Petitioner Ronald Barrow, serving a life sentence for murder in an Illinois correctional facility, appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Barrow alleges, inter alia, that since his trial counsel failed to present any evidence in defense and committed several other errors during state proceedings, he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Barrow claims that the Illinois Supreme Court’s determination that his trial counsel’s performance (1) was not objectively deficient and (2) did not prejudice Barrow constituted an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The district court found these contentions unpersuasive. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of Barrow’s underlying conviction are largely undisputed. After a jury trial in the circuit court of LaSalle County, *599 Illinois, Barrow was found guilty of murder, armed robbery, residential burglary and burglary on June 3, 1985. The following factual evidence — which would prove crucial to both Barrow’s state conviction and the district court’s denial of his later habeas claims of ineffective assistance of counsel — was presented at trial. 1
On February 19, 1984, the body of the victim, Joseph O’Berto, was discovered in the basement of his residence located in Cedar Point, Illinois. He had been shot in the head, and investigating officers found a spent projectile which police forensic scientists determined could have been fired from a 9 millimeter-caliber gun. Several of the stairs leading to the victim’s basement had been “torn up,” and the basement also contained an empty safe and three slot machines. There were no signs of forced entry into the victim’s home: Darlene Brown, the victim’s daughter, had discovered the body of the victim lying in the basement in a pool of blood the morning after the murder. Brown testified that she found the front door to the victim’s residence unlocked and that several rooms in the house were in disarray. She also determined that a number of her father’s possessions were missing, including his wallet (which she said typically contained about $500 in denominations of $100), a bank book with $20,000 on deposit and a gold money clip.
On March 15, 1984, Illinois State Police were contacted by Judy Herron, who informed them that her boyfriend, Harold “Smokey” Wrona, who was incarcerated in a Maryland State prison, had information concerning the victim’s death and wished to meet with police. The police met with Wrona and, based on information that he provided them, they made arrangements with Maryland law enforcement officials to have Wrona released from prison so he could meet with Barrow and provide an opportunity for Barrow to make incriminating statements that could be recorded with police surveillance equipment. On April 6, 1984, Wrona and Barrow met in a hotel room in Maryland which was equipped with hidden -audio and video equipment operated by Maryland law enforcement officials. After Barrow made a number of incriminating statements to Wrona, he was arrested and charged with the offenses indicated above.
At trial, the State’s star witness against Barrow was Wrona. Wrona testified that he met the defendant in July of 1983, while they were incarcerated in the same cell-block at a Maryland prison. According to Wrona, he told Barrow that in 1966 two of his friends had burglarized a home in Cedar Point, Illinois and stole $64,000 that they found under a step of the basement stairs. Wrona stated that his friends told him they also found three “barrels of change” in the basement but took only the cash, and they later discovered that an additional $175,000 was hidden under one of the lower steps of the basement stairs where they had not searched. Wrona further testified that on February 2, 1984, after Barrow was released from prison on bond pending an appeal of a Maryland conviction for armed robbery, Barrow visited Wrona in prison. At that time he told Wrona that he was going to Davenport, Iowa, because he had a “score” there and wanted to visit Wrona’s son on the way. The defendant also inquired about the robbery of the man in Cedar Point that Wro-na had told- him about earlier. He sought *600 directions to Cedar Point and asked Wro-na whether he knew what the burglarized house looked like.
According to Wrona’s testimony, Barrow again visited him in prison on February 24, 1984, reporting that he had made “a pretty good score” in Cedar Point. Barrow said he and his brother Bruce had watched the victim’s home for about a week, and that late one night he had knocked on the front door, told the victim that he was having car trouble, stuck his foot in the door and pushed the victim back into the house with a gun and handcuffed him. Barrow reported finding a wallet in the victim’s pocket which contained five $100 bills, and he searched the house and found a bankbook showing $18,000 on deposit. In the basement, Barrow reported finding an empty safe and three slot machines covered with plastic. Barrow also stated that he and his brother “tore a couple stairs up” but did not find anything. In addition, Barrow said that he asked the victim where the money was but the man could not hear so he “whipped him.” While pointing a finger to his head, Barrow told Wrona that he “had to take him [the victim] out of it.” Wrona testified that Barrow said he and his brother wore gloves during the course of the crime and that he disposed of the gun in a river in Indiana just prior to being stopped by an Indiana State trooper for speeding.
