*1 involving determinations, nal cases FISA We conclude that the legal material is- inspect, camera, this court can the same sues involved in the district court’s deter- documents classified reviewed the dis mination of legality also are on reviewable trict court to determine appeal whether the sur from a deportation final order. On legal, veillance hand, and can determine the other if the surveillance evidence used, whether the district court abused its discre is not or is not depor- material refusing decision, tion disclose contents of process tation Hamide’s due application. Sarkissian, rights FISA in that proceeding will not have been 964-65; Badia, F.2d at see 827 F.2d at violated.
1463-64. The lack
hearing
of a factual
does not make the
inadequate
thus
record
CONCLUSION
appellate
review.
In the
statutory
absence of a
or constitu-
We find
issues
factual
involved
challenge independent
tional
of the INS
district
court’s
determination
FISA
proceedings,
express
about which we
appeal
would
reviewable on
from a final opinion, review of the district court’s sur-
deportation order.
veillance determination must be limited to
appeal
deportation
from a final
order.
Because the district court’s order finding
Legal
b.
issues
the FISA surveillance lawful was not a
only legal
When
issue is involved
order,
final
and because both the factual
and a
hearing
unnecessary, ap
factual
legal
and the
issues involved will be review-
pellate jurisdiction encompasses legal de
appeal
on
deportation
from
able
a final
terminations on which the final order is order, we find
jurisdiction
we lack
over
contingent, where
sought
the relief
is in
appeal.
Hamide’s
deportation
consistent with the
order.
appeal
is DISMISSED.
Chadha,
F.2d evidence from the surveil deportation
lance is used in proceed
ings, legal issues related to the district
court’s FISA determination therefore will appeal
be reviewable on depor from a final 1) tation order if depends on the order SMITH, Ronald Allen gathered evidence through the FISA sur Petitioner-Appellant, veillance, 2) and Hamide seeks relief incon order, sistent with the such as cancellation deportation. McCORMICK,* Warden, Jack Prison, al., State et requirement The first easily If met. Respondents-Appellees. the surveillance evidence is material to the deport, decision then court will re- No. this 88-4115.
view FISA If the evi- determination. Appeals, United States Court merely dence is incidental the final de- Ninth Circuit. order, portation then Hamide will have lit- tle challenge incentive to it in Argued context and Submitted Oct. 1989. appeal deportation. The sec- Sept. Decided 1990. requirement ond easily is even more satis- Any appeal deportation fied. from a final likely will seek relief
order inconsistent deportation.
* predeces- Jack McCormick is substituted for his State Prison. sor, Henry Risley, as Warden of the Montana
gens child, as a and had consuming been to 20 tablets of LSD day during summer of 1982.
Without a car or much money, the three walked across the U.S. border into Mon- south, tana and hitchhiked coming to East Glacier, August Montana on 4. Munro had purchased large a quantity of LSD for the trip; he testified that he and Smith con- sumed at least 40 during “hits” each Au- gust 3 August and 4.
In East Glacier the young stopped men in a approximately bar at one o’clockin the Gardner, Fiedler they Cliff Gardner afternoon. There & Der- drank beer and Cal., ham, Francisco, played San for pool with petitioner-ap- bar, some others in the pellant. including Harvey Man, Jr., Mad and Thom- Rabbit, Running as Jr. After about an Gen., Betsy Brandborg, Atty. Asst. and hour, Smith, Munro and Fontaine bought Dorothy McCarter, Gen., Atty. Asst. Hel- more beer to take with them and started ena, Mont., respondents-appellees. walking along west Highway hoping to They hitch a ride. picked up by were Mad Running Man men, and Rabbit. The five drinking, all drove until Mad Man and Run- ning stop Rabbit decided to and urinate in FLETCHER, FERGUSON, Before and some roadside bushes. FERNANDEZ, Judges. Circuit Running When Mad Man and Rabbit re- FERGUSON, Judge: Circuit car, turned to produced gun, Smith a knife, they and Munro a had carried appeals Ronald Smith from the U.S. Dis- Intending with them from Canada. summary judgment trict Court’s denying car, steal the Smith and Munro walked Mad petition his for writ of corpus. habeas Running Man and back into the Rabbit Smith, sentenced death for the murder bushes. There Smith shot Mad Man. Montana, of two Native American inmen gun Smith then reloaded his and shot Run- asserts numerous constitutional violations ning The two Rabbit. victims were killed sentencing process. in the
instantly. and Munro then returned Smith car, to the and drove off. The car was I. recovered Fontaine and were when Munro 3, 1982, August On Ronald then later in robbery arrested for armed Califor- old, years hitched a ride from the town killings. nia. Fontaine linked Smith to the Alberta, Canada, of Red Deer in toward the Smith Wyoming. was arrested accompa- U.S.-Canadian border. He was charged Smith with two counts of was men, Munro, nied two other Rod a aggravated and counts of kidnapping two friend spent with whom Smith had time 1,1982, On November deliberate homicide. Fontaine, jail, and Andre someone Smith to the crimes. pled guilty Smith only had known a few months. The three men, young lacking employment stable and February Smith moved to On having jails, served time Canadian guilty, had and change plea to asked for the they decided had no future in Canada and He stated that he penalty. death wanted a would set off for Mexico. Smith and Mun- because he had received death' sentence users; heavy drug ro were apparent- Smith against his life from Native threats Ameri- ly begun using because, heroin and prisoners, having spent hallucino- can to examine 1983 ordered no prison, saw life nearly half his court. report for the prepare living prison. continue reason to psychia- to the objected Defense counsel plea, guilty acceptance of Following court rather directly reporting trist’s held March hearing Not- defense. acting an aid than mitigat- aggravating 1983, to consider objection, the withstanding the presented The state ing circumstances. direction held under examination testified, hearing. Smith at the
