Rohr v. Rohr

800 P.2d 85 ROHR, Plaintiff-Appellant, Teresa Ann ROHR,

William Michael

Defendant-Respondent.

No. 18547.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Oct. attorney fees

should have been awarded defending petition for modifi- for William’s cation of the decree. July, divorced in were child

Physical custody of their minor was William was al- awarded to Teresa and stip- rights pursuant to the lowed visitation re- ulated decree of divorce. The decree for quired William to maintain insurance if provided the child and that he remained he support obligations on current child for would be entitled to the child exemption purposes. federal income tax than six months after Less Pocatello, Kugler, plaintiff- B. John for disputes decree was entered arose between appellant. motions parties. Subsequently, several Pocatello, Gregory May, for defen- C. requesting filed the assistance of were dant-respondent. enforcing magistrate party’s in each hear- interpretation the decree. At the ing William should BOYLE, to determine whether Justice. fees, attorney for Wil- be liable This case us on from the is before review attorney his orally liam’s moved to dismiss Rohr, Appeals, Idaho Rohr v. Court for La- motion modification decree.1 Al- 118 Idaho 800 P.2d 94 response day same Teresa filed a ter that issues, though granted we review on all petition modify. days to Williams’s to Two presented primary question is one magistrate deny- entered an order later impression requires us to decide first attorney Eight ing days fees. later state courts of this whether the divorce signed dismissing magistrate an order Wil- require to petition liam’s for modification without exemp- to execute a waiver of tax written prejudice. status Internal Service tion for Revenue held hearing was Several weeks later 152(e)(1988). purposes to I.R.S. § separate contempt petitions two (West on 152(e) 1988). 26 U.S.C.A. § mag- In one were issued. order the orders “Teresa”), (hereinafter Teresa as- Rohr Teresa judge ordered to istrate that did not have au- serts claiming [cjease from the minor child her, par- thority require as the custodial in and as a tax violation of ent, allowing to execute a waiver William for Decree that the provided in said (hereinafter “William”), claim the Rohr for as- any Plaintiff be liable tax shall child. for their minor federal re- the Defendant be sessment that issue, addition to the claiming quired pay as a result her Teresa that contends exemption. minor child as for dismissing petition erred William’s magistrate found consider- In the other order the decree without modification of the party contempt, how- claim relief. Tere- that neither was ing independent ever, he clarified the divorce decree should sa also claims that his ordering to make child contempt of court William have held William monthly lump rather payments she one sum and that pay failure to child Modify attorney the Decree did not dismiss Motion to 1. Teresa that William’s claims Honor, merely begin Today, but make a formal motion expressed dismiss Your as I Divorce. record, an intent to dismiss. argument, formal like to make a I would however, following dialogue: discloses the completely. that action Motion Dismiss week, Honor, right, MR. All Your last right— MAY: COURT: All Kugler going that Mr. we were notified every specific must than two weeks and set forth reflects deference the view days opportunity and times when with the given special visitation trial would be weigh credibility allowed. court to assess State appear before it. the witnesses who magis- The district court affirmed 474, 708 P.2d 879 Tierney, v. 109 Idaho decision from appeal trate’s and on Tankersley, v. (1985); 107 Idaho assigned district court the case to the was Wolford (1984). 1062, 1201 695 P.2d Appeals. Appeals of of Court The Court affirmed the district court’s on the decision fees, of attorney

issues of Wil- dismissal II. petition exemption, how- liam’s Support Child and Visitation it the district ever remanded the case to purpose mag- for the requiring The clarified the divorce istrate court to dismiss Teresa’s with ordering by pay decree William to explanation hear it on a reasonable or to support monthly payment lump child in one granted petition the merits. We sum on the first of each month than rather for review. weeks, every doing and in two so did not abuse his discretion. Our review of the

