*1
Appellants,
al.,
Planned
Parenthood
Roe et
Appellees.
Region
al.,
et
Southwest
Planned
Southwest Ohio
[Cite as Roe v.
Parenthood
399,
June in a private records of reports nonparties confidential abuse medical discover is entitled plaintiff A issue is whether damages. predicate action related punitive damages seek for a breach of the to report suspected child abuse 2151.421, under former R.C. 2006 Sub.S.B. No. 238. *2 The reports confidential abuse and medical records at issue privileged
{¶ 2} 2151.421(H)(1). per disclosure R.C. 2317.02 and former Redaction of personal, information not identifying privileged does remove the status of the Therefore, records. the reports subject and medical records are not to discovery 26(B)(1). pursuant to Civ.R. We hold that the balancing test Biddle v. Warren Hosp. Gen.
{¶ 3} applies only as a defense to the tort of unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information and does not create a right discover confidential medical records of nonparties private in a lawsuit. addition, 2151.421(M) In we also hold that R.C. affects a right substantive application and its retroactive that, would violate due process and the absence statutory authority, there is no right punitive recover damages under former Therefore, R.C. 2151.421. reasons, albeit for different we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. History
Facts and Procedural The Roes filed against this action Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region Parenthood”) (collectively, others “Planned alleging that Planned Parenthood illegally performed an 14-year-old abortion on their daughter, Jane. The Roes that alleged Planned notify Parenthood failed to them or to secure their consent in advance of procedure and failed to obtain Jane’s informed consent procedure 2919.121, 2919.12, violation of R.C. and 2317.56. The Roes also alleged that Planned Parenthood breached its to report suspected child abuse of Jane in violation of former R.C. 2151.421. plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages injunctive relief. In the fall of when Jane was 13 and in the eighth grade, she began
a sexual with relationship 21-year-old coach, her soccer John Haller. In March 2004, Jane discovered that she was pregnant and told Haller. Haller convinced Jane to have an abortion. He called Planned Parenthood and attempted to schedule an abortion for her. Planned Parenthood told Haller that he could not schedule procedure and that Jane would have make the appointment. conversation, After it, this Haller told Jane to schedule and he also instructed her that if provide number, asked to a parent’s telephone she should give Planned Parenthood his cell phone number in lieu of her phone father’s number. Jane called Planned Parenthood and told an employee that she was 14
years old and that parents her could her. accompany She asked whether her “stepbrother” could come with her. employee asked whether parents Jane’s knew about her pregnancy. lied employee Jane and told the that one both of fact, her parents knew. neither knew. gave employee Jane her father’s address, more, correct name and but she telling lied twice that her employee father did not have a home phone number and then giving phone Haller’s cell number as her phone father’s number. Planned Parenthood scheduled the abortion for March 2004. The
employee told Jane someone would have to stop Planned Parenthood to pick up but that packet Jane did not have to personally retrieve packet. Sometime procedure, before the Haller picked up the information packet for Jane. The Roes alleged they do not know whether Planned Parenthood
called or to call attempted or, did, the cell phone belonged to Haller if it whether Planned Parenthood, Parenthood ever spoke Haller. Planned on the hand, other presented evidence at a hearing Jane had admitted that Planned *3 Parenthood had called Haller’s cell phone number and that pretended Haller had to be Jane’s father and had authorized procedure. the Planned produced Parenthood also the parental-notification form filled out by the doctor who performed procedure. the The form that indicated the doctor had telephonically parent notified John Roe Jane Roe was scheduled for an abortion at Planned Parenthood “no sooner than 24 hours from the time” the given. notice was Haller drove Jane to the clinic on the day procedure.
{¶ the they 11} When arrived, a Planned employee Parenthood requested identification. present- Jane card, ed her school-identification and Haller provided his Ohio driver’s license. They submitted the forms that Jane had filled out to an employee, who noted that Jane Roe’s “brother today.” here paid [was] Haller with a credit card. John — Before the procedure, Jane signed form that set forth the nature and of, purpose with, and the medical risks procedure. associated the One form she signed stated that Planned Parenthood had met its statutory obligation to obtain patient’s informed consent. The alleged Roes if even Jane had been informed, fully age her and emotional state precluded her from comprehending understanding risks associated with procedure. The Roes also alleged that Jane’s consent had not been in a given knowing, voluntary, or intelligent manner and that it had procured been under duress and coercion. Haller ended the relationship soon
{¶ afterward. After the breakup, 13} teacher overheard an argument sister, between Jane and Haller’s a classmate of Jane’s, about Jane, Haller and his with relationship including references to Jane’s sexual relationship with Haller. The reported teacher the suspected sexual abuse to the police. After a criminal investigation, Haller was convicted of seven counts battery. sexual A criminal investigation was also conducted into Planned prosecute did not County prosecutor Hamilton but the culpability, Parenthood’s any statutory violation. Parenthood for Planned from Planned lawsuit, they sought their the Roes filed After 2151.421 and made to R.C.
