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Rogers v. Rogers
351 N.W.2d 129
S.D.
1984
Check Treatment

*1 story. only consider one side of That is way things

.not we do America.

I would reverse the trial and re-

quire trial court to remand this case for i.e., a proceedings, hearing

further before

the Water Resources Board which would process. is not

avail due This because of

any “clearly rule. erroneous” SDCL 1-26- empowers reviewing court to “remand proceedings”

the ease for further if there rights prejudiced been substantial be- findings

cause of administrative which are

(1) statutory in violation of constitutional or (2)

provisions proce- or made unlawful I

dure. find that both exist before this

Board. ROGERS,

Olivia Plaintiff and

Appellant, ROGERS, Appellee.

Irvin Defendant and

No. 14089.

Supreme Court of South Dakota. Sept.

Considered on 1983. Briefs

Decided

130 a February appellee signed

On Execute document entitled “Contract to Will,” part: in which states by agree- intend That the this provide to for the execution of a ment in all the farm land owned Will which may in which have an the husband or he death, of will be interest at the time his bequeathed devised to the and children parties. any nor other instru- Neither document ap- prevents in the record appearing parties’ pellee disposing from of during appellee’s farmland lifetime. 16, 1982, appellant August signed an On support in of a to vacate affidavit motion set decree of and aside the and Williams, Battey H. Gellhaus Russell alleges in which she that she had divorce Aberdeen, plaintiff ap- Battey, for & (who attorney her trial is not advised pellant. attorney accept that she appeal) would Tonner, Maynes, Maynes L. Joe settlement on the condition that all reduced Aberdeen, Tobin, defendant Maynes & pass parties’ the real estate would to the appellee. appellee if died discontinued four sons operation. alleges The the farm affidavit WOLLMAN, Justice. more once been that than court’s appeal This is an from the trial attorney appellee that assured her trial to vacate denying appellant’s order motion deprive their children would not be able We and decree of divorce. by disposing the farm it and that reverse remand. question there was the farmland no in Appellant appellee married were boys. the further go would With children, only one 1949 had seven being papers” assurance that “the were action whom was minor when this divorce prepared, appellant executed the 29, January commenced in 1980. On agreement. 1982, a settlement entered into sons, appellant’s present who was One negotiated on that had been during discussions Paragraph attorneys. their behalf agreement, and when she executed the agreement provided part: VIII support appellant’s filed an affidavit agrees The to execute husband judgment, stating motion vacate Last keep force at all times a valid that his wanted he had understood mother Testament, being that Will terms manner “the land be vested such a any of the predeceases if the husband death, pass it his father’s marriage, any and all children of the boys.” death farm land at the time of his owned respective would be transferred motion, appellant’s the trial Pursuant to surviving children. court issued an order show cause on 13, September matter was sub- en- the trial court On court on and a divorce, mitted to the trial affidavits a judgment tered and decree of trial, following transcript of the divorce incorporated portion verbatim that ap- order agree- which entered the VIII of the settlement pealed ment set forth from. above. argues

Appellant cy, that because she was 85 S.D. 178 N.W.2d (1970). surprised when she learned that her attor See also Courtesy Gilliland v. Mo tors, Inc., ney prevent nothing had done her hus S.D. 232 N.W.2d 828 (1975). farm, disposing of the band from relieved judg should be divorce *3 affidavits, On the of the basis we 15-6-60(b).* pursuant to SDCL We appellant are satisfied that pre intended to agree. appellee vent depriving from the children by of the farm precluding him from dispos outset, join At the we those with ing during of the farm Appel lifetime. courts which have held that rules authoriz lant’s the statements at trial divorce that ing from judgments grounds relief final she understood the property or applicable such as fraud mistake are to agreement are respect not conclusive with support of property awards settle the full extent that understanding. incorporated ments in divorce decrees. See There was appellant no evidence that Larson, (Alaska Larson v. 661 P.2d 626 sophisticated in and divorce mat 1983), 3, p. cases n. cited at agreement clear, ters. The was not so “A motion for relief based on SDCL unambiguous, by lay understandable a 15-6-60(b) is addressed sound discre appellant man that should be held have tion of the trial court. Absent an abuse fully import understood the full of the crit discretion, that the denying order a such Additionally, ical therein. appel motion cannot be appeal, disturbed on [ci understanding lant’s agreement may the Overvaag tations v. City Dell omitted]” not even be relevant in the view of assur (S.D.1982). Rapids, 319 N.W.2d 173 attorney “papers” ances that other The court’s exer trial discretion should be being prepared. were also “pa The other liberally in legal equi cised accord with pers” appellant expected carry promote principles table so as to ends the out the settlement turned out to justice. City See Lemmon v. U.S. appellee’s February be “Contract Fidelity Guaranty, 293 433 N.W.2d Will,” to Execute which came into exist (S.D.1980); Northland, Badger Inc. v. Van only after the ence and decree Boom, (S.D.1975); Der 235 903 In N.W.2d then, Only was entered. when all docu Arbeiter,

