*1
Mich 520
INSURANCE COMPANY
HAWKEYE-SECURITY
ROHLMAN
10).
(Calendar
10,
Argued
No.
92675.
December
Docket No.
J.,
29,
Dissenting opinion by
Levin,
filed
June
1993.
Decided
30,1993. Rehearing
stood was not physically was not the van because he inside it when the occurred. courts did not accident below address whether purposes was an trailer *2 pip benefits, awarding rendering inadequate the record for of resolution that issue. required by 2. motorist are Because uninsured benefits not statute, any on the claim such benefits must be based the policy, requires injury which that the have acci- occurred person. Although dent have and been sustained a covered auto, the van was a covered the issue not ad- because was Appeals, the Court of dressed and because the insurer respect conceded that the trailer was a auto with covered uninsured motorist benefits and the courts below did not re- plaintiff trailer, occupying solve whether the was the remand is required development. for further factual Reversed and remanded. joined by Cavanagh, dissenting, Justice Chief Justice plaintiff, standing
stated that the
who
with
on
was
his feet
the
ground
touching
trailer,
and whose hands were
the side of the
occupying
was an
of and was
the vehicle.
"occupant,”
While the no-fault
does not
act
define
term
policy
specifically provides
of insurance
in the situa-
by 3111,
occurring
Michigan,
tion covered
an accident
outside
§
person occupying
may
a vehicle
no-fault
recover
benefits.
providing coverage
in, on, out,
persons upon, getting
or off a
policy
only persons
physically
includes not
who are
occurs,
in a vehicle when an accident
but also those "on” or
"upon”
plaintiff
a vehicle. The
he was
"upon”
meaning
the van or trailer within
in
of the word
policy
and as
construed
Nickerson Citizens Mutual Ins
Co,
(1975).
"occupant,”
meaning
Mich 324
of the word
analyzed Royal
as used
act and
no-fault
Globe
Co v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins
Mich 565
applicable
policy provides greater coverage
because the
to a
person "occupying”
"occupant”
provided
a vehicle than is
to an
3111.
under §
Whether
can recover no-fault benefits should not
affect
whether
can recover under uninsured
cover-
motorist
age.
question depends solely
Resolution of on whether he
"occupying”
meaning
the minivan or
within
trailer
of
trailer,
policy.
conceded
insurer
that the
as well as the
van,
purposes
was a covered vehicle for
uninsured
"upon”
policy
claim.
The construction of
in a similar
requires
surely
in Nickerson
affirmance of the uninsured mo-
Mich 520
Opinion op the Court
on the
be affirmed
award also should
The no-fault
torist award.
enlarging
language
authority
Nickerson
"upon”
coverage to include a
"on”
the no-fault
an out-of-state
in a situation covered
insured vehicle
accident.
(1991)
App
reversed.
Brandt, Judd); Randolph Taylor (by A. & Schoolmaster Gross), (by Nemeth, counsel James G. Gross & defendant-appellee Club of Michi- Automobile for gan. *3 plaintiff victim was case the this Brickley, by in an out-of-state a hit-and-run driver struck attending to a two- automobile accident from the that had become detached wheel trailer vehicle presents just exited. The case he had sufficiently issues, of which are of not all number developed Court. for decision this personal
Essentially, plaintiff’s recovery in of protection jury and uninsured no-fault benefits dependent interpretation on an is motorist benefits "occupant” appears the no- as it in the term seq.; statute, MSA 24.13101 MCL 500.3101 et fault seq., "occupying” it is defined et policy by This is insurance issued defendant.1 required mandated because benefits are pip coverage statute, is not. but uninsured "occupant” statute the term and the insurance While the uses "occupying,” perceive any we do not intended uses the term meaning on of different forms of the word. in the basis difference 1993] Rohlman Opinion of the Court We conclude that the term in no- fault is to be statute construed as we in indicated Royal Globe Ins Co v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Mich NW2d 652 and that plaintiff interpretation, under this literal in case was not of the automobile at purposes awarding the time of the accident for pip benefits. plaintiff
Because there evidence that the physical contact with the trailer at the time along peripheral accident, issue, awith issue whether the trailer awas covered vehicle for purposes of insurance, the uninsured motorist present question only a closer that can be resolved development with fuller on remand.
i August plaintiff, 5, 1985, On Frederick Rohl- passenger man, awas in a minivan owned registered Stevens, Vicki a relative, who is not Michigan, Hawkeye- and insured defendant Security Company. Insurance Ms. Stevens was driving through pulling Ohio, the van a small two- apparently unhitched, wheeled trailer that became crossing after some railroad tracks. The trailer overturned and came to rest the center lane of highway. parked
Ms. Stevens turned the van around and got trailer, behind the and the then out twenty van walked ten feet toward the intending trailer After turn over on its wheels.
approximately passed, *4 two had minutes plaintiff attempting right while the trailer, an unidentified vehicle struck the trailer plaintiff, injuring severely. and the him plaintiff, having own, The no of insurance his sought personal injury protection to recover and Mich op Opinion the Court the defendant motorist benefits
uninsured
insurer,
coverage. Plaintiff
filed
denied
but was
against Hawkeye
declaratory
on
action
this
Hawkeye
21,
moved for
sum
and
October
2.116(C)(8)
pursuant
mary disposition
and
to MCR
(10),
plaintiff
arguing
not related to
insured,
was not an
The trial
or the trailer.
the insured vehicle
either
court denied
ing
broadly interpret
and,
motion
"occupant,”
held that
the term
van and awarded
of the insured
was an
pip
motorist benefits.2
and uninsured
distinguishing
Appeals affirmed,
Court
key
area,
v Citi
in this
Nickerson
the two
cases
Co,
ii general definition In to the issue of the addition occupant, involvement of the van of and the because of the
trailer,
and because the insurance
pip
provided uninsured motorist benefits as well as
presents
benefits,
number of more
this case
complicated
the trial court nor
issues that neither
Pip
addressed.
benefits are
Court
determining
question
occupancy,
the trial court relied on
in Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Ins
393 Mich
this Court’s decision
(1975).