witnesses thp court. directly to reported the court die. He asserted request to reiterating his specific was limited examination mitigat- circumstances were no that there day of capacity on question mental At the conclusion *4 ing his crimes. killings. the execu- Smith’s ordered hearing, the court Decem- tion. at the testified The hearing. the In 1, 1983reconsideration ber however, filed a mo- Smith Subsequently, use assuming opinion, even psychiatrist’s sen- of the death for reconsideration tion immediately be- of LSD quantities large of court-ap- of a assistance and for the tence usage not substan- crime, did such the fore hearings on the At psychiatrist. pointed ac- capacity or mental tially affect Smith’s 1983, 3,May on for motion reconsideration pe- testimony, Smith Following this tions. 1983, that 1, testified Smith December and of another appointment for the titioned and plea guilty changed his he when denied, and was motion That psychiatrist. deeply depressed, had been to die he asked filed 1984, 15, trial court February the on reference omitted purposefully had and The to die. sentencing Smith its order that explained He mitigating factors. any circum- aggravating that found had shootings he for upon his arrest existed penalty a death justifying stances confinement without solitary placed in been 46-18-303, and Ann. Mont.Code § under He now air, or exercise. sunlight, fresh mitigating circum- were there that be- of the sentence sought reconsideration for “sufficiently call substantial stances to better cause, having been transferred leniency”. optimistic conditions, more he was prison he and because prison, surviving about affirmed Supreme Court Montana The urged family, who by his been visited had Smith, Mont. 217 sentence, State live. him to re- (1985),petition 1087 705 P.2d of hearings on reconsideration P.2d At 705 denied, 217 Mont. hearing sentence, that for stated Smith death of certiorari to A writ had been addicted years he previous five denied, was Smith U.S. shooting day of the LSD, that on and Montana, Fon- state. a dissociative he had been in post-conviction (1986), as was L.Ed.2d con- also testified and Munro taine Supreme Court. in the relief Mun- use. drug and alcohol relief, firmed habeas for federal then filed Smith and alcohol ro, LSD who had consumed summary judgment. on which was denied (Munro) that testified the district timely appeals He now day crime. hallucinating on court. background, criminal his discussed Smith previous crimes
indicating that none
his
II.
his inter-
stated
He
violence.
involved
brought forward
He
in rehabilitation.
est
A.
his claim
supporting
evidence
character
character,
out
violence
sentencing violat-
that his
asserts
con-
rehabilitation. He
capable of
he was
ex-
was denied
process because he
ed due
shootings.
for the
guilt
to admit
tinued
his
preparing
assistance
psychiatric
pert
We
mitigating circumstances.
testimony
on claims
contradictory
light of the
agree.
June
court on
mitigation, the trial
possible
Oklahoma,
Ake
Under
understanding
or her
of the defen-
(1985),
own
the court. As
prepared for
report
Now,
testified
Febru-
Q:
when Smith
dem-
stated, “The record
Harrison
Justice
killing
to
pled guilty
ary
he had
after
a neutral
was
that Dr. Stratford
onstrates
he
whether
boys he
asked
those
was
two
as to his
psychiatrist who examined
he
day or drunk and
was
that
intoxicated
Dr.
the offenses.
at the time
sanity
doing.
no that he knew what was
said
at the
foregoing
testified
Stratford
you agree
that be—would
Would
that this
on
basis
it was
hearing that?
evalu-
psychiatric
no additional
found
A: No.
Smith, 217
necessary.” State
ation
1110, 1114
453, 705 P.2d
drinking?
been
Q:
think he had
Mont.
You
A: Yes.
Ake,
by “neutral”
evaluation
But under
pro-
satisfy due
psychiatrist does
Q:
intoxicated?
Or was
capacity
psychia-
financial
to retain other
Judge Scalia stated
cess. As then Circuit
Competent
Appellant
amici would
court-appointed psychiatrist
to consider
availability
mere
believe
analysis
help prepare
other lines of
and to
[psychiatric] ex-
cross-examination of ...
might
other forms of defense. Counsel
provide
perts is sufficient to
the neces-
the use of the
to assist-
process.
restrict
sary
in the criminal
balance
bearing
refuting
ance in
other evidence
on
perhaps
psychiatry
be so if
That would
capacity;
might
mental
choose not to
physics,
so
were as exact
science
that, assuming
psychiatrist pre- present testimony on certain forms of men-
the ...
...,
impairment
op-
cisely
the data
error of
tal
at all. None of these
described
analysis could
demonstrated.
It
since the court
tions was available Smith
however,
Ordinarily
is,
limiting
scope
from that.
gave explicit
far
directions
psychiatric
evaluation,
only
psychiatric
effective rebuttal
and since the
of his
contradictory opin-
testimony
report
opinion
directly
to the court.
forwarded
testimony
ion
...
We
defense coun-
further note
since
1114.
740 F.2d at
predict
psychi-
cannot
the outcome of a
sel
competent
entitled to his own
evaluation,
Smith was
grant court-appointed
atric
expert.
v. Chav
See also U.S.
only
psychiatric assistance
on condition of
(D.C.Cir.1973)
is, 486 F.2d
to the fact finder
automatic full disclosure
(“Two, three,
for the
psychiatrists
or four
impermissibly compromises presentation of
the court do not constitute
Government and
defense, by depriving him of
an effective
“
expert assistance for the de
adequate
adequate opportunity
present
‘an
[his]
Sloan,
fense”);
776 F.2d
United States
sys-
fairly
adversary
claims
within
”
Cir.1985)
(10th
(state’s duty “can
at
tem.’
