Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York, on Behalf of Itself and All Others Similarly Situated, Appellant, v New York State Workers’ Compensation Board et al., Respondents.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
May 17, 2012
947 N.Y.S.2d 653
Mercure, J.P.
Plaintiff, a self-insured employer, requested reimbursement from defendant Special Disability Fund (hereinafter the Fund) in June 2010 for benefits paid to three claimants who were injured prior to 1994. The Workers’ Compensation Board previously determined that plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement from the Fund pursuant to
Plaintiff‘s June 2010 requests for reimbursement covered payments made between November 2004 and April 2009; it does not dispute that the requests were untimely under the filing deadlines imposed by the 2007 legislation. Rather, in this action, plaintiff asserts claims of actual and constructive trust, conversion and unjust enrichment, and seeks an accounting, injunctive relief and a declaration that the time limitation in
Absent any statutory language granting carriers a property right in their assessments or the Fund itself, there is no constitutionally protected property interest therein arising by reason of the fact that the moneys to be used in reimbursing carriers are derived from assessments on them (see Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v State Ins. Fund, 102 AD2d 367, 378 [1984], affd 64 NY2d 365 [1985], appeal dismissed 474 US 801 [1985]; cf. Alliance of Am. Insurers v Chu, 77 NY2d 573, 579-580, 585 [1991] [holding that the state could not appropriate to its general fund the earnings or assets of the Property and Liability Insurance Security Fund in light of a prior statute granting contributors to that fund rights in the income generated by their contributions]). Nor does plaintiff point to any statutory language “manifest[ing] a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State” (Medical Socy. of State of N.Y. v Sobol, 192 AD2d 78, 81 [1993], appeal dismissed 82 NY2d 802 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 917 [1994], cert denied 511 US 1152 [1994] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v State Ins. Fund, 64 NY2d at 377). Indeed, the statute provides that the assessments are deposited “for the benefit of [the] [F]und” (
To the extent that plaintiff, having received “benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them[,] has an interest in continued receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process” (Board of Regents of State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 576 [1972]; see Methodist Hosp. of Brooklyn v State Ins. Fund, 102 AD2d at 380), we conclude that it received constitutionally adequate process. “In altering substantive rights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a legislature generally provides
Finally, the statute at issue here did not work a taking of any property right that plaintiff may have had inasmuch as plaintiff‘s expectation of reimbursement “can continue to be realized as long as [it] complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions the [L]egislature has imposed” (United States v Locke, 471 US at 107). That is, it was plaintiff‘s own “failure to file on time — not the action of [the Legislature] — that caused [its reimbursement] right to be extinguished” (id.) and, thus, its takings claim fails.
Plaintiff‘s remaining arguments, to the extent not addressed by our decision, have been considered and found to be lacking in merit.
Rose, Stein, Garry and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.