(After stating the foregoing facts.) "While the judge, upon a hearing of a writ of habeas corpus for the detention of a child, is vested with a discretion in determining to whom its custody shall he given, such discretion should be governed by the rules of law, and be exercised in favor of the party having the legal right, unless the evidence shows that the interest and welfare
*498
of the child justify the judge in awarding its custody to •another.”
Sloan
v.
Jones,
130
Ga.
836 (
Since the mother of the child was dead, the prima facie right of custody was in the father, the defendant in error in this case.
Chapin
v.
Cummings,
191
Ga. 408
(
In
Brown
v.
Newsome,
192
Ga.
43 (
In the present case it appears that Willie Ben Calhoun, the father of the minor child, was in the U. S. Army until August 17, *499 1944, and that np to that time he had made an allotment to his child and the child’s mother. The mother of the child was ill from the time of his birth, and died July 16, 1945, in New York City. The father took his child from the home of Emma Roebuck, the maternal aunt, on July 8, 1946. From the record it appears that the father’s Army discharge was from the Baxter General Hospital, and was signed by a medical officer. The record is silent as. to the physical condition of the father on his discharge from the Army, or whether he was able to obtain immediate employment. Emma Roebuck testified: That immediately after her sister’s funeral the father asked her for the child and she refused to let him have the child; that on the same date,; and immediately before, the father took the child away from her home, she had talked with the father at the post office in Elberton, and he had said that he wanted to do something about the support of the child, and she had told him that she did not want any support for the child from him, that she had had the entire custody and control of the child almost from his birth, and ever since the death of his mother in 1945, and that she intended to keep it. The father testified: That on several occasions he had attempted to do something for the child in the way of providing necessaries, and Emma Roebuck had refused to allow him to do so, and told him that if the child needed anything she would look after that herself; and that since his discharge from the Army he had asked her to give him his child many times, which she had failed and refused to do.
We think that the evidence justified the finding that the father did not abandon his child; that while he was in the Army the child was eared for by the mother’s sister, since the mother was in bad health; that on the death of the mother the father attempted to obtain possession of the child, but the maternal aunt refused to allow him to have such possession; that the aunt not only did not demand that he support the child, but, on the contrary, discouraged and restrained any attempts he made to provide for him. Under all the circumstances of the case, we think that the father had not lost his parental power by failing to provide necessaries for his child and abandoning his family, as contended by the plaintiff in error, and that the judgment awarding the custody of the child to the father was proper. See
Broxton
v. Fairfax, 149
Ga.
*500
122, 124 (
Judgment affirmed.
