Rogers v. United States

practice of law for one year for his disciplinary violations this case. For 62 ROGERS, Appellant, Michael W. however, days, January from suspension effective date of ordered in STATES, Appellee. UNITED II, Hutchinson until March No. 85-1421. opinion vacated, date which that District of Appeals. Columbia Court of suspension was under for those same viola- Accordingly, tions. we subtract those 62 Submitted Nov. 1986. days suspension from the one-year Decided Dec. impose, leaving now remainder of 303 Rehearing Opinion En Banc Granted and days. March Vacated It is therefore respon- ORDERED that dent, Hutchinson, James D. suspended practice

from the of law in the District of period days, Columbia effective days opinion. the date of this See XI, 19(3). D.C.Bar.R. NEWMAN, Judge, concurring: my Reback, dissent in re (D.C.1986)(en banc), I made clear I believed suspension the six months’ imposed on Reback and Parsons was woe-

fully inadequate; thought I the appropriate suspension

sanction was year one and a day. It was clear me then that inadequate imposed sanction in that case

would come back haunt us in future

cases. In this case it does. The en banc struggles distinguish Reback to justify greater sanction this case. I join struggle.

decline in that The sanc- seriously tion Reback was deficient. A one-year sanction here of suspension, however, appropriate.

I specifically join much so court as overrules Keiler and Klein- controlling dienst as precedents on the is- of disciplinary sue sanctions. negative that evi-

nile arrests. hold reputation dence of is admissible but case, court’s exclusion of in this the trial testimony harmless error. We such was al- properly the trial court also hold that a government to test witness’ lowed the appellant’s reputation by ask- knowledge of had ing the witness whether appellant juvenile. had been arrested appellant’s affirm convic- We therefore tions.

I.

Appellant was convicted of distribution (PCP) (mari- cannabis phencyclidine and (1981 33-541(a)(l) juana), Code D.C. trial, presented Supp.). At following Appel- testimony to the effect: police approached lant had an undercover was officer and asked her whether she (meaning looking marijua- for some “herb” na). replied no, but The officer said (meaning looking she for “boat” was some PCP). Appellant across the street walked person, appeared to receive to another person, and something from that returned gave appel- to the officer. officer then prerecorded twenty-seven lant dollars police exchange for two tinfoil funds containing marijuana. and packets PCP description of the The officer broadcast seller, team, arrest on the and an basis description, appellant arrested a short D.C., Mann, Washington, ap- N. Peter twenty About minutes after time later. court, brief, pointed was on the sale, purchasing officer returned appellant. appellant as the the scene and identified diGenova, Joseph Atty., E. Mi- drugs. Appel- sold man who had her Farrell, Zeno, and Eliz- chael W. Thomas E. money possession in his lant had no Trosman, Attys., Washing- Asst. U.S. abeth time of his arrest. ton, D.C., brief, appellee. on the were behalf, Appellant, testifying in his own Rather, PCP. denied that he sold PRYOR, Judge, Before Chief testified, he on the arrest date BELSON, NEWMAN and Associate find a boys club to had walked to local Judges. play planned to friend he had with whom BELSON, Judge: sever- stopped He to talk with basketball. but, finding Ab- acquaintances al other first, appeal presents questions, This bott, look for him. club went to left the whether walking he was Appellant that as testified “negative evidence” of a defendant’s street, him. policeman detained down the second, reputation, whether Abbott, witnesses, including Several other government may impeach reputation wit- testimony. juve- corroborated ness reference guilty court, found of distri- ruling while not immediately, even- This phencyclidine tually bution of and cannabis. denied appellant’s request and ruled appeal followed. testimony permissible

only if the witness had specifically dis- II. cussed the defendant’s with oth- community. er members of the Appellant challenges first the court’s ex- testimony by clusion of Reverend David agree appellant with Durham, church, of appellant’s minister the ruling trial court’s If was error. a witness had testify whom the defense called to position inis such a that he probably or she appellant’s reputation in the commu- would have heard discussions in the com nity veracity. for truth munity concerning reputa the defendant's counsel, tion, attempting lay

