Roger McMaster v. Cabinet for Human Resources

Before NELSON, WELLFORD and Judges, COHN, District Judge.* COHN, District Judge.

I. This is an pursuant to 42 U.S.C. claiming violation of §§ sub- stantive because of mali- pen- Also involved are dent state claims for and, apparently, for defamation and inten- tional infliction of mental distress. Appellants (one deceased), plaintiffs be- low, worked for the Human Resources, a Kentucky agency responsible part for the juvenile care of delinquents. Following highly publicized death of a juvenile under questionable circumstances, * Cohn, Honorable Avern ting by designation. United States District Michigan, Court for the Eastern District of sit-

519 they suspended were “for personnel cause” on Janu- board as pro- the institution of 18, 1983, ary pursuant grounds to the ceedings; rather, they argue they procedures Ky.Rev.Stat. set forth required were under statutory scheme 18A.095; 1, Ky.Admin.Reg. 101 1:120 through to follow process §§ on a already 3, suspension and 7. Their of letters also Thus, instituted they defendants. char- announced their dismissal effective Febru- acterize the act of dismissal as the institu- 1,1983. ary regulations, Pursuant to state tion of a malicious go on to 3(3), Ky.Admin.Reg. 1:120 they in- characterize appeal defendants’ to the state pre-dismissal statutory right voked their to circuit court as the proceed- continuation of depart- have their counsel meet with their ings probable without cause. (plaintiffs ment head themselves chose not Defendants moved for dismissal or sum- present) to persuade be to him to revoke mary judgment on a variety grounds, of the decision to dismiss. He declined to do including Eleventh immunity, Amendment so. judicata, res estoppel. collateral statute, plaintiffs Pursuant to the then district court ruled that the mere dismissal appealed personnel to the state board seek- of employees, state despite statutory ing Ky.Admin.Reg. reinstatement. providing procedure scheme for dismis- 1:130. Plaintiffs’ action was for “reinstate- sal, does not constitute the institution of ment,” not a final on determination their Thus, proceedings. the district court ruled dismissal. Plaintiffs that their concede dis- they failed to a claim state for mali- missal an act complete itself without prosecution. Alternatively, the dis- any approval required by person- the state trict court held that section 1983 personnel nel board. The state board ruled claim was under Kentucky’s time-barred 29, 1983, awarding on June analogous one-year statute pay. reinstatement and full back After the personal actions, injury Ky.Rev.Stat. personnel state board plaintiffs, ruled for 413.140, they since failed to file their (plaintiffs’ defendants employer—also action year within one of their dismissal. “appointing known as the authority” under Garcia, 261, See Wilson v. 471 U.S. the statute —and agents various state al- 1938, (1985); S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 254 Mulli leged conspired to have plain- to dismiss Hazard, gan (6th Cir.1985). 777 F.2d 340 tiffs) appealed to the state circuit court as appeal Plaintiffs dismissal of the section allowed statute. circuit court 1983 substantive due process claim based personnel 6, affirmed the board on October prosecution. on malicious They have not argued their section equal protec- 1985 or 15, 1984, plaintiffs On June brought this appeal. They tion claims on dispute do not action in the federal court for district that the properly district court could Kentucky claiming Eastern District of bad pendent dismissed their any, state conspiracy faith to They dismiss them.1 after the federal claims were dismissed. alleged that because their dismissal was Gibbs, See United Mine Workers v. pursuant to an administrative scheme for 715, 1130, U.S. 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 218 dismissing employees, state the dismissal (1966). itself was the institution of Plaintiffs never ultimately proce- them that claimed denial of terminated in quintessential process their favor—the dural due element for and concede that defend- actions for complied ants statutory proce- Plain- with the tiffs do not appeal characterize their to the dismissing dures for them. Nor have 1. Plaintiffs concede that an to the state could make a determination of whether their personnel only remedy cause, board was to dismissal was without an ele- challenge reject and that ment of their section argument. claim. We this have claimed violation the federal civil principle It sounds of the ill-fated Nevertheless, plaintiffs laws at the outset. Patsy ar- exhaustion of state See remedies. gue required pursue Regents, all their Board 102 S.Ct. (1982); filing state claims before only in federal Pape, since 73 L.Ed.2d 172 Monroe v. 365 U.S. personnel the state board and circuit court 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1983), claimed substantive S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d 349 it is operative violations based on the act of abundantly clear that have failed apparently framed dismissal. Plaintiffs state a claim for malicious analogous to their claim as one malicious under section 1983. attempt pre- in an avoid Kentucky’s one-year