I. record satisfies us that William was sub Appeal Standard on stantially support in his child current obli gation although he had made several late presumed ap cannot be on Error payments. The record demonstrates that requires showing, but peal, an affirmative William thought agreement that he had an Co., Carpenter v. Double R Cattle 108 whereby pay Teresa he could his child 602, (1985), findings 701 P.2d 222 Idaho monthly in two installments be by fact made a trial court not be set will employment cause he his paycheck received they unless clearly aside are erroneous. every two weeks. declined State, 52(a); Rueth v. I.R.C.P. 103 Idaho delinquent to find William or in arrears on 74, (1982); 644 P.2d 1333 Marshall Bros. v. and did not find him in con Geisler, 734, (1978); 99 Idaho 588 P.2d 933 tempt. In find no error. Pipe Corp. Beall & Tank v. Tumac Inter mountain, Inc., 487, 108 Idaho 700 P.2d Likewise, magistrate’s finding (Ct.App.1985). Further, 109 the factual sup that Teresa denied William visitation is findings of the trial not court will be dis ported by competent substantial evi appeal on supported turbed they where are dence in the record and will not be dis by evidence, substantial and competent appeal. turbed on though even such evidence be conflict ing, State v. Tierney, 109 474, 708 Idaho III. (1985); MacNeil Me P.2d 879 v. Minidoka Hosp., morial 588, 108 Idaho P.2d 208 Dismissal Petition Johnson, (1985); Pointner v. 107 Idaho Teresa asserts that it was error to dis- 1014, (1985); 695 P.2d 399 Circle C Ranch petition miss to modify William’s the de- Jayo, 353, Co. Idaho P.2d 107 responsive cree when pleading seeking (1983), appeal and on appellate court’s was pending. affirmative relief responsibility is to record to review the determine whether Appeals trial court’s find correctly Court deter- substantial, ings supported by compe are pursuant mined that acted Madsen, Heacock evidence. discretionary tent 108 to authority prescribed 65, 41(a)(2)2 Idaho 696 P.2d (Ct.App.1985). This under I.R.C.P. rather than under 41(a)(2). by Rule pleaded by Dismissal of court.— order counterclaim has been a defendant Except provided paragraph prior as upon of this plaintiffs to the him service rule, dismiss, subdivision of this shall not an action motion action shall not be dis- plaintiffs upon against dismissed at the objection instance save missed defendant's unless upon pending order court and terms and such the counterclaim can remain for inde- proper. pendent by conditions as the adjudication court deems If a the court. Unless oth- notice of the dismissal. 41(a)(1).3 appeal Filing I.R.C.P. this instant no connotes signed stipulation delivery writing notice or dismissal of an instrument dismissal been filed in the proper had trial court. clerk official being kept One of these written documents must be purpose of him as a file prerequisite obtaining filed as a dismis- matter of reference or record. BLACK’S 41(a)(1). However, (5th 1979); sal to I.R.C.P. LAW ed. DICTIONARY Nikias, 41(a)(2) Park City see Overland I.R.C.P. allows dismissal of an ac- upon tion court order such terms and Kan. P.2d 56 As we proper. above, conditions court deems file noted William failed to such dismissal notice, as well as terms and condi- but instead made oral motion discretionary Therefore, 41(a)(1) the open tions are trial court. is in court. Rule Adney Mississippi v. Lime Co. Mis- inapplicable in this case. of souri, (7th Cir.1957). 241 F.2d 43 Our review does not of 41(a)(2) provides end Rule for dis here. adoption It is well established that our of order, by upon missal court such terms is pre the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure prop and conditions as the court deems sumably placed interpretation with the 41(a)(1), er. Rule a motion Unlike upon language in similar the Federal Rules under this is not a matter of dismiss rule by of Civil Procedure the federal courts. right, discretionary is trial but with the Christensen, 117 70, Durrant v. Idaho 785 both as to a dismissal whether Sperry Corp., (1990); Chacon P.2d 634 allowed, well as to the should be 270, (1986). P.2d Idaho imposed, if terms and conditions to be analysis in Appeals’ Court of of the issue Adney Mississippi Lime Co. allowed. noteworthy the case and bears instant is Missouri, (7th Cir.1957); 241 F.2d 43 quoting. of see 5 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 41(a)(1) Adoption of I.R.C.P. II 41.05[1] (2d (hereafter 1988) ed. 41(a)(2) Rules), however, (hereinafter has MOORE). purpose for the court’s practice obtaining the of a volun- altered discretionary authority under this rule Rules, tary dismissal. The Idaho pays regard due to insure that the court corresponding are almost identical to the plaintiff of the to the interests both rule, ways federal define three to dismiss defendant; plaintiff's the ac dismissal of methods, The first and second an action! jeopardize de unfairly tion must not the 41(a)(1), provided by Rule for covered See