Lead Opinion
Bеtty Roman filed suit against Teresa Terrell, an uninsured motorist, seeking to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile collision allegedly caused by reckless and negligent driving on Terrell’s part. Both Terrell and Roman’s uninsured motorist carrier, Motors Insurance Corporation (“MIC”), were served; and both filed responsive pleadings. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Roman for actual damages in thе amount of $15,600 and punitive damages in the amount of $24,000. The trial court entered judgment against both Terrell and MIC for the actual damages but declined to enter judgment against MIC for the punitive damages. Roman appeals.
1. Appellant contends that MIC waived the right to contest its liability for the punitive damages by failing either to deny such liability in its answer or to raise the issue during the pretrial procеedings in the case. However, MIC’s answer contains an express denial of liability for punitive damages, and it appears that the pretrial order was never signed by the judge. “Until an order is signed by the judge it is ineffective for any purpose.” Majors v. Lewis,
2. Apрellant also contends the trial court erred by refusing to enter judgment on the jury’s verdict for punitive damages against MIC where, as here, the tortfeasor is known and has been served. In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kuharik,
We find that Weathers was incorrectly decided. In Weathers, OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1) was quoted as requiring that uninsured motorist insurance provisions undertake “ ‘to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.’ ” Weathers reasoned that since the language wаs plain, and remedial statutes must be construed liberally, the quoted language “militate [s] against a finding that an exception for punitive damages should be carved out of the statutory language, ‘all sums.’ ” Id. at 558.
But the language of OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1) is not nearly so thin as that quoted in Weathers. In actuality the statute provides that “[n]o automobile liability policy or motor vehicle liability policy shall be issued . . . unless it contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle . . . because of bodily injury to or death . . . and . . . because of injury to or destruction of property of the insured. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Although Weathers found “no reason in either law or logic for ignoring the statute’s plain language . . . and making an exception for punitive damages,” we find that this language is not “plain” but requires construction to ascertain its meaning, and, contrary to the pronouncement in Weathers, supra at 558, it does not “defy logic” to interpret it as requiring an uninsured motorist insurer to cover only compensatory damages.
Typically, uninsured motorist insurance statutes fall into two categories: those which require that the insurer must provide coverage for “all sums” the insured could recover as damages from the tortfeasor, and those which require that the carrier must provide coverage for “all sums” the insured could recover from the tortfeasor “for” or “because of’ or “on account of” bodily injury or property damage. Courts interpreting statutes in the former category have usually found the statutory language “plain” and permitted the recovery of punitive damages, while many courts interpreting statutes in the latter category have construed the statutes to provide for compensatory damages only, and have held that punitive damages are not recoverable from uninsured motorist carriers. See generally Annot., Punitive Damages As Within Coverage of Uninsurеd Or Underinsured Motorist Insurance, 54 ALR4th 1186. Although the Georgia statutory language falls into the latter category, Weathers quoted only that part of the statute which is similar to the language of the former category, and went on to conclude that because the quoted language was broad and plain, and did not limit recovery at all, it should include punitive damages.
3. (a) As we have determined that the meaning of OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1) is not plain, we begin our analysis of the question of whether punitive damages are recoverable from an uninsured motorist carrier where the tortfeasor is known and served by applying the principles of statutory construction to the statutory language. It is elementary that “[i]n all interpretations of stаtutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly.” OCGA § 1-3-1. In attempting to discern the intention of the legislature, a “construction which will uphold a statute in whole and in every part is to be preferred.” Exum v. City of Valdosta,
(b) Moreover, although the statutory language possibly might
As to the distinction found in Weathers because the tortfeasor is known and has been served, any potential deterrent effect against the tortfeasor created by the insurer’s right to pursue a subrogation claim against him to obtain reimbursement of the award, is ephemeral at best. The reality is that most uninsured motorists are judgment proof, or at least difficult judgment debtors against whom to satisfy judgments. The uninsured motorist insurancе statute was designed to compensate their victims for this reason. Thus, the prospect of the insurer satisfying its subrogation claim is dim. Further, in the unlikely event that there are assets to be levied on, the victim will have a judgment for punitive damages against the tortfeasor and can reach them. This court has twice held that punitive damages are not recoverable in an uninsured motorist context. Kuharik; Coker, supra. We see no crucial distinction between known or unknown, served or unserved uninsured motorists in this regard, and extend the holdings in Kuharik and Coker to the situation presented here.