324;
That and in of our conclu- occupancy sion related to plete analysis van, of the a com- requires of these facts consideration policy relating and the statutes thereto must be read and together though part construed contract, the statutes were a of the presumed parties for it is to be that the contracted executing policy satisfying with the requirements, statutory intention of carry and intended to make the contract to out purpose. its policy A satisfy provi- of insurance must be construed to required, sions of the law particularly which was when policy specifies the tory requirement; issued in that it was issued to conform to the statu- policy and where an insurance has been pursuance requirement of the of a statute which operation good forbids the of a motor vehicle until and suffi- security given, cient has been the court should construe this policy together light statute and the purpose. legislative (rev Couch, Insurance, ed), §45:694, pp [12A 2d 331- 332.] liability in an automobile definition[s] insurance required statute, it, of the motor vehicles covered [are] be construed with reference to statutes with which it was comply [id., 45:695, p intended to .... § 333.] policies. We think the same would hold true for no-fault compulsory A only insurance statute is concerned with injured with Accordingly, insurer which do persons, or harmed third and therefore is not concerned any liability persons. matters which do not affect to such agreements collateral between the insured and the coverage provided not alter the or remedies [Id., 45:703, p statute are valid. 339.] Mich Opinion of the Court respect pip to the and the van benefits with trailer, motorist benefits and then of uninsured respect the trailer. The to the van and with also trial reach Appeals failed to court and Court issue or the uninsured the trailer presumably issue, both courts because benefits *6 occupant plaintiff the van at to be an of found the pip purposes of benefits. least for pip a. benefits: van argues length § 3111 of The defendant at to applies situation current no-fault act occurring of accidents out because it concerns state: protection pay- are Personal insurance benefits bodily in an injury for suffered able accidental state, occurring if out of this the accident
accident States, the United its territories and occurs within Canada, possessions injury the accident a protection of either domiciled in occupant whose owner or personal protection in whose and at the time of of the claim was is basis personal named insured under a spouse, his a relative policy, insurance household or an same in accident vehicle involved a registrant was insured under pro- has insurance security approved by secretary of state vided (4) under, section 3101. subsection [MCL 500.3111; Emphasis 24.13111. MSA added.] Appeals nor the trial court Neither Court resolving present in this section case. discussed plaintiff’s explanation, simply brief, without The states: "The Court of in not was correct discussing [MSA 24.13111]. 500.3111 It was MCL agree. applicable lawsuit.” cannot to this We dispute, of this are not
The basic facts case it clear the accident occurred Ohio. is directly applies, placing inter Therefore, § 3111 its Rohlman Opinion of the Court pretation reading at issue.5 A careful of 3111 plaintiff that, demonstrates in order to recover the only criteria, must establish a number two of plaintiff which are at issue. The must show that he 1) 2) of a vehicle involved in the negative question accident.6 A answer to either dispose issue; however, would because the many definition of disputes has been the source of many agonize and has caused as courts to be, over what that definition should mined to resolve the confusion.7 we are deter supra, pre-no-fault Nickerson, case, plaintiff passenger was a in an insured automobile operated Michigan. Davison, The car became occupants, waiting disabled, and the standing assistance, were outside of the vehicle. An uninsured vehicle struck the disabled vehicle pushing behind, into the causing injury. serious Id. at 326. The terms of the policy provided disabled vehicle’s insurance *7 plaintiff only with uninsured motorist benefits if "occupying he was the insured automobile.” Id. at interpreting policy’s 328. In the definition of "occu- pying”: upon entering alighting "in or or into or plaintiff argues The apply that 3105 and 3106 §§ this situation agree. Legislature and not specific 3111. § We do not The has enacted a applies section occurring of the no-fault act that to accidents state, ought out of priority and it seems evident this section to take may arguably apply over other sections that in a collateral manner to the facts of this case. plaintiff insured, of, spouse was not the named nor was he the to, Thus, only way related the named insured. the can recover occupant under is to §3111 establish himself as "an of a vehicle involved in the accident . . . .” requires Section 3111 also the vehicle involved the accident personal protection policy be insured under a insurance or other approved case, security. In this the van was insured defendant Hawkeye, and the trailer was insured defendant Automobile Club (acia). Michigan occupant unnecessary Because of our resolution of the issue it is to decide whether the van was a vehicle involved in the accident 3111. § 442 Mich Opinion of the Court plaintiff, because held that
from,” this Court "occupying” vehicle immedi- the insured he was ately his subse- accident and because before the repair, quent injury of its use arose out protection. Id. at uninsured motorist entitled to 328, 331-332. pre-no-fault law, was based on
While Nickerson again in the context raised issue was Royal supra. Globe, In that of the no-fault act case, stopped driveway while his the driver proceeded spouse got vehicle and out of the through garage When to enter house. walk the driver
began backing the vehicle into the striking garage accidentally accelerated, dispute spouse. two in- was between driver’s respon- companies to which was determine surance paying no-fault benefits. Resolution sible injured party an turned on whether the case in the accident as of the vehicle involved Royal in the no-fault act. Globe that term is used at 567-569. holding did not control that Nickerson distinguished
Royal decision, this Court Globe ways signifi in a most Nickerson number —the simple that Nickerson cant of which was the fact only required pre-no-fault and, thus, act case was a interpretation policy.8 Id. of the insurance at 572-573. stated: We It is familiar and fundamental rule of con- private
struction of a automobile insurance determine, duty first that language court’s used, con- apparent intention of the tracting parties, and then to construe doubtful or "occupant” as used in While act does define *8 question Royal policies in in Nickerson and Globe both had definitions given materially indistinguishable of the term the in, definition case, "in, upon, getting Hawkeye policy is: instant which on, out or off.” 529 Ins Opinion of the Court ambiguous terms favorably to the insured and against the insurer as the contract drafter. language statute, hand, of a on the other is re- quired to by assigning be construed words primary used their meaning the generally and understood apparent consistent with the intention of Legislature in enacting the law. at 573. [Id. Citations omitted.]
Furthermore, opined we "if this Court had found Nickerson an occupant be Parvin Nickerson would have had no re- covery for injuries his the insurance since the vehicle which caused his injuries was Id. at 574. uninsured.”