Defense to the witness’ failure to have heard reputation foundation for the anything negative witness’ testi- about the defendant is Durham, mony, you probative asked Rev. “Have reputation.1 favorable As anything spoken Supreme defendant Court stated in Michelson v. States, reputation and his to truth and veraci- United 469, 213, as 335 U.S. 69 S.Ct. answered, “No, ty?” (1948), Rev. Durham I ha- 93 L.Ed. 168 government ven’t.” moved to strike [reputation] qualify witness must [T]he testimony, the minister’s arguing that he give opinion by showing an such ac- qualified was not to testify because his quaintance defendant, with the com- knowledge “community” was munity in which he lived has limited to his congregation, church and not moved, circles in which he has the community in which lived. speak authority with of the terms granted The court the motion to strike not which generally regarded. he is To re- the objected-to ground, ap- because but quire repu- affirmative pellant had not established that witness may tation seem inconsistent with “actually spoken to members of the given testify latitude to the witness to community.” say reputation when all he can nothing that against he has “heard de- Following a recess and discussion of permitted upon This is as- fendant.” matters, some other defense counsel asked sumption that, reported no ill is permission the court’s if to recall Rev. Dur- one, reputation good. be must that, argued ham. Counsel since the minis- position (empha- ter was “in a to have heard about” Id. 335 69 U.S. 478 S.Ct. at 219 appellant’s reputation, added) (footnotes omitted). he should al- this be sis While nothing question directly lowed to he had heard has never addressed negative trial jurisdiction,2 allowing about the defendant. The in this the rule testi- Baldanzo, community thought per- in State v. 106 NJ.L. met how a 498,148 (N.J.1930), live, point A. 725 makes the most consequently son should and who has eloquently: about, deprived not been talked privilege be unusual, abnormal, proving reputation [I]t the noncon- when the forming provokes decently, act talk. To behave hour of need arrives and when it be of self, be, one’s live in those importance vital to him to show what respects, normal and There conventional.... community estimate of him is? In all fairness tongues wagging. is little therein start and, according that should not be departs When one the conventional weight authority, is not so. majority people does do not 501, Id. at 148 A. do, follow, begins.... talk then It does not App.D.C. v. 2. Fletcher United 42 53 however, that, that a man who leads life (1914), proper held that it strike testimo- according neighbor- to the standards of the ny by reputation witness who testified that a hood, who, therefore, is usual and correct and government chat, witness had a bad given neighbors has not food for veracity, truth place holds ty. no the esteem of communi- anyone with nor heard highly had never discussed contrary, regard- On the be reputation. very discussed ed. The absence of talk is an indication Fletcher, however, reputa- neighborhood regards Id. at 66-67. that the thy. him as wor- candidly state- ... Shall then the man whose life has tion witness admitted that his