MOORE at fendant’s interests. by or by stipulation dismissal notice of Benson, 1141.05[1]; Ga. [173 41(a)(2) provides parties. Smithloff v. for the Rule (Ga.App.1985). App. 328 S.E.2d 759 870] by dismissal order of the court. General- Furthermore, nec a counterclaim is not voluntary ly, dismissal under Rule subject of essarily dismissal because 41(a)(1) right; plaintiff a of the is matter plaintiff’s of action. dismissal court’s consent to do need not obtain the Benson, supra. Rule MILLER, so. See 9 WRIGHT & FED- Smithloff 41(a)(2) further states that if the defen AND ERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE: prior (hereinafter a to service dant files counterclaim CIVIL MILLER). However, plaintiff’s motion upon him or her of the Rule WRIGHT & dismiss, 41(a)(1) shall not be dis- require plaintiff the action does file occurs, order, (ii) filing stipulation by specified a dismissal a dismissal under or erwise paragraph prejudice. appeared signed by without in the all who stated in the notice of action. Unless otherwise 41(a)(1). Dismissal of actions —Volun- 3. Rule stipulation, or the dismissal without dismissal plaintiff— By tary dismissal —Effect thereof — except oper- prejudice, that a notice of dismissal stipulation. Subject provisions of By — adjudication upon as an the merits when ates 66, 23(c), any Rule of Rule statute plaintiff by filed who has once dismissed by of Idaho an action dismissed state state, States, any of this of the United (i) filing by plaintiff order without of court any including state action based any at time before service notice of dismissal same claim. party of an answer or of the adverse summary judgment, for whichever first motion against objection defending Wil against attorney missed defendant’s fees pend- unless counterclaim remain modify can decree. petition liam’s Rule ing independent adjudication 41(a)(2) to condition allows ¶ 41.09; court. MOORE United See upon payment dismissal costs States v. Air Con- Ordinarily, and fees. the court should con Professional Traffic Organization, trollers 449 F.2d 1299 plaintiff’s action dition the dismissal (3rd Cir.1971). Appellate courts which upon payment defendant’s costs of application have addressed of this rule litigation, some cases fees. See 5 generally principle follow the that dismis- Practice, ¶41.06, pp. 41- Moore’s Federal 41(a)(2) sal to Rule should be Miller, (1989), Wright 74 to and 9 & 41-81 allowed unless defendant will suffer Federal and Procedure: Civil Practice legal prejudice, pros- some other than the pp. purpose 176-83 pect of a second lawsuit. Hamilton v. this rule is alleviate the inconvenience to Co., Inc., Tire & Rubber Firestone LeCompte Chip, v. Mr. defendant. (9th Cir.1982); F.2d 143 WRIGHT & Inc., (5th Cir.1976). F.2d spec- MILLER 2364. Unless otherwise order, ified in court’s voluntary dis- case, however, In this Teresa had preju- missal under this rule is without any responsive filings not made at the time prevailing dice. 41.10. The MOORE § orally peti William moved to dismiss his view, adopt we today, which that such Therefore, only required tion. Teresa was a motion is addressed sound dis- appear argue and her attor motion court; cretion trial it will not be ney magistrate fees. The determined that appeal overturned absent abuse of petition dismissal of William’s to modi discretion. See Hamilton v. Firestone fy any way did prejudice not Teresa. Co., Inc., Tire & Rubber 679 F.2d 143 pending contempt issues and remained (9th Cir.1982). litigation entirely was not terminated Rohr, 698, 702, Rohr v. 118 Idaho 800 by petition of William’s dismissal 94, (Ct.App.1989). P.2d 98 Therefore, modify. magistrate deter adopt prevailing We rule and mined that conditions on the dismissal pursuant hold that a motion to dismiss magistrate would not warranted. A be 41(a)(2) Rule addressed to sound dis obliged not payment attorney to order cretion ruling of the trial court its will fees, Miller, Wright 9 & Federal Practice not be appeal overturned on absent an 2366, Civil, p. 180 Procedure: abuse of discretion. v. Hamilton Fire (1971), trial broad discre has Inc., Co., stone Tire & Rubber 679 F.2d conditioning tion in McLaugh dismissal. (9th Cir.1982). magistrate Cheshire, (D.C.Cir. lin v. 676 F.2d 855 petition dismissed William’s we find no 1982); Ohio, F.R.D. Blackburn error or regard. abuse discretion in that (S.D.Ohio 1973). appear It does not to us independent our review magistrate that the abused his discretion record leaves us concerned that Teresa’s awarding attorney not as a condi fees pending improvidently claim was dismissed magistrate’s tion of A dismissal. discre addressing without its merits. We affirm tionary decision will not disturbed on magistrate’s dismissal William’s appeal an abuse of absent that discretion. 41(a)(2), however, claim to Rule Chenery Agri-Lines Corp., 115 Idaho we remand to district court to enter an 281, P.2d requiring order court to ad dress and resolve Teresa’s claim on its mer

