This аction concerns the enforceability of deed restrictions. Plaintiffs and defendants are property owners in the Hickory Knolls Subdivision. The deed restrictions provide that all buildings in the subdivision are to be restricted to residential, single-family use. Defendants, however, seek to construct three one-story оffice buildings on two of the lots in this subdivision. The front of these buildings would face plaintiffs’ adjoining lots. Defendants, under the zoning ordinance, are required to build a six-foot wall along the border separating office use from residential use. Defendants’ proposed site plans provide for parking along this wall. Plaintiffs brought this action seeking a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from developing their lots as office sites.
The trial court upheld the restrictions and issued the permanent injunction plaintiffs requested. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a change in the character of the subdivision. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of the issues the Court of Appeals found unnecessary to address.
I
Hickory Knolls Subdivision is triangular and consists of 45 lots. The subdivision is bounded by Telegraph Road on the east, Franklin Road on the west, and Hickory Grove Road on the south. Lots 1 through 12 are accessible only from Telegraph Road and comprise the eastern side of the triangle. Each of lots 1 to 12 is vacant, except lot 2. Until *348 1971, no commercial development occurred on any of the lots in the subdivision. However, in 1971, the residence on lot 2 was converted to оffice use. There has been no objection by the residents of the subdivision to the use of the building on lot 2 as an office.
In 1956, the subdivision was zoned for single-family residential use. In 1968, Bloomfield Township changed the zoning on lots 1 to 12 to the O-1 classification, limiting construction to office buildings and prohibiting the construction of single-family residences.
In 1974, the easterly 54 feet of lots 7 and 8 were taken by the Michigan State Highway Department to widen Telegraph Road to six lanes with right and left turn lanes at some corners, leaving lots 7 and 8 with a depth of approximately 146 feet from Telegraph Road. According to the highway engineеr who testified at trial, curb cuts for driveways onto Telegraph Road would have to be 20 or 30 feet wide. Deed restrictions require a dwelling to have a minimum living area of 1,200 square feet, or two floors of 800 square feet each, and prohibit any building within 10 feet of a property line.
Across from the Hickory Knolls Subdivision, on the other side of Telegraph Road, is the Hickory Grove Subdivision, a residential area. There is a berm separating this subdivision from Telegraph Road. The area along Telegraph Road north of Franklin Road is zoned for office development and consists of several office buildings. The land along Telegraph Road south of Hickory Grove Road is vacant for some distance.
Plaintiffs argue that the deed restrictions should *349 be enforced because the restrictions constitute a valuable property right and because there have been no changes in the subdivision to render enforcement of the restrictions inequitable.
Defendants contend that the restrictions are unenforceable because it is illegal (due to the rezoning) and impractical to build residences on lots 7 and 8. Defendants further contend that the character of the subdivision has changed so that it is inequitable to enforce the restrictions, сiting factors such as rezoning, the use of the building on lot 2 as an office, the evolution of Telegraph Road, and the condemnation of 54 feet of lots 7 and 8 for the widening of Telegraph Road. We are not persuaded by these arguments.
II
Deed restrictions are property rights. 1 The courts will protect those rights if they are of value to the property owner asserting the right and if the owner is not estopped from seeking enforcement. 2
Defendants argue that it is impractical to build residences on lots 7 and 8. They contend that a residence cannot be economically built or sold and that the deed restrictions will require the lots to remain permanently vacant and useless. 3 Plain *350 tiffs’ witness testified that there is always a market for any property with appropriate price adjustments and lots 1 through 12 could be sold as residential lots.
Economic impracticability does not itself justify lifting building restrictions.
4
Plaintiffs purchased their property, in apparent reliance on the deed restrictions, and defendants were on notice of the restrictions when they purchased their lots. This Court has long recognized that such restrictions create valuable property rights. "The right, if it has been acquired, to live in a district uninvaded by stores, garages, business and apartment houses is a valuable right.”
5
In
Cooper v Kovan,
"Home owners seek, by purchasing in areas restricted to residential building, freedom from noise and traffic which are characteristic of business areas. How much in dollars the peace and quiet of this neighborhood is worth, or how much the contemplated major business invasion would diminish that value, would be hard to establish. But it is clear in our mind that residential restrictions generally constitute a property right of distinct worth.”
The change in zoning does not support defen *351 dants’ challenge to the validity of the deed restriction. If, as the defendants contend, the property as restricted is substantially valueless regardless of the zoning, then it is the deed restriction and not the zoning which brought about the loss of value.
