150 Iowa 270 | Iowa | 1911
Tbe accident upon wbicb tbis action is based occurred on March 15, 1909, at or near a highway
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1909, plaintiff was driving westward with a team and buggy on said highway, and in a careful and prudent manner approached the said crossing of the said railway company. That as he came close thereto a car being operated on the defendant railway company’s track, without warning to this plaintiff, approached from the south, and when the plaintiff was about seventy-five feet distant from the track of the said railway company, the said car appeared in sight a short distance from the said team, running at a high and dangerous rate of speed. That, when the said car vims distant about fifty feet from the plaintiff and his said .team, the motorman thereon, well knowing that plaintiff’s team had become frightened' and that the plaintiff was endeavoring to control them, did then and there negligently and wrongfully sound the whistle on the said car in a loud
The circumstances leading up to the accident are described by plaintiff in his testimony as follows:
This road on the highway where it crosses the Interurban is graded up. Back east from the track, probably about one hundred feet, they start,a narrow grade from there up to the top of the track. It is the same west of the track. On the day of this accident I was driving west, and my 'team had reached a point about fifty feet from the track when I first saw the car approaching. The car came from the south. I did' not hear any whistle blown or bell rung, or other warning of the approach of the car. There was no bell rung or whistle blown on this car as it approached at any time. I first observed the trolley on the car. I reined in my horses, and got out of my buggy. I was about fifty feet from the track. I got out to go forward to get to my horses by the head. At that time the horses were restless. The car having come into sight, the team moved .ahead and to one side and back again as a team would that was frightened. I next heard several short blasts of the whistle, and the team bolted ahead. At the time the' whistle was blown, I was on the ground and the car
The accident is described by the motorman as a witness for defendant as follows:
As I approached the crossing there was a team and buggy came in sight approaching the,railroad track on the east side of the crossing, coming from the east. As soon as I noticed the horses’ heads, I shut the power off from the ear to see what was going to be done, what I had to do. The team came walking along unconcerned, as though they were taking their own way about it. I began to apply my brakes when I did not see anyone that looked as though they had control of the team. I then began tooting the whistle to attract their attention. It was a single-seated top buggy. The top was up. It had side curtains on. From the position I was in when I first saw the buggy I could not see the 'occupant of the buggy. I could not see whether any person was in the buggy. When I discovered this situation, I threw the power off the car, and started to set the brake. I shut the power off and partially set the brake. That had the effect of slack
In answer to a special interrogatory, the jury found that the defendant was guilty of no negligence in sounding the whistle as the car approached the crossing. It nevertheless returned a general verdict for the plaintiff, and found it to be guilty of negligence in other respects. The only other negligence which is urged upon our attention as supporting the verdict is that the motorman failed to sound the whistle sixty rods distant from the crossing, and that the car approached the crossing at a high and dangerous rate of speed. This contention involves the question whether section 2072 of the Code requiring steam railroads to give certain statutory signals while approaching a crossing is applicable to electric interurban roads. But we pass this question for the present, and direct our first attention to the question whether the evidence in this record warranted a finding that either ground of alleged negligence last stated was the proximate cause of the accident complained of. The plaintiff’s petition was manifestly predicated upon the theory that the defendant’s motorman frightened his horses by the sharp whistling as he approached the crossing, and that he was negligent in doing so. That the failure to give statutory signals a thousand feet away was not a proximate cause of the accident is evident when it is considered that plaintiff stopped his team and got out of his buggy after he saw the approaching car. • According to his testimony, he drove some distance toward the crossing after he saw ■ the • car and before he stopped. His team was' under' control up to this point.