U.S.
appointment
of an
not be satisfied with
(quoting
Moffitt,
Ross v.
contrary
expert
ultimately testifies
who
...
potential
us,
had been
involving a
if Dr. Stratford
before
even
counsel in a case
run the risk
and had
insanity
psychiatrist,
must
acting
defense of
as a defense
expert whom hires
psychiatric
of no diminish-
that a
the same conclusion
reached
respect
crime,
defen-
him
day
to advise
with
Smith’s
capacity on the
ed
may be forced to
condition
dant's mental
as-
to a confidential
was entitled
counsel
witness.
involuntary government
evaluation,
an
be
and the
of such an
sessment
would,
rule
we
of such a
The effect
other, more
pursue
strategic opportunity
effect of de-
think, have the inevitable
But
favorable,
mitigation.
arguments for
the effective as-
priving defendants
was restricted
examination
Dr. Stratford’s
cases. A
in such
counsel
sistance of
inquiry prepared
field of
to a narrow
necessity make in-
psychiatrist will
counsel,
As
the court.
but for
for defense
surrounding the
facts
quiry
about
such,
psychiatric evaluation
process of
attorney will.
crime, just as the
alleged
inadequate.
attorney cannot
to the
made
Disclosures
govern-
proof in the
furnish
used to
B.
to the
made
case. Disclosures
ment’s
equally un-
attorney’s expert should be
request
The dissent
that Smith’s
asserts
placed on
available,
until he is
at least
psychiatric
“adversarial”
assistance
for
attorney must be
The
the witness stand.
properly requested.” Because
was “not
judgment with
make an informed
free to
record,
contrary
we
to the
this assertion
defense
course for the
respect to the best
to cite from the record
compelled
feel
creating
po-
inhibition of
without the
requests
repeated objections
government witness.
tential
At issue here
psychiatrist.
for his own
reject the contention
Thus we
...
are
question of
“there
not the
whether
insanity at the time of
the assertion
psychia-
is entitled to
times when one
attorney-client
the offense waives
added),
the dissent com-
(emphasis
trist”
con-
respect
privilege with
ments,
right
indigents
but rather
trial.
preparation
for
sultations made
psychiatric assistance
adversarial
the same
Disgust over
wealthy persons retain.
the Third Circuit that a
agree
We
particular
crime or
the heinousness of
psy
with her
communication
defendant’s
streamlining capital
interest
point of
protected up to the
chiatrist is
the constitu-
us to lower
does not entitle
of that communication.
testimonial use
indigents’
for
defense.
Nobles,
tional standards
also United States
See
2171 n.
240 n.
made his first
April
On
(1975) (order
de
to disclose
L.Ed.2d
psychiatric assistance.
request
*8
investigator’s report “resulted
fense
appointed psychi-
a
District Court
to make
voluntary election
[defendant’s]
to investi-
instructions
atrist with limited
report”);
of
United
testimonial use
[the]
pro-
and to
mental condition
gate Smith’s
1468,
F.2d
1470-71
Talley,
States
the court.
report
to
vide
Cir.1986)
(9th
(recognizing “attorney-psy
defendant
The dissent states
“[t]he
privilege”
in com
chotherapist-client
based
order; he
parts of the
objected to certain
law);
Edney v.
States Ex rel.
mon
United
report
that the
object to the fact
did not
(E.D.N.
F.Supp.
1054-55
to the court itself.”
might
available
Y.1976),
(defendant
protection
waived
timely objection, dat-
fact, the defendant’s
against prosecution’s use
rebuttal
read as follows:
ed June
expert
defendant
defense
when
one-time
have the same
2. The Defendant should
testimony
state from
on mental
introduced
testimony
expert
and
required
to
(2d
access
expert), aff'd,
doctor destroys relationship neces- Q[uestion]: In the you Court’s Order do sary to the doctor’s examination and recall the requesting that essen- evaluation, beyond the doctor’s realm tially you investigate discrepancies expertise, illegal constitutes an the Defendant’s testimony at pro- earlier delegation unconstitutional ceedings .... authority, Court’s operates as an That is correct. A[nswer]:
injustice to the Defendant.... (Emphasis added). quite The record is Q: youDo feel as a doctor that there is clear: the explicitly objected defendant pre- any inherent in performing conflict an cisely to both the nature investigative role for the Court on the being evaluation and to the report directed one hand performing an evaluation to the court. The contrary dissent’s claim of the Defendant on the other hand? insupportable. Well, you A: have worded that I The second sentencing hearing, in which any particular don’t see conflict.... psychiatrist testified, was held on De- cember 1984. Dr. report Stratford’s Q: you provided Is it true that me with govern- been forwarded to the court and report, written it however was for- counsel, ment and subsequently made Judge warded to originally, is that available defense report counsel. The correct? highly damaging claims of A: That is correct Mr. Doran. mitigation. The dissent asserts hearing that at this Q: Well, at, driving what I’m Dr. Strat- expressed objection “counsel to the fact ford, very is isn’t it you difficult for into that Smith did not independent have sphere your one mind assume the role psychiatrist. adversarial He did not ask investigator inquire of an into the report, to strike the or to refuse facts to make a determination —doesn’t it, consider to order another re- that in imply your fact you role that port... .Rather, he called skeptical have to be of what the version *9 the to witness stand.” is from the different try defendants and to come to may some conclusion as