Parenthood, pursuant of abuse including any reports Planned patients minors who had been nonparty the medical records produced Parenthood Jane’s ten-year Planned during period. Parenthood on nonparties records of the confidential provide but refused to medical records privilege. physician-patient the basis Planned Parenthood moved discovery. to compel The moved plaintiffs trial court followed Richards v. The prevent order to disclosure. protective
for a
nonparty patients’
information redacted from the records
patient-identifying
The court ordered all
and overruled the
plaintiffs’
compel
court
motion to
produced.
granted
specifically analyze
The court did not
protective
motion for
order.
defendants’
damages.
claims for punitive
Roe v. Planned Parenthood Southwest
appeals
The court of
reversed.
414,
Postargument Procedure
counsel for
in this matter on October
Following
argument
oral
i.e.,
127
authority,
recently enacted
the Roes filed a citation to additional
(“H.B.
280”),
April
No. 280
which amended R.C. 2151.421. On
Am.Sub.H.B.
following
we
to brief the
issue:
parties
ordered
(effective
2009)
provisions
April
“Do the
Am.Sub.H.B. 280
and,
so,
if
to this case
what effect do those
have on the issues
apply
provisions
Region,
this case?” Roe Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio
Ohio St.3d
1434,
The Roes’ Claims The Roes have that Planned duties alleged Parenthood breached its notify under R.C. 2919.12 and 2919.121 them of by failing perform the intent an failing abortion on Jane and to obtain their consent to perform procedure. any R.C. 2919.12 from an prohibits person performing upon pregnant, abortion a age unmarried woman under 18 without at least 24 actual notice in giving hours’ or person telephone parents obtaining the woman’s a written parent’s consent. R.C. 2919.121 prohibits person performing upon abortion pregnant minor without the written consent of parent.1 the minor and one Both provide statutes that one who violates this statute may compensatory be liable for punitive damages. The Roes also alleged Planned Parenthood performed proce- dure on without obtaining Jane first her informed consent violation of R.C. 2317.56. The statute that at requires least hours prior procedure, physician meet with pregnant woman in and that person published materials about the procedure given to her. It also requires give that she written consent to the A procedure. person who to comply may fails be liable in compensatory punitive damages. alleged Roes further that Planned Parenthood had reason to
suspect adult, sexually Jane was involved with an but that it did not report relationship, violation of 2151.421. They alleged that as matter of policy pattern and practice, Planned Parenthood not report does known or and/or suspected child abuse with respect to the minors to whom it provides medical services. Laws, II, 3868, afterward,
1. R.C. 2919.121 was
Shortly
enacted
1998. 147 Ohio
Part
*5
challenged
constitutionality.
lawsuit
was filed
federal court that
its
The court
an
issued
order
enjoined
county
enforcing
the state and
pending.
the new statute while the case was
(S.D.Ohio
Serv.,
2005),
then,
F.Supp.2d
Cincinnati Women’s
Inc. v.
937. Since
Taft
upheld
provision
required
consent,
Sixth Circuit has
24-hour informed
but severed the
provision
filing
petition
judicial
bypass
parental
per
limited minor to
one
for a
consent
Serv.,
pregnancy.
(C.A.6, 2006),
Cincinnati Women’s
Inc. v.
exception relevancy order to discover this itself is purposes not sufficient for under Civ.R. 26 when matters are privileged. rely Hosp., The Roes on Biddle v. Warren Gen. if a authority nonparties as to discover the medical records of
plaintiffs outweighs nonparties’ protecting need for the records interest the confidential nature of the records. voluntarily conspiracy
2. The Roes dismissed their causes of action for and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Roes, According publishes Planned Parenthood statistical data on the number of abortions reports performed reports in annual disseminates and the number of abuse made Department of Health and Planned Parenthood Federation of America. the Ohio *6 Because this case involves privileged confidential and
{¶ 29}
information,
Schlotterer,
we review the matter de novo. Med. Mut.
v.