galls v. 72 36 N.W.2d S.D. apparently complete, mentation was could (1949); Johnson, 54 669 Jones v. S.D. appellant have an opportunity to exam (1928). 688 N.W. really understand, ine it and sur “mistake,” “inadvertence,” terms, prise, the result was what her not “surprise,” neglect” and “excusable as attorney had assured her it would be. 15-6-60(b)(l) used in have no fixed SDCL agree We appellee cannot question must be determined meaning; any negligence appellant’s mistake or presented from the facts circumstances attorney failing accomplish trial Northland, Badger case. See Inc. each intended result in this should divorce be Boom, supra. v. Der Van appellant imputed to and should bar her judgment. Inasmuch as the motion relief to vacate from from “[T]he affidavits, attorney on the basis of or negligence was submitted mistake will unhampered imputed a our review evidence “is not client as bar to be (1) judge act or the rule that who has relief where omission of the (2) attorney is is observed demeanor witnesses excusable the defendant position weigh intelligently appellant] in a better is free from ne himself [here matter, (citations omitted)” appellate glect the evidence than court.” Agen Burgard, Davis v. Interstate Motor Carriers 79 S.D. Ackerman order, 15-6-60(b) provides part: judgment, proceeding * SDCL "On mo a final from Mistake, (1) upon just, following as are tion and such terms the court the ence, reasons: inadvert may party legal surprise, representative neglect; relieve or his or excusable ..." (1961). case, Finally, we consider action of In this 109 N.W.2d Appeals will case remanding not negligence appellant’s Court is free from her because she court with imputed to to the trial directions that neglect. As we have indi- permitted unexcusable to amend her com- wife be cated, agreement was the settlement alimony, de- plaint pray for layman. Ac- by a readily understandable respond permitted to thereto fendant be appellant chargea- is not cordingly, because upon the hearing and that a be conducted right, she not own neglect ble with that issue. merits of claiming any surprise. barred from 60.02, T.R.C.P., provides: Rule contends that Appellee motion and such terms “On seeking relief from the estopped from just, may party are the court relieve a A party to divorce judgment. divorce legal a final representative or his *4 the accepted judg the benefits of has who proceeding the judgment, order or for held to be may given in a case be following [Emphasis ...” in reasons: validity challenging the of estopped from original.] in especially true This is those the decree. underlined The vests party attempting in which the who cases to respect a broad with court discretion has remarried in re to attack the decree imposition the of must conditions which upon the decree. See Hanks v. liance by one seeks from a be met who relief (S.D.1980); Hanks, 523 N.W.2d Brock 296 Rule It is judgment final under 60.02. Brockel, S.D. 128 N.W.2d 558 el v. 80 in recognized granting that a court a well however, (1964). Here, only benefits the open judgment to vacate a motion or flowing appellant to have been the na limits, impose may, within reasonable Appellant money property. of ture just proper as it to such terms deems money to or will not be entitled additional prescribe.... of a result modification of as only just it and reasonable We consider prayer with her the decree accordance awarding a relief to that as condition Accordingly, upon reliance for relief. the under Rule 60.02 the issue defendant decree not been such a nature as the has of reopened in the alimony should be inequitable contrary pub to render it provided in court as the decree trial be policy permit lic the decree to modi Appeals. the Court intentions of the fied to reflect the true Qualls Qualls, v. 589 S.W.2d parties. (Tenn.1979) (citations and omit- footnote course, say, upon This is not to ted). may impose trial court remand the remand, appellant Accordingly, upon it determines court upon such terms as the trial terms, if just precedent any, a condition modi- what should to be as should consider above, fying upon the forth a judgment. imposed appellant As set condition 15-6-60(b) provides mo- requests. awarding SDCL the relief she “[o]n just, tion and such terms as are fees on Appellant’s request attorney’s for legal repre- may party a relieve appeal is denied. ” judgment a .... sentative from final denying the motion to vacate The order apparently not heretofore This court reversed, case is judgment 15-6-60(b) application addressed the further circuit court for remanded a of a motion relief from the context proceedings. in an action for divorce. entered Conrad, 599, 57 4 S.D. N.W. Ormsby Cf. (1894). persuasive find We which C.J., FOSHEIM, MOR- and DUNN and Supreme Court of Tennessee wrote JJ., GAN, concur. respect application of its state’s HENDERSON, J., 15-6-60(b): dissents. counterpart to SDCL HENDERSON, (dissenting). graph Justice VIII of Agreement pertained which to the execu- respectfully I dissent and affirm tion Testament, Last Will and the trial court. provision expressly incorporated effect, majority opinion, pits in the Final Decree of Divorce. When the her son appellant elevates affidavits redrafted against six-page Property submitted, was so a Contract to Execute a (with attachments), terms Will was by appellee forwarded and his thereof, testimony