{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Romano’s Carryout, Inc., appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court in favor of defendant-appellee, P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.
{¶ 2} Romano’s is a convenience store and check-cashing business operated by Steve Arsalane. According to Arsalane, in mid-December 2009, Jose L. Garcia came into his store to cash a payroll check that Garcia had received from his employer, P.F. Chang’s. Garcia indorsed the check in front of Arsalane, and Arsalane tendered to him the amount of the check ($776.81) minus a one percent check-cashing fee.
{¶ 3} Arsalane deposited the check with National City Bank, where Romano’s maintained an account. National City Bank presented the cheek to P.F. Chang’s bank, Bank of America, N.A., for payment. Instead of issuing payment, Bank of America returned the check and marked on the front of it, “RETURN REASON — ! ] STOP PAYMENT.”
{¶ 4} On April 20, 2010, Romano’s filed suit against P.F. Chang’s. Romano’s alleged that R.C. 1303.54 obligated P.F. Chang’s, as the drawer, to pay the amount of the check to Romano’s, the holder. At a bench trial, Arsalane testified to the facts set forth above. Arsalane also testified about his business relationship with Garcia. According to Arsalane, he first met Garcia in early 2007 when Garcia came into Romano’s to cash a payroll check from his employer, McDonald’s. After that, Garcia became a regular customer of Romano’s. Arsalane claimed to have cashed for Garcia approximately 80 checks from McDonald’s and 20 checks from P.F. Chang’s.
{¶ 6} At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court orally pronounced judgment in P.F. Chang’s favor. The trial court reduced its judgment to writing in a November 9, 2010 judgment entry. Romano’s now appeals that judgment entry, and it assigns the following error:
The November 9, 2010, decision and entry in favor of P.F. Chang’s was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 7} Under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, when competent, credible evidence exists supporting the findings and conclusions of the trial court, an appellate court must affirm the trial court’s judgment. Myers v. Garson (1993),
{¶ 8} Romano’s premised its claim against P.F. Chang’s on R.C. 1303.54(B), which provides:
If an unaccepted draft is dishonored, the drawer is obliged to pay the draft
(1) According to its terms at the time it was issued or, if not issued, at the time it first came into possession of a holder[.]
The obligation is owed to a person entitled to enforce the draft.
Pursuant to R.C. 1303.54(B), a drawer
{¶ 9} Bank of America dishonored the check at issue because P.F. Chang’s ordered it to stop payment. A drawer may stop payment of a check drawn on its bank account. R.C. 1304.32(A). However, the drawer’s stop-payment order does not rescind its obligation to pay the holder of the check, and it does not impair the holder’s suit to enforce that obligation. 2 White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (5th Ed.1988) 441, Section 21-5. See also UCC Official Comment (1990), Section 4^103, Comment 7 (“The payment can be stopped but the drawer remains liable on the instrument * * * ”); 6 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code (3d Ed.1994) 848, Section 3-413:101 (“The drawer who stops payment of his or her check is liable to the holder of the check for the amount of the check * * *, unless the drawer can establish a defense”). Thus, P.F. Chang’s could stop payment of the check at issue, but it continued to owe any holder of the check.
{¶ 10} A person can become a holder of a check when that check is issued to that person, or the status of a holder can arise as a result of an event that occurs after issuance. Uniform Commercial Code Official Comment (1990), Section 3-201, Comment 1. If a check is made payable to an identified person, that identified person is a holder of the check while he or she is in possession of the check. R.C. 1301.01(T)(l)(b).
