JIMMIE ROGERS еt al., Petitioners, v. HOMER E. DETRICH, as Director, etc., et al., Respondents.
Civ. No. 15295
Third Dist.
May 7, 1976
58 Cal. App. 3d 90
Robert Burkholder, Theresa J. Player, J. Kendrick Kresse, Carmen Massey, Loren Mitchell and Susan Weiss for Petitioners.
John B. Heinrich, County Counsel, J. Steven Burris, Deputy County Counsel, John B. Clausen, County Counsel, Harlan Van Wye and Edward V. Lane, Deputy County Counsel, John H. Larson, County Counsel, David M. Ager, H. Anthony Nicklin, Deputy County Counsel, Thomas M. O‘Connor, City Attorney, Kevin M. O‘Donnell, Deputy City Attorney, Robert G. Berrey, County Counsel, R. Rudolf, Mary Gell and William Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.
OPINION
JANES, J.—This mandamus petition is brought by and on behalf of applicants for and recipients of general assistance in the five counties whose welfare departments are headed by the named respondents, seeking review of the hereinafter described eligibility practices of such
In general terms, petitioners contend
Specifically, petitioners assert that the practice of computing eligibility for the amount of general assistance that an applicant-recipient (sometimes hereinafter “applicant(s)“) is entitled to receive under the county prоgram by taking into account income and resources of certain classes of SSI/SSP (hereinafter “SSI“) recipients affects four distinct subclasses of applicants. These are:
Husbands and wives where one of them receives SSI and the other receives or applies for general assistance. - Parents who receive or have applied for general assistance and with whom reside children, adult or minor, who receive SSI.
- Children who receive or have applied for general assistance and who reside with a parent or parents receiving SSI.
- One who receives or has applied for general assistance and who resides with an unrelated SSI recipient.
THE REGULATIONS
San Diego County followed suit on June 19, 1974, with a departmental memorandum, incorporated into the County Relief Guide in August. The San Diego regulation applies only to subclass one, married persons residing together.
On August 15, 1974, Sacramento County revised its General Assistance Manual to include as income for eligibility purposes the SSI grant of thе spouse with whom the applicant resides or of any person with whom the applicant has a “spouselike relationship,” i.e., subclasses one and four.4
The Los Angeles County position is not clearly embodied in a new or amended regulation, but has resulted from application of a new policy to an existing regulation, a practice which is alleged to have commenced on or before January 24, 1975. County Assistance Regulation section 40-101.214 provides that a recipient must apply for any governmental assistance for which he is eligible. The manner in which the regulation, as affected by the new policy, is said to violate
THE PETITIONERS
The individual petitioners are applicants for, or recipients of GA, and members of their families. Each of the applicants is a member of one of the first three categories of affected applicants and a resident of one of the five counties named, and has been denied GA or had his GA reduced because the SSI grant or other benefits of a family member with whom the applicant lives exceeded the income eligibility level for a family unit of that size. Each applicant asserts inability to work because of illness or disability. In most cases, petitioner applicants have applied for but have not yet been granted SSI benefits on the basis of their own status. No individual petitioners reside in Los Angeles County; applicants affected by the regulations of that county are represented herein by the Committee for the Rights of the Disabled (“CRD“).
Petitioners Stempfley, residing together in Contra Costa County, are husband and wife. Husband receives SSI and wife had been receiving a GA grant of $80. Her GA was terminated in April 1974 solely because husband‘s SSI grant exceeded the county‘s standard for two people. Wife‘s only income at present is a homemaker grant of $43 for her husband‘s care. Wife appealed to the department, and then to the board of supervisors, unsuccessfully.
Petitioners Loda Travnicek and Jackie Garaspe, also of Contra Costa County, are mother and daughter and formerly resided together. Jackie receives SSI. Loda‘s GA was terminated while she and Jackie resided together solely because Jackie‘s SSI grant of $158 exceeded the county standard for two people. Loda appealed unsuccessfully to the department and then to the board of supervisors. Because of the financial strain upon Jackie‘s household, Loda moved out to become eligible again for GA, which she now receives in the amount of $91.
Petitioners Christensen, residing together in Sacramento County, are husband and wife. Wife receives SSI of $235. Husband applied for GA in January 1975, and each month thereafter, being denied each time solely because of wife‘s SSI grant. Husband was advised by the department‘s employees that appeal would be futile and thus none was taken.
Petitioners Landry, residing together in San Francisco, are husband and wife. Wife received $112 SSI and $143 Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“SSDI“) (see
Petitioner Perez, also of San Francisco, resides with his wife and fully disabled adult child. Prior to November 1974 the family received AFDC. At that time the child began receiving SSI of $235. The parents then applied for SSI and for GA. In April 1975, the mother was granted $235 SSI because of disability. Perez has not yet been accepted for SSI and was denied GA in December 1974 because of his son‘s SSI. Further application resulted in written denial on the same ground.