its. V. IV. State Allocation Federal Exemption Tax

Attorney Fees argues remaining Teresa that the issue is of first one im- erred in denying request pression requires her for an award us to decide whether addressing in issue in the

the divorce courts of this state have au- Appeals care thority require parent to stant case the Idaho Court of a custodial exe- fully and state law cute a reviewed both federal written waiver (hereinafter magistrates 152(e) before it concluded that Idaho under 26 U.S.C.A. § and discretion in divorce 152(e)) provides pertinent I.R.S. proceedings to allocate the income tax de part: pendency exemption the noncustodial (e) Support test in child of di- case of directing parent by parents, vorced etc.— execute written waiver exemption.— gets Custodial 152(e). Rohr, I.R.C. Rohr under Except provided in this as otherwise sub- (Ct.App.1989). P.2d 94 We Idaho section, if— agree Appeals’ holding Court of (A) (as a child defined section opinion its on this issue and are of 151(e)(3)) sup- over of his receives half noteworthy. analysis is port during year the calendar from his Finally, address Teresa’s assertion parents— when he con- erred (i) separat- legally who are divorced entitled to cluded that William was separate ed a decree of divorce or under dependency exemption for the maintenance, rea- couple’s child. Teresa raises two (ii) separated who are under written First, argument. sons separation agreement, or that, law, only under federal she submits (iii) during apart live at all times who exemp- parent may claim the a custodial year, the calendar the last 6 months of (1988). Second, 152(e) I.R.C. tion. § that, if is even William Teresa asserts dependency to the (B) custody of entitled in the one such law, make he has failed to under federal parents or both of his for more than support, thus timely payments of child year, one-half of the calendar exemp- negating his entitlement treated, purposes such child shall be for inde- claims raise tion. Because (a), receiving half of subsection as over review, will questions for our pendent during year his calendar in turn. address each having custody a parent from the for greater portion year the calendar A. (hereinafter in referred to this subsection parent”). as “custodial Federal Law parent (2) Exception custodial where urges to conclude that us Teresa first exemption for the releases claim to 152(e) precludes a court divorce I.R.C. § year. parents described child of exemp- allocating dependency —A from having as paragraph shall be treated parent. Teresa to a noncustodial tion during his a received over half of she, only as the custodial submits that par- year from the noncustodial calendar exemp- this can claim waive parent, ent if— question of first Teresa raises a tion. (A) signs court; a parent writ- issue is the custodial at impression for (in and form may ten such manner allocate the declaration a whether divorce Secretary may regulations pre- exemption, as the dependency scribe) parent will not parent 152(e), such custodial to a noncustodial I.R.C. § dependent any for approval. a parent’s claim such child as custodial without law, beginning hold, calendar that a year such a matter of taxable We may such an alloca- year, and make divorce tion. parent (B) attaches the noncustodial 1985, could allo- Prior to divorce courts to the noncusto-

such written declaration either dependency a year cate parent’s return for the taxable dial parent. or noncustodial year. the custodial during such calendar beginning

