103 So. 237 | Miss. | 1925
The case was submitted to the jury on instructions for the respective parties. Appellants' contention is that the trial court erred in refusing their request to direct a verdict in their favor. In considering whether a directed verdict should have been granted, every material fact which the evidence tends to prove, either directly or by reasonable inference, should be taken as true as against the part complaining at the action of the court in refusing to direct a verdict. It is true appellee's evidence did not tend to make out a case under the principle that where a contract between a real estate broker and his principal specifies the terms on which the land is to be sold, the broker is entitled to his commission when he produces a purchaser ready, able, and willing to buy upon the terms specified. But we think it did tend to make out a case under the principle that where the terms of sale are not specified and the actual sale is made by the principal, the broker nevertheless has performed his duty and is entitled to his commission provided he produces the purchaser to whom the principal sells.
It is a well-established principle of law governing the obligations and rights of real estate brokers and their principals that where the terms of the sale are not specified in the contract between the principal and the broker *604
and the actual sale is made by the principal, still the broker has performed his duty when he produces a purchaser to whom the principal sells. This principle is recognized in Cook v.Smith,
Appellee did not make a strong case by his evidence, but we are of opinion that nevertheless it was sufficient to go to the jury. Appellee's evidence tends to prove, we think, directly and by reasonable inference, that he performed his contract with his principal in producing a purchaser to whom the principal sold.
Affirmed. *605