In deciding to follow Nickerson in this case, Court of failed to acknowledge signifi cance of adoption act, of the no-fault which passed in the time between the Nickerson Globe Royal It decisions. also overlooked that by act, terms of the no-fault all essentially acci dents are personal now covered by protec injury tion benefits or the assigned plan. claims There fore, the repeal of the uninsured motorist statute and passage of the no-fault act largely eliminated the motivating factors underlying the Nickerson Co, Bradley decision.9 See Mid-Century 409 (1980) (Justice 52-54; Mich NW2d Levin and Lankford v Citizens Ins writing Court), for the (1988). 413, 420; Mich App NW2d plaintiff In this case it is true that the is also without insurance of own; however, unique only apply very his isolated instances. The the result and would was out of state when the accident If occurred. the accident occurred in-state he would have been covered assigned plan 500.3172(1); claims of the no-fault act. MCL MSA 24.13172(1). Also, because, importance the case takes on added fairly isolated, unique the factual situation is the Court of Appeals interpretation provisions would extend to other Affording private- of the no-fault act. party provision solicitude to an insured in a setting interpreting statutory contract is far different from throughout that would have ramifications the no-fault act. *9 Mich Opinion the Court Royal in Furthermore, Globe we determined purposes no-fault act would be the of the that predictability certainty "by the and served better 'occupant’ of the word that a literal construction primary assigned yield, it is its and when will generally meaning.” Id. 575. There at understood Royal in fore, our Globe we reaffirm decision interpret not the task to the statute and our is coverage policy policy. is directed Where insurance language policy and the the no-fault act act, with that the intended to be consistent is language interpreted in consistent be should accomplished only fashion, preting inter which can be polic statute, than the rather individual ies.10 Globe, case, Royal in In this in we have a situation which the as from, language policy provides a definition of different and However, than;
possibly the the issue was not broader no-fault act. Globe, Royal presented by argued by litigants has it the in nor been parties arguing policy the definition of this case. Royal controls, plaintiff merely occupying us our asks to limit disputes companies priority insurance and Globe decision to between plaintiff apply those cases to Nickerson in fact-sensitive where recovery proposed by to a otherwise would not be entitled dissenting opinion. according emphasize this case that under facts of We controls, parties, presented by arguments not deal provide Although properly and we the statute do and, so, question policy if with whether the can did coverage required by than that the no-fault act. broader we the issue for a case which issue is reserve Couch, us, following supra, note from n 3 before we 45:697, p 334. § compulsory in effect a minimum A insurance statute declares observed, and a cannot be standard which must be coverage. with restrictive written a more manifestly policy, superior to and controls the The statute is conflicting provisions provisions supersede any of the its policy. However, may [although coverage its its contract restrict an insurer statute, may required contract less than that as, statutory liability, coverage for
for a than the broader op Opinion the Court pip whether, The question purposes benefits, van, plaintiff was an as that term is used when the accident occurred.
At the time of the accident attempting right the overturned and discon- nected trailer some ten to feet twenty away departed. the van from which he had As said in we Globe, Royal *10 "Whatever her status was after she left the motor vehicle in the street and walked some 60 feet to garage the rear of the where the her, Pontiac struck 'not an occupant’ was [she] Id. at the vehicle she 576. injured.” when was Although the no-fault act not does define occupant terms other of the occupying, sections act provide guidance determining meaning. its 3106(l)(c) Subsection of the act in part: states Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the maintenance, ownership, operation, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless . . . the occupying, injury was sustained a into, entering alighting from the vehicle. [Em- phasis added.] The Legislature recognized that "enter- expressly ing into” and "alighting separate from” are acts Globe, su- Royal a vehicle. See "occupying” pra at n 5. Section 3111 not include does "entering "alighting into” or from” the vehicle as acts that trigger personal protection would benefits for an out-of-state accident. giving the term
By occupant primary its instance, amount, respect territory, with circumstances of etc., operation, recovery solely by and in such case is measured policy. coverage may The fact of the be immaterial, required by broader than that statute is for the [Id., parties may contract of the be enforced as written. 45:699, p 336.] Mich Opinion of the Court meaning coupled generally with the understood statutory reference, we conclude that above plaintiff occupant an of the van because was not physically when the he inside the van was interpretation con occurred. We find this accident Royal sistent with Globe decision and our act.11 intent of no-fault pip
b. trailer benefits: parties respective mainly While the base their plaintiff question was claims on an also contends that trailer and that the trailer was whether the occupant plaintiff, briefly, van, of the albeit occupant an "covered vehicle” Hawkeye policy covering the van. The trial the Court did not find court and necessary to whether make determination occupant plaintiff of the trailer was an because they that he was an concluded van. analysis concerned, the
As far as benefits are pip of the trailer whether *11 11 occupant plaintiff that was an of and was The dissent would hold adopt occupying same fault that "would the the van. Justice states he Levin approach [reading policy occupant no- the definition of into the construing 'occupant’ term as in at in the used 3111.” Post § act] 543. Interestingly, Ins Heard State Farm Mutual Automobile type 1 used the Mich NW2d Justice Levin same pumping gasoline analysis hold of service struck insurance, and, that a who was at a self- occupant gas station not an of it was was his vehicle when purchased Mr. had another vehicle. Heard no-fault pip result, as he not have been entitled to a would under the act if his was involved in an benefits no-fault vehicle occupying he held that accident while was it. Justice Levin "[b]ecause he Heard’s uninsured vehicle was not involved in the accident and was a pedestrian a and not a motorist or of motor vehicle (or, occupant), prefers, pedestrian a was more like a than motorist if one policies he is as much entitled —under terms and of insurer of the vehicle that struck no-fault act—to recover him as is a nal). (parenthetical origi- pedestrian . . . .” at 146 Id. Opinion of the Court respect to that above with is similar to discussed acknowledge occupying the van. We that question occupying the than van. trailer is However, closer that the lower in addition to the fact issue, is this the record courts did not address inadequate for its resolution.12 argued Hawkeye court, that the trial plaintiff recovery from the insurer of should seek 500.3114(4)(a); trailer, MSA acia. MCL 24.13114(4)(a). that the trailer The trial court held policy Hawkeye’s was a "covered auto” under purposes holding priority, of while also plaintiff occupant of the van. A careful was an reading policy of the statute and show that this holding complete analysis. was reached without a above, As we stated ing the statute controls the award pip benefits, while the insurance just And, controls the uninsured benefits. plaintiff necessary it to determine whether purposes was an of the van or trailer for benefits, it as well as for uninsured motorist pip, necessary provide type is also the same analysis regarding question of "covered vehic le.”13 sparse regarding The record is whether the trailer had the in,
capacity occupied. attempting to be Plaintiff was never nor was he into, trailer, get Nobody riding presum- to ably the trailer. was and drums, lighting equipment, it was filled with sound and Furthermore, dance costumes. the witnesses were inconsistent with respect testimony to the dimensions of the revealed it was trailer — wide, long, eight four five to feet and one-half to five feet feet and two tall. Additionally, respect exactly the record is inconsistent with plaintiff when the The medical where records state: "This is a brought accident occurred. twenty-eight year old white male [sic] squad. patient walking rescue states that he was patient jump when a car crossed the mid-line. The way physician tried to out leg.” treating but was hit in the left also told his pedestrian Although that "he was a struck a car.” differently, trial court found we note the inconsistencies. pip controls, concerned, As far as benefits are requires the vehicle involved in the accident be covered *12 Mich Opinion op the Court BENEFITS
C. MOTORIST UNINSURED also motorist The trial court awarded uninsured Any must be claim for these benefits benefits. based policy, requires injury on the which that the by accident have been sustained have occurred person.”14 "cov To be considered a a "covered person” injured party in must ered sured, be any family insured, or
a member of the person occupying These the covered auto. other questions respect the van
must be asked with dealing and, trailer, are and the because we with policy benefits, the definitions uninsured motorist control.
