*1 pay pay. Kinnamon, basic for his basic pay should be considered Unlike Mr. Mr. implied that it was not purposes certain Pann the same rate pay received of basic (Diver) for and pay purposes, Rigger basic other was in his position as in his (Land) pay”). Taking “additional Mr. therefore Rigger position, because the dive extreme, argument logical to its if a Pann’s pay was not a portion compen- fixed of his (Diver) Rigger assigned diving was not sation, depended but on whether and how particular day, duties on a or he received performed often he certain tasks within his diving assignments in a particular fewer job description. He was thus reassigned than he had received in period time position to a having grade the same time previous period, complain he could pay rate of within the meaning of the pay” that he suffered a “reduction jurisdictional statute, Board’s even though day period. time That is not opportunities his for earning additional means, in pay” what “reduction as the pay were reduced. Board’s decisions on this issue make clear. Mr. Pann also proce- raises a number of correctly The Board therefore construed arguments. dural We have considered as within pay pay dive additional arguments carefully, these they but find § meaning of 5 C.F.R. 531.202. are without merit. Because Mr. Pann did v. Depart- Kinnamon Mr. Pann cites not suffer a reduction in his rate of basic Defense, (1992), ment 53 M.S.P.R. of pay reassignment as a result of his proposition for the that a “special salary,” (Land) Rigger position, we affirm the pay, may part such dive qualify as of an jurisdiction Board’s decision that it lacked employee’s pay. basic The administrative to hear Mr. Pann’s appeal.
judge acknowledged Mr. Pann’s case AFFIRMED. that the Board in Kinnamon had suggest- ‘special salary,’ ed that “some forms of circumstances, certain
under could be con- part pay’ purposes
sidered of ‘basic jurisdiction
adverse action under 5 U.S.C. 7512(4).” However, Kinnamon does not BROWN, Roger Ph.D., W. pay” hold that all forms of “additional Plaintiff-Appellant, pay. “special salary” basic at issue in Kinnamon compensation perform- was ing pursuant various administrative duties 3M, Defendant-Appellee, permanent to a appointment position to University
with Uniformed Services Chemicals, Inc., Air Products Health Mr. Kinnamon argued Services. Defendant-Appellee, position that he had been demoted to the professor substantially at a lower rate of pay, serving posi- basic after a different Revlon, Inc., Defendant. permanent tion-a administrative dual No. 00-1552. administrative/professor position high- at a pay. er rate of basic Based on the evi- Appeals, United States Court of Kinnamon, proffered by dence Mr. Federal Circuit. held that Board Mr. Kinnamon was enti- Sept. 2001. hearing tled to a establish that “special salary” part was a of the full
annual salary position from which he part
had been transferred and thus *2 Grant, Speth,
Maria Crimi Williams & P.C., Phoenix, AZ, Dangerfield, argued plaintiff-appellant. Brobeek, Elacqua, Phleger James J. & Harrison, LLP, Alto, CA, argued of Palo for defendant-appellee, 3M. With him on Allison, Craig the brief were Y. and Mi- Jr., chelle Glady, S. Falkoff. Edward R. PC, and Marty Harper, J. Goodman Raup Phoenix, AZ, joined in the brief. MAYER, Judge, Before Chief CLEVENGER, Cir.1991). Circuit
NEWMAN When a claim covers several Judges. compositions, gener structures either' alternatives, ically the claim is NEWMAN, Judge. Circuit PAULINE *3 anticipated any deemed if of the structures the deci Roger appeals Dr. W. Brown compositions scope or within the of the States District Court sion of United prior claim is known in the art. Titanium Arizona, summary granting of the District Banner, Corp. Metals America v. 778 of invalidity of of Dr. Brown’s judgment 775, 782, 773, USPQ F.2d 227 778 5,852,824:1 Patent No. We United States Cir.1985). Petering, See also In re 49 judgment. affirm the district court’s 676, 682, 133 USPQ 301 C.C.P.A. (CCPA 1962) (a compound 280 de DISCUSSION reference, scribed in a and a claim generic summarily The district court ruled including compound, unpatentable are anticipated that Brown’s was 102(b)); § Slayter, under 35 In re U.S.C. (the 5,600,836 Patent No. United States 408, 411, 47 C.C.P.A. 276 F.2d 125 Century for Turn of the “TOCS” (CCPA 1960) (a USPQ generic summary For of Systems). grant can not art claim be allowed in judgment there must be no material fact species ge describes a within the claimed no reasonable version of mate dispute, or nus). upon rial fact which the nonmovant could Liberty Lobby, Anderson v. prevail. See patents The Brown and the are TOCS 242, 250, 2505, 91 477 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 2000(Y2K)prob- both directed to the Year (1986) (the purpose L.Ed.2d 202 computer programs lem. For where summary judgment is not to procedure year represented by the two was trial, avoid an deprive litigant of a but to “99,” digits there was concern about unnecessary only trial when there is one year in programs whether 2000 the outcome). grant The reasonably possible year would differentiate between the summary judgment invalidity of is re of cata- 2000 and with forecasts applied by on the same viewed standard strophic consequences. proposed One so- court, upon appli
