Case Information
*1 Opinion issued May 17, 2012.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The First District of Texas ————————————
NO. 01-11-00126-CV
——————————— RONALD C. TOLER, Appellant V.
VICKY LYNN SANDERS, F/K/A VICKY TOLER, Aрpellee On Appeal from the 312th District Court
Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2009-80785 O P I N I O N
After eleven years of marriage, Ronald C. Toler (Ron) and Vicky Lynn Sanders (Vicky) began divorce proceedings. They decided to resolve any conflicts rеlating to their division of community property with a mediator’s assistance and entered into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA). See T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . *2 § 6.602 (West 2006). After signing the MSA, however, Ron claimed that the writing did not reflect the parties’ agreed division of the retiremеnt benefits earned during the marriage. Ron fought to have the MSA set aside and to have the issue returned to the mediator, but the trial court entered judgment on the MSA and denied Ron’s motion for new trial. In his appeal, Ron contends that the trial court erred in doing so because the MSA provision apportioning the retirement benefits contains an ambiguity and a mutual or unilateral mistake renders the provision unenforceable as written. Ron also contends that the trial court abusеd its discretion in awarding Vicky her attorney’s fees for defending the MSA’s enforcement in the post-judgment proceedings. Finding no error, we affirm.
Background
Ron’s main complaints concern the meaning of the MSA provision granting a portion of Ronald’s retiremеnt benefits to Vicky. That provision recites:
Parties agree to award wife 50% of the community property of Ron’s Rail Road Retirement benefits, with a stop date of September 27, 2010.
Documentation produced by Ron before mediatiоn explains that his monthly railroad retirement benefits derive from two sources: (1) “Tier I,” the railroad retirement benefit component,” constituting about 57% of the total monthly benefit, and “Tier II,” the “[d]ivisible railroad retirement benefit components,” further described as “supplemental annuity, dual benefits,” constituting about 43% *3 of the total monthly benefit. A handwritten insertion adds “Retirement” to the provision, and both parties’ handwritten initials appear at the bottom of the page.
The first page оf the MSA recites in boldfaced print, “THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION, AND MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 154.071, TEXAS FAMILY CODE TX CIVIL PRACTICE REMEDIES CODE [sic].” This recital is followed by the divorcing spouse’s initials and another boldfaced notice declaring “A PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THIS MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT [sic],” again followed by the parties’ initials. Following the text on the last page, the MSA states “APPROVED,” followed by the parties’ full signatures, as well as the signatures of the mediator and the parties’ attorneys.
A week after the MSA’s execution, Ron noticed that the provision did not reflect his understanding of the agreement. The parties addressed this issue with the mediator but were unable to reach a resolution. Before the final hearing for entry of the decree, Ron moved to set aside the MSA and refer the matter back to the mediator. The trial court denied the motion, and Ron renewed his request to set aside the MSA and decree in a motion for new trial. Vicky opposed the motion and requested that she be awarded $3,390 for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred *4 in responding to the motion. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and awarded Vicky $1,500 for fees and expenses.
Discussion
Mediated Settlement Agreement
Relying on his own sworn statement recounting the events at mediation, Ronald maintains that the MSA provision at issue should have limited the award to his “Tier I Rail Road Retirement Benеfits,” and, because it does not, it results in a different, larger award than he intended.
Resolution of this issue turns on the nature of the MSA and its interpretation. Texas law provides divorcing spouses various ways to handle an agreed division of their community рroperty. Section 7.006 of the Family Code prescribes one such method: it allows the parties to a execute settlement agreement that “may be revised or repudiated before rendition of the divorce” and that must be aрproved by the judge presiding over the divorce case. T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 7.006 (West 2006). Alternatively, divorcing spouses may choose to execute a settlement agreement that
(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation;
(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and (3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at the time the agreement is signed.
T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . §§ 6.602(b), 6.603(d), 6.604(b), 153.0071(d) (West 2006).