931 deny right or dimension to defense mony by reputation witness that he tional testify concerning govern nothing about a defend witness to she has heard bad call ant, position was in although the witness ment witness’ truthful bad statements, es ness), such is well have heard conclude under nevertheless See, jurisdictions. e.g., in other tablished harmlessness either non-constititutional 702, 704 Huffman, v. 607 S.W.2d test, State see 328 Kotteakos v. United State, 538 (Mo.Ct.App.1980); Baldwin v. 1239, 1248,90 L.Ed. 66 S.Ct. 109, 113(Tex.Crim.App.1976);Low S.W.2d (1946), stringent or under the more 659, -, State, Ala.App. ery v. test, doubt” beyond “harmless a reasonable Gambutti, (1958): 366, 367 v. So.2d State 18, Chapman California, 386 U.S. see v. 136, 143 A.2d N.J.Super. 828, 17 (1967), 87 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 705 State, (1955): 51 Del. Wisniewski trial court’s exclusion of Rev. Dur (witness (1957) 94, 138 who A.2d prejudiced testimony could ham’s may testify to acquainted person with well proper in appellant. assuming Even if never reputation, his or even witness her Rev. Dur quiry would have revealed that discussed). join reputation We heard that sufficiently appel ham was intimate with rule. jurisdictions adopting in those surroundings, testimony his lant’s would Although testimony as a lack merely to have been cumulative of more under reputation of bad thus admissible testimony appellant’s of second concrete circumstances, appropriate it is incumbent witness, that reputation who testified she upon assure that the trial court to speak appellant people about and had notoriety the communi absence of reflects reputation he tells the his was that “[t]hat igno ty’s rather the witness’ esteem than Furthermore, infra, truth.” discussed Thus, negative reputa rance. evidence of if Durham had been allowed testi Rev. accepted only tion “is from a witness government per fy, the would have been knowledge of habitat whose defendant’s appel of probe mitted surroundings enough and intimate so inquiring reputation by whether lant’s ill any failure to hear relevant had arrested as a appellant knew that repute ugly assurance that no rumors an we are convinced that juvenile. Because Michelson, supra, were about.” 335 U.S. testimony not Durham’s could Rev. case, 69 S.Ct. the instant verdict, need jury’s we not affected however, the of Rev. Durham’s exclusion he was in question whether remand testimony was based on the court’s errone appellant to have known if had position assumption negative ous evidence reputation veracity. a bad truth reputation circum improper any was under stances, a determination rather than on III. position Durham not in a that Rev. challenges the trial Appellant next appellant’s reputation. know of there prosecutor could ask ruling that the court’s its fore hold that trial court abused she witness whether reputation appellant’s striking in testi discretion Rev. Durham’s juvenile ar appellant’s had heard about mony, refusing to allow rests. recall him. See Johnson v. United (failure (D.C.1979) began present its Before defense recognize need to discretion consti exercise case, inquired to whether prosecutor discretion). tutes abuse of use record appellant’s he could defense witnesses who impeach arrests deciding the trial Without whether magni about would

