Lead Opinion
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
for the Court:
¶ 1. David and Helen Rogillio were married for eleven years, living in Vicksburg with their minor son, Morgan. Helen, who is disabled, alleges error in the chancery court’s failure to award permanent periodic alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because the chancellor made errors in her accounting of the marital assets that resulted in an abuse of discretion, we reverse and remand.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 2. Helen and David were married in September 1997. One child was born to the marriage, a son, Morgan, who was approximately six years old when the couple divorced in 2008. The couple had separated in March 2007, when David and Morgan had left the marital home and moved in with David’s parents. The chancellor entered an order granting an irreconcilable-differences divorce on October 3, 2008.
¶ 3. Helen and David agreed that David would have primary custody of their minor child and that David and the child would reside in the marital home. Helen agreed to move, into a mobile home that she had owned prior to the marriage, though the chancellor at one point noted that the mobile home had.become marital property.
¶4. David was given responsibility for almost all the marital debt, as well as all ownership interest in a savings plan and his retirement account. The chancellor ordered David to pay Helen $2,038.61 labeled as “marital assets,” $4,807 labeled as credit-card debt, and lump-sum alimony in the amount of $15,000 to give her a “fresh start.”
¶ 5. On appeal, Helen contends that the chancellor erred in not awarding her permanent periodic alimony. Both David and Helen are in their forties. Helen is a registered nurse, but she stopped working in 1998 because she suffers from neurofi-bromatosis, a genetic disease which has claimed the lives of multiple members of her family and for which she takes pain medications. David was fully aware of Helen’s illness prior to their marriage. During the marriage, Helen had more than ten surgeries to remove tumors from various parts of her body. Her Social Security disability benefit in the gross annual amount of approximately $9,324 is her only source of income. David earns approximately $83,372 per year, is in good health, and has secure employment as an engineer.
¶ 6. On her own, Helen’s medication would no longer be covered under David’s medical insurance. The mortgage and lot rent for her trailer would combine for $570, leaving Helen $200 to pay for food, clothing, and utilities each month. The chancellor found that, because of her disability, “the likelihood that she will obtain gainful employment in the future is very slim.” The chancellor also found that David and Helen equally contributed toward marital stability of the home and harmony of the family relationships.
DISCUSSION
Standard, of Review
¶ 7. A chancellor’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous.
Property Division and Alimony
¶ 8. Helen assigned one error on appeal: “Whether the chancellor committed error in not granting Helen Rogillio permanent periodic alimony.” The Court of Appeals cited Johnson v. Johnson for the proposition that alimony should be considered only “[i]f the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property ... leaves a deficit for one party.”
ASSETS LIABILITIES
TSP Savings Plan $ 82,289.748
Est. Value Marital Home $169,500.00
1st Mortgage on Home $124. ,334.00
2nd Mortgage on Home $ 19. ,984.00
David’s PERS Acct 6,959.68
David’s Checking Acct 136.00
David’s Savings Acct 10.00
Mortgage Mobile Home $ 22, ,917.009
Delinquent Rent $ 1, ,600.00
TSP Loan $ 38, ,914.3910
Credit Card Debt $ 9, ,614.3711
Credit Union Loan $ 1, ,214.00
Construction Lien $ 1, ,188.20
Necessary Home Repairs 7, ,725.00
Mobile Home $41,000.0012
¶ 9. From our calculations, the couple had $299,895.42 in marital assets and $227,490.96 in marital debt. To “split the baby” would have left David and Helen with $36,202.59 each. However, based.on the chancellor’s distribution (before alimony), David received $258,895.42 in assets and $192,480.39 in debt for a net of $66,415.03. If we assume that a ten-year-old mobile home has retained its purchase-price value of $41,000, Helen leaves the marriage with net marital assets of $5,989.43.
¶ 10. After finding that an equitable deficit existed, the chancellor proceeded to the consideration of alimony under the factors we outlined in Armstrong v. Armstrong.
