SANDRA ROJAS, LPN, f/k/а SANDRA MENDOZA v. DR. SANDRA MARTELL, in Her Official Capacity as Public Health Administrator of the Winnebago County Health Department; JAMES POWERS, in His Official Capacity as Chair of the Winnebago County Board of Health; and WINNEBAGO COUNTY, ILLINOIS
NO. 4-22-0222
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT
February 22, 2023
2023 IL App (4th) 220222-U
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 16L160. Honorable Eugene G. Doherty, Judge Presiding.
ORDER
Held: The appellate сourt affirmed the trial court‘s judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal, concluding (1) plaintiff had not established any error related to the court‘s finding that she failed to mitigate her damages and (2) defendants’ complaint in their cross-appeal was not subject to review given the absence of any error.
¶ 1 In June 2016, plaintiff, Sandra Rojas, f/k/a Sandra Mendoza, filed a complaint against defendants, Dr. Sandra Martell, in her official capacity as public health administrator of the Winnebago Cоunty Health Department, James Powers, in his official capacity as chair of the Winnebago County Board of Health, and Winnebago County, Illinois. Relevant to this appeal, plaintiff alleged defendants violated the Health Care Right of Conscience Act (Act) (
¶ 3 Defendants filed an answer to plaintiff‘s complaint, denying any violation of the Act and asserting affirmative defenses. With respect to their affirmative defenses, defendants alleged any recovery should (1) be reduced because of plaintiff‘s failure to mitigate her damages and (2) not be trebled because they were a public entity barred from being required to pay punitive damages. The latter affirmative defense was later struck by the trial court on plaintiff‘s motion.
¶ 4 In January 2021, the trial court, following an appeal which addressed four certified questions (Rojas v. Martell, 2020 IL App (2d) 190215, 161 N.E.3d 336), commenced a bench trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered a detailed 14-page memorandum opinion. The court found (1) defendants violated the Act and (2) plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. As a result, the court awarded plaintiff $2500 as the statutorily required minimum recovery for a violation of the Act (
¶ 5 Plaintiff now aрpeals, complaining about the trial court‘s finding that she failed to mitigate her damages. Defendants cross-appeal, complaining about the court‘s decision to strike their affirmative defense related to treble damages. As to the latter, defendants acknowledge their complaint is subject to review only if this court first finds error.
¶ 6 For the reasons that follow, we conclude plaintiff has not established any error related to the trial court‘s finding that she failed to mitigate her damages and, therefore, affirm the court‘s judgment. We further conclude, as a result of our initial conclusion, defendants’ complaint in their cross-appeal is not subject to review and, therefore, we dismiss the cross-appeal.
¶ 7 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 9 At trial, the parties presented evidence showing, in 2014, plaintiff, a Licensed Practicаl Nurse (LPN) and lifelong resident of Rockford, was employed as a full-time LPN with the Winnebago County Health Department. Plaintiff had worked as an LPN for the Winnebago County Health Department since 1996.
¶ 10 The Winnebago County Health Department operated several health clinics, each of which addressed separate health issues. Plaintiff primarily worked at the clinic that addressed pediatric health issues, but she had also worked at one of the clinics that addressed adult health issues. As an LPN in the cliniсal setting, plaintiff could administer medications, provide counseling, and provide patient education.
¶ 11 In January 2015, the Winnebago County Health Department began a process to consolidate its various health clinics into a single health clinic. The nurses at the consolidated clinic were cross-trained and expected to address a variety of health issues amongst a broad client population.
¶ 12 Sometime following the commencement of the consolidation оf the various health clinics, plaintiff expressed to her supervisors a religious objection to providing certain contraception and abortion services. Plaintiff‘s supervisors arranged for plaintiff to meet with the public health administrator of the Winnebago County Health Department, Dr. Sandra Martell.
¶ 13 On June 24, 2015, plaintiff met with Dr. Martell to discuss her objection to providing certain contraception and abortion services. Following the conversation, Dr. Martell contacted plaintiff‘s suрervisors and instructed them to temporarily accommodate plaintiff‘s limitations at the then-consolidated clinic.
¶ 15 Dr. Martell, concluding she could not continue to accommodate plaintiff at the consolidated clinic, began to search, with the assistance of the human resources director of Winnebago County, for “a comparable position to use [plaintiff‘s] skill level and her credentialing for.” Dr. Martell eventually informed plaintiff by letter of her conclusion that plaintiff could not be accommodated at the consolidated clinic. In the letter, Dr. Martell offered plaintiff two alternative positions outside of the сlinic. One of the positions was an LPN position at River Bluff Nursing Home, which is a nursing home owned by Winnebago County.