The most crucial piece of evidence was the recording of Barrow’s conversation with Wrona in the Maryland hotel room, which had been monitored by police surveillance equipment and was played for the jury at trial. A transcript of the recording was also received into evidence. The transcript shows that Barrow told Wrona that “everything went just like ... we had planned it.” Barrow said he watched the victim’s home for a week and that late one evening, after midnight, he forced his way into the victim’s house. Barrow stated that although he hit the victim “all over,” O’Berto would not tell him anything except “where he kept change.” Barrow said he searched everywhere and found only an empty safe in the basement. Barrow also stated that he “pulled up” the first two stairs leading to the basement but did not find any money. Wrona asked the defendant what kind of gun he used and the defendant replied that it was a “hot, nine mil[limeter]” which he had obtained in Delaware. The defendant added that he had tossed the gun off a bridge on his way back from Cedar Point.
The State presented abundant evidence demonstrating that Barrow and his brother were in the Cedar Point area driving a rented white Ford Thunderbird immediately before and after February 18, 1984. 2 Barrow and his brother were driving this same model and make of car when they *601 were stopped by an Indiana state trooper for speeding the day after the murder. The prosecution also presented evidence to link a pair of Barrow’s shoes, found in a search of his home in Maryland, to the impression of a shoe recovered from a piece of plywood found in the victim’s basement. A police forensic scientist stated that the shoes found in the defendant’s apartment “could have made the footwear impressions” considering that the size and the pattern of the sole of the shoes matched those exhibited on the impression. On the heel of the left shoe was found a small bloodstain which contained human blood type 0. Both the defendant and the victim were blood type 0 as well (as is 45% of the white, male population of the United States).
During the trial, Barrow’s attorney presented no evidence whatsoever in defense, apparently believing — erroneously—that the submission of any evidence would waive error on a later motion for a directed verdict.
People v. Barrow,
As part of this strategy of silence, Barrow’s counsel declined to put Barrow or his brother on the stand. 3 Barrow’s lawyer did cross-examine the State’s star witness, convicted felon Smokey Wrona, though Barrow contends that counsel did so ineptly since he failed to ask any questions about Wrona’s (many) prior convictions. Barrow further asserts that counsel did not adequately exploit inconsistencies in government evidence, did not adequately investigate or present certain evidence and failed to object to improper evidence and argument presented by the State.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Barrow guilty' of murder, armed robbery, residential burglary and burglary. The State asked for the death penalty, and after the first stage of the sentencing hearing, the jury found that Barrow was subject to the death penalty since he was over 18 years of age- at the time of the murder and had killed the victim in the course of a felony (armed robbery). The trial court sentenced Barrow to death for the murder conviction, plus a consecutive 30-year prison term for the armed robbery conviction and a 15-year term for the residential burglary conviction.
Barrow’s conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court on direct appeal.
People v. Barrow,
*602
Barrow then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with the district court for the Northern District of Illinois on June 3, 2002, and while the petition was pending, Barrow’s death sentence was commuted to natural life in prison by the executive clemency action of Governor George Ryan on January 11, 2003. The district court subsequently denied Barrow’s habeas petition,
U.S. ex rel. Barrow v. McAdory,
We granted Barrow’s Motion for a Certificate of Appealability on the limited issue of whether Barrow received ineffective assistance of eounsél, determining that Barrow had made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l)(B)(2). (2/2/04 Order, App. B at 37.) Barrow now appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas petition.
II. JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction over Barrow’s habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied Barrow’s petition and subsequently denied his Motion for a Certificate of Appealability on September 29, 2003. This Court then granted Barrow’s Motion for a Certificate of Appealability on February 2, 2004. Accordingly, we now have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s denial of a habeas petition
de novo
and its findings of fact for clear error.
Denny v. Gudmanson,
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court will not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court pro: ceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2) (2003).
See also Williams v. Taylor,
A state decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court applies the incorrect rule of law or confronts facts that are' materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court case and arrives at the opposite result.