Ohio
¶
181,
Application of H.B. 280 matter, As a preliminary we postargument address the briefs and {¶ 30} whether H.B. may apply retroactively this case. proposition Roes’ first of law plaintiff asserts that a entitled
seek punitive damages for a defendant’s systematic and intentional breach duty to report suspected abuse under R.C. 2151.421. The Roes requested have reports abuse from Planned Parenthood to establish their claim for punitive damages. R.C. 2151.421 places duty on persons special with relationships
minors to report suspected or known
neglect.
2008,
abuse or
In December
280,
General Assembly enacted H.B.
which
2151.421,
amended R.C.
adding
(M)
division
(H),
and supplementing division
both of which may affect the
2151.421(M)
outcome of
if applied
this case
retroactively. R.C.
provides that a
person may be liable for compensatory and exemplary damages for
violating
reporting requirements, and a person who
brings
civil action pursuant
(M)
division
may use reports of other incidents of known or suspected abuse or
neglect, with identifying
redacted,
in that civil action. R.C.
2151.421(H)(1) was supplemented to allow the use of confidential abuse reports
made under that division in a
(M).
civil action brought pursuant
to section
2151.421(H)
(M)
To determine whether R.C.
be retroactively
applied
matter,
in this
we apply a two-part analysis. Ackison v. Anchor Packing
Co.,
¶
228,
120 Ohio
ments were intended to apply retroactively to civil actions on pending act, effective date of April Thus, 2009. H.B. 4. Section they meet the threshold inquiry of retroactivity. We next consider whether the amendments are substantive or remedial. We have held that substantive law “impairs vested rights, affects an accrued right, substantive or imposes new or additional bur- dens, duties, obligations, or Bielat, liabilities as to a past transaction.” 87 Ohio St.3d at 721 N.E.2d 28. Procedural or remedial law prescribes methods of (1984), 9 Dwiggins French obtaining redress. rights enforcement 32, 34, 9 OBR St.3d damages civil any no reference to 2151.421 made Former R.C. (M) provides: now the statute. Division
violating (A) for compensatory this section is liable division “Whoever violates *7 subject of the have been the to the child who would damages exemplary and that was not made.” report (M) of that damages a measure newly punitive enacted division adds plaintiff confirm that a merely clarify It not and not exist. does previously
did for a common-law exemplary damages and compensatory available both had Instead, is akin to a change contend. such of statute as the Roes violation (1981), A D Furniture Co. 68 is Osai v. statutory which substantive. penalty, 328, Thus, that 99, 100, 22 N.E.2d 857. we hold R.C. O.O.3d 428 Ohio St.2d 2151.421(M) would right, application and its retroactive affects substantive process. violate due 2151.421(H)(1) in except limited situations provided Former R.C. here, 2151.421are pursuant of child abuse made R.C. apply reports
that do not the use exception by allowing H.B. created an to nondisclosure confidential. 280 2151.421(M), brought pursuant provided in a civil action R.C. reports of abuse subject report child who is the of the any identifying information about the (M) case, it may retroactively applied not be this redacted. Because division (H)(1), may rely discovery provisions that the Roes not on the because follows (M). Therefore, we only brought pursuant to civil actions to division they apply cause action the version of R.C. 2151.421 effect when the Roes’ apply must for a punitive damages whether a is entitled to seek plaintiff arose determine failure to abuse. report suspected defendant’s
Availability Damages of Punitive under Former R.C. 2151.421 any damages 2151.421 made no reference to civil for a Former R.C. any contend that the absence of mention of violation of the statute. Roes availability damages. They argue not damages preclude punitive does (2001), 92 “liability” Campbell court’s of the word v. Burton interpretation this 336, 341-342, 539, liability, civil criminal St.3d 750 N.E.2d to include and Ohio in Rice v. interpretation “damages” Corp. with the CertainTeed coupled 1217, 417, 419-420, as both including compensatory 84 Ohio St.3d legally recognized They entitles them to seek all relief. also punitive damages, compensatory have to seek both permitted plaintiffs contend courts U.S.Code, 1983, 42, although punitive under Section Title punitive damages in that statute. damages specified Burton, “liability” construed the word Campbell broadly In this court 2744.02(B)(5) 2744.03(A)(6)(c) that a subdivi- political and determined R.C. liability claim under the Political employee immunity
sion and its
could not
R.C.
Liability
perform duty imposed
Tort
Act for the failure to
Subdivision
two,
Id.,
336,
539,
one,
and three
paragraphs
2151.421.