1. THE VAN concerned, far is it is that As as the van obvious policy; however, it a auto is covered Appeals did not this because the Court address analy- issue, we are left without the benefit of its deciding sis, we and therefore refrain issue at this time. personal protection It is evident that policy. statute defines policy. accompanying text. insurance See n 6 and Hawkeye’s the van was a vehicle covered under trailer, however, complex. For The the issue more trailer, "[mjotor including vehicle” "a a operated operation upon public highway by power designed for power other than which has more than 2 wheels.” MCL muscular 24.13101(2)(e). 500.3101(2)(e);MSA However, policy the insurance contains different definition pur- Hawkeye the statute for "covered auto.” contends that controls pip however, benefits; poses the which makes plaintiff applicability contest does not benefits, policy purposes of 'uninsured definition trailer a auto for covered those benefits. argues exclusively. controls definition it ended Court of did not have deal with this issue because analysis parties have
its this issue resolved. with van. We think the are entitled to (A resolving fact that noted this must be when trailer.) issue is acia insured accident, injury and will It is contested that occurred pertains following analysis, question, therefore that as it to the not be discussed. *13 Dissenting Opinion Levin, J.
2. THE TRAILER trailer, concedes Hawkeye respect With with policy auto under is a covered at What is motorist benefits.15 to uninsured respect the courts issue, was not discussed and what occupying below, is whether in the insurance the term is defined trailer arise here concerns that of the same policy. Some above, applicability regarding discussed were to the of statutory definition of pip of benefits.16 purposes trailer
hi Ap- the Court of judgment Accordingly, reversed, is remanded and the matter is peals consistent with proceedings further that Court for Court of opinion. Specifically, this ordered to consider: pip
1) benefits, Rohl- whether purposes For so, and, if of the trailer man was an vehicle; the trailer was a covered whether benefits, 2) of uninsured purposes For either the van occupying Rohlman was whether trailer, Hawkeye policy. as it is defined Mallett, JJ., Boyle, Riley, Griffin, con- Brickley, J. curred with Supreme opinion following of the was filed with the Clerk 30, 1993, opinion of the of the Court June after the release
Court on 29,1993 Reporter. June on — Rohlman Levin, Robert (dissenting). Frederick automobile accident in Ohio an n 13. See accompanying text. n 12 and See 442 Mich Dissenting Opinion Levin, J. attempting that had to reconnect a trailer mini- named insured’s become unhitched riding. questions he had van presented which been Rohlman are whether "occupant” (cid:127) of the vehicle within was meaning liability no-fault act automobile providing out- § 3111,1 of-state no-fault benefits for
accidents; "occupying” (cid:127) was meaning provided the vehicle within insurance, which no-fault and uninsured both —for " *14 purposes '[occupying’ motorist means —that upon, getting in, on, in, out or off.”2 liability provides The no-fault automobile act that where acciden- bodily Michigan, injury in a tal benefits is suffered state other than no-fault may by "spouse” or recovered named insured and his be occupant by in the or a "relative” domiciled of” the named insured’s vehicle "involved insured’s household "an in the accident”: payable protection are for acci- Personal insurance benefits injury occurring bodily dental this territories and suffered in an accident out of state, States, its if the accident occurs within United Canada, possessions or in and the whose
injury time is of the claim at the of the accident the basis was personal policy, protection a named insured under insurance spouse, his or an owner insurance secretary of either domiciled the same household a relative occupant in the of a vehicle involved accident whose personal protection registrant or was insured under provided security approved policy has (4) of section 3101. of state subsection [MCL 500.3111;MSA 24.13111.] policy "agreement” part begins The with an on the the insurer follows”) immediately ("[W]e agree you the insured with as with followed definitions, including following: in, in, on, "Occupying” upon, getting means out or off.
[Emphasis added.] (described "personal The no-fault endorsement endorsement”) protection coverage injury states: policy apply Provisions of Definitions General [Emphasis unless modiñed this endorsement. added.] Rohlman Dissenting Opinion "occupant” an hold that Rohlman was would We "occupying” the vehicle. of and was i "question majority states plaintiff . . . the whether van, concerning §3111,”4 is used
as that term occurring state,5 and concludes out of accidents of the van not an "that physically inside the van when not he was because added.) (Emphasis the accident occurred.”6
A judge no-fault Rohlman The circuit awarded expense $8,400 $16,330 for medical benefits Coverage Injury provide Personal Protection We do not bodily injury: occupying by any person an auto if not 3. Sustained However, Michigan. place this exclu- takes outside the accident apply to: sion does you; a. any family member. b. .van, trailer, Hawkeye as the was a as well concedes *15 purposes "uninsured motorist claim”: vehicle for covered in the that the trailer involved The trial court below found qualified "your it was a as covered auto” because accident finding dispute Hawkeye as
temporary substitute. does applies the uninsured motorist claim. open question the trailer was whether This concession leaves by Hawkeye policy The trailer for no-fault benefits. covered by policy appears Automobile Club a issued to have been covered minivan Michigan of the insured to the mother of the owner of involved in the accident. 4Ante, p 531. n 1. See 6Ante, p 532. 442 Mich Opinion Dissenting Levin, J. uninsured $20,000 loss, and
for work coverage.7 presents totaling $24,730, award, no-fault The concerning statutory construction an issue meaning "occupant” §in 3111. used the term presents an $20,000 motorist award uninsured The issue of contract meaning concerning the construction "occupying” in the as used of the term policy of insurance.