Id.
at 405-06,
IV. DISCUSSION
Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the now-familiar two-pronged test outlined in
Strickland v. Washington,
In its affirmance of Barrow’s conviction on direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Barrow’s ineffective assistance claims, stating that, under the legal test outlined in
Strickland,
“there is a strong presumption that the challenged action of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence” and concluding that, in Barrow’s case, “[w]e cannot say that the defendant has overcome this presumption.”
Upon considering Barrow’s petition for post-conviction relief, the Illinois Supreme Court initially disposed of most of Barrow’s claims under the doctrines of
res judicata
or waiver.
In its denial of Barrow’s habeas petition below, the district court addressed a multitude of grounds for the ineffective assistance claim, only some of which are raised here. The district court first concluded that many of Barrow’s claims were procedurally defaulted since they were not raised before the Illinois Supreme Court.
In the instant appeal, Barrow advances seven distinct failings by his trial counsel that, he claims, entitle him to relief: (1) that counsel failed to present any evidence in his defense at trial; (2) that counsel was not diligent in investigating and challenging the state’s evidence, especially shoe-print and fingerprint evidence; (3) that counsel did not impeach or adequately cross-examine Smokey Wrona, the State’s star witness; (4) that counsel promised to *605 present testimony in defense — including testimony from Barrow himself — -and failed to do so; (5) that counsel actually asked jurors to credit the testimony of state witness Smokey Wrona; (6) that counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Wrona about the recorded conversation he had with Barrow in which Barrow incriminated himself; and (7) that counsel failed to contest or object to the State’s presentation of certain misleading evidence. Barrow also claims that the cumulative impact of these errors is sufficient to warrant a reversal of his conviction. The district court treated some of these claims as procedurally defaulted and reached the merits of others, but such procedural distinctions are ultimately immaterial to our disposition of the instant appeal. The end result is the same even assuming that all of Barrow’s claims are eligible for review on the merits.
Barrow’s most basic ground for his claim — one that arguably subsumes most of his other more specific grounds — concerns his lawyer’s failure to introduce evidence at trial. Both parties acknowledge that Barrow’s counsel presented no evidence whatsoever in defense, and that this tactic (if it may be so called) was motivated at least in part by counsel’s erroneous understanding of Illinois law concerning directed verdicts. Both parties also agree that the Illinois Supreme Court correctly identified the Strickland test as the legal rule governing Barrow’s ineffective assistance claims. The only issue is whether the Illinois court applied this rule unreasonably under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
As to the first prong of the
Strickland
test, we take issue with the Illinois Supreme Court’s initial determination that trial counsel’s performance was reasonably competent.
See
Nonetheless, the Illinois Court’s final ruling on
Strickland’s
second “preju
*606
dice” prong is another matter, especially given the highly deferential standard of review mandated by § 2254 of AEDPA. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that, in light of the “overwhelming” evidence against Barrow, the absence of exculpatory evidence at trial did not alter the final outcome of the case.
Barrow next contends, as a separate ground for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that his attorney promised the jury he would present exculpatory evidence — including testimony from Barrow himself — and then failed to do so. This claim may be seen as a reprise of Barrow’s more general claim regarding counsel’s failure to introduce exculpatory evidence,
6
though the district court recognized it as a separate claim and apparently evaluated it
de novo
(though it did not explicitly so state).
However, in Hampton, we placed special importance on the fact that trial counsel had specifically promised the jury that the defendant would testify himself. Id. Here, while it is undisputed that Barrow’s attorney promised to present exculpatory evidence, and while, by presenting his opening statement in the first person plural (using the pronoun “we”), he arguably insinuated that Barrow would participate personally in the defense, counsel made no explicit promise that Barrow would testify himself. 7 Even more importantly, the case *607 at bar also differs from Hampton on the crucial prejudice issue. In Hampton, we held that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call him to the stand, in large part because the sole evidence against him was other eyewitness testimony. Id. Under such circumstances, we concluded that defendant’s opportunity to contradict and cast doubt on such testimony was critical to his defense. Id. In this case, by contrast, the primary evidence against Barrow was his own oral confession, recorded during a conversation with state witness Wrona, in which Barrow confessed to the crime and described in his own words how he committed it. Under these circumstances, Barrow’s personal testimony seems far less crucial to his chances of success at trial.