clusive effect stat- III. limitations, already ute of which had effec- tively barred claims on and mea- based A. operative sured from the act of dismissal some sixteen months earlier.2 only While the we review parties

of the federal the none II. theless discussed the section 1983 claim throughout in analogy terms of to the com parties agree points. The on several mon law tort of malicious First, they agree that state tenured em- Section 1983is a creature of federal statute interest, protected by ployees have an the depend and does not for its existence on Constitution, retaining United in States the definition of similar state causes of jobs compliance the fun- absent with Supreme action. Court in reaffirmed requirements process. of due damental Garcia, supra, Wilson v. that federal law agree prosecution They also that malicious and not purposes state law is relevant for case, may, appropriate support in an a sec- characterizing of a section 1983 claim. 471 prosecu- 1983 tion action and that malicious 268-71, U.S. at 105 S.Ct. at 1943-44. may apply tion to the of institution adminis- Nonetheless, where a section 1983 claim is proceedings, trative rather than the narrow essentially deprivation of civil applied only that the tort common-lawview through prosecution, malicious look to we strictly judicial proceedings. They fur- common prose law elements of a malicious agree Garcia, ther supra, that v. Wilson judging cution in claim the merits of the requires in a federal court a section 1983 Dunn, supra, section 1983 action. See analogous action to look to the state cause (adopting F.2d at 125 n. 4 definition of personal injuries of action for to ascertain prosecution malicious of state in which applicable the of statute limitations. Last- arose); claim Lucsik v. Board Educ. agree of ly, they of that relevant of statute Dist., Brunswick School 621 F.2d Kentucky required plain- (6th Cir.1980). 841, 842 file section tiffs 1983 claim one within year of accrual of their cause of action. The elements of malicious Kentucky are: disagree parties