court’s error was of constitutional veracity. In the course tude, A.2d for truth Bassil prosecutor, defense among the (D.C.1986) (error colloquy 716-17 of constitu- person’s community reflect discussion ment that the behalf, person’s probative reputation, not good it is only "was was based on his own bad” State, 140 Tex. reputation. See Gilson v. Fur- bad and thermore, others. Id. at 66. not the 145 S.W.2d Crim. think it that while lack we obvious counsel, Finally, noted, judge, questions trial it was revealed Id. we ju- about prosecu- adjudications of the three arrests that the venile have the negative ef- raise, disclosing two fect of tor wished to had been dismissed records for which there is strong policy and one had a consent of confidentiality. resulted decree.3 See id. respective Initially, based on the outcomes hand, on the other we distin- arrests, the trial ruled that the guished McAdoo and held govern- potential prejudice of allowing questions may question ment outweighed any probative about them val- wrongful acts committed the de- however, Later, ue. the court reversed its juvenile. fendant as In contrast to their ruling prosecutor and allowed the to ask probable lack of awareness of ad- appellant’s reputation witness about the ar- judications, “it seems reasonably likely rests. The witness answered that she had community ... members not heard about the arrests. The court juvenile’s will have heard of a commission immediately instructed the acts, independently ar- questions were “not intended establish adjudication.” rest or 530 A.2d at 1175 place, that those events took only but added) (footnote (emphasis omitted). Since reliability attest the of the character [wit- wrongful acts were within the realm of testimony.” nesses community knowledge, concluded, McA- prohibition against questions doo’s blanket recently This court has addressed the juvenile adjudications ap- should propriety asking reputation both of wit- ply questions underly- bar about the acts nesses about a adjudi- ing adjudications. those Id. Our resolu- cations, asking and of about “bad acts” tion upon of the issue hand at turns our underlying such adjudications. We ruled response question to open by a left Devore: that, inquiry per- while into “bad acts” is community likely whether members are to missible, inquiry adjudication into is not. juvenile arrests, have of they are as States, See Devore v. United A.2d acts, independently of the re- (D.C.1987); McAdoo United sulting adjudication. confidential We an- (D.C.1986). question swer that in the affirmative. McAdoo, questions we reasoned that about juvenile adjudications a defendant’s have usually An public arrest is a act. The legitimate probative no value because the community’s knowledge of an does arrest confidentiality to attaches depend records, not police its access to unlikely records makes it a that witness (1981); hearings, D.C.Code 16-2333 to § cf. adjudica- will heard talk about have 16-2316(e) (1981); or D.C.Code to § cf. 419; tions. Id. D.C.Code 16-2331 decision, judicial their a § consummation as (1981) (confidentiality (1981). case No D.C.Code 16-2331 knowl- § cf. edge records). questions added that such is in- obtained records highly prejudicial, part are in they Rather, because volved. fact of arrest is an “plant[ impression an which knowledge any bystander the character to who accessible ] in position happens progress.4 witness not a to counteract.” to view arrest in appellant's qualifications 3. We note that records to test the the witness be- sealed under D.C.Code 16-2335 speak community opinion. one never If speculations in heard the and rumors government’s ability ques- 4. The in to arrest, indulge upon even Mends one’s his tion a witness about the defendant's jury may giv- capable doubt whether he is (non-juvenile) arrests clear: ing very as to reliable conclusions his may Arrest without more im- nevertheless reputation. pair reputation. or cloud one’s False arrest supra, 335 U.S. at 69 S.Ct. at may acquitted may to be do that. Even dam- recently 221-22. We held States, in Crews v. United age good community one's name if the re- (D.C.1986) a defend- 514 A.2d 432 a chooses ceives verdict with wink and used to ant’s arrests could be cross-examine ought remember defendant one who testify as to his character witness he called have been convicted.... veracity. truth and inquiry permissible an as to arrest is prosecution right also because the has court its in bystander to the did not abuse discretion What known soon be- community, permitting impeachment. in- comes known to the arrests, deed, likely in the case of sum, agree we with community’s in the point become of focus trial court its discretion it abused when gaze. negative testimony appel- excluded hold, however, reputation; has lant’s we We conclude when a defendant We also chosen to his character issue the error was harmless. hold that place exercised its presenting properly about his the trial court discre- a witness prosecutor it reputation, pros- permitted demands that the tion when fairness challenge opportunity ecution ask a have statements, Appellant’s both arrests. convictions witness’