{¶ 11} “Indorsement” means “a signature, other than that of a signer as maker, drawer, or acceptor” that is made for purposes that include “negotiat[ion] [of] the instrument.” R.C. 1303.24(A)(1)(a). Generally, “an unauthorized signature is ineffective,” and thus such a signature does not constitute an “indorsement by the holder.” R.C. 1303.43(A). See also Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. (1988),
{¶ 12} Read together, R.C. 1303.21(B), 1303.43(A), and 1301.01(QQ) preclude a person who accepts a check under a thief s forged indorsement from becoming a holder. Since the thief of a check payable to another is not a holder, any writing the thief makes on the back of the check is not an “indorsement by the holder.” Consequently, “the transaction — however voluntary with a third party who is fooled by the thief — does not constitute a negotiation * * * and does not therefore render that third party himself a holder.” 2 White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (5th Ed.1988) 172, Section 17-3. See also Morris at 50,
{¶ 13} In order to challenge the authenticity of, or the authority to make, a signature on a check, a defendant must specifically deny the validity of the signature in its answer. R.C. 1303.36(A); Fifth Third Bank v. Jones-Williams, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-935,
{¶ 14} In the case at bar, Romano’s claimed that because it was the holder of the payroll check issued to Garcia, P.F. Chang’s owed it payment once Bank of America dishonored the check. P.F. Chang’s challenged Romano’s holder status by attacking the validity of the indorsement. In its answer, P.F. Chang’s “specifically denie[d] the authenticity of, and the authority to make, the signature of Defendant Garcia on the instrument at issue.”
(¶ 15} At trial, P.F. Chang’s pointed out that Garcia’s last name was misspelled in the indorsement. Because the probability of a person misspelling his or her own name is remote, this evidence rebutted the presumption of validity. Romano’s, then, had to prove the validity of Garcia’s alleged signature. To do this, Romano’s relied on Arsalane’s testimony that he knew Garcia because he had previously cashed approximately 100 payroll checks for Garcia. Arsalane claimed that he saw Garcia sign the check at issue. P.F. Chang’s, however, impeached Arsalane’s testimony. When presented with all of Garcia’s cancelled payroll checks from P.F. Chang’s, Arsalane could not find Romano’s stamp on any of the checks issued prior to the check at issue. Arsalane then admitted that the check
{¶ 16} Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court could resolve the case in one of two ways. First, the trial court could believe Arsalane’s testimony. If the trial court accepted that Arsalane knew Garcia and saw Garcia sign the check, then the court would have to conclude that indorsement was authentic. In that case, Garcia properly negotiated the check to Romano’s, and Romano’s, as the holder of the check, was entitled to payment from P.F. Chang’s.
{¶ 17} Tangentially, we note that under the above scenario, Romano’s recovery would not depend on whether it qualified as a holder in due course. If the validity of a disputed signature is proved, the holder is entitled to payment, unless the defendant proves a defense or claim in recoupment. R.C. 1303.36(B). The holder can avoid certain defenses by establishing that it is a holder in due course. Id.; R.C. 1303.35(B). Here, P.F. Chang’s challenged only the validity of the check; it did not present any evidence of a defense or claim in recoupment. Thus, upon proving holder status, Romano’s would be entitled to judgment in its favor. Uniform Commercial Code Official Comment (1990), Section 3-308, Comment 2 (“In the absence of a defense or claim in recoupment, any person entitled to enforce the instrument is entitled to recover”); 4 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series (1999), Section 3-307:6 (“If the defendant fails to establish a defense, the plaintiff, having the rights of a holder, will recover”). Because P.F. Chang’s failed to provide evidence of a defense, Romano’s would not have to prove that it was a holder in due course in order to recover. Arcanum Natl. Bank v. Hessler (1982),
{¶ 18} Second, instead of believing Arsalane’s testimony, the trial court could reject his testimony as incredible. Without Arsalane’s testimony, the misspelled signature remained the only evidence relevant to the validity of the indorsement. That evidence indicated that another person, presumably a thief, signed Garcia’s name to the back of the check. As a thief is not a holder of a check made out to another person, the thief of Garcia’s check could not negotiate the check. Romano’s, therefore, would not be the holder and would not be entitled to recover payment from P.F. Chang’s.