the district viz. whether reprogram computer was to into lution cation of the correct law a reasonable trier year it was an earlier than thinking find of fact could for the nonmovant it. was, in reasonably actually year ending material facts and so that a disputed all factual inferences are resolved favor of reached. The “00” would not soon be the nonmovant. patent presented a solution of this TOCS “two-digit years provided as type, wherein Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. adjusted by inputs novelty, lack 102 means change complement a time either value every fact. ele question anticipate, To value,” output while the dates are claimed inven ment and limitation of the Although disput- in local time. it is sented single prior tion must be found art ed, purposes for the of review of this sum- reference, arranged as in the claim. Kar mary judgment accept position Brown’s we ., 242 Mfg. Corp. sten v. Cleveland Golf patent does not teach two-digit year (Fed.Cir.2001); remediation of other than Scripps & Research Clinic Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d dates. Foundation 10, 2000). (D.Az.Aug. Co., No. 99-CV-
1. v. Proctor & Gamble computer represent Not all databases mechanism for the year- year solely by digits; two some date data representations in the data- digits digits databases use three four base file to a two-digit represent year especially newer representation. computer programs. Thus several differ- added.) (Emphasis During prosecution may running date formats on the Dr. Brown identified the TOCS computer system. same The Brown inven- (filed 14, 1995) on November as the closest adjustment programs
tion includes con- reference. taining any systems. such date The district court construed the licensed to com- word “or” in claim 16 as meaning that the pany called Unbeaten Path International *4 capable of converting “only (UPI), that, provided program Ltd. who a two-digit, only three-digit, only four-digit, Brown, according to Dr. year remediated any two-, three-, combination of and computers dates on running applications four-digit Slip op. date-data.” at 9. We two-, three-, containing four-digit year and agree claim, with this construction the by setting dates the computer date clock to it plain reading is the of the claim text. an offset time. Dr. Brown states that the art, These are not technical terms of defendants use this method of remediating do not require interpretation. elaborate data, year by date and that application to There is no basis in the specification or two-, dates, four-digit year three- or prosecution history reading “or” as Brown patent infringed. is “and”—nor Dr. request does such a Brown’s filed May on Dr. reading. 22, 1997, a system claims for setting the computer time, clock applica to an offset Neither party disputes that ble to year records with date data in “at handling year teaches the least one of two-digit, three-digit, or four- in two-digit dates format by setting the digit” representations. Claim 16 is in suit: system clock to an offset date other than 16. An apparatus year- for processing the actual Although date. Dr. Brown ar computer data in a system, gues that anticipate TOCS does not apparatus comprising: larger capability system of the Brown CPU; a conduct four-digit date conver threeand/or CPU; coupled bus to the sion, the TOCS disclosure of two-digit
a memory bus; coupled to the anticipates remediation the Brown two- system coupled bus, clock digit By rededication. claiming his inven system wherein the clock is set to an alternative, tion in the Dr. Brown pre has offset time wherein the offset time is a sented claim for infringement which time; time other than the actual would lie whether or not there were also at least one program offset of three-digit or four-digit year stored in memory being execut- dates. The principle of law concisely is by CPU; ed embodied in the truism that: “That which infringes
a[t]
least one
anticipates
database file stored in
later
if earlier.”
the memory containing
Corp.
Co.,
Polaroid
v.
records with
Eastman Kodak
year-date
1556, 1573,
years being
data with
USPQ
Cir.1986)
by
sented
at
least one
two-digit,
Co.,
(citing Peters v.
Mfg.
Active
three-digit, or four-digit year-date
rep-
129 U.S.
9 S.Ct.
because it does disclose the “mechanism repre-
sentations” limitation.
Similarly, infringe- the test for literal ¶ first,
ment under 6 is whether the performs
accused device an identical func- claim, and, tion to in the if the one recited re INLAND In STEEL COMPANY. so, whether the accused device uses the structure, same materials or acts found No. 00-1143. the specification, equivalents. their Appeals, United States Court of Co., Ltd., Elec. v. Nintendo Gen. Federal Circuit. 1913-14 system A made accor- Sept. 2001. dance with the TOCS would not literally infringe the '824 it because not perform
would the function of convert-
ing three-digit four-digit Therefore,
sentations. because it would later, infringe
not it cannot anticipate
though earlier.
Moreover, the burden of proving pat *6 anticipated particularly high
the prior art was before the examiner dur
ing prosecution application. Hew
lett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb USPQ2d 1525,
909 F.2d Brown cited the
TOCS as a reference to the examin
er in his patent. his '824
Had the examiner believed that the Brown alternative, was claimed in the he
would expected imposed be to have a re
striction requirement, rejected ap Instead,
plication. claims, he allowed the
which use the term “or” in practical way claiming
common-sense the single
invention of an with multiple
inter-related functions. This is not say
that the patent might not inherently missing
disclose the limitation in the or that the Brown
might obvious, not be held invalid as
even might that Brown unpatentable
not “useful.” But neither parties nor