It is true what that defense counsel called the yet sphere truthful and in the other stand, to the witness without telling you assume that the defendant is objecting hearing report. at this to the first the truth as far drug as or alcoholic But defense counsel called Dr. Stratford to usage and come to an evaluation or medi- testify for the sole purpose discrediting of regard. cal conclusion in that Isn’t that report. Dr. Stratford’s Defense counsel an your part? inherent conflict on specifically object did to Dr. Stratford’s conflict, A: It yes. could be a report at the hearing, end of that before any sentencing, new specifically preserving by the as used drugs hallucinogenic such further witnesses no have Mr. Doran: I by inves- who, unfettered and I Defendant Honor that your I feel your Honor. in- a more duties, present could tigative closing state- lengthy not make need to the opinion as unbiased and formed regard to the case.... in this ment of at the time of mind state Defendant’s may testimony, I have doctor’s further incident.... may the in one and to motions make fact psychi- additional motion include a this characterize could for the dissent That by an inves- untainted evaluation atric not “did indicating that Smith as record may I have and requirement tigative evalu- psychiatric to the effectively object” to the Court to make motions additional puzzling. is process ation grant to me ask the I would so to “failed Smith that dissent states The any additional motions days consider when issue personal psychiatrist] raise [the make in this may desire I that Supreme to the Montana appealed he first case.... Smith, 217 Mont. inYet State Court.” _I De- granted the have Court: The (1985), the 1087, 1100-01 461, 705 P.2d in writ- submit 12th to until the fendant noted, “The defen- Supreme Court may he that motions any additional ing requested the the court argues dant when may later occur mind or which have Dr. investigation, [psychiatric] additional point is say at this I can him.... [A]ll he changed and became role Stratford’s are, what the motions see what will we some- Even were we the agent for State.” by any such motions requested is relief proper- not the was agree issue that how of the tran- long preparation how and the Montana appeal to first ly raised the I set then will may require script hear agreed Court, that court for thereafter deadlines additional forth the Ake decision after Ake claims Smith’s counsel. argument written Mont. State in 1985. issued added). (Emphasis Mon- (1985). Since the P.2d process, the court’s with In accordance and decided heard Supreme Court tana filed, on December timely of question defendant issue, obviously there is repeating motion an additional The claim. to this bar procedural state It psychiatrist. for a defense prior request not assert court did district federal no more motion did barred; this hardly true that is procedurally was Ake claim “in new examination request a than Su- “agree[d] it rather Stratford’s, Dr. place and stead” a second conclusion preme Court’s restated The motion states. required.” dissent not was evaluation psychiatric objections: June as- that one did believe The district suspi- assist- the elements 2. To introduce the defendant’s pect of duties, forwarding oth- investigative
cion, objection to impose claim—the ance doctor-patient directly with the to the trial court— report interfere erwise conflict an inherent courts relationship state creates not been raised had Stratford_ in our part Dr. shown we have on As was barred. however, this obser- record, of the review object. so error, did Smith vation his directed should have The doctor objected, so had even if Again, mitigating factor any findings towards would Ake claim principal basis to the Defendant’s related whatsoever psychi- provided remain: still usage inci- prior to the alcohol drug or assisting him in charged with expert atric usage could effect such any dent alone Smith this On basis defense. percep- Defendant’s upon the have hearing. a new entitled mind. or state tions Smith, an acknowledges dissent *10 the Defendant Counsel defendant, psy- requested capital indigent pro- appropriate identifying an of process mit- of claims prepare assistance specialization chiatric degree of awith fessional it is is that position The dissent’s igation. in the and effects expertise use permissible respond for the state to to such at timely which he requested, but request by providing a “neutral” or was denied. examination, psychiatric “state” even when psychiatrist reports submits or testimo- C. ny against the defendant’s interests. argues Smith also that consideration of “Fundamentally,” dissent, states Dr. Stratford’s testimony, as well as use of “there is right no absolute to an adversari- information presentence from a report, vio psychiatrist al sentencing.” But here lated his 5th rights Amendment under Es
the dissent simply repeating is the lone 454, 101 telle v. 451 U.S. S.Ct. dissent to Ake: (1981). find, L.Ed.2d 359 Because we agree if I were to [E]ven Ake, under that Smith is entitled to a new right state-appoint- Court that some to a court-appointed psychiatric expert to assist psychiatrist ed recognized should be preparations defense for a new sentenc here, I grant right would not the broad ing hearing, we do not reach the 5th competent psychiatrist to “access to a Amendment claims. appropriate who will conduct an examina- evaluation, tion and prepara- assist III. tion, presentation defense.”
Ante,
(emphasis
at 83
S.Ct. at
[105
1096]
Smith asserts that the Montana courts
added).
psychiatrist
A
attor-
refused to
give
consider or
effect to rele-
ney,
job
whose
it is to advocate. His
mitigating
vant
evidence in its decision to
opinion
sought
question
on a
that the
impose the death
agree.
sentence. We
question
State of Oklahoma treats as a
any
Since
“unfairness”
these
fact.
A.
cases would arise from the fact that the
only competent witnesses
question
penalty
Montana death
statute
State,
reads,
being
are
part,
hired
all the de-
in relevant
fendant should
entitled
to is one com-
determining
impose
whether to
a sen-
petent opinion
the witness’
imprisonment,
tence of death
—whatever
the court
conclusion—from a
who acts
shall take
aggravating
into account the
independently
prosecutor’s
office.
mitigating
circumstances ...
Although
independent psychiatrist
impose
shall
sentence
death if it
should be available to answer defense
aggravating
finds one or more of the
questions
trial,
prior
counsel’s
and to
circumstances and finds that there are no
testify
called,
if
I
why
see no reason
mitigating
sufficiently
circumstances
defendant
oppos-
should be entitled to an
leniency.
substantial to call for
view,
ing
or to a “defense” advocate.