Ohio St.3d
that a
and its
syllabus. Campbell
political
employee
held
subdivision
2151.421,
damages.
for a
but it did not discuss
be held liable
violation
at
we
Corp.,
Rice v. CertainTeed
N.E.2d
in a civil
punitive damages
held that R.C. 4112.99 authorizes an award of
4112.99
action
under R.C. 4112.02. R.C.
employment-discrimination
arising
relief,
injunctive
any
appropriate
for “a civil action for
other
provides
damages,
Rice,
punitive damages.
relief.”
concluded that this
includes
language
We
statutory duty did not exist at common law unless the award is expressly 61, 66, Kleybolte authorized statute. v. 89 Ohio St. 105 N.E. Buffon duty There was no common-law child abuse. The statute that report Therefore, created the does not authorize for its any damages breach. we hold that in the absence of statutory authority, punitive damages are not available under former R.C. 2151.421.
Discovery Reports per Abuse Child R.C. 2151.421 2151.421(H)(1)provides reports R.C. for “the use of of other incidents of suspected neglect proceedings brought known or abuse or a civil action or (M) pursuant discovery to division of this section.” There is no for exception (M) civil types other actions. Because we have determined division retroactively applied, pursuant not be the Roes do not have civil action (H)(1) (M), they may rely division not on amended to discover and use reports of other incidents of abuse this action. 2151.421(H), no for Thus, exception which makes we look to former addition, kind of civil action. In to the extent
discovery of for this reports abuse physician-patient information obtained within the reports that the abuse contain disclosure. This case does not fit privileged that information is relationship, injuries, “a child’s privilege involving exception physician-patient within the * * * report from a abuse, any judicial proceeding resulting neglect 2151.421(G)(1)(b). this case to this section.” R.C. Because pursuant submitted 2151.421(G)(1)(b) Jane, R.C. does report does not arise from a submitted about are confidential reports pursuant these abuse apply. Consequently, 2151.421(H) in this former R.C. and are not discoverable case.
Discovery
Third
of Confidential Records of
Parties
In general,
Roes also seek medical records of
medical
nonparties.
subject to
Hageman
records are confidential and not
disclosure.
Southwest
¶9.
Ctr.,
153,
paragraph
Nevertheless,
improper
but rather the
release of documents.
apparently litigants
information,
have used Biddle to seek
confidential medical
and courts in
nonparty
several
of tort cases
Biddle
types
interpreted
creating
right
have
as
to obtain
nonparty confidential medical information. See Fair v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr.
*9
522, 527,
Kerlakian,
106;
136
App.3d
Ohio
737 N.E.2d
Richards v.
162
¶
823, 2005-0hio-4414,
768, 5;
App.3d
Alcorn v. Franciscan
C-060061,
privileged from medical disclosures of confidential to the tort of unauthorized applies as defense discover the information, not authorize Roes to we hold that Biddle does Planned Parenthood. nonparties confidential medical records will further Ohio’s amici curiae assert that this The Roes and however, note, this case is about children. We public policy protecting Roes only. as to Roe alleged violation of duties Jane Planned Parenthood’s no victims. The case has alleged action on behalf of other have not filed class crimes, and the already Haller has convicted of the implications: criminal been charges against criminal pursue but declined to investigated has prosecutor Parenthood. Planned also public and various amici curiae advance To the extent the Roes records, of confidential medical whether support of disclosure
policy arguments nonparty patient’s right are to overcome a policy such issues sufficient public likewise be addressed confidentiality of medical should has judiciary. Assembly addressed Assembly, not the General General abuse; however, changes those reporting of child Roes’ concerns about the prospectively. law apply
Conclusion
privi-
at issue are
reports and medical records
The confidential abuse
2151.421(H)(1).
and former
Redaction
R.C. 2317.02
leged
per
from disclosure
privileged
not remove the
status of
identifying information does
personal,
subject
Therefore,
reports and medical records
records.
26(B)(1).
pursuant
Civ.R.
185,
N.E.2d addressed *10 ¶ 17. Id. at right of medical information. emphasized patient’s privacy information in the medical to disclose confidential Biddle addressed the of a context defense the tort of unauthorized disclosure. Biddle not does medical in a right nonparties create discover confidential records lawsuit. private
(¶ may pursue private The Roes still their for damages against claims 55} statutory per- Planned Parenthood for violations: Planned whether Parenthood 2919.121, formed unlawful on under and abortion Jane R.C. 2919.12 which authorize an punitive award of whether consent damages, proper Jane’s was 2317.56, under R.C. which authorizes an award of punitive damages, and whether it had report suspected abuse of Jane under former R.C. 2151.421. The Roes entitled to discover Jane’s own medical They may records. pursue matters, of other privileged, reasonably are relevant and Therefore, calculated to lead to the of admissible evidence. for the reasons, foregoing judgment we affirm the the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed. Lanzinger Moyer, C.J., Cupp, JJ., and concur. J.,
Pfeifer, separately. concurs J., part concurs and dissents part. O’Donnell, Donovan, J., dissents.