{¶ 19} Because it entered judgment for P.F. Chang’s, the trial court necessarily chose to disbelieve Arsalane and rely, instead, on the misspelled last name to find that someone other than Garcia indorsed the check. The misspelled last
{¶ 20} In arguing to the contrary, Romano’s urges this court to find credible Arsalane’s assertion that he knew Garcia because on redirect examination Arsalane again stated that he had cashed P.F. Chang’s payroll checks for Garcia prior to the date of the check at issue. The trial court, not the appellate court, weighs the evidence and determines credibility. Wilson,
{¶ 21} Romano’s also argues that we should reverse the trial court’s judgment because it is inconsistent with a comment that the trial court made when orally pronouncing judgment at the conclusion of trial. We disagree.
{¶ 22} A court speaks exclusively through its journal, not through oral pronouncement. Schenley v. Kauth (1953),
{¶ 23} In sum, we conclude that competent, credible evidence establishes that someone forged Garcia’s signature on the check. As negotiation requires a valid endorsement, Romano’s never became a holder of the check and cannot recover payment from P.F. Chang’s. Accordingly, we overrule Romano’s assignment of error.
{¶ 24} As a final matter, we must address P.F. Chang’s motion for sanctions. Loc.R. 4(D)(2) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals provides that if a civil or administrative appeal is selected for a prehearing conference:
[U]pon seven days notice from the conference attorney, the attorneys, and the parties if requested, shall attend a prehearing conference * * * to consider the possibility of settlement, the simplification of issues, and such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceedings by the Court.
If an attorney fails to comply with the provisions of Loc.R. 4, this court “may assess reasonable expenses caused by the failure, including attorney fees; assess all or a portion of the appellate costs; or dismiss the appeal.” Loc.R. 4(F).
{¶ 25} In letters dated December 22, 2010, this court’s conference attorney informed the attorneys for both Romano’s and P.F. Chang’s that a prehearing conference had been scheduled for January 12, 2011, at 1:30 p.m. Although P.F. Chang’s counsel appeared at the prehearing conference, Romano’s counsel did not.
{¶ 26} In its motion for sanctions, P.F. Chang’s requests that this court dismiss the instant appeal or assess against Romano’s the expenses that P.F. Chang’s incurred in bringing its motion and preparing for and attending the prehearing conference. Romano’s failed to file any response to P.F. Chang’s motion. However, Romano’s attorney, Kevin O’Brien, addressed the matter after this court questioned him about it during oral argument. O’Brien admitted that he received the notice of the prehearing conference but due to an unintentional oversight, he failed to place the conference on his calendar.
{¶ 27} Prehearing conferences serve to clarify the issues before the court and facilitate possible settlement. The absence of either of the parties’ attorneys defeats both of these important purposes. Nevertheless, because O’Brien’s failure to attend the prehearing conference was unintentional, we decline to impose sanctions.
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Romano’s assignment of error, and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court. Additionally, we deny P.F. Chang’s motion for sanctions.
Judgment affirmed, and motion denied.
Notes
. The check at issue in this case was dated December 18, 2009.
. A "drawer” is "a person who signs or is identified in a draft as a person ordering payment.” R.C. 1303.01(A)(3). In this case, the check identifies P.F. Chang's as the entity ordering payment, so P.F. Chang's is the drawer.
. Dishonor of a check occurs if after the “check is duly presented for payment to the payor bank otherwise than for immediate payment over the counter, * * * the payor bank makes timely return of the check or sends timely notice of dishonor or nonpayment under section 1304.27 or 1304.28 of the Revised Code * * R.C. 1303.62(B)(1). The parties do not dispute that Bank of America, P.F. Chang’s bank, dishonored the check at issue in this case.
. R.C. 1301.01 was repealed by 2011 Am.H.B. No. 9, effective June 29, 2011. That act amended the provisions of R.C. 1301.01 and renumbered that section so that it now appears at
. As we stated above, R.C. 1301.01 applies to the instant case, even though it was repealed and replaced with R.C. 1301.201. We note that R.C. 1301.01(QQ) and 1301.201(B)(41) are substantially similar.