Even if the zoning were relevant, it is well established in this state that a change in zoning cannot, by itself, override prior restrictions placed in deeds. 6 Zoning laws determine property owners’ obligations to the community at large but do nоt determine the rights and obligations of parties to a private contract. These are separate obligations, both of which may be enforceable. 7
Defendants next argue that the character of the subdivision has changed so that enforcement of the restrictions would be inequitablе. In support of this claim, defendants cite factors such as rezoning, the use of lot 2 for business purposes, and the *352 evolution and widening of Telegraph Road. However, the restrictions will not be lifted unless the character of the subdivision has changed in such a way as to subvert the original purpose of the restrictions. 8 Because the character of the subdivision has not so changed, defendants are not entitled to relief on these grounds. 9
A change in zoning is not sufficient evidence of a change in the character of an area to require lifting residential restrictions. In
Brideau v Grissom,
We are also unpersuaded that use of one of the 45 lots for office purposes so changes the character of the subdivision as to render the restrictions *353 inequitable. This structure was built as a residence and previously used as suсh, although now it is used for business purposes. The use of this building for office purposes has not materially changed the character of the subdivision. The subdivision has remained substantially residential. 11
Likewise, the evolution and widening of Telegraph Road does not justify lifting the restrictions. The widening of Telegraph Road has not changed the character of the subdivision. The subdivision is still substantially residential. Similarly, the evolution of Telegraph Road into a business district has not rendered enforceability of the restrictions inequitable, because the subdivision has not lost its character as a residential area. "The fact that substаntial changes in the character of the neighborhood outside of the subdivision have taken place does not make it inequitable to enforce the restrictions.”
12
Furthermore, as this Court said in
Redfern Lawns Civic Ass’n v Currie Pontiac Co,
*354 Although there has been a change in the character of Telegraph Road, this change has not subverted the purpose of the residential restrictions so *355 as to render enforcement of the restrictions inequitable. 14
We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of the issues regarding laches, waiver, and interpretation of the deed restrictions, which it found unnecessary tо consider.
Notes
Cooper v Kovan,
Jones v Schaffer,
The defendants might have been entitled to compensation for the entire value of lots 7 and 8 if the condemnation substantially destroyed the value of those lots.
In
Mack Outer Drive Improvement Ass’n v Merrill,
"Even if it were impossible for defendant to use her lots for residential purposes, which appears to be the case in so far as lot 225 (owned by third pаrty) is concerned, it does not follow inevitably that the restriction should not be enforced.”
See, also,
Monroe v Menke,
Signaigo v Begun,
Brideau v Grissom,
While defendants assert that there is authority for the proposition that valid zoning extinguishes deed restrictions, they cite no case law which supports this proposition.
Lamb v City of Monroe,
The weight of authority is that zoning does nоt override deed restrictions. See cases collected in 26 CJS, Deeds, § 171c(2), p 1181 ff.; 20 Am Jur 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, § 277, p 837 ff. Because defendants provide no reason to doubt the validity of this rule, it is not appropriate to reconsider it. If this issue were properly raised and supported by argumеnt, it would be necessary to consider whether a rule permitting zoning regulations to override deed restrictions would be prohibited by US Const, art I, § 10, "No State shall * * * pass any * * * Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts”, and whether the Legislature, in delegating zoning authority to municipalities, also delegated the powеr to override private deed restrictions.
We make no finding regarding the legality of the zoning ordinance because that issue is not presently before us.
Scott v Armstrong,
In
Bohm v Silberstein,
Brideau, supra, p 668.
See
Scott v Armstrong,
" 'The true rule seems to be that, even after 1 or more breaches, equity will grant relief if the restriction can be shown to be of value to complainant, and such breaches have not resulted in a subversion of the original scheme of development resulting in a substantial, if not entire, change in the neighborhood.’ ”
In
Boston-Edison Protective Ass’n v Goodlove,
Monroe v Menke,
"The only equitable consideration in the case at bar appears to be *354 the undesirability of using the lots in question for residence purposes. On this point it may be оbserved that there must of necessity be a dividing line somewhere. The original subdividers made no provision for possible business lots along Grand River avenue. It is inevitable that all lots on the fringe of a residential district may, with the changes of the surrounding neighborhood, become a buffer, between the residential arеa and a business or commercial area. It is one of the factors inherent in considering the nature and value of such property. To lift the restriction under consideration, here on the lots in question would only cut down this desirable residential area and create another buffer area. To permit the dividing line to be moved in the case at bar thereby creating another buffer district, now composed of both residences and vacant property, does not present sufficiently strong equitable considerations.”
Similarly, in
Bohm v Silberstein,
" '[T]hose owning property in a restricted residential district or neighborhood, and especially those who have their homes there, and been led to buy or build in such locality by reason of restrictive covenants running with the land imposed upon the street, block or subdivision in which they have purchased, are entitled to protection against prohibited invasion regardless of hоw close business may crowd around them on unrestricted property, provided the original plan for a residential district has not been departed from in the restricted district, street or block, and the restrictive requirements have been generally enforced, or accepted and complied with by purchasers.’ ”
Defendants rely on
Klug v Kreisch,
In
Lemmon,
because of the size of the lot after condemnation, it was not physically possible to erect a residence complying with all of the building restrictions. See
Mack Outer Drive Improvement Ass’n v Merrill,
While if there had been a " 'complete change in the character of the neighborhood, so as to defeat the purposes of the covenants and to render their enforcement an inequitable and unjust burden on the owner of the lots, * * * equitable relief [would] not be granted, and the plaintiff [would] be left to his remedy at law’ ”.
Moore v Curry,