sworn attorney to appellant attorney. and her repre- judge, quality before a circuit very experienced, able sentation two Notwithstanding negotia- all these Aberdeen, law in South lawyers practicing tions, appraisal an was made one Ken- Dakota, long-time and the reflection of a Jark, expert neth R. an employed by appel- judge. Vaulting trial over affidavits lant, on aAs result of this aforesaid, majority opinion holds appraisal, negotiations continued. Appel- that a written entered duly lant then saw fit to serve notice of a new wrong. are set aside. It is date, trial to be had October On triggered action 1981. This new trial date further by appellant-wife. By commenced March negotiations and further offers which in- 12, 1980, negotiations for were very provision concerning cluded the same *5 underway. Proper answer and counter- an execution of a a will and Contract to reply Negotiations claim and were served. 8, 1981, a Will. Execute As of October the Depositions continued. were on No- taken parties had not a still reached settlement so 19, Negotiations vember 1980. continued negotiations 3, continued. November On through May December 1980 1981. 1981, appellant comprehensive submitted a Negotiations through. fell was The matter 1981, offer of settlement. In November 17, parties set for trial on June 1981. The parties bargain haggle the continued to and stipulated later the that trial be continued alimony keep about and who was the 15, negotiations 1981. Extensive parties appellee-hus- house of the how and concerning Property continued a Settle- buy pay and it band could the home off. language and con- to be Again, negotiations, appellant-wife in these tained in Judgment a and of Di- Decree absolutely problems had no whatsoever (as vorce. negotiations These included will, of a respect the execution its 15, 1981) provision June appellee- a that provisions, and a to Execute Contract a husband would execute a Last Will and Will. Testament which would proper- devise real January By appellant submitted ty owned at the time of his death to all of settle the comprehensive a offer to case parties the children of the neces- but not tendered, compre- part and she as sarily equal negotia- on an basis. Further settle, very hensive offer to the same Last tions continued lawyers between the and language Testament and Contract Will and through 22, 1981, clients June to in- parties language a Will to Execute agreement, by correspondence clude an be- already agreed By times. upon several respective attorneys, appel- tween the that the executed a January leaving lee would draft a will prop- his real Agreement. Settlement Under- Property erty marriage to the children the standably, the identical Last Will and Tes- attorneys specifically agreed the that such language and to Execute a Contract tament provision expressly a be included included, language having was same Will Property Agreement. a Ulti- 24, agreed on divers occasions. 1981, been mately, appellee on June settlement, part provi- as a Upon this a submitted redrafted thereof, $2,000 pre- appellee parted with including sion language ultimately by way attorney’s cise Para- fees for benefit set forth in cash attorney. A. Yes. her Substantial passed. consideration therefore Di- Decree of On same date entered, expressly pursuant vorce was anything but This action was and Divorce, V(C) the Decree of regu- The matter came on action. default $30,000 cash, all for appellee parted with 2, 1982, by February on larly appellant. Unquestionably, the benefit of parties and their counsel stipulation. The sizeable, this is substantial consideration. His Honor. The resultant appeared before (the of the conditions of this contract One judg- anything but default Agreement) Property Settlement Findings of Fact ment. Who drafted the wife to vacate the house appel- of Law? Answer: and Conclusions on 1982. far as April So Judgment Who drafted lant-wife. concerned, September record is appel- Decree of Divorce? Answer: Final house. she continued to reside in the incorporated very Last lant-wife who she her suggests The record flaunted language and Contract Will and Testament promise con- word and the Execute a which was Will house, nesting and remained in the tained comfort, ment, $32,000. she had to on In and which with the Di- The Final Decree of find sought occasions. out counsel to fault with divers Findings Fact affording and Conclusions vorce document comfort. Law were entered lady equity old grand Lest called author, per appellant, shunned course, Marriage is, contract. civil contract, (a) a 1977 Chevrolet received: right Parties have the SDCL 25-1-1. automobile; (b) personal most extensive thereto. respect make contracts with goods, ef- property consisting of household 25-2-13. This includes the SDCL (c) $30,000 fects, furniture; cash husband and wife have accumulated aforesaid; (d) $60,000 during marriage. payable These over nine the course of *6 payment a civil via a one years, beginning entered into with first Divorce, language, in our year entry written instrument mother after of Decree of English. suggestion no being assigned There is an tightly same secured Eng- deed; (e) record she does understand in a addi- interest contract for an (under by her $60,000 lish. She was asked counsel by way parties’ of inter- tional oath): acres, payable three est in a home with at $649.48, years at the rate of