B provides specifically policy of insurance an accident covered in the situation occurring "occupying” Michigan, person a outside may no-fault benefits.8 recover the vehicle "occupant” §in 3111 or not defined The term liability act. automobile in the no-fault elsewhere The term include not policy "occupying” is defined person physically only "in” a "upon” a vehicle. is "on” or also one who but "upon” Rob1man he was meaning that word or trailer within van the in Nickerson this Court as construed 324; 224 NW2d Co, 393 Mich Ins Citizens Mutual v (1975),9 pre-no-fault case. Nickerson Hawkeye policy provision of insur The uninsured motorist ance states: person” means: in this Part as used "Covered family any member. 1. You or occupying your Any covered auto.
2. other 3.....
8 See n 2. majority states: passage of repeal motorist statute of the uninsured [T]he motivating un- largely factors eliminated
the no-fault act Mid-Century Bradley See derlying decision. the Nickerson *16 539 1993] Ins Dissenting Opinion standing injured next to he was when the vehicle He, like motorist. struck an uninsured Rohlman, of a vehicle- had left the vehicle because during journey. Rohlman incident oriented minutes of the time within two van, and from the the trailer became detached twenty His hands feet of the van. within ten to "upon” literally body and were "on” detached, which, had been trailer, until it became to the van. hitched "upon” generally the "on” or
Courts construe language who leaves a vehicle to include a intending journey, of the the termination before occupancy in- vehicle, is and who resume geographic perimeter jured, within a reasonable engaging servicing the vehicle or part n. in "vehicle-oriented” conduct. See other c Royal analysis post-no-fault case, The Co, 419 Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Globe Ins Co v (1984), concerning the 652 Mich NW2d meaning "occupant” in no- as used of the term (1980) (Justice Co, 1, 52-54; 409 Mich 294 NW2d Levin Court),
writing
and Lankford v Citizens
(1988).
413, 420;
[Ante, p
App
Courts that provide coverage statutorily than is may greater ques concludes that the majority mandated.10 The "occupying” policy tion whether the definition in used "occupant” than the was broader term "presented 3111 of not the no-fault act was § controls, and parties, the the statute we do and, the can question policy with the deal whether so, re coverage if did broader than provide not read quired by the no-fault act.” We would presentations .narrowly. the so parties
D on a literal read quite is insistent majority 3111. It ing "occupant” term as used § pro Hawk deciding eye policy avoids whether no- required than is coverage vides broader act, fault and thus need not decide whether literal construction approach follow the same for Rohlman under provide coverage no-fault (i) no-fault endorsement circumstances no- provides specifically of insurance to a coverage "occupying fault who Michig if place auto takes outside accident (ii) including the "definitions” of an,”12 policy, to the no-fault "occupying,” apply the definition of (rev Insurance, 45:699, ante, Couch, ed), p quoted p 2d 12A 530, n 10. 11Ante, p 530, n 10. coverage language is the no-fault is not while not The exact converse: by any person provided occupying injury is where the "[sustained place Michigan.” outside See n 2. an auto if accident takes Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J. (iii) "occupying” provide endorsement, is defined to (iv) "upon” coverage; "on” or this Court Nicker- factually son, case, similar ruled that there was coverage "upon” language.13 under the
E question whether Rohlman can un- recover coverage der the uninsured motorist should not be majority’s affected decision not to decide question whether Rohlman can recover no- fault benefits under the no-fault endorsement of policy defining "occupying” to include an in- jury "upon” suffered the vehicle. Resolution of the question whether Rohlman can recover under the *18 coverage depends solely uninsured motorist on "occupying” whether he was the minivan or meaning policy. trailer within the of the question answer to that does not turn at all on legislative intent, but rather on a construction of policy. analysis construing Nickerson,
This Court’s "upon” language policy, in a similar insurance surely requires $20,000 affirmance of at least the uninsured motorist award to Rohlman. In Nicker- riding son, the vehicle in which Nickerson was highway, helped push stalled on the and he it to reentering passing the side of the road before it. A stopped, again and Nickerson left vehicle and walked to the front of the vehicle. An uninsured vehicle then struck the insured vehicle. case,
In the instant
an uninsured vehicle struck
13Hawkeye concedes that
the trailer
awas
covered auto for unin-
coverage.
sured motorist
We
no
see
need to decide whether the trailer was a covered auto for
purposes
no-fault
because the accident occurred within a "reasonable
geographic perimeter,”
Lightning
see Robson v
Rod Mutual Ins
App
accompanying
Ohio
to
2d
The factual circumstances Hawkeye the trailer has conceded that Nickerson. pur- uninsured motorist was a "covered auto” for poses. justification for remand to There is no need concerning applicability the of the uninsured motorist Court
coverage. F thus affirm the uninsured We would $20,000 authority on of Nickerson. We motorist award on would also affirm the no-fault award $24,770 language authority of Nickerson and the coverage policy enlarging the no-fault to include a person "upon” "on” vehicle in the the insured very an out-of-state situation covered oriented; accident. Rohlman’s conduct was vehicle "upon” the mean- "on” or the van within ing Court in of those as construed this words eighteen courts in at least other Nickerson twenty jurisdictions, though he was ten to even feet from the when the accident occurred. van
G bright-line approach, building majority’s on Royal concluding that the term Globe and "occu pant” requires have been "physically inside” will tend elimi *19 priority disputes nate between insurers §§ and 311515of no-fault act. 311414 juris number courts assimilated
A have prudence developed in the construction of "on” "upon” expense in the medical and uninsured n) (see part when Constru motorist endorsements
14 500.3114; MCL MSA 24.13114. 500.3115; MCL MSA 24.13115. Dissenting Opinion Levin, J. ing "occupant” "occupying” the term as used adopt their no-fault laws.16 We would the same approach construing "occupant” the term as may § used in 3111. The failure to do so Michigan taxpayers transfer providing the cost of medical long-term Michigan care for residents seri ously injured in vehicle-oriented out-of-state acci Legislature dents; this the did not intend.
ii language, pro- The automobile insurance viding "occupying” upon, getting "in, means in, on, off,” out or has been a feature of automobile policies before the enactment of no-fault laws. The language precedes the uninsured motorist endorse- ment. language generally
This has been construed to provide expense17 medical and uninsured motorist coverage18 persons physically who are not in a where, vehicle when an accident occurs as in the physically case, instant pied occu accident, the insured vehicle before the shortly injured person accident occurred ceased after physically occupy egréss injured person of from the vehicle occurred during journey, not at the termination of the journey, injured person left the vehicle be emergency necessitating servicing cause of an "clearly conduct, other vehicle-oriented” and the injured person occupancy intended to resume possible.19 soon as eighteen jurisdictions
At least have so construed "on” or words "upon.”_ 11(C). part See ika). part See n®). part See Law, 6.14, King, p No-Fault Automobile Accident 296. *20 442 Mich 520 544 Dissenting Opinion J.