Mont.Code Ann.
46-18-305
§
Oklahoma,
68, 92,
Ake v.
The statute also defines
circum-
S.Ct.
(Rehnquist,
L.Ed.2d 53
stances:
J., dissenting). This view is not the law.
(1) The
significant
defendant has no
his-
court,
As a
obliged
circuit
we are
apply
tory
prior
activity.
criminal
Ake,
the rule of
position
rather than the
(2) The
committed while the
offense was
expressed in Ake’s dissent. Even if we
defendant was under the influence of
agree
were
with the dissent that the Ake
mental or emotional distur-
extreme
right should be read
narrowly,
more
in the
bance.
case before us the Montana
respond-
(3) The defendant acted under extreme
ed to Smith’s claims of
impairment
mental
duress or under the substantial domina-
by ordering
report presented
person.
tion of another
eviscerating
to the court
argu-
(4)
mitigation.
ments of
The capacity
ap-
Smith was
of the defendant
entitled
simply
preciate
to cross-examine
psy-
criminality
the court
of his conduct or
chiatrist,
present “responsive
but to
psychi-
to conform
require-
his conduct to the
testimony,”
atric
Mont.Code
§
in miti-
exists
(8)
fact that
(“any other
tion
structure,
of a
any
if
Montana
the
Under
and
references
his character
gation”):
present, death
is
aggravating factors
list of
for rehabilitation.
desire
penalty,
appropriate
presumed to be
is
emerged in
defects
constitutional
Two
mitigating circumstances
there are
unless
of these
weighing
courts’
the Montana
a sen-
justify
“sufficiently substantial”
First,
regard to
mitigation.
of
claims
defen-
capital
aIf
than death.
tence less
specifically
not
mitigation
of
those claims
any
of
evidence
brings forward
dant
by the
statute,
covered
but
listed
factors,
mitigating
enumerated
first seven
(8),
Montana
“catchall” subsection
consider
must
court
the Montana
evidence
consider Smith’s
courts refused
leniency
if
determine
factors
weigh the
term
at all. The
factors
mitigating
as
mitigating
If some other
appropriate.
not to
was used
“sufficiently substantial”
seven,
does
factor,
among the
which
mitigating
weighing
process of
describe
an-
standard
qualitative
not meet
qualifier which
factors,
rather as
but
disturbance
(e.g., an emotional
nounced
mitigat
as a
consideration
excluded from
capacity
or diminished
“extreme”
less than
“did
excuse
ing factor evidence
“substantial”)
brought for-
less than
McKoy v.
See
conduct.”
the defendant’s
(8) appears to
ward,
catchall subsection
—
-,
Carolina,
110 S.Ct.
U.S.
North
other
consideration
such
permit
(1990) (citing
1223,
369
L.Ed.2d
108
factors.
104, 113—
Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
Eddings v.
876-78,
1
71 L.Ed.2d
16, 102 S.Ct.
B.
original).
(1982)) (emphasis
hearing,
resentencing
In his second
claims which
Second,
evaluating those
brought
forward
listed under
specifically
invoked factors
mental
(1)
diminished
he suffered
factors:
statute,
trial
both
LSD; (2)
suffered
to use of
capacity due
analyzed each
Supreme Court
con-
to alcohol
capacity due
diminished
discretely, to determine
mitigation
claim
showed
(3)
record
his criminal
sumption;
sufficiently sub-
alone was
if that factor
char-
had eleven
activity; (4) he
violent
The Montana
leniency.
to warrant
stantial
be-
attesting that violent
acter references
as a
weigh Smith’s claims
courts failed
character;
admit-
(5) he
out of
havior was
“the circumstances
whole, to determine if
contrite,
was committed
guilt,
ted
the character
together with
offense
all
were
factors
These
to rehabilitation.
offender”, Pennsyl-
propensities
mitigating evidence.
clearly relevant
Ashe,
U.S.
v.
ex rel. Sullivan
vania
66, 73-76,
Shuman, 483 U.S.
Sumner
(1937)
L.Ed. 43
58 S.Ct.
2721-23,
97 L.Ed.2d
107 S.Ct.
added),
call
sufficient to
(emphasis
were
Louisiana, 431
(1987);
(Harry)
Roberts
leniency.
633, 637, 97 S.Ct.
U.S.
v. Ari
Court Walton
North
(1977);
Woodson
L.Ed.2d
—
3047, 111
-,
zona,
Carolina, 428 U.S.
*12
necessary pun
just and
of
the “suf-
determination
(1990), recently found
L.Ed.2d 511
Appendix
Appeal
on
at
ishment.” Record
leniency”
to call
ficiently
for
substantial
added).
(emphasis
To declare that such
7-3
penalty statute
death
in Arizona’s
standard
brought
on
“must
to bear”
not
burden of
evidence
regard to the
constitutional with
directly
punishment
vio
determination of
Id.
sentencing.
at
capital
in
persuasion
However,
requirements
an
the constitutional
that
lates
-,
Q[uestion] In
use
word?
that there are cer-
Judge Keedy indicates
words,
I
used other
sub-
A would have
enumer-
mitigating factors that are
tain
stantially.