695 See, 153(e), e.g., Morphew Morphew, explicit 419 there no authorization § (Ind.App.1981). for a divorce court to N.E.2d 770 the amendment See 1984, dependency exemption. enactment of an amendment allocate Larsen, supra. Brandriet v. 152, I.R.C. Re- occasioned the Tax § 1984, 98-369, form Act of P.L. No. contrast, appellate from courts oth 423(a), (1984), produc- 98 Stat. that, § jurisdictions er not concluded changes ed significant in the standards amendment, withstanding the a divorce dependency exemp- for allocation court still has to allocate a only tion. amendment Under that dependency exemption to the noncustodi parent is entitled to claim the parent by directing par al the custodial dependency exemption, subject to three written waiver. Lin ent to execute exceptions: involving multiple-sup- cases Lincoln, coln v. Ariz. P.2d [155 272] port 152(e)(3); agreements, I.R.C. Marriage In re (Ariz.App.1987); § involving “qualified pre-1985 cases in- Einhorn, 212, 127 Ill.App.3d Ill.Dec. [178 struments,” 152(e)(4); I.R.C. Fu (Ill.App.1988); 533 N.E.2d 411] exception applicable present in the situa- Molstad, denberg N.W.2d 19 tion, parent where the custodial waives Fleck, (Minn.App.1986); Fleck v. dependency exemption by written (N.Dak.1988); Cross v. N.W.2d 355 152(e)(2). waiver. I.R.C. The noncus- Cross, Per (W.Va.1987); 363 S.E.2d 449 todial dependency waive the golski v. Pergolski, Wis.2d [143 166] yearly for num- basis (Wis.App.1988). Following N.W.2d 414 ber specified years, all future Ap the lead of the Minnesota Court of years. 26 C.F.R. Molstad, 1.152-4T in Fudenberg supra, peals Congress’ purpose amending the stat- that, generally agree these courts re ute disputes was to resolve factual be- gardless of the amendment’s restrictive tween parents divorced over the issue language, state courts retain who the dependency exemp- could claim equitable authority to direct execution of tion. a waiver the custodial where Cross,