While the about when (1) of orig- statute limitations commenced runn the institution or continuation ing,3 judicial proceedings, need not decide issue. we this Con inal either or civil struing complaint favorably plain criminal, discipli- or of administrative or tiffs, considering (2) nary proceedings, by, must in a motion to as we or at the in- dismiss, Gibson, stance, Conley plaintiff, (3) v. see U.S. of the the termi- 45-46, 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 nation of such in defendant’s (1957); Tennessee, (4) favor, Dunn v. State malice in the institution of such (6th Cir.1982), proceeding, F.2d cert. denied or (5) want lack of Dunn, Wyllie proceeding, (6) sub nom. cause for the judgment dismissing ground 2. The court's district filed at an earlier date. We our limitations, case failed to asserted state a decision not on the statute of but 12(b). claim. basis Fed.R.Civ.P. technical plaintiffs’ rather on failure to state a claim. plaintiffs’ for dismissal was that action was barred the relevant statute of limitations. argued 3. Defendants to the district court that suggests that had filed a This the relevant date is the date of sal, dismis- dismissal, they measured from the time of their might plaintiffs argued while for the date the state spec- have stated a claim. We need not personnel circuit court affirmed the board. ulate as to whether cessfully could have suc- type stated some other of claim had upon of the conduct damage as a result based suffering of directly judi- proceeding. the defendant that results quasi-judicial cial or conduct Drasin, (Ky. S.W.2d Raine plaintiff. correctly point Defendants out 1981). prose- malicious Because the tort of machinery did set the law, the at common cution was disfavored merely by issuing statute motion maintaining the action are prerequisites for dismissing plaintiffs. letters The statute “strict.” Id. regulations place the burden on em- judicial ex variety A wide ployees adversely who are affected to in- related to law and ecutive-branch actions legal machinery guaranteed voke support a its enforcement will cause statutory employer scheme.4 The where action for charges against employee not file “economic injury “person” there is merely required to forth the set reasons in some sense. See W. Prosser livelihood” suspension for the dismissal or in a letter Keeton, & W. The Law Torts § employee.5 The stated reasons must (5th 1984). Defendants concede 890-91 ed. scrutiny only employee withstand if the jurisdictions Kentucky and other statutory process by request- invokes the rejected a distinction between administra ing hearing appealing a and to the state judicial quasi-judi or proceedings tive personnel board and circuit if neces- Am.Jur.2d, proceedings. Mali cial See sary. 7, 191, 20, at 198 Prosecution at cious § § (1970). The relevant issue in this case is only by plaintiffs case cited proceed what constitutes the institution arguably supports position is Hardy ings. Vial, 577, (1957), v. 48 Cal.2d 311 P.2d 494 upheld employee’s which a state for claim instituting The test for prosecution malicious where the defend (also “initiating” variously as or described conspired charges ants had to file false “instigating”) proceedings is whether resulting disciplinary hearing a and dis machinery defendant “sets the of the law differ, however, motion_” Hardy missal. does not May First Nat’l Bank of ordinary instigation from the rule that the Gardner, (Ky. v. 376 S.W.2d field filing charges proceeding or actual to a 1964) (First) (quoting Restatement of Torts support a cause of will action malicious (1938)); comment a accord Seidel Here, plaintiffs were effec Greenberg, N.J.Super. 260 A.2d tively dismissed under the statute without correctly note Plaintiffs charges any proceeding. the need for or variety may that a wide of conduct consti “institution,” “initiation,” or “insti tute the argument Plaintiffs’ would stand the law proceedings, gation” of both under Ken prosecution By on of malicious its head. tucky generally. law and the common law plaintiffs’ reasoning, successfully chal- Keeton, supra generally Prosser & See lenged wrongful joba dismissal from sub- 871-73. bargaining agreement, ject to a collective convincing example, support only sup- do not offer would Plaintiffs exists, employer for their standard claims or port, nor do we think such both, also a claim for mali- prosecution will lie union or view that employee in- way prosecution because the a defendant acts in a that re- cious where judicial proceedings voked internal administrative or quires plaintiff to institute compen- proceedings for reinstatement or rights. vindicate his The tort of mali- Board, synonyms. die words are See Goss v. Personnel Goss v. Personnel 456 S.W.2d 4. See Sermonis, discharged Board, (Ky.1970) (noting King supra; that it is the 822 employee see also proceedings Thus, al- who "initiates" (Ky.1972). the sometime use S.W.2d 652 statute.) by the lowed regulations "charges” word in the of the appoint- not convert the dismissal letter regulations use both the words "reasons” 5. The (i.e., employer) ing authority into the institu- "charges.” Kentucky Supreme opin- Court legal proceedings. or initiation of tion interpreting clear that ions the statute make it Similarly, every rest, incarceration, charges sation. successful def- of violation support parallel amation case Dunn, (ma- would of non-traffic supra laws. See prosecution for malicious arrest); cause licious following plaintiff Lucsik, because the also entitled supra (suggesting to insti- incarceration proceedings injury tute contempt may give redress to his for civil rise to section reputation. alleged). Also, 1983 claim malice recognized courts that have that malicious Malicious relates to resort to prosecution may support a section 1983 procedure for purposes. abusive Where a virtually claim are holding unanimous in conduct, plaintiff complains of other even protection that constitutional only exists requiring plaintiff conduct to institute respect with to criminal proceedings to reverse the effect of a de- proceedings. not to civil M. Schwartz & J. conduct, plaintiff fendant’s must assert Kirklin, Litigation: Claims, Section 1983 premised directly a cause of action on the 3.6, and Fees at 50 & n. 6 Defenses underlying conduct. (1986); Nahmod, 3.10, see also S. supra, § (collecting cases). at 155 181-82 nn. B. past, In the recog we have declined to probative While it analogous nize a section 1983 claim to mali prose failed to state a claim for malicious plaintiff where the law, finding cution under such a danger “in imprisonment.” never dispositive is not of their Vas section 1983 quez, supra, (allegation 757 F.2d at 773 above, although claim. As noted state law police harassment for issuance of may traffic be considered to the extent it is not citations); Patera, see law, also Bacon v. 