I
different kinds of lan-
used
that includes the
ated
statute ... and
guage
report.
my opinion,
in the
mental or emotional
influence of extreme
*14
drug
extremely
my report the
effect was
appre-
capacity
that his
disturbance or
present
if
at all.
minimal
his conduct or to
criminality
the
of
ciate
Q
you[r]
assume that
Does
conclúsion[]
requirements
to the
conform his conduct
miti-
mitigating
to have a
become a
—to
substantially impaired.
of law was
some
gating factor that there has
be
prepared by
report that I reviewed
the
by
or material effect caused
substantial
sections ... Did
you, you refer to these
drug?
your report was
be
you assume that
Well,
understanding
essentially my
A
in
legal guidelines?
these
prepared within
up
Judge
to the
of it that that decision is
prepared
My report was to be
A[nswer]
quantitatively I would think a rea-
but
being fully cognizant of the nature
it
person would assume that
sonable
I
order and
of law
conclusions
have to be substantial.
would
language
which would
respond
tried
these
I am familiar with
indicate that
Q
say
To
that there was
substantial
these terms
I understand what
terms and
say that there was no
effect is not to
professional practice
my
on
mean based
effect?
Well,
say
I
that there was none
A
can’t
position
Q
you
or take the
Did
believe
that the
comparing your
conclusions
320-21;
304-05;
Transcript
Appeal at
on
anything,
mitigating factors could be
339.
not
tied to deliber-
anything that could
intent ... ?
ate criminal
Supreme Court followed
The Montana
concluding that
analysis,
court’s
I
the trial
understanding that was
my
A That’s
support
“there
substantial evidence
was
mental or emotional
to look for extreme
rejection of intoxi-
the District Court's
so on.
disturbances and
mitigating
circumstance.”
cation as
added).
(emphasis
Because
P.2d at 1098
Q Okay, assuming that Mr. Smith
impairment did
the evidence of mental
number of
taken LSD for a considerable
“extreme” or
statutory level of
rise to the
daily
specifically on a
basis
years but
“substantial”,
“rejected”
the evidence
may have
prior
month
to the crime
for a
circumstance, rather than
aas
day
hits of LSD a
as much as 50
taken
considered,
of
mitigating circumstance
as a
crime, may have drank as
prior to this
factors.
weight, along with other
lesser
day
12 beers on the
many as
any
crime,
as to
your
conclusion
together mitigating
what
weigh
The failure to
drugs
of these
and wheth-
may
mental effects
individually
circumstances
reality
ability
perceive
er in fact his
reflected in the
leniency was also
warrant
proper way may have
to act in a
of Smith’s
Supreme Court’s treatment
shortly, “against
been
The court stated
[a]ffected?
record.
crime, we cannot
the record of this brutal
given
question
My opinion
A
prior vio-
lack of
say that the defendant’s
history
drug ingestion
and the
sufficiently
activity is a factor
to the
lent criminal
degree
acquisition
of tolerance
leniency.”
at
Id.
had,
to call for
namely
I
LSD and
substantial
hallucinogens as
there, show-
ends
1097. The consideration
degree
tolerance to alcohol which
that since
ing that
the court believed
by
long and colorful
is characterized
by itself did not
record
materially affect his
criminal
drug history did not
underlying
Eighth
Amend-
death,
humanity
less than
require a sentence
Dulles,
[86],
ment,
Trop
considered
combina-
see
need not be
record
Yet
mitigating evidence.
L.Ed.2d
other
tion with
[78
history
had no
requires
that he
consider-
(plurality opinion),
Smith’s claims
630]
capaci-
mental
and that
violent behavior
record of the
ation of the character
drugs and alcohol are
ty was affected
the circum-
individual offender
carry a
reinforcing, and
different
mutually
offense as
particular
stances of
separate-
assessed
if
weight together than
indispensable part of the
constitutionally
ly-
inflicting
penalty of death.
process of
summarized its
Carolina, 428 U.S.
v. North
Woodson
“we hold
District
by saying,
analysis
L.Ed.2d 944
conclusion that ‘no
in its
correct
Court was
(1976) (plurality opinion).
sufficiently
mitigating circumstance
”
Penry
O’Connor wrote
As Justice
leniency.’
P.2d
to call for
substantial
—
-,
Lynaugh,
*15
added). The use of the
(emphasis
at 1098
2951, 106
(1989),
than
L.Ed.2d 256
“[r]ather
each indi-
that
singular
again reflects
form
unguided
creating the risk of an
emotional
by
weighed
mitigating
factor
vidual
of evidence
response, full consideration
aggravat-
totality
the
against the
itself
penalty
death
mitigates against the
that
ing factors.
jury
give
to
a ‘reasoned
essential if the
sentencing jurisprudence
capital
Our
back
response to the defendant’s
moral
if
record or
clear that even Smith’s
makes
” (citations
character,
ground,
crime.’
and
not in themselves
impairment are
mental
omitted;
original).
in
Justice
emphasis
death, they
than
for a sentence less
cause
the
conjunctive
use
O’Connor’s
—that
mitigation and must be
to
still relevant
are
sentencing must
analysis in
moral
death
other factors
weighed
conjunction
in
with
background,
respond to “the defendant’s
if
of the circumstances
determine
all
crime”,
character,
follows
Woodson’s
together
a lesser sentence.
warrant
mitigating evidence must
position that all
recognized
previously
This
has
Court
weighed “together”.
sen-
determination of
that
“[f]or
tences,
requires consid-
justice generally
consider,
only
must not
The sentencer
particular
acts
eration of more than
mitigating evi-
all the
“give
but
effect" to
by
the crime was committed
But
at 2947.
Penry,
dence.
109 S.Ct.
the cir-
into account
that there be taken
“rejected” as miti-
Supreme
Montana
together with
cumstances of the offense
sufficiently
gating that evidence not
sub-
propensities of the of-
the character and
deprived
leniency, and
to warrant
stantial
Pennsylvania
fender.”
ex rel. Sullivan
failing
any
by
effect
such evidence of
51,
59, 61,
Ashe, 302
55
S.Ct.
v.
U.S.
[58
weigh together
it
other circumstances.