Q. I show has over twelve Rogers, you Mrs. what 8% she plaintiff’s payment on the first month that been marked as Exhibit first (the parties agreed, had [Property No. Settlement vacates house house); (f) ment], effect, get if you you ask have had that he would opportunity per alimony; (g) read and examine month $200 $300 agreement? monthly this for who is to support child a lad 3, 18 on 1984. turn A. Yes. Appellant, apparently, changed counsel

Q. your if you signature And I’ll ask time) (for began first questioning appears thereon? contents her Last Will of ex-husband’s A. Yes. Appellant to va- and Testament. refused Q. ex- property Was this to va- agreed that she cate house had plained you? $2,000 of the cate. She made no re-tender Yes. A. $30,000 attorney’s fees nor the cash. Q. you fully Do the nature understand to restore the fruits She never offered of the settlement? received, to include the contract that she A. Yes. goods family car of the household and all keep Appellant Q. And it meet and furniture. wants your does with satisfac- has, portion everything isolate one tion? that she contract, litigate Appellant’s it. I ship over well taken. appel- at the estopped, equity, under floats or maintain that she is late level sinks surprise under part neglect cannot rescind doing so. She and/or excusable under SDCL 15- e-eoobxi).1 part and affirm the she wants. the contract Although Appellant-wife, she knew the contents of through counsel, appellee’s Last Will and Testament all dur- Finding approved by drafted of Fact ing the of 1982 and had an attor- court, summer provides: which it, ney kept review fruits of That the have freely and vol- contract, refused to move from the house untarily Custody, entered into a Child agreed, question provi- and did not Support Child and Property Settlement concerning the Will sions Last and Testa- 29, 1982, dated January language or the Contract to Execute which “Property is entitled language in her a Will as set forth civil Agreement” and it is their mutual de- contract, denominated sire and intention that this Agreement. the basis the settlement and form determination respective all of their An issue was made of the fact that the rights, obligations, and arising duties Execute a Will was not dated Contract To out relationship, their marital sub- days until six after the ject approval by (Empha- this Court. divorce. The Contract to Execute a Will is mine.) supplied sis in the exact same form and the exact same appel- as was first submitted to Also, appellant-wife, through her coun- on lant’s counsel June almost sel, Finding had drafted ap- of Fact eight prior entry months proved court, provides: Judgment and Final Decree of Divorce. 8. That filing to Execute a Will Contract original Agreement, which is just a mere clerical act as the terms part marked Exhibit and made a hereof and conditions had been to and dis- thereto, specific reference many through cussed times the entire set- if the same force and effect as herein set negotiations. tlement detail, length forth at constitutes a yet attorney equitable