Petitioner Talomie lives in San Francisco with her disabled daughter, who receives $213 SSI. Mother‘s application for GA was denied because daughter‘s SSI exceeded the county standard for two. Appeal to the department failed.
The remaining individual petitioners, the Coans and the Newburys, are husbands and wives, residing together, respectively, in San Diego County. Both Mr. Coan and Mr. Newbury receive $235 SSI grants. Both Mrs. Coan and Mrs. Newbury had previously received GA. Mrs. Coan‘s aid, which had been $119, was terminated in August 1974 because her husband‘s SSI raised the family‘s income level above the county standard for two of $212. Mrs. Newbury‘s GA of $125 was terminated in February 1975 for the same reason.
Petitionеr CRD asserts by way of the declaration of Miriam Gosling, a staff attorney for the Western Center on Law and Poverty in Los Angeles who represents local welfare recipients before the department, that a client of hers was denied GA because the client had had the option of receiving aid herself through the AFDC program, but by applying successfully for SSI for her disabled dependent child had “chosen” to refuse AFDC. This “refusal” to seek AFDC benefits is viewed by the department as a refusal to pursue an available relief resource which, within the meaning of county regulations, precludes a GA grant. Further, the child‘s SSI grant exceeds the county‘s standard for a family of two.
Section 3003, limited to the blind, provided in part after the 1951 amendment: “No person concerned with the administration of this chapter shall dictate how any applicant shall expend the aid granted to him. All money paid to a recipient under this chapter is intended to help him meet his individual needs and is not for the benefit of any other person. Aid granted under this chapter shall not be construed as income to any person other than the blind recipient.”
In 1949, as is essentially still the case, California welfare programs fell into two groups. The categorical aid programs and the general assistance prоgrams. The first group included the so-called adult aid programs and AFDC, programs administered by the county under the supervision of the state, in which the federal government defrayed a large portion of the costs. (County of L. A. v. Dept. of Social Welfare, supra, 41 Cal.2d 455.) The second group were and are funded and administered solely by the counties, although the county, in doing so, is at all times acting as an agent of the state. (Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 678-679 [94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231].)
The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, in 1949, adopted the policy that the grant of an aged or blind recipient would be considered as income in determining a spouse‘s eligibility for GA. Several affected applicants sought review before the State Social Welfare Board, but while their “appeals” were still pending thе county filed an action in mandamus challenging the jurisdiction of the state agency to interfere in matters which were allegedly the sole concern of the county. The superior court denied the writ and the county appealed. While this appeal was pending (County of Los Angeles v. Dept. of Social Welfare (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 827 [250 P.2d 716]), the state board completed its hearings and issued its order that the county immediately discontinue the practice of treating any part of grants to the aged and to the blind spouses of GA applicants as income available to such applicants. The state board made findings which provided, inter alia, that those grants were for the use of the aged or blind recipient alone.
The Supreme Court held, as had the trial court and the appellate court, that the state board had no power over county administration of GA programs, and more importantly, that absent any statute to the contrary, a county was not precluded from viewing as family income the grant made to one of the spouses as aid to the blind or to the aged. (Id., at pp. 458-459.) The court noted the passage of the statutory and constitutional amendments regarding the prоhibition of such treatment of grants made as aid to the blind, and footnoted Los Angeles County‘s termination of the challenged practice, insofar as aid to a blind spouse was concerned, after the effective date of the amendments. (Id., at p. 459.) Also pointed out by the court was the Legislature‘s failure to enact proposed legislation which would have added to the code, in regard to aid to the aged, language comparable to that of section 3003. (Ibid.)
In 1957, the Legislature enacted section 2017 which clothed aid paid to the aged with the same protection given aid paid to the blind by the 1951 amendment to section 3003. (Stats. 1957, ch. 260, p. 912.)
In 1963, both sections, 2017 and 3003, were superseded by sectiоn 439 which provided: “All money paid to a recipient or recipient group as aid is intended to help the recipient meet his individual needs or, in the case of a recipient group, the needs of the recipient group, and is not for the benefit of any other person. Aid granted shall not be construed as income to any person other than the recipient or, in the case of a recipient group, the recipient group.” (Stats. 1963, ch. 43, p. 654.)
Section 439 was re-enacted in 1965 as
Analysis of the various amendments reviewed above reveals the Legislature‘s intent to insure that aid paid (1) is for the individual needs of its recipient, (2) is not for the benefit of any other person, and (3) shall nоt be viewed or treated as income available to any other person.6 To treat one person‘s aid as a reason to deny eligibility or to reduce assistance to which another is entitled amounts to defiance of the legislative proscription.
Our construction of
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS
Respondents initially challenged the exercise of our original jurisdiction, contending that there is no showing of urgency or of statewide public importance. Recognizing the similarity to recent California welfare litigation we issued our alternative writ but declined to grant temporary stays sought by petitioners. The answers and returns filed raise no significant dispute with respect to the factual presentation of petitioners.
