11 A.D. 141 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1896
Successive litigations involving a consideration of the construction of the Brooklyn bridge at its terminal in the city of Brooklyn, as it existed when the present accident happened and prior thereto, have produced from the courts conclusions which limit the range of discussion. In Langin v. The Trustees of N. Y. & B. Bridge (10 App. Div. 529) we said, in substance, that negligence could not be predicated upon the construction and maintenance of the bridge as a structure. In that case the trial court limited the jury to a finding of negligence from a consideration of the single question whether sufficient warning was given of the existence of the open space. We held that this question upon the facts was a proper one to be submitted to the jury, and that from such facts they might find negligence. But the court charged as a rule of law that the warning must have been such as to give specific notice to the plaintiff. We held that such rule coiild not be supported ; that the law was satisfied when the warning was such that in the ordinary course it was likely to reach all the passengers as they alighted from the cars, •and upon this ground we reversed the judgment. The question whether negligence could be predicated upon the character of the construction of the bridge was considered in Fox v. Mayor, etc., of New York (70 Hun, 181), and it was there held that negligence could not he imputed from the character of the structure as it had been maintained and used. As thus limited, the questions presented upon this appeal resolve themselves into a consideration of the means used to make it reasonably safe for passengers to pass from the cars to the platform of the bridge, and rulings made respecting the admission of evidence upon the trial and in the submission of the case to the jury.
The evidence offered by the plaintiff tended to establish that, at the time when she sustained the injuries complained of, the platform of the bridge was not sufficiently lighted to enable her to perceive the open sjjaee, and it is fairly to he inferred from the testimony that the space between the car and the platform presented to her vision the appearance of a solid support. Her testimony in this
Upon the trial evidence was permitted to be given of prior accidents occurring at or about the particular place where plaintiff met with the accident. Proof of tho happening of such accidents was made in this wise: Plaintiff called the superintendent of the bridge and proved by him that as superintendent he had made a rule directing the captain of the police force connected with the bridge and subject to the superintendent’s control to make a record of all accidents of all kinds that occurred on the bridge and enter the same in a book to be kept in his (the captain’s) office and to make a report to the superintendent in duplicate the next morning after the accident happened. This system was begun as early as 1886 and was continued down to the happening of the accident. Each morning whenever there had been an accident the superintendent received a copy
“ O. O. Mabtin, Chief Engineer and Superintendent:
“ Deab Sib.—• The following took place...... Name of injured ...... Residence...... Property destroyed...... Character of accident...... Cause of it...... Extent of injuries...... Damage to property...... If on roadway, which one...... If on railroad train give number of car ..... Conductor’s name...... Residence...... Who witnessed the affair, name, residence and occupation...... General remarks......
“(Signed.) ...........”
These blanks in the reports introduced in evidence were filled up as indicated by the words used, and in each case it was stated therein, under the heading, “ Character of the accident,” in varying phrase, “ Slipping or falling between the car and platform.” The reports were, for the most part, signed by James Ward, captain, “per” or “ by,” usually giving the initials of the person signing. Some were signed by the policeman who made the report or by the conductor of the train. Under the heading of “general remarks” was given a brief account of the circumstances which attended the transaction. Yarious voluminious and pertinacious objectioás to the introduction of these reports, or the books containing them, were interposed by the defendant’s counsel, beginning with the offer of the first and continuing to the reception of the last. The objections which are now urged as fatal to the ruling of the court which received them are (1) that the testimony was incompetent to establish the fact of the happening of other accidents; (2) that the questions allowed were fatally defective in form; (3) that the memoranda were not sufficiently
The record being admissible, was it competent to establish the fact that other accidents of a similar character had happened at this place ? That the entries referred to the place where the present accident happened is without practical dispute ; the recital shows that the accidents happened by stepping or falling between the car and the platform. They were, therefore, in their nature similar, varying slightly in detail and cause. We have no doubt that the. facts recited show fairly that the accidents were similar in character within the general signification of that term, and were, therefore, competent evidence within the authority of Brady v. M. R. Co. (127 N. Y. 46).
It is to be borne in mind that this record was kept in all essential respects as a record of the corporation. It may be conceded that such record would not be admissible in its favor, even though properly authenticated by the person who made it. Upon this point, however, we express no opinion. But as an admission against the corporation, when it was shown to have been made by one of defendant’s officers, and called to the attention of the superintendent, we think it- was sufficiently authenticated, even though the person making the entry was not called to verify it. (First Nat. Bank of Whitehall v. Tisdale, 84 N. Y. 656; Root v. Great Western Railway Co., 65 Barb. 619.)
A very instructive discussion of the question of the admissibility of written memoranda is found in Mayor v. Sec. Ave. R. R. Co. (102 N. Y. 572). There the memoranda was held admissible in
W a have examined with care and with such patience as we could command, in view of their number, when few only were necessary to present every question of which the case permits, the exceptions taken upon the trial to the admission of evidence and to the charge of the court.
We find no substantial error, and, therefore, conclude that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Judgment andt order unanimously affirmed, with costs.