Enter another on fair, just behalf of settlement and August indicating respective determination all attorney delving rights, obligations arising that this was now into this and duties relation, considering entirely reopen- case and and the out their marital ing hereby approves such specifically of divorce. This Court *7 thereof, ultimately picture Agreement faded from the and and all of the terms present appellate by the refer- appeared adopts counsel on her and the same above part Findings of these behalf. ence thereto as mine.) (Emphasis supplied of Fact. September appellee On greeted with an Order to of Law 6 was likewise draft- Show Cause Conclusion counsel, through set her and judgment by appellant, vacate and aside the entered ed alia, states, Property Although ap- herein on inter Settle- claimed, fair, just pellant by pleadings, “constitutes a that the ment mistake, set settlement and determination judgment equitable should be aside for and inadvertence, rights, obligations or of the surprise, duties excusable ne- of ” * * * arising marriage out of their glect, her trial counsel admitted before the Property the “terms” of the Set- trial court that mistake and inadvertence and that hereby adopted, “are helpful decisions in this Court were not tlement * * * ” with the damaging by her cause. This admission this Court “same force is grounds legal sponte, with such like a volca- 1. Fraud or mistake as a means to set aside this sua Appellant judgment inapposite; pleaded and her sons have not accused it was not or no. appellee attorney upon erupt, his with fraud. relied below and this Court cannot or husband, of the and the wife length set at files has effect as if herein forth knowledge to the full business and and in detail.” husband, nature, and the affairs of the Judgment and Final respect With extent, separate proper- of his and value Divorce, by appellant’s Decree of drafted of the here- ty, and her, counsel, by approved by ap- approved to; this and rea- fair counsel, adopted by pellee and his mine.) (Emphasis supplied sonable. court, Paragraph judg- VIII of said Appellant seeks to disavow her written con- provides: ment now, affidavit, by tract and tries to influ- agrees to execute and The husband believing ence the courts of this state into Last keep in force at all times a valid type represen- that there has been some Testament, being that Will and the terms was, tation her own which predeceases any of the if the husband is, supposedly damaging to her and the marriage, any and all children got marriage. sons of the The father farm land owned at the time of his death agreed farm. to will the farm to his He respective would be transferred to his surviving equal children in shares. He did surviving children. right so. She has no to come forward and husband, predeceased If a child has father, he, say that taken leaving body, issue his or advantage attorney. of her share of the deceased child under the boys right had no more to the farmland equally among Will is to be divided girls; boys right than the have no (Emphasis issue of such deceased child. girls rightful oust of their inheritance mine.) supplied by one affidavits authored son and the language language This is identical only try mother to not to rewrite the terms which was submitted on June absolutely im- of a written contract but to as included pose upon he will a father how distribute VIII, Agreement, Paragraph law, worldly goods. right, What identified and re- which was as Exhibit boy his mother have to force a does ceived in evidence. property in a manner con- man to will his pertinent provisions There are other trary his written contract and a he will judgment (Property she saw and to? prepared which extenso) ment is set forth which are The answer: none. This Justice hazards deserving appellate consideration. Par- ground that she seeks a deed to the farm ticularly, Paragraph I refer to XI of the beyond to insure that it is the father’s provided: “Each of the control. With a commitment to her of parties expressly certifies that each of $120,000 payments plus alimony of $300 agreement upon them has entered into this month, per the father needs economic mature consideration and the advice breathing room to make the commitments. separate counsel.” Said XI oath, she admitted before the trial Under (her counsel was the court, at the time divorce was scrivener) which, contains it- read the granted, that she Settle- self, estop coming wife now it, Agreement, that she understood attacking forward and this decree. This that she was satisfied. Is an oath *8 language is as follows: Moreover, meaningful pointed or not? Prop- to the execution of this Consent judge out to the that there had been exten- Agreement erty Settlement has not been negotiations relating property sive duress, fraud, or obtained undue and that she had executed instruments of person; represen- any conveyance Proper- no in with the accordance influence of telling act been made to include by ty Agreement, tations Settlement except party judge either to the other as here- that she had “sold home the farm” to her ex-husband. expressly forth; in set the wife has had located on $32,000 hand, books, records, in and with the full to the and With the access plus Yet, the furniture the ali- entire fruits bargain. automobile and of her her sup- mony support, and the child she now wants plication is heard a knock on the door of pro- to rescind the contract because of one equity. Her hands are unclean and I would son, liking of and a not to the herself vision open the door.