772 inconsistent with federal federal law (6th Cir.1985)(no F.2d 259 con purposes characterizing controls for substantive sec protection against stitutional Thus, harassment leading tion 1983 claims. one com through prosecutorial misuse of state’s ma rights litigation mentator on sug civil has results). chinery, employment even loss of gested that courts’ discussion of section Stephens, Garner v. 460 1983 malicious F.2d claims misleads Cf . (6th Cir.1972) 1144 (applying Kentucky law) because it tends to focus on tort-laden ter (noteworthy public employee’s that minology, neglect to the section of constitutional 1983 suspension action for Nahmod, employ from analysis. S. Rights See Civil analogous ment not treated as to malicious Litigation: and Civil Liberties The Law prosecution claim). an 1983, 3.10, (2d Even arrest that Section at 154-56 ed. support will 1986); a state claim for Whitman, law see also Government Re necessarily will not rise Torts, to the sponsibility Constitutional 85 for level of a (1986) constitutional tort (discussing 225 redressable Mich.L.Rev. the inad under section 1983. Bowling, Fiser v. 812 equacy of traditional tort doctrine to decide (6th Cir.1987) F.2d 1406 (dismissing plain involving section 1983 claims conduct tiff’s section 1983 entities). following government However, arrest applica driving intoxicated). for while As we noted principles tion of federal to the same leads Dunn, supra, “Neither the Fourteenth conclusion. designed Amendment nor 1983 were to re The test for substantive due all injuries dress incurred reason of claims whether defendants’ conduct brought unfounded or malicious claims “shocks the conscience.” Rochin v. Cali state court actions.” 697 at F.2d fornia, 205, 96 S.Ct. L.Ed. previously plaintiffs We have measured Because subjected were never section possibility incarceration, 1983 malicious claims they E.g., Vasquez this standard. v. failed to state a for claim violation of sub- Hamtramck, (6th 757 F.2d process. Cir. stantive due simply Dismissal 1985). recognized possi Where have we “shock the conscience.” doWe claim, ble section 1983 Congress circumstances not believe intended section 1983 uniformly apply every have involved situations of ar- claim of dismissal from cause, employment without at The mere fact theory that the is assert plaintiffs point least ed, where can to no other course, does not mean that it has dismissal, invidious reason their such as Conspiratorial merit. termination of the political race or beliefs other status or supposed “property in public interest” em protected by conduct the Constitution or ployment would not constitute a denial of federal statutes. process” “substantive due under any inter pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment foregoing reasons, For the we AFFIRM familiar, with which I am absent in the district court.6 fringement of some right “fundamental” NELSON, plaintiffs have failed Judge, DAVID A. to mention. con- curring. Psychological Illinois Association, et al. Falk, al., Marshall et 818 F.2d fully agree I disposition with the court’s (7th Cir.1987); Brienen, Brown v. prosecution” I of the “malicious (7th F.2d Cir.1983), 366-67 368-69 separately my write to state views on cer- (Flaum, J., concurring). tain issues that the court did not reach. plaintiffs Even if the could per- somehow opinion suggests “plain- court’s suade us that might once have had a tiffs claimed substantive due [have not] justiciable process” claim, “substantive process violations operative on the based however, I believe the claim would be act of dismissal.” The com- barred. explaining Before why, I shall however, plaint, alleges which employ- pause to invite consideration of the reme- Kentucky’s ees of for Human Re- dies that were available to the sources, acting law, under color of state point when the dismissal from their willfully maliciously conspiratorial- jobs effective, became bearing in mind ly dismissed the from their state procedures concession that fol- jobs knowing that just there was no cause lowed not constitu- so, doing appears to me to have been tionally defective. intended to assert pro a “substantive due type recognized cess” claim of a Russell appealed admin- Harrison, (5th (as 736 F.2d istratively did), Cir. and could have 1984), and Housing Authority, Barnett v. persuade tried to Personnel 1571, 1577(11th Cir.1983). 707 F.2d As the Board that there no cause for the plaintiffs brief, state in opening their dismissals Kentucky under law. Alterna- “[t]he plaintiffs’] manner of tively, they dismissal from brought could [the have a civil employment their clearly rights violated the re action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and § quirements of process.” substantive due persuade have tried to a federal or plaintiffs repeat The this claim in the next state court that the dismissals were in vio- paragraph of their brief: “the Defendants lation of federal provisions constitutional maliciously conspired together ... to termi interpreted, that have been Judge as Cohn nate protected property indicates, prohibiting inter as state [Plaintiffs’] action that * * * patent est. This was violation of a “shocks the conscience” judge by of the requirements the pro of substantive due whom the heard. Such an § cess.” action would have to stand or had fall on brief, simply 2). 6. hearing There is no to argument need discuss election of plaintiffs’ at The preclusion, suggested by remedies or claim hearing as appeal, counsel at the on their as well concurring opinion the post-hearing Punton, and as discussing discussed in the as their brief Seattle, opinion divided they rely Punton make opera- clear that do not on the — (9th Cir.1986), denied, F.2d 1378 cert. tive act of dismissal state a claim. Their -, narrowly L.Ed.2d 527 drawn claim was an obvious effort to grounded explicitly Plaintiffs here pleading their section avoid itself, an on the act of attack “charges 1983 claim on the fact implicated and termi which would have the Ken- nation tucky actions, personal injury [were] initiated statute of damages should, them supra pp. without cause. The see We 519-20. and sought and majority opinion, relief same as in respect the other do in the the narrow- (Plaintiffs’ post- plaintiffs’ malicious action.” ness claim. proposition the that the dismissals filing consti- by 1983 action less than one § year, pro- tuted a denial of allegedly wrongful “substantive while the dismis- cess,” say and it is fair to that at that sals occurred year more than one before least, stage, plaintiffs’ filed, chances of action was § wrongful prevailing in on that dismissal claim obviously a suit based “durable would oxymoron,” Judge it, by be barred the statute of as Posner has called limitations un- persuaded less the courts could be to ac- would be next to nonexistent. cept the malicious theory. The plaintiffs