Mary J., E. District, Appellate sitting Second Donovan, J. O’Connor, J., concurring. Pfeifer, I opinion, concur in the with exceptions, two in the judgment. I disagree majority’s with the to clarify decision Biddle v. Warren Gen. (1999),
Hosp.
St.3d
Ohio
{¶ 2151.421 made no any statute,” reference to civil damages for a violation of the therefore, that punitive damages are unavailable to Roes. I disagree with majority’s decision to discuss Kleybolte 89 St. Buffon N.E. 192. That is not case to reach necessary holding majority reaches. exceptions, join With these I majority opinion.
Cupp, J., concurring. circum- troubling of circumstances. These out Plaintiffs’ claims arise 60}
{¶
his
by abusing
in criminal conduct
engaging
an adult soccer coach
stances involve
who
13-year-old,
relationship
a
with a
having
and
sexual
authority
of
position
this
pregnant through
minor
a
on his
team. When the
became
player
was
soccer
and
He
to have an abortion.
directed
relationship,
coach convinced her
illicit
the
to,
knowledge
the
notice
or
in a
to obtain the abortion without
her
scheme
guided
place
The
took
of,
majority
details.
abortion
parents,
opinion
the minor’s
as the
Region.
Southwest Ohio
at the clinic of Planned Parenthood
their lawsuit
through
now
to
parents
The
of the minor
seek
establish
61}
{¶
breaching its
unlawful abortion
that Planned Parenthood facilitated the
abuse,
a
and
parent
of
suspected
notifying
of
child
statutory
reporting
duties
consent,
informed
of
the minor’s
consent.
obtaining
and
obtaining
To
the
damages.
gather
punitive
The
seek
and
compensatory
Roes
claim,
through
the
also seek
establish their
Roes
needed facts
information to
reports
the
provide
to
abuse
compel
to
Planned Parenthood
this
circumstances of
case
nonparties.
underlying
of
medical records
However,
legal
is
to resolve the
troubling.
duty-bound
a court of law
deeply
it
apply
would
byit
the law the same manner which
applying
issues before
legal
same
issues.
disturbing
involving
law cases with less
facts but
the
the
to
claims
underlying
the
of
reviewing
language
statutory provisions
the
statutory
and the
relief,
language
to “look to the
for
courts are constrained
”
(1999),
Corp.
Rice v.
‘purpose
accomplished.’
to be
CertainTeed
State ex rel. Richard v. Bd. Trustees
quoting
of
of
(1994),
409, 411,
Fund
St.3d
Disability
Police & Firemen’s
& Pension
usual, normal
in a statute must be taken in their
“Words used
* * *
it is
of the court
customary meaning
give
effect
[and]
Richard,
ex
69 Ohio
to insert words not used.”
rel.
words used
not
State
St.3d
No. does plainly for requirements person comply reporting failure with the statute’s not contest that the text of former suspected parties child abuse. also do Instead, damages. of civil explicitly provide recovery does not R.C. 2151.421 for violation remedy criminal as expressly provides penalties the statute 2151.99(A). not R.C. Because the statute does statutory reporting duties. remedy words to judicially permit civil we not insert damages, authorize provide. plainly the statute does analysis applicable is claims for access to the plaintiffs’ The same parties who to this reports persons
abuse and medical records other are not 2151.421(H), action. former effect when the conduct Under version occurred, such and medical are confiden- giving reports raise to this action abuse tial, states, majority provided and as no in the statute for opinion exception Moreover, nonparties abuse the civil reports action. Hosp. 86 Ohio balancing-of-interests test Biddle Warren Gen. St.3d *12 395, 518, two of to paragraph syllabus, unavailing plaintiffs. the is balancing only The Biddle test to applies damages claims unauthorized to release of confidential medical records and not the of restric- circumvention confidentiality tions on the of unreleased records. has, suit, legislature subsequent filing of plaintiffs to the amended
{¶ 66} the to most of that now controlling provide plaintiffs statutes the relief seek from However, this court. be applied those amendments cannot to this case. As the majority analyzes, amendment, opinion correctly the substantive R.C. 2151.421(M), cannot be without applied creating unconstitutional retroactive 2151.421(H), impact, provision, permit and the remedial R.C. which plain- would they seek, tiffs access to the of reports nonparties restrictively abuse is drafted. 2151.421(H) expressly R.C. linked to which provision, may the substantive not be constitutionally applied present to the case. then, In final analysis, plaintiffs the can granted they the results seek
in if only this court we amend judicially the and the child-abuse-reporting patient- physician-privilege statutes disregard or the constitutional on prohibition retroac- legislation. tive substantive so, however, To do would be to across the step line that marks the
boundary authority of that our constitutional system separation powers has allocated to judiciary. step That is we may properly take. I concur. J., concurs in foregoing opinion.