notwithstanding fully her ex-husband has neglect Excusable meaning. has no fixed and, importantly, most on the performed concept This is a which has repeatedly been (the Testament) very item Last Will and Certainly, voiced in this Court. as men of “surprise.” did “sur- that she claims When law, in right reason we have the grounds rescinding prise” become negotia- consider that there were extensive The written instrument this state? case; tions in that there were grounds for rescission this state are: represented by experienced, most able law- (1) party rescinding If consent of the or yers; believed, and that the as did any party jointly contracting with lawyers, property settlement given by him mistake or obtained was fair, just, equitable, was as did the trial fraud, duress, through or undue in- presided court which over this action. There fluence exercised or with the con- simply neglect part no excusable on her party to whom he nivance of the as Appellant, or that of her counsel. in actu- rescinds, party any or of other ality, claiming that there ais different jointly interested with such agreement. equated How is this with ne- party; glect? neglect by There appellant’s is no (2) party through If fault of the as to former counsel. I have reviewed the affi- rescinds, whom he the consideration davits on file herein which the Order obligation fails in whole or in for his predicated. Appellant to Show Cause was part; “neglect” and her son do not use the word (3) entirely If the consideration becomes “negligence.” transcript of the di- cause; any void from proceedings a) testimony vorce reveals her

(4) If it is ren- such consideration before negotiations that there had been extensive him

dered to fails a material re- settlement, b) dealing with the cause; spect opportunity that she had an to read and Property examine the (5) By parties. consent of all the other ment, c) SDCL 53-11-2. her, fully explained d) below, it, I agree The trial court the nature of the that she understood set- held that VIII of the tlement, e) fully that she was satisfied with written in sim- f) agreement, signed that she ple, unambiguous language, that she could agreement. Having understand. testified under oath majority’s position I find the on the es- that she understood this document and hav- issue, toppel considering the fruits of the ing signed a document that she understood possesses, prepos- to be contract which she it, such how can an affidavit overcome majority pooh-poohs terous. The the bene- held, strong The trial evidence? flowing appellant apparently fits as be- agree, except representations, I that no money prop- “in ing only the nature of agreement, were made. set forth arises, where, by erty.” estoppel “An con- signed to that ef- She a written document acts, party induced to duct or has been all of the fect. She swore under oath that position alter or do that which he would property terms met with her done, prejudice.” to his not otherwise have satisfaction. As to how this can Crawford, 75 S.D. mystery Willadsen v. surprise, claim is a total now (1953). Appellee 60 N.W.2d al- relying upon surprise to not me. She is position by tered his a written contract. only try (by stipulation) to set aside a tried Iverson, *9 forth in 87 S.D. culminating divorce case in a decree but As set Iverson v. (1973), 628, 631-32, 213 710 also a civil contract where she retains N.W.2d 138 (8) judgment; Willadsen, princi- 692; 60 N.W.2d doctrine ... is bottomed “[t]he (9) dealing Iverson, and is 213

