John David ROGERS, Petitioner, v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Respondent.
No. 25720.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Decided Sept. 22, 2003.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 2003.
588 S.E.2d 87
Reheard June 10, 2003.
Further, the death penalty here is proportionate to other cases where the murder resulted from domestic problems. E.g., State v. Kelly, supra; State v. Ard, 332 S.C. 370, 505 S.E.2d 328 (1998). Finally, while it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose a death sentence on a mentally retarded defendant, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), the imposition of such a sentence upon a mentally ill person is not disproportionate. State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992).
We have conducted the sentencing review mandated by
TOAL, C.J., MOORE, WALLER and BURNETT, JJ., concur.
Henry Dargan McMaster and John Gregg McMaster, both of Tompkins & McMaster, of Columbia, for Respondent.
Justice PLEICONES:
We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision in Rogers v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 343 S.C. 52, 538 S.E.2d 664 (Ct.App.2000). We affirm as modified.
FACTS1
Norfolk Southern Corporation (“Norfolk Southern“), under contract with U.S. Silica (“Silica“), transports Silica‘s product over spur tracks owned by Silica. Silica runs slurry2 through pipes running beneath the spur lines to a storage facility.
A slurry pipe ruptured two days before John David Rogers’ (“Rogers“) injury. Silica employees temporarily repaired the pipes, intending to replace them at a later date. Silica did not notify Norfolk Southern of the rupture.
On the day of Rogers’ injury a Norfolk Southern train entered the Silica complex on a spur track. The Norfolk Southern crew, consisting of a conductor and an engineer, dismounted from the train for a break. They returned to discover a large hole beneath the track estimated to be between four to five feet deep and approximately eight to ten feet wide. The train engineer noticed a small stream of clear water at the bottom of the hole, which flowed outward from the direction of the Silica plant. The train conductor testified that no exposed pipe was visible in the hole. The train conductor asked Norfolk Southern to inspect the track to ensure the train could traverse it safely. Norfolk Southern sent Rogers, an assistant track supervisor, to inspect the hole.
As Rogers neared the hole, the ground shifted beneath him. Rogers jerked backwards to avoid falling and immediately felt pain in his back. Rogers sought medical treatment and was diagnosed with a herniated disc, which resulted in pain in his back and his left leg. Rogers attempted to return to work after surgery, but he has work restrictions on lifting, bending, stooping, and twenty percent impairment to his lumbar spine.
Rogers filed suit against Norfolk Southern under FELA, alleging Norfolk Southern was negligent in failing to provide him with a reasonably safe place to work. Rogers also filed suit against Silica for common law negligence. The jury returned a $3,000,000 verdict against Silica and Norfolk Southern, apportioning 30% of the verdict to Norfolk Southern and 70% to Silica. Following the verdict, Norfolk Southern‘s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) was denied. The Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUES
- Did the Court of Appeals err in applying a state standard in reviewing a trial court‘s denial of Norfolk Southern‘s Motion for JNOV in a case premised on federal law?
- Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court‘s denial of Norfolk Southern‘s Motion for JNOV?
I
Standard for JNOV
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this case before we decided Norton v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 350 S.C. 473, 567 S.E.2d 851 (2002) in which we held state trial courts
A Motion for JNOV3 requires a court to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, a state court presiding over a FELA action must apply federal rules in deciding a Motion for JNOV. Cf. Norton v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., supra.
The Court of Appeals applied the state standard of review and concluded Rogers presented no evidence to support the jury‘s finding that Norfolk Southern was negligent.4 The Court of Appeals erred by failing to apply the federal standard, applicable to both trial and appellate courts, which is:
the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it are assessed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . and the credibility of all evidence favoring the non-moving party is assumed. . . . Assessed in this way, the evidence must then be of such quality and weight that
reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment could reasonably return a verdict for the non-moving party . . . . a mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to withstand the challenge.
Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, 844 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir.1988) (internal citations omitted). In other words, “the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.” Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957) (citation omitted). However, before the case may be properly left to the jury there must be more than a scintilla of evidence establishing defendant‘s liability. Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943) (“the weight of the evidence under [FELA] must be more than a scintilla before the case may be properly left to the discretion of the trier of fact. . . .“).
Both the state and federal standards require a trial judge to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. However, under the state standard the trial court should not grant JNOV where the evidence yields more than one inference. An appellate court may not overturn the decision of the trial court, under the state standard, if there is any evidence to support the trial court‘s ruling.
In contrast, under the federal standard both the trial and appellate courts must ask whether a fair, impartial, and reasonable juror could return a verdict for the non-moving party. To survive the motion the non-moving party must have presented more than a scintilla of evidence to establish his claim. In ruling on a Motion for JNOV in a FELA action, a state court must ask whether more than a scintilla of evidence was presented which “justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.” Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., supra.