(1937).
82 L.Ed.
Consideration
43]
possible
Simply
list of
to run
a
down
the offense in or-
both the offender and
seriatim, deciding wheth-
mitigating factors
appropriate
just
at a
der to arrive
weight, fails
one
threshold
er each
meets a
progres-
as a
has been
sentence
viewed
appropriateness
sentencing
to focus
development. See
humanizing
sive and
Failure
specific individual.
of death for a
York,
[241], at
337 U.S.
v. New
Williams
“uniquely individu-
to assess
defendants
at
93
247-249
S.Ct.
[69
Woodson, 428 U.S. at
beings”,
al human
1337];
Georgia,
v.
408
L.Ed.
Furman
light
of the com-
at
S.Ct.
[238], at 402-03
S.Ct.
U.S.
[92
mitigating
all the
weight of
bined moral
C.J.,
(Burger,
2810-11,
circumstances
IV.
*16
light
appropriate-
different moral
Id.
penalty.
754 P.2d at
ness of the
death
1977,
its death
In
Montana revised
to
did make reference
484-486.
attempt
in
eliminate
penalty statute
to
and de-
claims of remorse
the defendant’s
Mon
mandatory sentencing. A
review
himself, as
as to the
to reform
well
sire
pen
in death
Supreme Court decisions
tana
personal prob-
“miscellaneous
defendant’s
1977
alty
since
indicates
cases
However, since the
lems.” Id. at 485-486.
of miti
in the consideration
inadequacies
mitigating
consider the
evi-
court did not
case
apparent
in Smith’s
evidence
gating
whole, and, according to
as a
dence
pattern
consistent
since
have been a
view,
individual
no
court’s
to
adoption
“sufficiently substantial
of the
excuse,
legal
to a
this
factor amounted
The Montana
leniency” standard.
call for
given
(8)
clearly
evidence was
subsection
to con
regularly
has
failed
Supreme Court
con-
weight
mitigation. The court
mitigating circum
totality
sider
ritualistically that each circumstance
cludes
stances,
weighing each individual
instead
call for
substantial
to
“sufficiently
the full
against
alone
mitigating factor
leniency.” Id.
And,
crime.
the Court
weight
moral
(8):
catchall subsection
has
to use the
“sufficiently
failed
substantial
find
We
has the
penalty
case since 1977
applied
in no
leniency”
death
standard as
to call for
weight
an unenu-
given mitigating
Supreme
Court has unconsti-
the Montana
mitigating circumstance.
merated
of miti-
tutionally
the consideration
limited
Godfrey v.
Compare
gating
evidence.
Top,
Kills on
787 P.2d
v. Lester
State
1759, 64
420,
Georgia,
446
100 S.Ct.
U.S.
Dawson,
(1990),
v.
233 Mont.
State
336
(sustaining
applied”
“as
(1980)
L.Ed.2d 398
Risley,
v.
Coleman
(1988),
P.2d 352
761
penalty stat-
challenge
Georgia
death
(1983),
237,
VI. explain any challenge, deny or otherwise stories. We therefore find below, aspect of their has proceedings In the claim without merit. assistance Smith’s Gardner asserted ineffective repeatedly Among allegations is Smith’s of counsel. change plea his that at the time of Conclusion guilty, attorney failed to guilty II, was denied In Part we hold that Smith examination deter seek a the court to process by the failure of due competence, and that the attor mine his him psychiatrist to assist appoint a defense on a misunder ney’s decision was based sentencing hearing. preparation for his applicable legal standard standing of the and remand reverse the district court We guilty plea. competent for a grant the writ of habe- with instructions Treating the claims of ineffective assist- State, within a reason- corpus unless the colorable, ance as time, appoints a defense able trial counsel to file a Court ordered Smith’s conducts a new and thereafter relied responsive declaration. The Court procedures hearing in accordance with exclusively declaration to find that on this opinion. set forth in this allegations “without merit.” were IV, III and we hold that In Parts *17 evidentiary objected to the lack of an Smith to call for lenien- “sufficiently substantial hearing and renewed his claim before Montana, standard, applied in has cy” as also District Court. That Court sum- U.S. unconstitutional failure resulted an marily denied the claim. give to all relevant miti- consider and effect a “[Wjhere petitioner a raises colorable evidence; the Montana Su- gating and that assistance, and claim of ineffective where provide complete failed to a preme Court federal hear there has not been a state or discussing all relevant reviewable record claim, remand to the ing on this we must the dis- mitigating We reverse evidence. evidentiary hearing.” district court for an remand with instructions trict court and F.2d 1090 Wainwright,
Harich v. 813 corpus unless the grant the writ of habeas (11th Cir.1987). parte An ex submission of State, time, resentenc- within a reasonable proce an affidavit the trial counsel is the standards es Smith accordance with to a durally inadequate; Smith is entitled opinion. in this set forth evidentiary hearing. full v. Es Jackson remaining V, In Part we dismiss Smith’s telle, (5th Cir.1978); F.2d objections to constitutional McCauley, 563 F.2d 808- Woodcock penalty statute. death Cir.1977). (7th We remand to the dis evidentiary is entitled hearing VI, trict court for on that Smith hold In Part we hearing solely assistance of counsel. evidentiary ineffective to an assistance of coun- question ineffective an evidentiary also seeks district court and re- sel. We reverse hearing determine if the trial court re to conduct the evi- instructions mand with parte on ex conferences between lied hearing. dentiary court and the and RE- Rodney the district court accomplices, Munro We REVERSE Fontaine, instructions. determining sentencing. MAND with Andre FERNANDEZ, Judge, little that there are times when one Circuit doubt dissenting psychiatrist, concurring part, is entitled to a even at sen Oklahoma, tencing. part: Ake v. 1087, 1096-97, 84 L.Ed.2d portion respectfully dissent from the I II, III forth in Parts opinion
the court’s set IV, in Parts V and although I concur However, this is not case where we VI. should find that the lack of an adversarial psychiatric consultation results in overturn- turning the merits of the Before ing properly the sentence. It re- claims, be said about should few words quested.1 case. the facts of the notes, Smith, majority good for no