¶ 12. Lump-sum alimony has been described as “a means of adjusting financial inequities that remain after property division.
¶ 18. The chancellor’s findings of fact are clear that Helen is unlikely to be able to support herself financially. Her income level, as determined by the chancellor, fell below the 2008 federal poverty threshold for a single person.
¶ 14. On the other hand, in deference to trial courts, we rarely have granted reversal on alimony matters. In Ericson v. Tullos, the Court of Appeals would not overturn a chancellor’s decision to deny alimony.
¶ 15. Considering the actual net estate (including lump-sum alimony) of the parties, accounting for the chancellor’s appar
¶ 16. Chief Justice Waller writes to agree with the chancellor’s decision to deny alimony. However, the errors in the distribution of assets make that determination improper and impossible. Alimony and distribution of assets are distinct, but interrelated, concepts, and where one expands, the other must recede.
CONCLUSION
¶ 17. Under the facts of this case, the chancellor erred in improperly analyzing the equitable distribution of marital assets and by doing so not adequately considering alimony. The lump-sum alimony payments may be increased, consistent with an accurate accounting of the marital and separate estates set out within this opinion. Furthermore, an award of permanent periodic alimony may be considered, balancing the husband’s right to live as normal a life as possible with a decent standard of living and the wife’s entitlement to support corresponding to her rank and station in life. The chancellor should carefully review the needs of the wife to live her life in a manner comparable to that which she enjoyed during the marriage and to consider her future needs. Because the need for alimony is affected by the distribution of marital assets and liabilities, we reverse the Court of Appeals and the chancellor’s findings in toto and remand for a hearing consistent with this opinion.
¶ 18. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. The chancellor at no time entered a clear finding as to the status of this asset. Nor did the chancellor find a current value to be placed on the mobile home. According to the record, the purchase price of the mobile home was $41,000.
. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So.2d 623, 625 (Miss.2002).
. Watson v. Watson, 724 So.2d 350, 354-355 (Miss.1998)
. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1287 (Miss.1994).
. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994).
. The parties originally borrowed $46,000 from the TSP account. As of the date of the order, October 3, 2008, the parties owed $38,914.39. The chancellor offered no explanation for not deducting the current amount outstanding for the TSP loan.
. By extrajudicial agreement, Helen and David split some articles of personal property, including a truck and an ATV, though there may have been more. These articles were not classified as marital or separate or assigned values by the chancellor.
. This is the difference between the amount that was in this savings account on the day of the decree and tire amount in the savings account at the time of the marriage, or the amount earned and saved during the marriage.
. The chancellor regularly referred to the mobile home, acquired by Helen before the marriage, as "Helen’s,” but found in Footnote 8 of the Memorandum Opinion that the mobile home "was rented out during the marriage and the proceeds mingled with the household money and use for the benefit of the family, thus becoming a marital asset.”
. This represents a loan taken out by the Rogillios,. collateralized by David’s Retirement Savings Account. Because the chancellor reflected this loan as marital debt and subtracted its value from the balance on the savings account, the loan was counted twice, significantly underestimating the value of the savings account as an asset. Further the chancellor miscalculated the equity in the account by using the original loan amount, instead of the balance owed.
. All of the credit-card debt was in Helen’s name.
. Again, the chancellor was unclear about whether this asset was separate or marital. In either case, the chancellor erred by failing to find the value of this asset. We have used its purchase price, which, we admit, is likely a gross overestimate.
. These net values account fpr the chancellor’s order that David pay half of Helen’s credit card debt, as well as $2,038.61 labeled as "marital assets.”
. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.1993).
. Deborah H. Bell, Mississippi Family Law § 9.02 (2005).
. Id. at 9.02[1]. •
. McDonald v. McDonald, 683 So.2d 929, 931 (Miss.1996).
. Brennan v. Brennan, 638 So.2d 1320, 1324 (Miss.1994).