A
language appears
"upon”
to have
The
or
"on”
deciding
by courts in
whether
been first construed
coverage
applica
expense payments
was
medical
ago,
forty-five years
in
v Farm
Madden
ble. About
App
Co, 82
Ins
Bureau Mutual Automobile
Ohio
(1948),
Op
586
the
111;
456;
79
Ohio
NE2d
injured
changed
when
a tire and was
insured had
struck
placing
the
he was
another vehicle while
trunk.
of
tire in the
The Ohio Court
removed
Appeals rejected
argument
the
the insurer’s
"alight
"upon”
injured person
ing”
"in”
was not
or
"entering”
in
the
when he was
vehicle
expense.20
jured,
medical
and awarded
thereafter,
in Lokos v New Amsterdam
Soon
(1949),
Casualty Co,
40, 41;
197 Misc
93 NYS2d
expense
injured person recovered medical
bumper
to
his
had fallen
where the
of
automobile
pavement
hanging
He
on one side.
and was
tying
bumper
injured
he
so
was
the act
proceed
journey,
he
lean
on his
"while
could
bumper
ing
his
car with the
over
.
hands
. . ,”21
vehicle,
standing
that the insured was
behind
court said
upper
"touching
touching
leaning
it and
forward with
or almost
compartment,”
body
part
was struck
when
and arms within
rear
his
another automobile.
Co,
475;
Mutual
Ins
139 W Va
In Green v Farm Bureau
Automobile
recovery was denied to a driver who
himself as he arm, lapsed, causing physical provision had no the wheel to crush his claimant drum required as the medical benefits connection policy. his insurance "upon” on and asked: The court focused the word "upon” Can said that insurer attached to word it be encompass only
meaning the entire supported by person in which narrow such cases so weight person’s body resting upon or positions Considering of a the usual the vehicle? in use the fact that other in relation a car being upon the automobile risks include acts of enumerated Rohlman Dissenting Opinion by Levin, in Sherman Supreme Island, Court of Rhode v New York Casualty 78 RI A2d 839 (1951), held upon” the words "in or should be *21 given a broad and liberal construction and the recovered medical expense.22
A California appellate court awarded medical expense person to a struck when automobile changing a wheel where the policy provided "upon” coverage. Christoffer v Hartford Accident & Indemnity App Cal 2d P2d (1954). The court said injured person the was
"upon the automobile” as the term employed in policy, just the as a fly "upon is said to be "upon wall” or ceiling,” painter or a is said to "upon wall,” person be "upon to be a raft” although supported hand, only by the or as a (the runner) player baseball "upon is said to be portion base” if any body his is in contact with bag. [Id., pp 982-983.] Rohlman was standing with two feet on the ground, facing the side of the trailer and with both of his hands on it.23
An Illinois appellate court awarded medical ex pense who, to an insured after becoming involved in accident, a two-car was injured when struck by a third vehicle as he was returning to his vehicle añer exchanging information with the driver of the second vehicle. Wolf v American Casualty Co resting upon being supported it, sense it is reason- give meaning including able to the term a broader some acts person [Id., p
which the inis contact with the car. 42.] 22The leaving insured had reached his destination. After the auto- mobile, rolling attempt he noticed it stop backward. In an taillight registration plate, he held onto the and and then he put bumper injured his knee on the and was when the vehicle hit a wall. 23See n 3. 442 Mich Opinion Dissenting Levin, J. Pa, 124; 118 NE2d App 2 Ill 2d Reading,
of (1954).24 B cases, expense this the medical Building on states, Nickerson, courts in other Court "upon” language "on” or construed endorsement. of the uninsured motorist context Manning Appeals, The Arizona Court 79; 623 Co, 128 Ariz P2d 1235 Home Ins Summit mo- the uninsured recovery allowed where torist endorsement from the trunk he removed the chains when them so that began straightening vehicle put on positioned to would be better chains court rear tires. The said: *22 indi- opinion, better reasoned cases our the prox- that if are such close cate one’s activities operation to and imity to the car and so related its integral part of occu- they use are one’s that car, may one said to and of the then be pancy use [Id., p "upon” car. be the 82.] v Farm Mutual Auto- Cocking see State Similarly, 971; 86 Cal App Rptr mobile Ins Cal 3d (1970), appellate court said: where California agreed it is that Under the facts also evident 24The court said: case, As the is the use of the word related to instant "upon” ambiguity. It which creates an cannot mean the clause, insured, meaning to to be within the of the had be running car on or couched on the roof sitting board physical relationship It on the hood. must connote some enlarged himself and the car that the area defined
between [Wolf, "entering alighting” and the word "in.” words supra, p 130.] Dissenting Opinion plaintiff performing physically an act directly related to the Since car.
traveling highway requiring under conditions tire chains, put acts stopping his the vehicle to on, undoing bag containing chains chains while in suggest and of proximity car, clearly
close to the place his intent to those on the chains car’s Accordingly, plaintiff’s tires. we hold that position preparatory placing on chains put requisite tires of the car relationship position, therefore, him in the physical injury to the car. His while in "using” occurred he was "upon” Volkswagen the car and while he was meaning within and [the statute]. [Emphasis added.] Sayers Supreme Montana,
The Court of America, Safeco Ins Co Mont P2d held that an insured could recover his vehi- the uninsured coverage cle when was injured while under hood of parked another vehicle ten twelve feet front of his vehicle to facilitate use of his vehicle’s battery jumper cables. The court said: "physical determining contact” test determinative
whether one is an is not developed under Montana law. Court This has "reasonable connection” test. issue here is Sayers’ whether injury activities at the time of the reasonably were so vehi- connected the Galetti that, law, Sayers cle an under the to be could be said policy’s meaning. within *23 Sayers single rode in the Galetti vehicle for the purpose jump-starting using the disabled car battery. attempted Galetti’s His assistance was dependent undeniably connected to the Galetti upon reasonably and thus [Id., pp 338-339.