II
Norfolk Southern‘s Motion for JNOV
Norfolk Southern has a non-delegable duty to provide Rogers a safe place to work, even when Rogers is
Congress mandated courts construe FELA provisions liberally in favor of injured railroad workers. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949). Although FELA is to be liberally construed, this “does not mean that it is a workers’ compensation statute. [The U.S. Supreme Court has] insisted that FELA does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur.” Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 2404, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). An employee may recover under FELA only upon proving the employer‘s negligence contributed, in whole or in part, to the worker‘s injury. See
Rogers was sent to the track on U.S. Silica‘s premises to inspect the track and report any problems or damages found, and advise his supervisors of any necessary
We fail to see how, in this instance, Norfolk Southern could have been any more prudent. Rogers was Norfolk Southern‘s first responder following advisement by its employees of the obvious problem at the site. Rogers’ job was to inspect the area around the track and to inform Norfolk Southern of any danger.5 We agree with the Court of Appeals that Norfolk Southern was not chargeable, prior to Rogers’ arrival, with knowledge of the cause of the problem at the site. Rogers v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 343 S.C. 52, 61, 538 S.E.2d 664, 669 (Ct.App.2000). Norfolk Southern was not, therefore, negligent in any particular in dispatching Rogers to inspect the site.
The law does not require that employers be omniscient, only that they exercise reasonable care. Rogers was the agent of Norfolk Southern entrusted with informing the company of dangers in the Norfolk Southern workplace. No more than a mere scintilla of evidence, if that, was adduced at trial from which the negligence of Norfolk Southern could be inferred. We conclude that a fair, impartial and reasonable juror could not have returned a verdict against Norfolk Southern. The Court of Appeals arrived at the correct result as to all
We therefore AFFIRM AS MODIFIED the Court of Appeals’ decision.
MOORE, A.C.J., and Acting Justice James C. Williams, Jr., concur.
BURNETT, J., dissenting in a separate opinion in which WALLER, J., concurs.
Justice BURNETT:
I respectfully dissent. The evidence presented by Rogers is more than sufficient to satisfy the federal “more than a mere scintilla” standard.
Under the federal standard, applied alike at trial and on review, the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it are assessed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the credibility of all evidence favoring the non-moving party is assumed. . . . Assessed in this way, the evidence must then be of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment could reasonably return a verdict for the non-moving party . . . . A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to withstand the challenge.
Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, 844 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir.1988) (internal citations omitted).
A scintilla is defined as “a trace” of evidence. Black‘s Law Dictionary 1347 (7th ed.1999).
The majority concludes Norfolk Southern was not negligent in dispatching Rogers to inspect the site. I agree. The mere dispatch of Rogers to the site was not negligent.
In my opinion, however, Norfolk Southern was negligent in failing to provide Rogers with a safe place to work. As noted by the majority, Norfolk Southern had a non-delegable duty to provide Rogers a safe place to work, even when Rogers was working on the property of a third party. See Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Trimiew, 253 Va. 22, 480 S.E.2d 104 (1997); McGraw v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 201 W.Va. 675, 500 S.E.2d 300 (1997); Schrier v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 102 Ill.App.3d 855, 58 Ill.Dec. 262, 430 N.E.2d 204 (1981).
The convex hole created beneath the Norfolk Southern tracks resulted from the rupture of slurry pipes which ran beneath the tracks. The pipes were visible going into the ground adjacent to the track and emerging from the ground on the opposite side of the track. Although the installation of the pipes was not disclosed to Norfolk Southern, the pipes were not concealed from view. Photographs and witness testimony show the entry of the slurry pipes into the ground twenty feet from the spur track. It was clearly foreseeable that a dangerous condition existed adjacent to Norfolk Southern‘s tracks.
In my opinion, more than a mere scintilla, a trace, of evidence was introduced establishing Norfolk Southern knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known the conditions at Silica posed a danger to its employees. Accordingly, under FELA standards, Rogers is entitled to prevail. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957) (under FELA, an employee prevails if he establishes “that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.“).
The majority opines no fair, impartial, and reasonable juror could have returned a verdict against Norfolk Southern. The record, however, is devoid of evidence the jury which returned the verdict against Norfolk Southern was unfair, partial, or unreasonable. Instead, Rogers presented this jury more than a mere scintilla of evidence Norfolk Southern breached its non-delegable duty, resulting in injury to him.
I would REVERSE the Court of Appeals’ decision.
WALLER, J., concurs.