Respondent directors make five contentions in addition to the jurisdictional challenge. They argue that this is not properly a class action in regard either to petitioners or to respondents; that the overwhelming economic burden that would result from granting the relief sought compels its denial; that there is a fatal nonjoinder of defendants (i.e., that the vital defendants are the members of the boards of supervisors of the affected counties); and that
Several of respondents’ contentions may be disposed of summarily. The separate Los Angeles challenge is clearly meritless. The standing of welfare organizations to prosecute actions on behalf of recipients is well settled. Individual Los Angeles recipients need not be named as petitioners; participation of the Committee for the Rights of the Disabled and of its president, Warren Moss, is appropriate. (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953]; California League of Senior Citizens, Inc. v. Brian (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 443, 448 [110 Cal.Rptr. 809].) Further, the State Department of Benefit Payments is not a necessary party to this action. The policy challenged here is not a state policy denying benefits to a parent and one disabled dependent child where the child loses its dependent status upon receiving SSI, but to a county policy which denies GA to such parent.
The rule of stare decisis is a complete answer to San Diego‘s claim that petitioners’ action must fail because of nonjoinder of all the state‘s counties. We are here called upon to construe an act of the Legislature; the final decision of an appellate court in the exercise of that function is binding throughout the state, (See People v. Hallner (1954) 43 Cal.2d 715, 720-721 [277 P.2d 393].)
Class Action
Respondents urge that this is not a proper class action, either as to petitioners or respondеnts. Our conclusion on the claim of nonjoinder of all counties disposes of the contention as to class respondents. We hold this a proper class action as to petitioners. While it is true that all petitioners do not rely on the same facts to establish the wrong to them, the wrong in each case is the same—the treating of another‘s SSI as income available to petitioners. Respondents’ alleged wrongdoing varies only in regard to the choice of those SSI recipients whose aid is so construed, or conversely, those GA applicants who are viewed as having another‘s SSI available to them. The tests set forth in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, at page 704 [63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732], are clearly met.
Economic Burden
Arguments regarding financial costs incident to the granting of judiсial relief, where such relief is compelled by law, are properly addressed to the Legislature, not to the courts. (Mooney v. Pickett, supra, 4 Cal.3d 669, 680.)
Respondent directors contend they are not proper parties to this proceeding in that the boards of supervisors for their counties, rather than they, are the only persons enjoined by statute to provide aid to county indigents, and against whom mandamus will lie. (
The gravamen of this proceeding is the alleged violation by the named respondents of
Violation of Section 11005.5
It is evident from the foregoing analysis and discussion that petitioners are corrеct in their contention that the practices of which they
The parties are in accord that the phrase “aid granted under this part [or under
Petitioners’ construction finds support in
Under well settled rules of statutory construction, “‘relative or modifying phrases are to be applied to the words immediаtely preceding them and are not to be construed as extending to more remote phrases.‘” (People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44, 46 [69 Cal.Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675].) The only exception exists where “‘. . . the context or the evident meaning of the statute requires a different construction.‘” (Elbert, Ltd. v. Gross (1953) 41 Cal.2d 322, 326-327 [260 P.2d 351].)
It follows that only the first use of the word “aid” in the second sentence of
Retroactive Relief
Finally, we reject respondents’ contention that retroactive relief is not authorized by law. The question of the retroactivity of entitlement to GA was squarely in issue in the case of Mooney v. Pickett, 26 Cal.App.3d 431 [102 Cal.Rрtr. 708]. The court, at pages 434-436, in reliance upon decisions of the Supreme Court, held that a county‘s obligation to provide relief pursuant to
Let a writ of mandate issue directing respondents to determine eligibility for general assistance аnd the amount of general assistance to which an applicant is entitled without reference to aid, income or resources of SSI/SSP recipients and further, to make such redeterminations and payments as are consistent with the views expressed herein.
Friedman, Acting P. J., concurred.
PARAS, J.—Because I disagree with the majority‘s interpretation of
I
I begin my analysis, as does the majority, with a quotation from the pertinent sentence of the statute. “Aid granted under this part . . . to a recipient or recipient group . . . shall not be considered in determining eligibility for or the amount of aid of any other recipient or recipient group.” It is unnecessary to go any further in search of meaning. The sentence juxtaposes “a recipient or recipient group” to “any other reсipient or recipient group” and simply provides that aid to the former does not affect aid to the latter. Of what “aid” does the statute speak? Of “aid granted under this part, etc.” Why on earth would the statute relate
II
A consideration which fully supports my interpretation arises from the fact that
Former
Former
I don‘t believe it. The Legislature did not act idly; it intended by the change to restrict the meaning and effect of the statute to those types of aid which are included in part 3 (“this” part) of the
III
There is yet further support for my interpretation of
Having expressly given such broad discretion to the counties (see e.g.,
Finding no illegality or impropriety in the eligibility practices of the respondent welfare departments, I would deny the writ.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 2, 1976, and the petitions of all the parties for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied July 28, 1976. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.