When the agreement complies with these three requirements, it “is binding on the
parties” as soon as it is executed, and a party is “entitled to judgment on the
agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another
rule of law.” T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . §§ 6.602(b(c), 6.603(d); 6.604(c),
153.0071(e);
Cayan v. Cayan
, 38 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. Apр.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied);
see In re Joyner
,
The MSA at issue in this case meets the requirements of section 6.602 of the
Family Code. Mindful of the unique attributes the Family Code confers on the
MSA, we apply contract principles to interpret its meaning.
Chapman v. Abbot
,
If the words used in the written instrument can be given a certain or definite
legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe
the contract as a matter of law.
Coker v. Coker
,
Ambiguity
Ronald contends that the trial court should have set aside the MSA because it is ambiguous. If a divorce decree’s terms are ambiguous, the court may consider evidence in the record along with the decree to aid in its interpretation. Chapman , 251 S.W.3d at 617. A mere disagreement about the proper interpretation of an agreement, however, does not make an agreement ambiguous; the instrument is ambiguous only if, after application of the rules of construction, the agreement is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning or if its meaning is unсertain or doubtful. Id.
The term “50% of the community property of Ron’s Rail Road Retirement
Benefits” is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning: it
unambiguously entitles Vicky to that share of all of the retirement benefits earned
for the specified period under the railroad retirement plan. Ronald clearly would
have preferred to have limited Vicky’s share to 50% of the Tier I benefits under the
plan, but his urged construction does not emerge from the provision as written; to
convey that meaning would require additional language that would substantively
alter the provision’s plain meaning. A party’s request for an order altering or
modifying a property division in a final decree constitutes an impermissible
collаteral attack.
See Hagen v. Hagen
,
Mistake
Ron also contends that the trial court should have set aside the MSA based
on a mutual or unilateral mistake. Mutual mistake occurs when the parties to an
agreement have a common intention, but the written instrument does not reflect
that intent.
Dyer
,
In a footnote in his brief, Ron also alludes to the rule that a court may set
aside a contract based on unilateral mistake if the party shows that (1) the mistake
is of so great a consequence that to enforce the contract would be unconscionable;
(2) the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract; (3) the mistake
occurred despite ordinary care; and (4) setting aside the contract does not prejudice
the other рarty except for the loss of the bargain.
See Ledig v. Duke Energy Corp.
,
193 S.W.3d 167, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Ron,
however, cannot make the required showing. “A party who signs a document is
presumed to know its contents . . . .”
In re Lyon Fin’l Servs., Inc.
, 257 S.W.3d
228, 232 (Tex. 2007). Ron initialed the bottom of the page containing the
retirement benefits provision—which has a handwritten revision—and signed off
on the MSA as a whole. He cannot avoid the provision by alleging that he simply
failed to notice it until after signing.
See In re U.S. Home Corp.
,
The language apportioning a share of Ron’s railroad retirement benefits to Vicky is unаmbiguous, and Ron has not shown a mutual or unilateral mistake. We therefore hold that the trial court properly denied Ron’s motion to set aside the MSA. For the same reasons, we further hold that the trial court was entitled to construe the MSA as а matter of law and thus did not err by denying Ron’s request to refer this dispute to the mediator. [1]
Attorney’s fees award
Ron complains that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Vicky her attorney’s fees on the basis the trial court’s underlying decision on the merits is erroneous. Bеcause we have upheld the trial court’s ruling, this complaint lacks merit, and Ron does not advance any other ground for reversing the attorney’s fee award. As a result, we leave the attorney’s fee award undisturbed.
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying Ronald Toler’s motion for new trial or in awarding Vicky Sanders her attorney’s fees. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Sharp. Justice Sharp concurs in the judgment only.
Notes
[1] Ron points to language in the MSA that, according to his reading, required
that the trial court refer the dispute to the mediator for resolution.
See
Milner v. Milner
,