Ronald C. Toler v. Vicky Lynn Sanders, F/K/A Vicky TolerRonald C. Toler v. Vicky Lynn Sanders, F/K/A Vicky Toler
JANE BLAND, Justice.
After eleven yeаrs of marriage, Ronald C. Toler (Ron) and Vicky Lynn Sanders (Vicky) began divorce proceedings. They decided to resolve any conflicts relating to their division of community property with a mediator‘s assistance and entered into a mеdiated settlement agreement (MSA). See
Background
Ron‘s main complaints concern the meaning of the MSA provision granting a portion of Ronald‘s retirement benefits to Vicky. That provision recites:
Parties agree to award wife 50% of thе community property of Ron‘s Rail Road Retirement benefits, with a stop date of September 27, 2010.
Documentation produced by Ron before mediation explains that his monthly railroad retirement benefits derive from two sources: (1) “Tier I,” the railroad retirement benefit component,” constituting about 57% of the total monthly benefit, and “Tier II,” the “[d]ivisible railroad retirement benefit components,” further described as “supplemental annuity, dual benefits,” constituting about 43% of the tоtal monthly benefit. A handwritten insertion adds “Retirement” to the provision, and both parties’ handwritten initials appear at the bottom of the page.
The first page of the MSA recites in boldfaced print, “THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION, AND MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 154.071, TEXAS FAMILY CODE TX CIVIL PRACTICE REMEDIES CODE [sic].” This recital is followed by the divorcing spouse‘s initials and another boldfaced notice declaring “A PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THIS MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT [sic],” again followed by the parties’ initials. Following the text on the last page, the MSA states “APPROVED,” followed by the parties’ full signatures, as well as the signatures of the mediator and the parties’ attorneys.
A week after the MSA‘s execution, Ron noticed that the provision did not reflect his understanding of the agreement. The parties addressed this issue with the mediator but were unable to reach a resolution. Before the final hearing for entry of the decree, Ron moved to set aside the MSA and refer the matter back to the mediator. The trial court denied the motion, and Ron renewed his request to set aside the MSA and decree in a motion for new trial. Vicky opposed the motion and requested that she be awarded $3,390 for attorney‘s fees and expenses incurred in responding to the motion. The trial court denied the motion for new trial and awarded Vicky $1,500 for fees and expenses.
Discussion
Mediated Settlement Agreement
Relying on his own sworn statement recоunting the events at mediation, Ronald maintains that the MSA provision at issue should have limited the award to his “Tier I Rail Road Retirement Benefits,” and, because it does not, it results in a different, larger award than he intended.
Resolution of this issue turns on the nаture of the MSA and its interpretation. Texas law provides divorcing spouses various ways to handle an agreed division of their community property. Section 7.006 of the Family Code prescribes one such method: it allows the parties tо execute a settlement agreement that “may be revised or repudiated before rendition
(1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation;
(2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and
(3) is signed by the party‘s attorney, if any, who is present at the time the agreement is signed.
The MSA at issue in this case meets the requirements of section 6.602 of the Family Code. Mindful of the unique attributes the Family Code confers on the MSA, we apply contract principles to interpret its meaning. Chapman v. Abbot, 251 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex.2003). We construe the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to the decree as a whole. Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 447; Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 616. We accord contract language its plain, grammatical meaning unless it definitely appears that the intention of the parties would thereby be defeated. Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 616.
If the words used in the written instrument can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe the contract as a matter of law. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983); Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 616. Courts must enforce an unambiguous con
Ambiguity
Ronald contends that the trial court should have set aside the MSA because it is ambiguous. If a divorce decree‘s terms are ambiguous, the court may consider evidence in the record along with the decree to aid in its interpretation. Chapman, 251 S.W.3d at 617. A mere disagreement about the proper interpretation of an agreement, however, does not make an agreement ambiguous; the instrument is ambiguous only if, after application of the rules of construction, the agreement is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning or if its meaning is uncertаin or doubtful. Id.
The term “50% of the community property of Ron‘s Rail Road Retirement Benefits” is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning: it unambiguously entitles Vicky to that share of all of the retirement benefits earned for the specified period under the railroad retirement plan. Ronald clearly would have preferred to have limited Vicky‘s share to 50% of the Tier I benefits under the plan, but his urged construction does not emerge from the provision as written; to convey that meaning would require additional language that would substantively alter the provision‘s plain meaning. A party‘s request for an order altering or modifying a property division in a final decree constitutes an impermissible cоllateral attack. See Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex.2009). The trial court, therefore, properly denied Ron‘s request.
Mistake
Ron also contends that the trial court should have set aside the MSA based on a mutual or unilateral mistake. Mutual mistake occurs when the parties to an agreement have a common intention, but the written instrument does not reflect that intent. Dyer, 333 S.W.3d at 718. Ron asserts “that the MSA does not reveal the intent of both parties,” but absent from this assertion—and the record as a whole—is any showing that the mistаke was mutual. Notably, Vicky nowhere indicated that she, too, meant to limit her share of Ron‘s railroad retirement benefits to the Tier I benefits. Ron‘s sworn statement concerning the events at mediation, therefore, was not properly before the trial court. Under the parol evidence rule, courts may not consider extrinsic evidence that varies or contradicts the express or implied terms of the written agreement absent a showing of fraud, accident, or mutual mistake. See id.; DeClaire v. G & B McIntosh Fam. Ltd. P‘ship, 260 S.W.3d 34, 45 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no. pet.).
In a footnote in his brief, Ron also alludes to the rule that a court may set aside a contract based on unilateral mistake if the party shows that (1) the mistake is of so great a consequence that to enforce the contract would be unconscionable; (2) the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract; (3) the mistake occurred despite ordinary care; and (4) setting aside the сontract does not prejudice the other party except for the loss of the bargain. See Ledig v. Duke Energy Corp., 193 S.W.3d 167, 175 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Ron, however, cannot make the required showing. “A party who signs a document is presumed to know its contents....” In re Lyon Fin‘l Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex.2007). Ron initialed the bottom of the page containing the retirement benefits provision—which has a handwritten revision—and signed off on the MSA as a whole. He cannot avoid the provision by alleging that he simply failed to notice it until after signing. See In re U.S. Home Corp., 236 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tex.2007). Based on Ron‘s failure to adducе any proof of a mistake, the trial court thus properly refused to consider Ron‘s extra-contractual statements in upholding the plain meaning of the MSA provision.
The language apportioning a share of Ron‘s railroad rеtirement benefits to Vicky is unambiguous, and Ron has not shown a mutual or unilateral mistake. We therefore hold that the trial court properly denied Ron‘s motion to set aside the MSA. For the same reasons, we further hold that the trial court was еntitled to construe the MSA as a matter of law and thus did not err by denying Ron‘s request to refer this dispute to the mediator.1
Attorney‘s fees award
Ron complains that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Vicky her attorney‘s fees on the basis the trial court‘s underlying deсision on the merits is erroneous. Because we have upheld the trial court‘s ruling, this complaint lacks merit, and Ron does not advance any other ground for reversing the attorney‘s fee award. As a result, we leave the attorney‘s fee award undisturbed.
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying Ronald Toler‘s motion for new trial or in awarding Vicky Sanders her attorney‘s fees. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Justice SHARP concurs in the judgment only.