depth of events are therefore consciousness, community’s within the Affirmed. accuracy represen- as to the of the witness’ Having inquiry tations.5 initiated into the NEWMAN, Judge, dissenting: community, an inquiry view his part most, could not itself make jurisdiction, like has Our somewhat trial, grudgingly evidentiary defendant not enshroud a accepted prac history likely governing arrests that are tices cross-examination char community’s testifying affected view. As on behalf acter witnesses Devore, “by acceptance stated criminal This is at defendant defendant. tributable, seems, inertia introducing character elects more to than witness ... prove name, else, issue, good by anything practices he draws for the aside though widely his own have been univer practiced, hand whatever veil law “illogical”, youthful sally severely otherwise criticized as place over con- “irrational”, “nonsensical”, “archaic”, duct....” 530 A.2d at 1176. “grotesque”. “clumsy”, even See Michel Again, as we stressed the trial son v. United “carefully weigh probative must (1948); 168 5.Ct. 93 L.Ed. Morris prejudicial value and of exposing effect” 432, (D.C. 469 A.2d 435 juvenile deciding the before arrests wheth- U.S.App.D.C. 1983); 122 Awkard v. United permit prosecutor’s er to inquiry. See 641, (1965). 170, 165, F.2d 646 352 case, id.6 is clear the instant it Court, Supreme trial potential preju- supra, considered practic- accepting prevailing dice to any and concluded even while prejudice es, depicted their outweighed by eloquently such need most irration- was anomaly to test the noted the of testimony ality. for the witness’ Court basis disallowing from appellant’s reputation. witness testi- We hold that 607, juvenile. dealing specifically impeach- 198 A.2d 5. While was a See id. at at cases with by by ment of a interpretation witness reference to the is borne out more re- This few, appear juvenile decision, defendant's arrests to be Pennsylvania in which the court cent those all allow that we have found such im- argument summarily rejected State, 1149, peachment. See Green v. 352 So.2d allowing trial erred in im- that the court had State, (Ala.Crim.App.1977); v. 1151 Love 533 by peachment of reference 6, (Tex.Crim.App.1976); S.W.2d 10 State v. Commonwealth v. See arrests. 765, (La.1975); Knight, 768 Hendron 323 So.2d 984, 7, n. Floyd, n. 431 A.2d 992 494 550 Pa. Commonwealth, (Ky. 487 S.W.2d 278 7 1972). Jenkins, See also Commonwealth v. (1964), Pa. in which Penn- 198 A.2d 497 discretion, the court 6. In aid its exercise sylvania Supreme Court reversed the defend- may whether the arrest was choose to ascertain ant’s of errors in conviction because cross-exam- accomplished public view or otherwise out of ining reputation witness about the defendant’s community probably way such a that the finding arrests. The court’s basis for defense, course, may error, unaware it. however, appears to have been the form opposing such this effect prosecutor’s offer information to question, rather fact than the cross-examination. arrests occurred when defendant fying counterprivilege as to own and observa- to the other. But ... defendant, constraining pull him misshapen tion of the one stone out of the [t]o gath- grotesque report hearsay has more only likely structure is simply upset “although present much its community, ered in the balance between ad- by persons quali- said less verse interests than to establish a have been ration- al edifice. judge fied to himself.” Id. 335 U.S. than 219; Morris, at at see also S.Ct. 486, 69 Id. at S.Ct. at (Newman, J., supra, at 439 dis- 469 A.2d my I have heretofore stated con- senting). pay The defendant must for this cerning “the misshapen Michelson that illogical” “helpful but use of character wit- stone condemns the entire structure. It is good name, prove by being nesses to long time past for us to build a new one.” subjected “equally illogical” to an condition Morris, (Newman, supra, at 439 prosecution may on their use: the test the J., dissenting). my now, per- I renew call credibility reporter as a for the haps fervently. even It more is bad community by asking if he has heard ru- enough openly within the tolerate law a mors of the defendant’s former miscon- knows, practice profession which the duct, arrests, convictions, very type or see, highly prone observer can propensity evidence of character or subterfuge. It is abuse even worse which is to the prosecution closed its subterfuge put used to before Michelson, supra, case-in-chief. 335 U.S. jury, guise testing under “illogi- This S.Ct. 219-20. credibility, character witness’ otherwise in- practice subject cal” is notoriously prior admissible evidence of a abuse. juvenile record. I need to add see no of inquiry method or cross-exami- “[t]his of this structure” ill-effects “condemned nation frequently resorted to coun- subverting poli- that of our well-established very purpose injuring by sel for cy protecting confidentiality of matters they indirection character are pertaining juveniles. directly to way forbidden attack in that policy long That has reflected in our inquiry testing ... The value Confidentiality statutes and our case law. purposes oppor- is often so small and the is statutorily case records man- ways tunities of its abuse underhand dated, (1981), D.C.Code 16-2331 and case § great practice are so records, records, social and law enforce- amount to little more than a subter- mere relating juvenile proceed- records ment fuge.... ings may years be sealed two after the quoting Id. at 474 n. S.Ct. at 217 n. discharge custody final (3d 1940). J. ed. Wigmore, Evidences supervision. 16-2335(a). or D.C.Code § Although recognizing practice that this public juve- The is excluded from opens inquiry “at its a tricky 16-23126(e). best line of proceedings. nile D.C.Code § shapeless subject matter[, to a and elusive The enactment of these statutes opens and its worst ... a veritable a]t upon strong policy, social founded irresponsible gossip, Pandora’s box of innu- aim is amnesty their and oblivion the which, endo and smear”1 to make matters transgressions youthful offenders. worse, opportunity the defendant has no philosophy juve- fundamental of the The rebut, majority the of the on to Court went delinquent a child nile laws is that practice. reasoning: countenance the Its is to be considered and treated not as a general opinion We in the requiring care, concur person criminal but as a courts, education, profession and the protection.... textwriters It would archaic, faith, paradox- public this much of law serious there- be a breach of compromises compen- fore, permit pre- ical and informal and full of these advantage by sumably procedures sations an irrational beneficent to be- which records, offset reasoned the criminal by poorly to one side is a come basis for 1. 335 U.S. at 69 S.Ct. at 220.