¶ 16 The LPN position at the nursing home, a full-time position, involved providing care for residents. It included care planning, delivering medications, and scheduling services. It also included charting in accordance with certain requirements and regulations, wound care, and communicating with the families of residents. On occasion, it required heavy lifting; however, the nursing home had machines which assisted with the lifting. It also occasionally required supporting certified nursing assistants with bathing residents. Those who worked in the nursing home had to deal with residents with dementia, residents dying, and emergency situations. Overall, the nursing
¶ 17 Plaintiff received Dr. Martell‘s letter on July 14, 2015. She interpreted the letter as telling her that she would lose her job if she did not do the objected-to services at the consolidated clinic. Plaintiff believed the position at the nursing home was not viable because she would be working under her son, who was a registered nurse at the nursing home, because of the county‘s anti-nepotism policy. Plaintiff also felt she was a рediatric nurse, not a geriatric nurse. Plaintiff did nothing to explore or learn more about the position. Plaintiff was not, in fact, barred from working at the nursing home because of her son‘s employment there or because of the county‘s anti-nepotism policy.
¶ 18 On July 16, 2015, plaintiff informed Dr. Martell she would not pursue the position at the nursing home and would submit her two-week letter of resignation. She then submitted a letter of resignation dated July 17, 2015, and effective July 31, 2015. Plaintiff acknowledged she was aware she would have a pension loss at the time of her resignation. She also acknowledged her pension was important to her.
¶ 20 It was stipulated plaintiff lost salary in the amount of $18,767.15 and lost pension benefits in the amount of $213,088.34. It was also stipulated that “[t]he River Bluff position had significantly different responsibilities than [plaintiff‘s] responsibilities at the Health Clinic.”
¶ 21 Based upon the evidence presented at trial, plaintiff argued defendants had not met their burden of proving her failure to mitigate damages. Specifically, plaintiff argued, in relevant part, defendants had not shown the nursing home position was “substantially equivalent” to the position at the consolidated clinic and, therefore, she could not have acted unreasonably in failing to pursue that position. In support of her argument, plaintiff highlighted differences between the two positions related to the (1) client population, (2) nature of the facilities, (3) hours of work, (4) job responsibilities, and (5) status (being subjected to a probationary period).
¶ 22 Defendants, in response, argued they had met their burden of proving plaintiff‘s failure to mitigate damages. Initially, defendants argued they only needed to show plaintiff failed to reasonably pursue “appropriate” employment, as opposed to “substantially equivalent” employment. Furthermore, defendants, while acknowledging the position at the nursing home had “a handful of less favorable duties and perhaps less desirable hours” than the position at the consolidated cliniс, highlighted similarities between the positions related to the (1) salaries, (2) benefits, (3) pensions, (4) employment status (full-time), and (5) qualifications.
¶ 24 This appeal followed.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 On appeal, plaintiff complains about the trial court‘s finding that she failed to mitigate her damages. Specifically, plaintiff argues the court‘s finding is based upon an erroneous determination that the position at the nursing home was substantially equivalent to the position at the consolidated clinic. Plaintiff asserts the court rеached its erroneous determination by either applying an incorrect standard or by incorrectly applying the correct standard.
¶ 28 A. Applicable Standards of Review
¶ 29 At the outset, the parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. Plaintiff argues for the application of the de novo standard, while defendants argue for the application of the manifest weight of the evidence standard. We find both standards of review applicable.
¶ 30 The first issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court applied an incorrect standard in reaching its determination that the position at the nursing home was substantially equivalent to the position at the consolidated clinic. Plaintiff specifically contends the court committed several legal errors, each of which demonstrate the application of an incorrect standard. Determining whether the trial court committed any legal error is a question of law, subject to de novo review. See United States Steel Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 384 Ill. App. 3d 457, 462, 892 N.E.2d 606, 611 (2008).