We are persuaded by the logic of the court in Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co.,
Although it is true, as pointed out in Weathers, that in Georgia recovery of punitive damages has been held not to violate public policy per se in the context of liability coverage, see Greenwood Cemetery v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
Therefore, because we find the proper construction of the statute, as well as the proper public policy of this state, is that no recovery of punitive damages may be had against an uninsured motorist carrier, Weathers, supra, is overruled, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in this case.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I would not necessarily disagree with the majority’s contention that, as a matter of public policy, it might be preferable that punitive damages not be recoverable in an action for uninsured motorist benefits. It is the legislature, however, and not the courts, to which belongs the prerogative of incоrporating public policy considerations into the laws which the courts are bound to uphold. It is what the law says, not what we might wish it to say, that is binding on the courts.
In the instant case the statutory language, when read according to the statutory directive, OCGA § 1-3-1 (b), plainly and unambiguously permits the recovery of “all sums” recoverable “as damages.” OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1). Thus to overrule State Farm Mut. &c. Ins. Co. v. Weathers,
“In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly.” OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). “It has been held that the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the Georgia uninsured motorist statute was ‘to protect the insured as to his actual loss.’ State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Murphy,
We find the “all sums” terminology to be as inclusive as any language that might have been used in expressing the legislative intent. See State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga., supra at 714. As noted in the concurring opinion, the subsequent language, “because of bodily injury” and “because of injury to or destruction of property of the insured,” appears in subdivisions (A) and (B), respеctively, of § 33-7-11 (a) (1), dealing with the limits of the required coverage. When read in proper context, this terminology is merely a limit on the amount of coverage required to be made, such amounts differing in the two categories covered in (A) and (B). Thus properly construed,
Further, careful analysis of Coker v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
Moreover, like the author of the concurring opinion, I disagree with the majority’s assertion (Division 3 (a)) that “the purely technical application of the rules of statutory construction” would favor the conclusion that the legislature’s intention was to permit recovery only of compensatory, not punitive, damages. The majority’s public policy arguments are by no means unpersuasive or devoid of validity, as far as they go. A far more comprehensive and persuasive public policy analysis would be required, however, before I would feel compelled, in the face of thе unambiguous statutory language, to adopt the extreme and essentially illogical position taken by the majority. Compare, e.g., Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky,
The worst-case scenario proposed by the majority (Division 3) — that “most uninsured motorists are judgment-proof” — is a risk inherent in the nature of uninsured motorist coverage and as such properly falls upon the insurer, not the insured. The insured, whose loss has been increased by the aggravating circumstances not only intangi
Moreover, should the majority’s dire prediction that “the added liability would be passed along to the premium payers” be realized, this would be no new thing and arguably would leave the premium-payer no worse off than he was already. It is our observation that there has often been no readily ascertаinable or predictable relationship between the insurer’s actual loss experience and the premiums charged the insured. Therefore, such a result as that predicted by the majority would be neither inevitable nor novel. In any case, a remedial statute must be construed to protect the insured (or victim) rather than the insurer.
In short, neither legislative intent, nor statutory language, nor the holdings in Kuharik and Coker, supra, dictates the result sought by the majority. I feel strongly that Weathers represents the correct approach to this complex of issues, and that that case should therefore not be overruled.
I must respectfully dissent.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially.
I agree that motor vehicle insurers are not required by OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1) to provide uninsured motorist coverage for punitive damage claims. However, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion, expressed in Division 3 (a) of its opinion, that “the purely technical application of the rules of statutory construction” necessarily favors this interpretation. The words “because of bodily injury” and “because of injury to or destruction of property of the insured” appear in subdivisions (A) and (B), respectively, of § 33-7-11 (a) (1), dealing with the limits of the required coverage. Thus, in the contеxt in which they are used, they may be construed as a limitation merely on the amount of coverage required to be made available, which differs between these two categories. So construed, these phrases would provide a meaningful qualification of the requirement that coverage be provided for “all sums the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle,” without necessarily excluding coverage for punitive damages.
Nevertheless, I do not believe the Legislature intended to require automobile insurers (and ultimately, as the majority points out, premium payers generally) to cover claims for punitive damages arising from wrongs committed by uninsured motorists. “It has been held that the Legislаture’s purpose in enacting the Georgia uninsured motorist statute was ‘to protect the insured as to his actual loss.’ State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Murphy,
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Carley and Judge Pope join in this special concurrence.