ples morality and fair N.W.2d 708. It justice. the ends of intended to subserve If, indeed, the heart of the majority opin- fair be- is accomplish that which seeks to Property ion is that the is a statement tween man and man.” Such in question fully ment does not reflect the majori- theory self-destructing to the understanding parties and that is the estoppel. ty’s position on why reason and decree of supporting this dis Bibliography of law vacated, perforce divorce should be so it (rescission statute); (1) sent: SDCL 53-11-2 subsequently can be modified to reflect (S.D. Weber, (2) 298 N.W.2d 96 Forester v. that which the had intended principles are 1980), holding that agree upon, opening this Court is the door interpreting property when applicable alter, modify, add to the written con- incorporated into a settlement Furthermore, parties. of these tract decree; holding ambigui also that divorce tolerating very Court low form of (the majority apparently holding ties that namely affidavits, proof, two far worse type ambiguity there is some nebulous evidence, parol than to overcome a written at contract, testimony, sworn and the con- hand) arising in a contract should be inter an experienced sidered scrivener, preted against and construed highly regarded judge. circuit court citing City Henry Falls v. Carl Sioux Rogers, son, affidavit of Duane is re- (S.D.1977); (3) Co., 258 N.W.2d 676 son hearsay plete expresses with rank con- (S.D. Flynn Flynn, v. 338 N.W.2d 296 clusions about what he understood from 1983), holding “parol evidence that should what his mother understood his when meaning where the of a not be admitted attorney, mother counselled with her clear,” patently provision contractual cit understanding of his mother’s intent and ing North River Ins. Co. v. Golden Rule that he with his mother that she Constr., (S.D. 1980) N.W:2d 910 296 execute the should v. Delzer Constr. Co. South Dakota State understanding based (S.D.1979); of Transp., Bd. 275 N.W.2d 352 of that contract. Such statements are not (4) Separation 24 Divorce and Am.Jur.2d proof To use same as a form of facts. § alia, (1983),providing, 471 inter highest par- court in to have the this state ordinarily party who obtains a decree is not decision, tially employ it to reverse this subject estop- entitled to attack it and is imagination beggars the and intellect of (5) 24 pel quasi-estoppel; Am.Jur.2d Di Ap- man or woman versed the law. § (1983),provid Separation vorce and 464 affidavit, pellant’s to buttress her own self- ing, essentially, accept that one cannot ben statements, serving conclusory incor- efits of a decree and not be bound its porates hearsay her son’s affidavit. The burdens; Johnson, (6) v. 291 Johnson affidavit of is a maze of factual (S.D.1980), holding N.W.2d 776 that or separate In conflict and conclusions. six parties, der to determine intent of affidavit, places in her she indicates that it separation property agree understanding that “all was her of the real ment, repeated language of which go boys,” to the four “all of estate would decree, interpreted divorce to be would situated in such a the real estate be holding a contract must written and go it automatically manner that would whole, just construed a detached as a boys,” go “the farmland it; (7) portion Gesinger, Rousseau v. protected farm boys,” “the was to be (S.D.1983), Blare, N.W.2d 522 and Blare “[tjhat boys,” and she was taken (S.D.1981), total- standing N.W.2d both by suprise when ly she was advised proposition settle for the that a [sic] guaran- it was not a vested title with a designed a divorce action is boys, but, rather, pass tee to finality property rights settle with entry simple comittment as of the time of the whatever land [sic] *10 public policy demands that this action pass to would left at the time of death was repose. Adam, amazing affidavit remain See Adam v. This is an the children.” (S.D.1977). no writ- sign punish ap- for there N.W.2d To for sib- male only having complied ten documentation pellee with his con- Her get the farm. someday lings tract, were having and with drafted a Last Will state- this remarkable contains affidavit and Testament in exact accordance with Decree Judgment and ment: “[T]hat to Execute a Will and the Contract nothing more than provided for Divorce Divorce, passeth all under- Final Decree of whereby the land arrangement contractual standing. lasting, In the name of durable by her.” boys pass to the could in domestic rela- and stable civil contracts fallacious statement is a Obviously, this tions law known as very agreement written contrary to agreements, where does this decision leave essence, In the affi- into. entered that she litigants and the Bar of the State of that she was led to believe fantasizes davit Dakota? South immediately vest the farmland would boys. only a deed It evident accomplished purpose have could obligation any contractual was never

there immedi- family farm appellee to deed siblings, male see

ately to the

VIII of Judgment Paragraph VIII of Divorce, supra. Pinal Decree of OWEN, Appellee, Harry L. Plaintiff and opinion permit majority impose “terms” that “are court to seeking to rescind a just.” Appellant is OWEN, Marilyn Defendant terms, in by “surprise.” Those Appellant. necessitate a return my opinion, would No. 14278. $32,000 cash, personal the extensive obtained to include property which she Dakota. Supreme Court South automobile, alimony that she and all of the Briefs Feb. now amount to has received which must Considered dollars, and upon thousands of thousands 3, 1984. Decided quo in status before place signed. has had She house, amount to and that would use of a dollars, An also. thousands

several not meet just terms that are does

award of dissent, nor aspect of this

the substantive into majority it lift the rationale

does bail It is an academic plausible work.

out. has not equity

Appellant desires but under the equity. takes benefits

done She validity. Having disputes its

decree but contract, she of her

enjoyed the fruits from de- equitably estopped

should be origin. Stability should

nouncing its

accorded contract, as the

ment, private civil as well controversy has decree for this

divorce litigants the interest of decided and

been

Case Details

Case Name: Rogers v. Rogers
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 3, 1984
Citation: 351 N.W.2d 129
Docket Number: 14089
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
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