theAs (1) whatever, Request two Native Ameri- Psychiatric killed for a reason men, him had befriended and his can who Examination. part of the reason for companions. A 11, 1983, April defendant asked for a On the theft killings was of the these senseless psychiatric examination to ascertain wheth- importantly, More vehicle. victims’ er he suffered from a mental disease or sentencing hear- at his first Smith admitted defect of a character. At a he wanted to ing, he killed them because hearing May presented argu- on he kill it like to someone. see what would be support request, pros- ment to and the that, he the court that Beyond he informed really oppose ecutor said he did not it. The re- person, that he felt no was a violent could, prosecutor say went on to that he morse, again. He he could do it and that Stratford, perhaps, get Dr. the con- William the court that he was also informed sulting psychiatrist prison, to at the state drugs or intoxicants under the influence examination, perform the and Smith question. crimes in he committed the when presented objection to that. An order record, upon that the court sen- Based appointed Dr. then issued which Stratford Then Smith had sec- tenced him to death. report to examine Smith and to make a on thoughts. decided he was not so ond He Quite findings. clearly, the intent of after all and could be rehabilitated. bad report that order was that the would be then proceedings in the since
That resulted to the court. available prolonged have this matter parts objected The defendant to' certain date, delay common March of 1983to this order; fact object did not to the grudging rather legal system’s our under *18 report might available to the that the disposition penalty of death approach to the The amended its order court itself. today that it opinion assures cases. Our objections.2 the in accordance with por- delayed further. Some will be even delay necessary; are other tions of that Thereafter, hearing a second portions of it are not. There, again, ex- place. counsel took objection to the fact that Smith pressed no Psychiatric
A. Assistance. independent have an adversarial did not the court to He did not ask psychiatrist. consti- majority asserts Smith’s it, to consider report, or to refuse rights have violated because strike tutional been he ask report. Nor did independent or to order another given not an adversari- he was already if it had court to recuse itself hearing for reconsid- psychiatrist al at the Rather, psy- he called the sentence, report. opposed to a seen the of his eration stand. There can be chiatrist to witness psychiatrist. “neutral” mere Dr. Stratford properly request ad- 2. The amended order instructed did 1. Since Smith not second set of state- the truth of Smith's assume psychiatrist, not reach the issue of versarial I do drugs regarding and alcohol. his use of ments to one if he would have been entitled whether so, and he had done Dr. Stratford testified that sup- requested properly one and had he had discharge properly able to on that basis was request. ported that psychiatrist. professional duties as 1172 by psy- hearing, requested performed his own adversarial new
After Smith’s
chiatrist.4
examination.
In that
a further
complained
the nature of
request, he
about
Thereafter, Smith did claim that Ake v.
the nature
examination and
Dr. Stratford’s
Oklahoma
psychi
entitled him to a second
He still did not
prior
court order.
However,
opinion.
atric
as the Montana
given a
complain
he had not been
out,
Supreme
pointed
this case was
report
would
separate psychiatrist who
Smith,
very different from Ake.
v.
State
requested
that a
only
him. All he
(1985);
see
217 Mont.
ing in the record was judge unimpressed remain to be and that Montana Death Application B. submitted at the other evidence Penalty Statute. hearing. second his that majority The holds burden, bore, or I not undertake to will their duties in a to understand courts fail by glossing the reader what ensorcell effect, it is said case. penalty death In actually wrote Supreme Court scrutinizing what was they are when that say it to it decided this case. Suffice when many circum- gather that they done fail to I in that court’s can see no error possibly re- together could stances taken report of its approach; I commend the a deci- mitigation to cause sult in sufficient per- interested unanimous decision all penalty. impose the death sion not to Mont. sons. State v. only can my opinion, that conclusion (1985).7 P.2d 1087 jaundiced eye by casting very reached was, fact, Therefore, de- unless Smith have done the Montana courts upon what counsel, prived of effective assistance here. properly imposed penalty death quite clearly considered judge trial reason, I can- For and should stand. him; placed circumstances before all majority’s opinion to the in the not concur that Smith simply impressed contrary. leniency. any grounds for established at the second hearing the evidence After explaining that it had
hearing and carefully in vain for other
“searched surrounding the commission
factors might call offenses which would
these prior adhered to its leniency,” the court pen- merited the death that Smith
decision striking majority it
alty. The finds after the sec- trial court’s conclusions as its conclu- hearing were the
ond same hearing. I do of the first at the end
sions might striking at all. While one find it That findings upon state courts. imposed right is to counsel to This is unlike 6. entitled, showing a federal simply procedural or re- It is not a state issue. one without See, Wainwright, e.g., quest. imperative. Gideon Here the Montana constitutional *20 (1963). complied 9 L.Ed.2d they had courts were satisfied say the not for us to It is with Montana law. majority's Incidentally, agree with the I do not 7. Maass, F.2d contrary. O’Bremski See suggestion courts were re- (9th Cir.1990); Cupp, 768 F.2d Middleton fact, findings of quired more extensive to make denied, Cir.1985), (9th cert. agree authori- that the nor do I 92 L.Ed.2d actually proposition deal ties cited for that particular fact compel form of written it. No
