This appeal arises from a claim for life insurance proceeds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Household Life Insurance Company (HLIC) on the grounds that Alan Rogers’ life insurance contract was void because he was adjudicated incompetent before he entered the сontract. Alan’s son and guardian, Jason Rogers, argues that the contract was merely voidable, that as Alan’s guardian he had the capacity to and did ratify the contract, and that the contract was thus enforceable. We affirm, but deny HLIC’s request for attorney fees incurred on appeal.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Alan Rоgers was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and dementia in 2003. Soon after, Alan’s son Jason sought an adjudication that Alan was incapacitated. An order to that effect was entered on January 27, 2004. The letters appointing Jason as guardian and conservator for his father did not place any limitations on Jason’s powers.
On May 15, 2007, Jason assisted his father in completing and submitting an online application for life insurance offered by HLIC. The application requested information regarding Alan’s health, but did not specifically inquire as to whether Aan suffered from Alzheimer’s or dementia. The completed applicatiоn did not reveal that Alan was adjudicated to be incapacitated, nor did it reveal that Jason had been appointed as his father’s guardian and conservator. That day, HLIC approved the application, the initial $447.20 premium was paid, and Alan Rogers’ term life insurance policy with a face value of $250,000 took effect. Jason was the sole beneficiary of the policy.
Alan passed away on June 7, 2007. His death certificate lists the sole cause of his death as “dementia of the Alzheimer’s type.” Jason submitted a notice of claim to HLIC, seeking the $250,000 policy proceeds. HLIC cоnducted a medical-history verification, a routine procedure for claims arising within two years of a policy’s inception. Several months later, HLIC informed Jason of its
Jason brought suit against HLIC, alleging breach of contract and tortious bad faith. HLIC moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Alan Rogers was adjudicated mentally incapacitated prior to entering into the insurance contract and therefore thе contract was void ab initio. Jason countered that a contract entered into by one adjudicated incompetent is not void, but rather is merely voidable at the election of the incompetent’s guardian, and also that a guardian may ratify such a contract.
The district court granted summary judgment in favоr of HLIC on the ground that Alan’s adjudication of incompetence rendered the contract void and dismissed Jason’s complaint. Jason timely appealed. HLIC requests attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code § 41-1839.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district court’s order granting summary judgment under the same stаndard used by the district court in its ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz,
III. ANALYSIS
A. Under Idaho Code § 32-108, one who is adjudicated incapacitated lacks the capacity to contract as a matter of law.
Idaho Code § 32-108 provides as follows:
After his incapacity has been judicially determined, a person of unsound mind can make no conveyance or other contraсt, nor delegate any power or waive any right until his restoration to capacity. But a certificate from the medical superintendent or resident physician of the insane asylum to which such person may have been committed, showing that such person had been discharged therefrom cured and restored to reason, shall establish the presumption of legal capacity in such person from the time of such discharge.
Jason assei’ts that the statute’s language that one adjudicated to be incapacitated “can make no conveyance or other contract” means thаt although such a person should not contract, if he or she does, the contract is merely voidable. HLIC responds that under the statute’s plain language, the contracts of one who is adjudicated incompetent are void because the individual lacks all capacity to contract.
The language of I.C. § 32-108 does not, upon preliminary consideration, support Jason’s position. Effectively, Jason argues that the statutory language that a person adjudicated to be incapacitated “can make no ... contract” means that such a person may enter into a contrаct, while simultaneously retaining the ability to avoid the obligations imposed by the agreement. Nevertheless, when considering Jason’s claim that the insurance contract in this ease was merely voidable, rather than void
ab initio,
we consider the statutory framework relating to persons who suffer from impaired cаpacity and their ability to make decisions regarding the conduct of their lives. This is because “[i]t is a fundamental law of statutory construction that statutes that are
in pari materia
are to be construed together, to the end that the legislative intent will be given effect.”
