*1 § 2.702, right prior to the seller’s of and where all tor is subordinate lienholders satisfied, Furthermore, fully have been if the Court seller’s claim reclamation. priority against will be afforded right status as power deny its to the seller’s utilizes buyer’s general the unsecured reclamation, creditors. adequately protect it must of Furthermore, hold we that such a seller’s by granting interest the seller’s the seller’s priority proceeds will extend that are priority expense as an administrative goods. traceable to the We therefore re- securing the claim a lien. 11 U.S.C. holding the District verse Court’s as to this § 546(c)(2). Thus, post-Samuels, new the remand, point. however, last We for a bankruptcy right code deals with seller’s finding factual to whether O’Sullivan perfected equivalent of reclamation as to a diligently right exercised its of reclamation. security interest under Article Nine.19 See finding That is essential to a determination § Finally, Report 363. the House U.S.C. However, of this case.21 the District Court Congress intended to extend indicates clearly granting correct in Westside right proceeds: reclamation to the of priority to interpleaded first the fund. however, right pow- to the is PART, AFFIRMED IN IN REVERSED deny the reclamation and er of PART AND REMANDED. protect by granting pri- the seller him a ority expense as an administrative arising the his claim out sale of of goods. 372, Report, supra, at U.S.Code
House 1978, (em- Cong. p. & Admin.News 6328. Roger HANDLEY, L. Plaintiff-Appellee, § added). Hence, 546(c) phasis we see that reclaiming was intended to allow the seller priority against proceeds claim20 INDIANA & MICHIGAN ELECTRIC goods from the sale of the when Court CO., Defendant-Appellant. goods chooses not to return the them- No. 82-5694. Clearly “preferen- selves. constitutes United States Court Appeals, of against buyer’s general
tial treatment Sixth Circuit. unsecured creditors.” Texas UCC See § 2.702 comment 3. 8, Dec. 1983. April Decided 1984. Conclusion Rehearing Rehearing and En Banc foregoing, all the On the basis of Denied June 1984. goods has
we hold that where a seller diligently right asserted its of reclamation requirements otherwise met structure, Lazadis, (mere bankruptcy supra, Under the 21. See note 16 fact that a most inter- 19. right party have a to rescind under ven- property except ests in the debtor’s are cut off— interests, dor’s lien is not tantamount to election to exer- security judgment perfected liens right). cise that order for O'Sullivan to re- against, which have been levied certain reclamation, right priority tain a under its nondischargeable By providing debts. diligently right. must have exercised that trustee’s interest subordinate to the seller’s is unclear whether O'Sullivan record could have reclamation, right bankruptcy the new code goods. demand on TEMI for return made right a sense elevated the has in of reclamation clearly While the letter Westside states that it it, level of these other to the interests because 2.702, pursuant telegrams § is a demand too, filing is not cut short bank- payment only. to TEMI made demand for On petition. ruptcy remand the District Court should determine whether O'Sullivan could have made such a By providing grant that the trustee must no, demand on TEMI. If the answer is then the priority expense, as an administrative he seller Court must determine whether District Westside granting effect the seller the to be is in fiduciary stood as a of TEMI when O’Sullivan paid from whatever assets remain. See 11 first it, supra made demand on n. so that demand U.S.C. 507. on Westside constituted demand on TEMI. *2 “pilot daily log house sheet” showed barge Handley on which was in-
jured picked up had Virginia. been in West Virginia Handley While still West waters in trying pull “barge hurt his back barge wire” aboard a with the assistance of *3 (I M) one other seaman. The defendant & corporation principal is an Indiana with its place Virginia. of business West Act, brought action was under the Jones 46 (1976)1 general U.S.C. 688 and the mari- law; subject jurisdiction time matter is ad- mitted. The district court found that it had personal jurisdiction over I & M and award- damages Handley following ed a non- jury appeal trial. On the defendant ac- 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., knowledges that Rule any controls review of the merits of the solely case and it seeks reversal on its personal district court lacked Pinney, argued, Graydon, B. Head John Ohio, Cincinnati, Ritchey, John R.S. I.
&
Adams, Brooking
&
Stepner,
Brooking,
A.
Ky.,
defendant-appellant.
Covington,
for
This court has dealt with the issue
Lawrence, argued, Coving-
Meredith L.
personal
jurisdiction
nonresident
of
over
ton, Ky.,
plaintiff-appellee.
for
cases,
defendants
a number of
almost
however,
exclusively,
subject
LIVELY,
when
matter
Judge,
Before
Chief
KRUPAN-
jurisdiction
diversity
has been based on
of
SKY,
PHILLIPS,
Judge, and
Senior
Circuit
leading
citizenship. Our
case of this varie
Judge.
Circuit
ty is Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco
LIVELY,
Judge.