¶ 31 The second issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court incorrectly applied the correct standard in reaching its determination that the position at the nursing home was substantially equivalent to the position at the consolidated clinic. Plaintiff specifically contends the court‘s determination that the positions were substantially equivalent must have been from an incorrect application of the correct standard given the undisputed facts. While several facts are undisputed, the trial court, as the trier of fact in this casе, was responsible for evaluating those facts and making reasonable inferences from them and then making the ultimate factual determination
¶ 32 B. Undisputed Principles of Law
¶ 33 The parties agree certain principles of law are applicable to a claim brought under the Act. They agree that plaintiff had to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary care to minimize her damages and that the burden was on defendants to prove plaintiff failed to act accordingly. They also agree that defendants, in order to carry their burden in this case, had to show the positiоn at the nursing home was sufficiently similar to the position at the consolidated clinic, such that plaintiff could be found to have acted unreasonably in failing to pursue that position. Absent any argument to the contrary, we will accept these principles of law to be true and applicable for the purposes of this appeal.
¶ 34 C. Applicable Standard When Evaluating Whether Employment Positions Are Sufficiently Similar
¶ 35 Plaintiff asserts, as she did before the trial court, the “substantially equivalent” stаndard is applicable when evaluating whether two employment positions are sufficiently similar. See Heeren Co. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm‘n, 150 Ill. App. 3d 234, 242, 502 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1986) (“Although a claimant need not accept a demeaning position or enter another line of work, he forfeits his right to back pay if he refuses a job substantially equivalent to his former job.“).
¶ 36 D. Plaintiff‘s Contentions of Error
¶ 37 First, plаintiff contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider multiple relevant factors when conducting its evaluation of whether the position at the nursing home was substantially equivalent to the position at the consolidated clinic. We disagree. Both parties submitted written argument addressing multiple relevant factors for consideration when evaluating whether the positions were sufficiently similar. The court, in its memorandum opinion, indicated it considered “the excellent legаl arguments of counsel.” While the court only explicitly addressed a few of the relevant factors in its memorandum opinion, that does not show the court failed to consider other relevant factors in conducting its evaluation of whether the position at the
¶ 38 Next, plaintiff contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in comparing the nursing home position to the children‘s home position. We disagrеe. The court‘s analysis makes clear it was aware that it was to consider whether the position at the nursing home was sufficiently similar to the position at the consolidated clinic. When conducting its analysis, the court recognized the position at the nursing home would have required plaintiff to work with a more limited population than the one at the consolidated clinic. After recognizing this difference, the court noted the fact plaintiff had worked with a similar institutionalized population whilе at the children‘s home. The court‘s observation, considered in the context of its entire analysis, does not show any improper comparison. In fact, the court‘s observation was relevant to the question of whether plaintiff‘s decision not to pursue the position at the nursing home was reasonable under the circumstances.
¶ 39 Third, plaintiff contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing the fact the position at the nursing home was conveyed to her by her employer. We disagree. In support of her position, plaintiff, as she did before the trial court, relies on Schwarze v. Solo Cup Co., 112 Ill. App. 3d 632, 445 N.E.2d 872 (1983). In that case, the appellate court found the plaintiff, in order to mitigate his damages, was not required to accept an offer from his original employer that had the same salary but would have breached the original employment contract and constituted a demotion. Id. at 639. In this case, there was no employment contract, and the trial court did not find the nursing home position was a demotion but rather a substantially equivalent position. Accordingly, even if the nursing home position was conveyed by plaintiff‘s original employer, that fact is of no import.
¶ 40 Last, plaintiff contends the trial court‘s determination that the position at the
¶ 41 We note plaintiff has cited Raintree Health Care Center v. Human Rights Comm‘n, 275 Ill. App. 3d 387, 655 N.E.2d 944 (1995), in support of her position before this court. That case is distinguishable. There, the appellate court affirmed a finding of the Human Rights Commission that an employee had mitigated his damages, concluding the commission‘s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 395-96. The court, in reaching its conclusion, indicated thе employee‘s refusal to take his employer‘s offer of an alternate position was reasonable in light of the fact the employee did not own a car and would have depended upon public transportation to get to work, which was approximately 47 miles from his home. Id. at 396. Unlike Raintree Health
¶ 42 As a final matter, plaintiff contends the trial court‘s mitigation analysis contravenes the letter and intent of the Act and renders the Act less protective than Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) (
¶ 43 In summary, we conclude plaintiff has not established any error related to the trial court‘s finding that she failed to mitigate her damages. As a result, we further conclude the complaint in defendants’ cross-appeal is not subject to review. We, therefore, find the trial court‘s judgment is subject to affirmance and the cross-appeal is subject to dismissal.
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 We affirm the trial court‘s judgment and dismiss the cross-appeal.
¶ 46 Affirmed; cross-appeal dismissed.