. Deborah H. Bell, Mississippi Family Law § 9.02 [2] [a] [ii].
. Seymour v. Seymour, 960 So.2d 513, 519 (Miss.Ct.App.2006).
. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss.1994).
. The 2008 Federal Poverty Threshold for a single-person household was $10,400. 73 Fed.Reg. 3971-72 (January 23, 2008).
. Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss.1992).
. See Box v. Box, 622 So.2d 284, 288 (Miss.1993).
. Ericson v. Tullos, 876 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Miss.Ct.App.2004).
. Id.
. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 929.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
¶ 19. Because I believe that the chancellor equitably divided the marital estate and awarded sufficient alimony, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 20. Helen does not contest the equitable division 'of their marital property or the lump-sum alimony amount. Her brief states that “[i]t is not [Helen’s position] that the chancellor erred in awarding lump-sum alimony ..., rather it is her position that due to the disparity in income and lifestyle between [her] and David, that the chancellor committed error by not awarding permanent periodic alimony.” Similarly, her petition for certiorari requests that this Court “reverse the disal-lowance of permanent periodic alimony....” Because Helen does not contest the property division or lump-sum alimony
¶ 21. Still, I find that the chancellor equitably divided their marital estate and awarded more than sufficient lump-sum alimony. In the chancellor’s final order, she addressed the Ferguson factors, then equally divided the equity in their home, the TSP, the PERS account, and the bank accounts. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994). Save for the delinquent rent and the mobile-home repairs, the chancellor also equally divided their marital debts. If we follow the chancellor’s logic and equally split the equity in the mobile home,
¶ 22. After thorough, on-the-record findings, the chancellor determined that a $15,000 lump-sum award would enable Helen’s “fresh start.” Considering the actual numerical deficit, the amounts Helen received in marital-asset and debt payments, and the other factors addressed in the final order, the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in awarding this amount in lump-sum alimony.
¶ 23. As discussed above, Helen contends that the chancellor erred in awarding lump-sum rather than permanent alimony. Specifically, she refers to her initial pleadings requesting $1,500 per month and contends that “equity demands” that she be “entitled” to permanent alimony.
¶ 24. A chancellor’s decision to award permanent alimony must consider both need and ability to pay. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.1993); Gray v. Gray, 562 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss.1990). In making that decision, the chancellor considers, in relevant part, the reasonable net income and expenses of both spouses. Box v. Box, 622 So.2d 284, 288 (Miss.1993).
¶ 25. Here, a full evaluation of David’s net income and reasonable expenses dispels Helen’s contention that she is “entitled” to permanent alimony. David had no disposable income after his recurring monthly expenses; thus, making a monthly permanent-alimony payment would have been impossible unless he sacrificed the basic needs of them child or his household. In fact, since David had no funds remaining after his and Morgan’s expenses, the chancellor would have committed reversible error had she required him to pay permanent alimony in any amount. See McEachern v. McEachern, 605 So.2d 809, 814-15 (Miss.1992).
¶ 26. In sum, neither our precedent nor equity requires the chancellor to ensure a particular standard of living for the payee spouse to the utter detriment of the payor spouse and minor child. And that any of us might have arrived at a different decision matters not, as the chancellor fully considered Helen’s and David’s financial statements and heard their testimony. The chancellor awarded sufficient lump-sum alimony in light of the factors discussed above. Further, the chancellor’s decision to award lump-sum instead of permanent alimony was supported by substantial, credible evidence showing that David did not have the ability to make a monthly payment. Therefore, I would af
LAMAR, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
. In assessing the Ferguson factors, the chancellor recognized that Helen and David already had agreed to divide the following marital property: their income-tax refunds, the mobile home, the Tahoe, the Jeep, and the household furnishings and appliances. I think this logically suggests that Helen received all the equity in the mobile home, which further supports my finding that she received sufficient lump-sump alimony. See Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928.