Chief
Industries,
Inc.,
1269 rather amendment, Fifth than Fourteenth Amend- fourteenth but the fifth ment. amendment. (footnote DeJames, at 1237-38
Id.
citation omit-
(Gibbons, J.,
mentators. arising person’s: from the interpretation by a number critical of the 4(e) provi- adopts state Rule courts that Transacting any in this 1. business amenability to service of on sions Commonwealth; relating manner of to the as those as well Contracting supply services or 2. See, D. e.g., A. Mehren & von service. Commonwealth; goods in this Adjudicate: A Troutman, Jurisdiction injury by Causing tortious an act 3. Analysis, 79 Harv.L.Rev. Suggested Commonwealth; in this or omission (“... (1966) in enforcement 1123 n. 6 injury in this Causing tortious law, there is federal arising under claims act or by an omission Commonwealth refuse to federal court to for a little reason regular- if he outside this Commonwealth the courts of merely because proceed business, engages in or ly or solicits does claim sitting would not it is state which conduct, persistent course any other Corporations Alien Note, jurisdiction.”); from revenue derives substantial Genuinely A Aggregate Contacts: ren- or services goods used or consumed Standard, Federal Jurisdictional Commonwealth, provided in this dered (1981) (“The most ob- Harv.L.Rev. occurring in this that the tortious long-arm statutes on impact of state vious doing or out of the Commonwealth arises limit the full en- jurisdiction is to federal persistent soliciting or a of business law.”). On the other of federal forcement of sub- or derivation course of conduct Marine, Inc., hand, in DeMelo v. Toche the Common- within stantial revenue support for found F.2d at the court wealth____ amenability is controlled its conclusion that 454.210(b) it clear makes long arm statutes KRS provisions of state (a) federal circumstances set forth subsection respected treatises in two Miller, Fed- exclusive: Wright & A. are courts. See 4 C. and Procedure eral Practice (b) person jurisdiction over When Moore, (1969 2 J. J. Supp.1982); & 312-13 section, only a solely upon this based Moore’s Thompson, Lucas, H. Fink & C. enumerated arising from acts *6 4.32[1],
Federal Practice fill 1[3] against him. may asserted 4.41— this section be (1982). attempted prove that Handley to causing the arose from I & M’s his claim II. Kentucky, in injury by an act or omission A. in recited KRS 454.- the circumstance provi- Act does not contain 210(2)(a)3. barge The Jones He testified that the wire I M was process, and & sion for service of pulling out of the river when which he was Kentucky long arm pursuant to the served injured might have fallen over he himself in this case However, The manner of service statute. Kentucky in waters. board jn plaintiff followed the issue. The Kentucky” is not proof of this “act or omission of the arm stat- provisions best, to” “how and did not estab speculative was Kentucky secretary of state of and the by preponderance ute of the lish this fact copy complaint of the to promptly sent a rules on a chal When a court evidence. Ken- portion of the hearing the defendant. The after lenge personal jurisdiction setting forth the tucky long arm statute evidence, considering a mo opposed nonresident affidavit, under which a plain circumstances supported by an tion Kentucky forth may served are set be demonstrate the exist tiff’s is to burden 454.210(2). (KRS) jurisdiction by Revised Statutes supporting of facts ence v. relating to claims for tortious provisions Welsh of the evidence. preponderance 454.210(2)(a)l-4: Gibbs, injuries are found KRS conten 439. There is no 631 F.2d at of con Handley’s claim arose out tion that (2)(a) may exercise A court in Ken- tracting supply goods or services di- person who acts jurisdiction over tucky I & M and is clear that did not actions in federal courts. When a federal Kentucky by an hearing cause act or deciding and a federal Handley somewhere else. omission was question problems case there are no Virginia. injured in West Thus neither “coequal sovereigns.” That is a Four- (2)(a)4 (2)(a)2 applies. subsection nor teenth Amendment concern which is not present in actions founded on federal*sub- appears to The district court have relied Thus, stantive law. in our due 454.210(a)(2)l finding on KRS analysis present light case in the ruling In oral on the de- Kentucky arm statute we bewill dismiss, fendant’s motion made after all only concerned with whether the district in, proof the district judge was said: jurisdiction unfairly assertion of I evidence shows oper- think the I requirement burdened & M with company ations of this are more or less litigating in an inconvenient forum. up continuous and down the river and talking about ... a we’re failure to take III. practices certain action on and certain people the crew and go the boats do A. the river up through Kentucky and down Kentucky long arm statute is Kentucky byor and I think suffi- that’s permitted intended to reach to the by limit cient. the Constitution. Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, Thus,
B.
en v.
311 U.S.
61 S.Ct.
KRUPANSKY,
Judge, dissenting.
Circuit
342,
(1940).
assertion litigating in requirement of
I M & with the case at inconvenient forum”. long-arm stat-
bar, relevant on non-resi-
ute limits service the non-resi- arising from to claims
dents within its of business
dent’s transaction
geographic boundaries. the as- the record evidences
Here from the accrued out
serted cause of action non-Kentucky negligence state de-
cf proximately caused
fendant which plain- to a
outside of the state never had
tiff was not and been a who
resident of that state. case,
Accordingly, from facts of this apparent pursuant invoked not have been
could long-arm I
Kentucky’s statute. would judgment vacate the of the court
therefore the case for dismissal
below and remand
for lack of GASKIN, INC., AND
TAYLOR
Plaintiff-Appellee, INDUSTRIES,
CHRIS-CRAFT
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 80-1387. Appeals,
United States Court of
Sixth Circuit.
Argued Sept. 1983. April
Decided