surprisingly, Not elected order, district in a preliminary stated bring not to 1983 action at the time of that “the court cannot see that the action is dismissal; they their took an administrative one for prosecution.” malicious The court appeal to the Personnel Board nothing saw argument, different after oral appeal, instead. contested the Cabinet judgment entered a final determining lost; Personnel but Board ordered that that “this action not meet the essen- plaintiffs jobs restored to be requirement tial of a pay “be awarded back and emoluments type and, therefore, 1983 action this ac- suspensions from the date of their until tion is barred the Statute of Limita- reemployed....” Cabinet Human plaintiffs Insofar as the tions....” appealed Resources the Personnel Board’s contending that pro- their “substantive due Court, decision to a as cess” had been violated the dis- law, permitted by Kentucky again. but lost themselves, missals I believe that the dis- towel; The Cabinet then threw in the al- trict court concluding was correct in though appealed higher it could the action was barred the statute of court, it not to. chose limitations. Only after the had thus conceded If one were to conclude that the “con- plaintiffs defeat did the file their action tinuing misconduct” somehow tolled the Now, it, under as saw limitations, statute of I believe there is argument had an additional that the Cabi- why another reason judgment conscience; net’s conduct shocked the ought district court to be affirmed. The only discharged had the Cabinet them with- plaintiffs having pursue elected to cause, maliciously out it had defended law, administrative remedies under state plaintiffs the dismissals after the appealed, having received the full measure of it maliciously appealed had the order of relief to those which remedies entitled reinstatement entered when i.e., reinstatement pay— with back them— won appeal, their administrative and it had concepts familiar preclusion of claim would maliciously pursued its until the cir- prevent suing from for the cuit court affirmed the reinstatement. The additional sought million dollars here for depict thus tried to the Cabinet as anguish, injury mental reputation, legal having engaged in a continuum of mali- punitive damages. That, fees and Ias read misconduct, magni- of constitutional it, teaching is the clear Punton v. of tude, that did not end the until Seattle, (9th Cir.1986), 805 F.2d 1378 of cert. — fight losing abandoned the after its denied, U.S. -, in the Circuit Court. (1987), 95 L.Ed.2d 527 and the decisions cited therein. (or theory continuing This of misconduct prosecution,” “malicious as have Punton was a case where a Seattle po- it) might chosen to thought label be not lice officer who had been dismissed from only to add some semblance of muscle to job his took appeal, an administrative won plaintiffs’ process” “substantive due reinstating an order him pay, with back also, courts, accepted by to brought and then a in federal § solve the one-year of statute seeking damages court for emotional dis- problem. judg- Because the attorney tress and Ap- fees. Court of ment of Circuit Court peals affirm- for the Ninth Circuit held that the ing the order preceded judgment of reinstatement recovered in the plaintiff city af- Summary judgment for the complete to the re- a bar court was state preclusion. of claim firmed on basis supplemental relief under covery any ****** 1988: § initially proceed “Punton’s election Supreme no Court case “We have found splitting a court amounted to in the state merely litigation holding that because an of action as well as of his cause advantages strategy perceived and start, At the he of remedies. election adequate in federal court a more award in directly federal proceeded have alternative, per- make it an attractive reinstate- 1983 claim for court with a § can aggrieved by son official state action general damages. ment, pay, and back colorably remedy that satis- abandon a Instead, chose to seek the relief he first in the state court process fies due of law pay in the and back reinstatement recovering substantially he after what court. state contrary, Migra lost. On the has not have clusion effect claim cannot be state up offensive intended to not der the of state created al that claim grievance court tial but barred court under Community “Punton “It “We claims * * necessarily follow. (9th Cir.1986). mandamus action which relitigation of the claim recently held state incomplete relief was highly * * litigated his preclusion brought pursuant case now permit state court vindication collateral and therefore College judgment. of his 1983. Clark represents that he could originating barred property interests to set * * unlikely that partial recovery un- arising from a state District, in an estoppel * * § His 1983 claim employment v. Yosemite * his * point claim California for feder- in federal Congress substan- granted * * F.2d pre- whereas: missal—a dismissal distinguish argument, hearing state federal Education, F.2d 1378 at structs to the ^[892] In a they did procedural Warren cation of their istrative vigorous ly aware from of law and den than would “McMaster rest court held that complaining —violated supplemental at 898 procedural due their claim on a more narrow not receive a full and fair City School District Punton on the oral proceeding. As due assuming 465 U.S. reading [79 1381-83, passim. argument, claims in the state contrary.” process, have been the officer’s state L.Ed.2d 56 King in brief Officer effected without a ^[75] the briefs [sic] process rights, ground that the Appellants sole- or further that filed this action carried under Punton, Punton’s dis- attempted greater (1984)], in- after Board Court and the adjudi- admin-, denied S.Ct. area bur- oral and are police officer in charged his pay. application to the F.2d 81 Commission, “Another instructive case ^[******] job, Cohen acquitted after (3d Cir.1984). The commission awith reinstated City Philadelphia, crime, discharged from Philadelphia who was municipal Civil Service trial, without back is that of a upon a collateral the same as cution action. ^[******] damages termination them without attack-type proceeding, i.e. a rights by having and relief were denied substantive proceedings initiated other malicious probable cause. sought is charges prose- [sic] pursu- prosecution action A malicious Cohen had or not found that whether of state requires exhaustion he ant to burglary for which participated resolution remedies and successful police de- acquitted, he had violated of the one remedies favor lending money to a those state partment rules making (Emphasis the claim.” thereupon sued superior officer. Cohen plaintiffs.) court, alleging a 1983 claim. in federal think, might point, I plaintiffs have a willing to concede that their solely rested on the claim 1983 action