This is especially so because of the content of Barrow’s proposed testimony. Barrow claims he would have testified that his taped conversation with Wrona concerned another crime in another state, that he was spotted in the vicinity of Cedar Point, Illinois on the night of the murder because he was delivering a suitcase for Wrona in that area, and that he was carrying $500 in cash (the precise amount that the victim habitually carried) because Wro-na had paid him a fee for delivering the suitcase. 8 However, Barrow does not offer any detail (nor was he able to offer any at oral argument) as to what this alleged “other crime” was, when it occurred, or why it was recounted (in the recorded conversation with Wrona) in terms so uncannily similar to the crime for which Barrow was convicted. In short, it seems most unlikely that Barrow’s testimony, as described at this late stage, could have altered the ultimate verdict. 9
Thus, while we take pains to reaffirm the importance of the principle articulated in Hampton — that unfulfilled promises to present personal testimony from a criminal defendant are highly suspect under Strickland — Hampton is distinguishable from the case at bar. We also agree *608 with the district court 10 that, regardless of the standard of review employed, 11 given the abundance of evidence against him, Barrow cannot show that he suffered prejudice from his attorney’s unfulfilled promises to present evidence.
Finally, Barrow also contends that his decision not to testify, based on his lawyer’s “ridiculous” advice, was not intelligent or informed and thus constituted a violation of his constitutional right to present testimony in his own defense. Barrow, of course, is correct that the right to testify in one’s own defense is a fundamental procedural right. He is also correct that a defendant must acquiesce fully and intelligently in counsel’s attempts to waive that right — only the defendant himself, not his lawyer, can waive the right to testify.
See Ward v. Sternes,
Barrow may find some support in Moore, but only indirectly. Moore held that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty was not a valid waiver of his right to stand trial when that decision was based upon his lawyer’s erroneous advice regarding the sentencing consequences of plea bargaining versus going to trial. But crucially, the court in Moore also required a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the erroneous legal advice actually changed the outcome of the case. Id. at 241-43. In Moore, since the court was convinced that the defendant would have elected to stand trial but for counsel’s erroneous advice, defendant’s plea was invalidated. Id. Here, it is clear that Barrow elected not to testify based on his lawyer’s admittedly mistaken legal advice. However, as discussed above, it also seems clear that Barrow’s claims regarding counsel’s failure to call him as a witness do not entitle him to relief, even under de novo review. 12
V. CONCLUSION
We cannot say that the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling involved an unreasonable *609 application of Supreme Court precedent under Strickland v. Washington. We therefore Affiím the order of the district court denying Barrow’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Notes
. The facts in this section are taken principally from the Illinois Supreme Court's affir-mance of Barrow's conviction on direct appeal,
People v. Barrow,
. This evidence included testimony from Judy Herron (Wrona’s girlfriend), indicating that Barrow and his brother, driving a white car, had- visited her home in Seatonville, Illinois twice during this period; testimony from Patricia Hurley, an employee of Budget Rent-A-Car in Newark, Delaware, to the effect that on February 11, 1984, Barrow rented a white Ford Thunderbird bearing license plate number 744741; testimony from a clerk of the Holiday Inn motel in Peru, Illinois who testified that on February 13, 1984, the defendant checked into room 123 with a second man and checked out on February 19, the morning after O’Berto's murder; the testimony of Kathleen Noll, a LaSalle County police officer, indicating that on February 16, 1984, at approximately 4:45 a.m., she observed Bruce Barrow driving a white Ford Thunderbird with Delaware license plate number 744741, heading the wrong way down a one-way street in downtown LaSalle, Illinois; a tape recording of phone calls made by Bruce Barrow to the defendant after being stopped and arrested by officer Noll for this traffic offense; testimony from a worker at a Cedar Point restaurant patronized by Bruce Barrow at approximately 10 p.m. on February 18, 1984; testimony of Curtis Barmes, an Illinois State trooper, indicating that on February 18, 1984, *601 at approximately 1:55 a.m., he observed a white Ford Thunderbird with Delaware license plate number 744741 heading north on Route 51 at a point south of the Illinois River bridge near Cedar Point; testimony of Dave Doll, an Indiana State trooper, indicating that on February 19, 1984, at approximately 5:07 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, he stopped Barrow and another man for speeding in a white Ford Thunderbird heading east on the Indiana Toll Road.