935 person a does though majority to harass the mention that our could be used throughout part his life. was motivated in decision McAdoo by confidentiality a concern for the of the States, U.S.App.D.C. 74 v. United Thomas 167, 932,2 justice system, it juvenile Maj.Op. at (1941). 170-71, 908 121 F.2d conveniently ignores policy then when confidentiality of policy respecting The it comes the basis for its deci- to discuss reflected in our records is likewise juvenile There, only sion. we hear about the fact Thus, prior evidence of evidence. law juvenile questions that more about arrests are adjudication may not be used juvenile probative credibility the witness’ general credibility of a wit- impeach than nothing convictions. We hear those about States, 392 A.2d ness. Smith the obvious fact that (D.C.1978); Brown v. United 993 questions may in such prejudice inherent 203, 207-08, 338 States, U.S.App.D.C. 119 greater, only likewise be because not do Thomas, (1964); supra, 547-48 F.2d information, they they divulge confidential 169-71, 121 F.2d at U.S.App.D.C. at 74 may also impugn the defendant’s character recently And in McAdoo v. United 907-09. wrongdoing by insinuating none (D.C.1986), a case A.2d place. may actually have taken one, which, concerned present like the general public pronounced defendant’s charac- has a “[T]he cross-examination ter tendency witness, by po- that such a witness to view even we held arrest being “if lice—let impeached by appearance asked alone actual may not be in court— guilt, prior irrespective the defendant’s conclusive evidence he has heard about” holding in adjudication.” Note, The McA- of the result of an juvenile convictions. upon Police, two considerations. Juvenile Delinquents: was based doo State policy pro- Justice, our concern for Courts and Individualized One confidentiality Thus, mat- tecting Harv.L.Rev. asking question, because of that mere prosecu- The other was that ters. tor, “in unlikely spite theory policy, a of all and of the prior judge’s charge,”3 ju- “telling succeeds in have heard about the concluded, jury what prove there- it could not adjudications. directly venile fore, juvenile what suggestion of a that while the no chance to [defendant] deny, and arrested; highly prejudicial namely, will be defend- that he had been record so probative ant, inquiry thereby insinuating have little either will that he had credibility. been leaving convicted of the crime relative or value Id. at guess 418-19. that this had been the outcome.” supra, 335 logic the latter con- Entranced 495, 69 (Rutledge, J., at 227 S.Ct. dissent- sideration, such as nod and without even ing). If public it is a “breach of faith” former, majority now decides to the juvenile adjudication allow a “used to be witness cannot be that while character throughout life,” harass a person about the defendant’s questioned conviction, Thomas, 170-71, supra, U.S.App.D.C. questioned be ineq- F.2d at how much more majority reasons arrest. The juvenile’s person uitable with a is for that to be harassed arrest, juvenile’s unlike because arrest which not even conviction, public is a act of which culminated conviction. apprised, community knowledge likely will become appropri- is an majority, of such an arrest like the division in reporter claim to be weighing preju- ate test of witness’ content to leave the community’s against of defendant. Al- probity view dice discretion of the doing, majority questions In so regarding is more candid than of victions, con- confidential the division in acts, Devore v. United A.2d concluding wrongful be- (D.C.1987),upon majority which the relies. ing public, problem. do not suffer from I this That case held regard description this of McAdoo as a distor- questioned wrongful be about the plainly tion. The court in McAdoo acknowl- underlying juvenile acts tion, the defendant’s convic- edged policy regarding confidentiality our if she even not be asked about the juvenile justice system, philos- as well as the position having conviction itself. distinguish In the ophy behind it. 515 A.2d at 418. These consid- division, McAdoo, the Devore incred- played part erations as much a in its decision ibly, acknowledge did not even that McAdoo probity. did considerations of part was motivated in a concern for confi- dentiality juvenile justice system. of the It supra, 3. 