Thus, Cross v. required. law one so new has clarified the question parent reaching of when each at In may claim S.E.2d 458. this conclu sion, exemption, among the doing and in so it there is a consensus has these the authority judges simply appellate judicial undercut that courts allocation of exemption, to the magis dependency exemption award the does not the inter trate purpose, did here. it fere with the has left un amendment’s question namely answered the to rid the of whether a di Internal Revenue Ser vorce indirectly accomplish deciding court can vice of the burden of who thing by directing exemption. same claim the in Cross As noted custodial Cross, supra, v. parent Congress a ap sought to execute waiver. what Several pellate amending 152(e) to in courts have concluded achieve I.R.C. that certainty was amendment divests divorce of this the allocation of courts McKenzie v. authority. dependency exemption Kinsey, for federal tax ad Lorenz Lor (Fla.App.1988); purposes; v. nothing So.2d 98 ministration enz, Mich.App. precludes amendment a domestic N.W.2d [166 58] (Mich.App.1988); Hughes Hughes, requiring parent from a to custodial exe [35 (Ohio Id. Ohio cute such a at St.3d N.E.2d 1213 waiver. 165] Michlitsch, 1988); Gleason Or. agree reasoning. [82 We with this In this App. 965, 967, (Ore. 728 P.2d n. 6 state, 688] the dependency exemption has tra- Larsen, Brandriet v. App.1986); ditionally been treated as a valuable Fair, (S.Dak.1989); Davis v. N.W.2d 455 right allocated, which can be like other (Tex.App.1986). S.W.2d 711 For the rights, by many the divorce court. In part appellate cases, most these courts themselves will allocate that, reasoned other than the enu exemption three to the terms of exceptions provided separate agreement. However, merated for in I.R.C. their we ty permissible it nothing wording pay, find to under federal in the of the legislative history amendment nor in law and the Idaho statute to take the account, expressly a prohibits divorce court into value directing depend- thereby indirectly allocating from allocation of the its economic par- ency exemption (Footnotes noncustodial parties. value between the ent; amendment itself contains no omitted.) requirement that the waiver be voluntar- Rohr, 698, 703-706, 118 Idaho Rohr likewise, signed ily the amendment (Ct.App.1989). P.2d 99-102 prohibit a divorce court from does not Although appellate several state courts directing parent sign the custodial 152(e) preempts have held that I.R.C. § Marriage In re Ein- such a waiver. authori- their courts’ discretion and hom, at 533 N.E.2d at Ill.Dec. 419] [127 ty exemption, allocate the federal tax Congress prohibit had intended to 37. If opinion opposite position are of the that the allocating exemp- divorce courts from by many appellate taken other courts a tion, so in it have stated the amend- could policy. more reasonable and functional Furthermore, that ment. we believe di- 152(e) 1984, amending Congress I.R.C. § posi- a are in much better vorce courts tax allowed the allocation the federal efficient tion than the IRS ensure en- by providing for a of the waiver of child orders direct- forcement exemptions to be executed the custodial dependency ly linked allocation 152(e). The parent. I.R.C. reason parent exemption. If a custodial who changed in law 1984 was to relieve the was he finds later that executes waiver Internal Revenue Service of involvement she not received the child has resolving disputes parents over between spouse payments which noncustodial exemption. Enactment of amended the tax make, obligated to then the custodial was 152(e) Congress persuades I.R.C. us may go to court and obtain an spouse courts would intended that state divorce compelling judgment the non- order or long as so it was allocate the spouse pay the value of the accomplished within the framework of that, exemption. We therefore hold lost of a As noted statute execution waiver. proceedings, in divorce divorce court Appeals, in order to shift by the Court has discretion allocate income dependency exemption, the custodial dependency exemption to the noncustodi- waiver fore- sign must written directing par- parent by the custodial al exemption, and the noncustodial going the ent to execute a written waiver his must this waiver to attach 152(e). exemption under I.R.C. § year in tax return for the taxable income holding, we intimate no view that so The Revenue question. Internal Service permissible directing only a is the waiver 8332, “Release of Claim provided has Form assuring proper party the means of that Sep- Exemption for Child of Divorced or to ultimately receives the economic benefit Parents,” accomplish to this trans- arated method, exemption. of the tax Another exemption the fer of the tax to noncustodi- recognized Supreme Dakota by the South parent. 26 C.F.R. 1.152-4T al See § Larsen, supra, is in Court Brandriet procedure for transfer The mechanism and to re- adjust support child itself to the exemption tax to the noncustodial of the party realized the flect the benefit provided by both the Con- parent has been claiming exemption. approach This the Internal Revenue Service. gress and the 32-706(A)(6), consistent with I.C. grant- not compelling exists for No reason fixing currently the in allows which the ing courts of this state the divorce of to consider the “ac- the level discretion, proper authority in the case and party recognized by the tual tax benefit circumstance, utilize this method to and to claiming exemption.” Al- the federal tax rights parties. equitably the of the allocate child though may whether it be debated denying suggested of our by refer- alternative should be fixed levels authority order the custo- divorce courts to need and abili- to factors other than ence general jurisdiction dial then sign exemption to and courts are courts of imposing upon responsibility plenary the court the cases and and for divorce have of taking consequences tax in power parties into account equitable to order to making property a division is a circuitous significance of documents execute various process and that is cumbersome at best deeds, of assignment interest in such as beset with the likelihood of error. Our bonds, policies, insurance bills stocks and authority divorce courts should have the of sale, and numerous other documents of doing directly suggested be ac- what process. We are of the during the divorce complished