. Barrow claims that counsel promised the jury it would hear testimony from both Barrow and his brother. However the trial transcript reveals no such explicit promise. Barrow's lawyer merely assured the jury that evidence would be presented, and that Barrow had an explanation of the night in question that "we will tell you about.” (R. at 1863-72.)
. Both parties and all the courts below have proceeded on the assumption that Barrow's claims are governed by the
Strickland
standard. Barrow does not argue for application of a different legal test. However, we note at the outset that counsel’s extreme failings at trial come perilously close to triggering the rule outlined in
United States v. Cronic,
In the instant case, given that Barrow’s attorney adduced no evidence in defense (including no oral witness testimony), it could certainly be argued that Barrow’s counsel "entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing.” However, this characterization is not supported by the Supreme Court's subsequent applications of
Cronic.
For example, in
Bell,
the Court rejected a habeas petitioner’s argument that his lawyer failed the
Cronic
standard by declining to present a case in response to evidence offered by the prosecution at a sentencing hearing.
Id.
at 696-98,
When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney’s failure to test the prosecutor's case, we indicated that the attorney's failure must be complete .... Here, respondent's argument is not that his counsel failed to oppose prosecution throughout the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points.
Id.
at 696-97,
Of course, counsel’s failings in the instant case occurred at trial rather than at a sentencing hearing, and thus they may be considered more grievous. Nonetheless, like the lawyer at issue in Bell, Barrow’s attorney did not fail to take action altogether — at the very least he presented opening and closing arguments, and he cross-examined the State’s witnesses (however inexpertly). Thus in light of Bell it is most apt to say that counsel’s failure was not complete, but occurred "at specific points” in the proceeding. As such, we are satisfied that Strickland is the appropriate governing precedent.
. In his brief, Barrow describes counsel’s mistakes as "incredible” (p.20), "startling” (p.32) and "ludicrous” (p.32), stating that counsel showed "remarkable consistency in his incompetence” (p.21).
. In its post-conviction proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court took this view and dismissed the issue as
res judicata.
. Barrow's attorney speaks in the first person plural throughout his opening statement, using language like “we will show,” "we had a reason,” etc. (See R. at 1863-72.) However, the closest he comes to promising personal *607 testimony from Barrow is the following statement: "We have a place that we were located at on the evening of the murder at or about the proposed time of the murder that we will tell you about. We have a line of progression of events after that which will clearly show to you how Ron Barrow got to where he was at ....” (R. at 1865 (emphasis added).)
. Barrow’s brief presents his proposed testimony as follows:
Ronald Barrow would have testified ... that he was innocent of the crimes charged, that he knew nothing about the killing with which he was charged and that he never spoke to Wrona about the murder of the victim. His April 6, 1984 taped conversation with Wrona concerned another crime in another state which Wrona had arranged. Mr. Barrow would also have testified that he was in Illinois in February, 1984 to deliver a suitcase for Wrona, that he received a $500 money order from Wro-na as a fee for arranging the delivery of the suitcase. On February 18, 1984, he was with his brother Bruce at the Lamp Liter Bar in Ottaoa, IL until 1:30 A.M. when they left on Route 6 to return to the Holiday Inn Motel, that his brother missed the exit, took the next exit at Route 51 and made a U-turn at the first available road, after which an Illinois State Trooper began following their car, that neither he nor his brother has ever been in Cedar Point, IL, that he was not wearing "hush puppy” shoes while he was in Illinois, that he did not have a gun in his possession that night, and that, at the time, he was attempting to be included in Wro-na’s "mob partners.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 28.)
. This is so even under the more lenient formulations of the "prejudice” standard cited by Barrow.
See Strickland,
. For the district court’s ruling on this issue
see
. The Government urges this Court to reject the district court's
de novo
approach and review this claim under § 2254’s far more deferential standard. (Gov. Br. at 17-18 (citing
Gomez v. Acevedo,
.It is an interesting question whether defendant’s forfeiture of his constitutional right to testify, standing alone, is sufficiently "prejudicial” to warrant reversal of a conviction, or whether the decision not to testify — even when based on erroneous legal advice — is not prejudicial unless it actually affects the outcome of the trial. Seventh Circuit precedent seems to support the latter view that defendants who allege they waived their right to testify still must show that this waiver was prejudicial, i.e., that the failure to testify affected the outcome of the trial.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States,