335 U.S. at 474 n. 69 S.Ct. concern, glossed describing over that McAdoo as 4, citing Wigmore, supra, n. J. being "primarily probity based" on the lack of Rutledge, dissenting trial court. Justice in ing the conviction. decision in Devore Michelson, supra, expressed his concerns majority’s and the decision in this case let enough, solution: “Nor is it through about this in forbids the back door what McAdoo my judgment, to trust to the sound discre- through front, for reasons judges protect are, view, tion of trial against the defendant which my specious. It is time prosecution. of the excesses To do for the en banc court to build a new struc- effectively they this need standards. None ture. provided ruling....” are under the Court’s 494, PRYOR, Before MACK, Judge, Chief 335 doubts, 69 S.Ct. at 227. These U.S. NEWMAN, FERREN, BELSON, TERRY, share, I amplified are in ROGERS, STEADMAN, involving cases juvenile disclosure of Judges. cases, matters. In such prejudice PER CURIAM. placing before the otherwise inadmis- propensity compounded by sible evidence is ORDER divulging that of conduct committed as a appellant’s petition On consideration law, juvenile which the for reasons of banc, rehearing opposition and the en policy, protects public sound view. thereto; appearing majority and it We have not seen fit to leave to the trial judges of this court has voted court’s discretion the admissibility juve- banc, rehearing grant petition en impeach nile records to general a witness’ Smith, credibility, 993, supra, see 392 A.2d at impeaching nor their use in a defend- appellant’s petition for ORDERED that McAdoo, ant’s character witness. See su- rehearing granted and that the en banc pra, 515 A.2d at 418. I see no reasoned judgment of December basis for a different rule when the issue is hereby are vacated. It juvenile adjudications, but the the Clerk FURTHER ORDERED underlying acts or arrests them. argument shall schedule this matter for course, recognize Of I that the interest in sitting en as soon as before the business of the court banc confidentiality juvenile proceedings permits. Counsel not absolute. supra, See 530 A.2d hereby provide copies ten are directed to 1175; Alaska, at 94 S.Ct. Davis v. the briefs heretofore filed to the Clerk or before March 39 L.Ed.2d 347 But it strong countervailing takes a interest Supreme overcome it. The Court has ruled protecting that the interest in the confiden- tiality the give records must way to Right defendant’s Sixth Amendment conduct effective cross-examination showing a witness’ bias. Id. But Smith, supra, 392 A.2d at we drew the line on the use of convictions OFFUTT, Appellant, A. Eric impeach, holding they may that while be bias, they may used to show not be used to impeach general credibility. the witness’ STATES, Appellee. UNITED law, “In as in all areas of the No. 86-961. legal principles supporting our decisions must be reasoned and consistent.” Towles Appeals. Court of Columbia District (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting). 5, 1987. Nov. Submitted If confidentiality the interest in 22, 1987. Dec. Decided proceedings outweigh is sufficient to a de- right impeach fendant’s witness, credibility certainly it most outweighs prosecution’s right to “test credibility” of a defendant’s McAdoo, supra. If principles witness. supporting confidentiality justify non-dis- closure of convictions for such purposes, they justify must also non-disclo- underly- sure of the act or arrest

Case Details

Case Name: Rogers v. United States

Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Date Published: Mar 8, 1988

Citation: 534 A.2d 928

Docket Number: 85-1421

Court Abbreviation: D.C.