vehicle. Emphasis added.] , 520 442 Mich
548 Opinion by Dissenting test in "physical contact” rejected This Court Nickerson, supra, p 331. (Mo 1986), Stolts, App, Pope SW2d
In person held that a Appeals Court of the Missouri automobile, his with of an engine over leaning its grill against and his knees against its stomach Pope was occupant of the vehicle. bumper, was an their dis-. jump-starting neighbors in assisting his un- struck an automobile when he was abled not Pope was holding After motorist. insured (one of cars of either of other two an own) near the shoulder parked his on was which Pope held that was the court the disabled vehicle to be con- "upon” the disabled sufficiently occupant. an sidered Kentucky in Kentucky Appeals, Court of Gray, Mutual Ins Co v
Farm Bureau SW2d 1991), App, allowed uninsured (Ky stopped to assist person for a who had recovery removing motorists, after injured and was disabled start- jump his vehicle and battery own ing the disabled vehicle. Court decided that "upon” his vehicle was language. the policy sense of Combs, Co v Michigan Mutual Ins 446 NE2d (Ind 1983), Appeals the Indiana Court App, leaning person injured that a determined vehicle, repairing of a compartment into the rear al- engine, of the vehicle riding though he had been in the vehicle did not intend to ride before it broke down and repaired. The after it was insured vehicle between relationship court focused on that he determining and the vehicle claimant "upon” the vehicle in the sense language. in Hart v Traders & Court of
The Texas (Tex 1972), App, Civ General 487 SW2d *24 1993] 549 Ins Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J. held that person a injured while changing a vehi- cle’s fuel pump was "upon” the vehicle and there- fore an occupant of the vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist coverage.
Uninsured motorist recovery was allowed Ohio Court of Appeals, where a passenger was placing a stereo in injured while open trunk a vehicle. The court said: In construing provisions uninsured motorist automobile policies insurance provide which cover age persons "occupying” vehicles, insured determination of whether a vehicle occupied
by a claimant at the time of an accident should take into account claimant had to the the immediate relationship the within a reasonable geographic perimeter.[25] [Emphasis added.] The Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed un- insured motorist person injured recovery to a while waiting to enter automobile, which had just pulled up to the curb. The court said adopted a test that:
considers party whether was vehicle-oriented or highway-oriented at the time of the injury. The vehicle orientation test considers the nature of the act engaged in at the time of the injury and the person intent of the injured. ... To these two considerations we add a third: whether the injured person was within the geographical reasonable vehicle.[26] perimeter [Emphasis added.] The Minnesota in Klein v Appeals, Court of 25Robson, supra, p n 13 headnote. Similarly, Oregon person the Court of held that a removing packaged gift while a from her trunk was an Co, Unigard App 500; of her vehicle. Mackie v Ins 90 Or (1988). P2d 1266 Heritage 166, 173; Kreuser Mutual 158 Wis 2d (Wis 1990). App, NW2d 806 Mich Opinion Dissenting Guaranty Fidelity Co, 451 NW2d & States
United (Minn 1990), App, uninsured allowed 901, 903-904 recovery struck motorists changing The court said: on his vehicle. tire "oc- liberally have construed jurisdictions Other *25 per- geographic a reasonable to refer to cupying” continuing relation- a a imeter around vehicle [Empha- and the claimant. ship a vehicle between sis added.] continuing a relation- injury, Klein and of his At the time vehicle; his he was ship existed between resuming his purpose of changing tire for
trip. persons in- held that courts have also Other ongoing journeys connec- have sufficient in volved uninsured motorist to recover tion to their vehicles Co, 780; AD2d 103 In In re Ins Nassau benefits. (1984), in- a driver was 415 taxicab 477 NYS2d exchanging jured he insurance information as was vehicle, of a second with which with the driver just struck the second A third vehicle had vehicle, collided.
propelling In hold- it into the two drivers. ing of an his the taxicab driver was appellate court vehicle, York’s intermediate New said: departure from vehicle is occasioned "Where interruption temporary to some incident occupant remains journey in immediate pletion and the and, upon com vicinity the vehicle objective occasioned the brief place his in interruption, he intends resume vehicle, passenger.”[27] ceasé to be a he does not
[Emphasis added.]
27
6;
Co,
Id.,
(quoting
p
Rice v Allstate Ins
NY2d
re
[1973]).
NYS2d
NE2d
Rohlman
Dissenting Opinion
Levin, J.
court,
Pennsylvania’s
appellate
intermediate
in
Contrisciane v Utica Mutual Ins
312 Pa Super
549;
Similarly, 563 So 2d 1316 (La 1990), App, the Court of Louisiana allowed uninsured motorist for a recovery the traíñc lane of a service station as he walked from the cashier his which was parked island, pump the outside lane of the gasoline. after paying adopted The court *26 findings: trial court’s had relationship never abandoned his [P]laintiff passenger as departure an act of the insured physical vehicle. His solely purpose performing for the of physically directly that was related to
the car. He never turned aside from this mission
process
and was in
resuming
fact
in the
of
his
physical contact
injured.
with the vehicle when
[Id., p 1318.][28]
Oregon
In DeStefano v
Co,
Mutual Ins
762 P2d
(Utah
1988),
1123
App,
the Utah Court of Appeals
28
facts, coverage
injured party
Under similar
was denied to an
seeking
to be deemed an
of the car that hit him in the
station,
opposed
service
to his own vehicle. The court ruled that a
prior
injuring
claimant must have some
connection with the
automo-
occupancy
Hollingworth
bile before
status can be established.
v Amer-
Co,
(1969).
Liability
693;
ican Guarantee &
Ins
105 RI
allowed gasoline poured injuries suffered as for benefits highw the the side of vehicle on into his disabled ay.29 recently, Supreme of Court Tennessee the
Most
person
recovery for a
uninsured
allowed
DeStefano,
assisting
the
motorist struck
vehicle
An uninsured
his
The court held
propelling
that
vehicle.
that vehicle into DeStefano
immediately resuming
"plaintiff
every
of
his
had
intention
[suggested]
of
journey”
a course
conduct reason
and that his "actions
vehicle."Id.,
being ’in, upon,
entering
p
the
ably
into’
incidental
added.)
(Emphasis
1126.
recovery
where the
in circumstances
have also allowed
Courts
purposes.
transportation
is not related to
to the vehicle
connection
standing
Appeals
car and in conversation
person
a
Court
held that
The California
street,
driver,
parked
with its
next to a
spaces
parking
away when he was
an
hit
Fund
of his own
two
Ins Co v Fireman’s
an uninsured motorist. Utah Home Fire
(1970).