indirectly. holding today Our discretionary and opinion the same that purpose consistent with stated equitable power exists in divorce courts our Congress relieving in the Internal Revenue regard ordering to execute party with responsibility deciding Service of the exemption. tax a waiver the federal which parents may of the tax claim the Accordingly, judicial we hold that the allo- exemption.4 dependency exemption cation is not magistrate work inconsistent with and does not interfere courts of this state 152(e). Cross, on daily proper- basis with division of I.C.R. See Cross v. ty rights, rights, support, (W.Va.1987). child visitation 363 S.E.2d 449 myri- responsibility medical care and a At the time the decree in ad significant of other issues in divorce present case was entered I.C. 32-706 did requiring every than actions. Rather specifically require not the court to consid- allocating process case the circuitous exemption.5 er the effect of the federal adjusting sup- property, division of However, magistrate court was statuto- payments port process or some other rily required at that time consider the order to ex- balance the effect the tax resources, needs, obligations “financial and emption, leaving and then par- the custodial both and noncustodial Service, work with the Internal Revenue Certainly, ents.” allocation fed- policy practicality better and reasons eral tax affects the financial re- dealing compels issue with this us to hold either the sources of non-custo- magistrate courts who are con- dial court did not fronted regular with these issues on a basis sign either requiring err in Teresa to authority be allowed the discretion and the pay waiver or William the resolve directly the tax issue tax he a result of not additional incurred as they opinion if are proper that it is a having exemption. remedy Obviously, to utilize. power such parties stipulated In this case the cautiously is to exercised express decree its the divorce prudently. right terms allows William the to claim the courts of deal this state with issues equal exemption provided he is cur greater significance impact federal tax support payments. his child exemptions they than tax rent with should supports magistrate’s finding alternative to utilize in the record available substantially was proper circumstances. Idaho’s that William current 98-432, II, disputes 4. part Cong., relatively high H.R.Rep. 2d See No. these History (Legislative generally Deficit Sess. 3 of the tax Government has little revenue at Act, 98-369), reprinted Reduction P.L. in 1984 the stake in outcome. The committee wishes Ad.News, 697, Cong. U.S.Code 1140. The re by & certainty allowing provide more to the port states: spouse the unless that right spouse waives his or governing claim the present The rules the allocations Thus, exemption. dependency disputes dependency exemption sub- be- of the tire often proof parents jective present problems difficult of tween will be resolved without the and and substantiation. Internal Revenue of the Internal Revenue Service. involvement disputes many involved in Service becomes depend- § 5. The current version of I.C. 32-706 as parents who both claim between the requires ency providing support amended the court to consider the “ac- exemption based on recognized party by claiming applicable cost to tual tax benefit over the thresholds. The exemption.” dependency Government to resolve the federal child Congress in en- magis- emasculates the intent of payments. his child determining acting the which simply ordered Teresa to com- scheme trate court exemption. ply parent decree to which she is entitled the divorce stipulated previously and allow William had provided The written waiver I.R.C. alternative, exemption. In the the tax 152(e)(2) exceptions only one of three § compensate magistrate Teresa to ordered general rule established I.R.C. tax he for the added for which William 152(e)(1), providing that the custodial § having of became liable because not dependency will be entitled exemption available. Under these claimed speci- exemption under the circumstances this order was within circumstances exceptions other relate to fied there. The of and was not an power (I.R.C. multiple-support agreements abuse discretion. 152(e)(3)) pre-1985 “qualified instru- Directing party (I.R.C. 152(e)(4)). Congress to execute the waiver If ments” allocating only is not the means could intended that divorce courts allo- had exemption. exemption, economic benefit it would have been cate may, is autho- fourth ex- easy to have included this by I.C. many the current version other ception. rized wonders how One 32-706, value of take portions account of the Internal Revenue Code effect when and allocate its of trial rewritten the decisions now be initial or modified child vari- ordering taxpayers it makes an to execute courts Nonetheless, returns, waivers, elections, to re- or other order. ous alternative execution waiver quire documents. courts of this state the divorce view, very my our divorce courts are to utilize under the should have available subject of capable dealing with the

proper circumstances. determining the cus- support after whether dependen- the other issues We have considered claim the todial intends to they are Teresa and conclude rewrite cy exemption, raised without the need to without merit. to allow courts the Internal Revenue Code exemption. require the waiver

Therefore, we affirm concern- and district court decisions issue, denial ing the federal of William’s attorney fees and dismissal modify. remand

petition to proceedings on hearing or further

for a Modify Response to Petition to affirmative relief. which seeks 800 P.2d 94 respondent. No attor- appeal on Costs ROHR, Plaintiff-Appellant, Ann Teresa appeal. ney fees awarded McDEVITT, C.J., BAKES, J. and ROHR, William Michael Tem., WOOD, Pro Judge, District Defendant-Respondent. concur. No. 17496. Justice, JOHNSON, concurring Appeals of Idaho. Court of dissenting. 4, 1989. Dec. ex- majority opinion, with the

I concur holding that our cept portion Feb. Review Granted depend- income tax may allocate the courts noncustodial ency exemption parent to execute directing the custodial under written waiver view, holding 152(e)(2). my

I.R.C.

Case Details

Case Name: Rohr v. Rohr

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Oct 19, 1990

Citation: 800 P.2d 85

Docket Number: 18547

Court Abbreviation: Idaho