that the Cabinet for Human Re-

sources violated their constitutional

by maliciously defending position its plain-

administrative that the discharge

tiffs initiated after their

maliciously prosecuting a first-level reinstating

from the administrative order pay. plaintiffs with back

have made no such concession their com- brief, however,

plaint opening or least as them, supplemental

I read and the brief

quoted going above does not strike me as To the extent far either.

plaintiffs contend that the dismissals them- unconstitutional,

selves were it is immateri- they are

al whether claimed to have been procedural process

unconstitutional on

grounds or on substantive due

grounds; Commonwealth of

having jobs, restored the to their proceed-

as demanded in the administrative

ings themselves elected to

initiate, the order of reinstatement bars recovery, including recovery additional compensatory punitive damages or on distress, repu-

account of emotional loss of

tation, legal expenses gain- incurred in

ing reinstatement. Dixon, Barbourville, Ky., John C. pe-

titioner. Bd., Dept,

Benefits Review U.S. of La- bor, Kusic, O’Neill, Marta J. Michael Office Solicitor, Labor, Dept, Wash- D.C., ington, respondents. HIX, Petitioner, Elmer MERRITT, Before MARTIN and WELLFORD, DIRECTOR, Judges. Circuit OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS and Labor, Department

United States Re WELLFORD, Judge. spondents. Hix, Appellant Elmer min- a former coal No. 86-3611. er, applied in 1975 for benefits under the Lung Black Benefits Act. The claim was Appeals, United States Court of initially denied, but was later reviewed un- Sixth Circuit. der the liberalized standards of the Black Submitted June 1987. Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977. The July Decided (AU) Judge Administrative Law found

that Hix years had established nine of coal employment, mine rather than the fifteen AU, nevertheless, years ap- claimed. The

Case Details

Case Name: Roger McMaster v. Cabinet for Human Resources

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 29, 1987

Citation: 824 F.2d 518

Docket Number: 86-5606

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.