34 F. 91 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Colorado | 1888
A question of jurisdiction under the act of 1887 arises on demurrer to the complaint in each of these actions. The warrants on which plaintiff’s seek to recover are in the usual form of such instruments, signed by the chairman of the board of commissioners, attested by the clerk, and directed to the treasurer of the county. In the Chaffee County Case they are payable to a person named therein or to his order, and in the other case they are payable to a person named or to bearer. The names of the payees are not given, nor is anything alleged- as to their citizenship; and the question is whether the action can be maintained without showing that they, as well as the plaintiffs, were qualified to sue ixi this court. The meaning of that clause of the first section of the act of 1887, (24 St. 553,) which relates to suits by assignees of promissory notes and other dioses inaction, is not very clear, but it seems to be well stated in Newgass v. City of New Orleans, 33 Fed. Rep. 196. When it came from the house of representatives the clause referred to was as follows:
“Nor shall any circuit or district court have cognizance of any suit founded on contract in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon if no assignment had been made, except in cases of bills of exchange.” 18 Cong. Ree. 646.
The senate amendment was probably intended to retain jurisdiction over a large class of securities made by corporations, railroad companies, and the like, which are sold in open market and negotiable by delivery. Certainly it was not intended to give jurisdiction in all actions by assignees on promissory notes and other contracts excepting those .last mentioned, and that seems to be the alternative if we reject the proposed ■construction. Accordingly, I am constrained to follow the interpreta