State v. Yager,
Idaho Code §§ 32-106 through 32-108 address the enforceability of contracts involving persons of unsound mind. If a person is “entirely without understanding,” he “has no power to make a contract of any kind, but he is liable for the reasonable value of things furnished to him necessary for his support or
A judicial determination of incapacity and appointment of a guardian is a proceeding in which a judge assesses the caрacity and decision-making ability of an individual and determines whether he or she is generally and consistently incapable of caring for his or her personal needs and financial affairs. Several statutory definitions inform the magistrate court’s determination of competency and, under the doctrine оf pari materia, inform this Court’s interpretation of the statutes at issue here.
First, an “incapacitated person” is one “who is impaired ... to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person ...” I.C. § 15-5-101(a). “Incapacity” is the legal disability of one “likely to suffer[] substantial harm due to an inability to provide for his personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care, or safety, or an inability to manage his or her property or financial affairs.” I.C. § 15-5-101(a)(1). Further, “[ijsolated instances of simple negligence or improvidence, lack of resources, or any act, occurrence, or statement ... [that is] the product of an informed judgment[] shall not constitute evidence of inability to provide for personal needs or to manage property.” I.C. § 15-5-101(a)(3). Rather, a judicial finding of incapacity must be supported by evidence оf “acts or occurrences, or statements which strongly indicate imminent acts or occurrences ... [that] occurred within twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the petition for guardianship or conservatorship.” I.C. § 15-5-101(a)(2). Thus, a judicial finding of incapacity and appointment of guardian must be supported by evidеnce of multiple events that demonstrate the individual’s inability to care for his basic needs, property, and financial affairs, such that appointment of a guardian who is capable of making those decisions in his stead is justified.
These definitions support a plain reading of Idaho Code § 32-108, as does longstanding Idaho precedent. In 1925, this Court approvingly quoted the Colorado Supreme Court’s statement that because one was adjudicated incompetent, her “contract and [] deed were absolutely void____ ‘To compromise a suit instituted to set aside such a void deed is to nullify the statute. It is by judicial decree to inject life and vitality into an instrument which the law imperatively prohibits as contrary to public policy.’ ”
Miles v. Johanson,
This Court recognizes the individual’s interest in the right to contract, and in
Fleming v. Bithell
we held that a summary civil commitment proceeding, as then conducted, was “not a conclusive judicial determination of sanity or insanity, capacity or incapacity.”
However, guardianship proceedings fall directly within the scope of those the legislature intended to be conclusive judicial determinations of incapacity. The magistrate judges handling probate matters have jurisdiction over incapacitated persons, I.C. § 15-1-301(3), and the general definitions of the Uniform Probate Code expressly refer to the guardianship provisions to define “inca
pacitated
Jason urges this Court to overrule
Miles v. Johcmson
by holding that contracts of a person adjudicated incompetent are merely voidable, a position he supports with the assertion that upholding contracts that benefit an incapacitated person is in line with the protective purpose of Idaho Code §§ 32-106 through 32-108. As noted above, statutory construсtion is a question of law over which this Coui’t exercises free review.
Yager,
This Court may not ignore or amend unambiguous statutes; rather, policy arguments for altering unambiguous statutes must be advanced before the legislature. Idaho Const., art. III, § 1;
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund,
B. HLIC is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because it failed to cite the specific subsection of Idaho Code entitling it to an award of fees.
HLIC requests an award of attorney fees on appеal under Idaho Code § 41-1839, asserting that Jason’s claims were pursued without any foundation in the law because of the plain language of I.C. § 32-108 and longstanding Idaho precedent. A court may award attorney fees in any action involving a dispute arising from an insurance policy if it finds “that a case was brought, pursuеd or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” I.C. § 41-1839(4). Although Jason’s claims may be supported to some extent by modern policy considerations that would be properly presented to the leg
islature,
However, if a party claims “a statute provides authority for an award of attorney fees, the party must cite to the statute and, if applicable, the specific subsection of the statute upon which the party relies.”
Bream v. Benscoter,
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s order granting HLIC’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Jason Rogers’ claims, and deny HLIC’s request for attorney fees. Costs to respondent.