that the dismissal of the individual officials was improper, the need for the substitution no longer exists. Since the City of Los Angeles was already a defendant in this action, the joinder of its agencies, the Board and the Police Department, was also unnecessary. We therefore reverse the addition of the Board and Police Department as parties to the present action.
Ill
CONCLUSION
The dismissal of all the individual officials on summary judgment and the substitution of the Board of Police Commissioners and Poliсe Department was improper with regard to Heller’s claims that his injuries were caused by a policy or custom promulgated by certain officials in their official capacities.
The dismissal of the Monell claims against the City of Los Angeles and the claims against all individual officials was in errоr. The jury verdict for Officer Bushey in the first proceeding does not require such a result. It does not preclude the claims against individual officials or the Monell claims against the City.
We therefore reverse, and this action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. All government officials еnjoy a qualified, good faith immunity from liability under sec
*1374
tion 1983 if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
. See Jury Instruсtions, 7 Reporter’s Transcript 813 (”[T]here is no dispute in this case that the defendant Craig Bushey was a police officer of the City of Los Angeles at the time of this incident in that he was acting under the color of the authority of the State of California____”).
. See id. at 816. (“[I]f you find ... that the plaintiff has proved his claim that he was arrested without due process of law or that he was subjected to an excessive force in being placed under arrest, your verdict will be for the plaintiff and against the defendant.”). Because the instructions required a verdict for Heller if either the due process or the excessive force claim was found, the jury's verdict for the defendant required a negative finding on both claims.
. See 2 Reporter's Transcript 19-21.
. Id.