Co,
50;
Rptr
App
3d
The New
Cal
Cal
recovery
Jersey Supreme
the uninsured motorist
Court allowed
provision
leaning
vehicle’s driver. Mondelli v State Farm Mutual
policies
injuries
for
suffered
a
of two insurance
conversing
with the
on the roof and door of a vehicle while
Automobile Ins
(1986).
court determined that
102 NJ
particular
p
Id.,
facts.”
653.
Fidelity
Cepeda
Estate
v United States
&
Guaranty Co,
37 AD2d
Not physical departure from the vehicle results in termination passenger. of status as a departure tempo- Where the rary interruption is incident to some vehicle, journey passen- when ger gets the The situation here is is a there mechanical failure and the help out to even observe the work of driver, passenger. does not cease to be a indistinguishable. Where the passenger alights following temporary some inter- ruption destination, place at other than his remains in the vicinity immediate of the vehicle that, is every reason believe had there accident, shortly not been for the he would have place his resumed his status as a passenger [Id., changed. pp has Em- 455-456. added; phasis citations omitted.] relationship The focus on the between the vehi- supports cle and the claimant the conclusion that *28 442 Mich by Opinion Dissenting automatically leaving terminate a does not vehicle Asnip passenger. In an one’s status as Indemnity Co, 446 2d & So v Hartford Accident 1121 (Fla 1984), App, District Court of the Florida recovery of no-fault and both allowed injured a driver benefits to uninsured motorists conversing friend on the side of with his Asnip following a friend when the pulled over to the had road. been down. He friend’s vehicle broke friend, the two were discuss- after his shoulder ing third vehicle struck when a the breakdown determined, law, a matter of them. The court injured was an of his motorist vehicle. recovery injured when the
Courts
denied
have
merely
party’s
coi
connection to the vehicle was
ncidental.30
(Tex
Co,
Ferguson
Casualty
Surety
&
who was
when she
area, although
grabbed
parking
she had
the door handles
traverse a
only
nearby
The
connection with the
of a
automobile.
claimant’s
attempt
support along the
her
to use it as a
treacherous
vehicle was
pathway.
journey
recovery when the
in which the
the
Courts have also denied
injured passenger
participated had
end
had
come
before
Keystone
injury.
Employees Ins Co
Ins
442 F
In Government
v
(ED Pa, 1977),
passenger
Supp
an automobile
left
vehicle
(uninsured) vehicle,
riding,
jumped
approached second
which he was
a
starting
fight,
purpose of
a
when
on its hood for the
was
suddenly.
accelerated
The court
the driver of the second vehicle
concluded that "the
Murray
been
only
passenger] and the
connection between [the
passenger]
injury
vehicle at the time of the
had
[the
person
riding
in that vehicle when he decided
assault
who
Curry,
subsequently injured
Ins Co
him.” In Colonial Penn
v
157 Misc
recovery
to a
2d
sought
destination at the time of
stop
the accident. The
at
gas
the
the
station was incidental
purpose
trip.
After
the attendant
serviced the car
Fountain would have returned to the vehicle inte
rior. To hold the status of
"occupant”
Fountain as
changed because he exited for a brief moment
would be to defeat the intent of the statute. Foun
tain at the time of
enjoyed
the accident
the status
’’occupant”
and is entitled to no fault beneñts.
Hosp
Fountain,
v
Super
[Newcomb
NJ
295;
(1976).
had
awarding
the road.
In
no-fault
the shoulder
said:
benefits,
Superior
Pennsylvania
Court
person who is
that a
general, it can be said
In
occupant
an
from a
is still
alighting
vehicle
"occupy” the motor vehi-
He continues to
thereof.
cle until he severs all connection
it. That
with
when he becomes
point of
is reached
severance
being
opposed to
ori-
highway
vehicle
oriented
then,
alighting passenger contin-
ented. Until
Until such a
ues
an
of the bus.
to be
person is
or her own without reference
on his
bus,
passen-
a
has not ceased
be
occupant. [Id., p
Emphasis
31.
ger or
added.]
Son, Inc,
Super
&
369 Pa
McGilley
Chubb
Pennsylvania
Supe-
This Court held that Heard was entitled to no- fault benefits and said: parked vehicle is not "involved in the acci- [A] dent” exceptions parked unless one of the to the 3106) provision (§ applicable.
vehicle
Those ex-
ceptions spell
parked
out when a
vehicle is deemed
vehicle;
to be in
pertains
exception
use as a motor
"[e]ach
injuries
related to the character of a
parked vehicle as a motor vehicle —characteristics
which make it
stationary
unlike other
roadside
objects that can be
involved
vehicle accidents.”
Miller v
Auto-Owners Ins
411 Mich
(1981).
Because Heard’s uninsured vehicle was not in- volved in the pedestrian accident and he was a and not a motorist or of a motor vehicle (or, if prefers, one he was pedestrian more like a than a occupant), motorist or he is as much enti- tled —under the policies terms and of the no-fault act —to recover from the insurer of the vehicle that struck him pedestrian as is a motorcyclist (or who does not or pedestrian own an automobile motorcyclist who does own an automobile but who, Heard, like purchased has not no-fault insur- ance) and who also has not contributed "to the 500.3113; MCL MSA 24.13113. *31 442 Mich Opinion Dissenting [Id., paid.” p are be
fund from which benefits 146.] meaning of "in-
The in Heard was issue meaning "occupant.” a volved,” of word Dictionary depends of a definitions on context. of different mean- often contain a number word ings. "occupant,” acknowledge when used
We gener- operation respect vehicle, of motor to the physically person ally vehicle. inside a means "occupant” meaning terms But coverage, "occupying” purposes of insurance foregoing mandatory not, is, review of as the eighteen jurisdictions authority shows, in at least injuries suffered when an and includes broader interrupted by journey incident, automobile the insured as a breakdown or need service such or another and the conduct vehicle geographic injured person, a reasonable within perimeter, is vehicle oriented. gener- industry appears
The insurance to have judicial ally accepted "on” construction of "upon,” injuries after a and thus that suffered geographic perim- breakdown, within a reasonable eter, are within the insured risk if conduct of oriented. Automobile is vehicle policies generally continue be written insurance including defining injuries "occupying” suffered Legislature, "upon” the "on” or vehicle. enacting drafting law, the no-fault did not Case-by- slate, on a clean but in context. write unavoidable, even a no-fault case resolution is system. *32 Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J.
IV We would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, C.J., Levin, concurred with