Lanzinger,
J.,
O’Donnell,
concurring
part
dissenting
part.
in
and
in
I concur in
majority’s
While
decision regarding punitive damages
and
confidentiality
reports pursuant
2151.421,
child-abuse
former
I
respectfully dissent from
holding
its
medical
third-party
records are never
26(B)(1).
subject
view,
under
my
Civ.R.
In
this court’s decision in
(1999),
395,
518,
Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp.
86 Ohio
St.3d
N.E.2d
sets forth
an appropriate test for determining
may
when a claimant
discover information
that might
subject
physician-patient
Moreover,
otherwise be
privilege.
the privacy
protect
orders
to enter
authority
trial courts have
circumstances. Civ.R.
disclosed
these
whose records are
patients
interests of
(C).
appeals
court of
26(B)(6)
Thus,
judgment
I
reverse
would
Parenthood to
Planned
compelling
the trial
order
reinstate
court’s
part and
records, subject
order
protective
third-party
medical
disclose
patients.
these
identifies
redaction of
Biddle,
privilege
that the
recognized
physician-patient
this court
“
‘[al-
are not absolute. We reasoned
confidentiality
a physician’s
information],
is a
confidentiality
there
[of
favors the
medical
though public policy
it must
circum-
yield
appropriate
interest
which
countervailing public
” Biddle,
518,
v.
quoting
MacDonald
86 Ohio St.3d at
N.E.2d
stances.’
(1982),
482, 487,
emphasized,
As we further
Clinger
84 A.D.2d
proposition
litigant may
third-parties’
that a
records
compel
26(B).
v.
hospital
to Civ.R.
See Fair
St. Elizabeth
physician
pursuant
Kerlakian,
(2000),
522,
106;
v.
Med.
136 Ohio
737 N.E.2d
Richards
App.3d
Ctr.
823,
medical records disclosure is outweighs confidentiality,” interest in authorizes vailing patient’s interest Litigants trial to balance the interests involved these circumstances. courts 414 right
have a
to liberal
under
Civil Rules of
(1994),
638,
v. Mt.
Med. Ctr.
661-
Procedure. See Moskovitz
Sinai
662,
interest in maintain-
undeniably
635
331. And while
have an
patients
N.E.2d
information,
Rules
ing
confidentiality
provide
of their medical
the Civil
interest,
consistently
we have
trial
safeguard
recognized
means to
and
See,
authority
discovery.
e.g.,
courts’ broad
to enter
orders
State ex
protective
(1999),
11, 16,
rel. Abner v. Elliott
85 Ohio
Trueblood,
held,
safeguards
which
adequate
protect
“[W]here
exist to
the identity
and confidentiality of the non-party patient,
the trial court
allow the
discovery of
non-party patient
patient
medical records even where the
has not
waived
physician-patient
privilege.”
415 subject matter it is “relevant information is discoverable when that the objection for ground and that is not pending “[i]t in the action” involved sought trial if the information will the sought be inadmissible evidence.” discovery to of admissible calculated to lead appears reasonably absence of an regard ruling trial court’s this We should not disturb the (1973), St.2d Ohio Daggett ex rel. Gessaman of discretion. See State abuse Furthermore, trial court 55, 57, N.E.2d 659. because 63 O.O.2d redacted, them protective order ordered the medical records under placed by their Planned violated disclosure by will not be physician-patient Parenthood. majority’s I decision. part from this of the Accordingly, dissent 78}
{¶ J., Donovan, dissenting. of the court of judgment I respectfully I dissent. would reverse 79}
{¶ discovery. My focus compelling court’s order appeals, reinstating thus trial (“H.B. 280”), I find the No. 280 as in this will not be on 2008 Am.Sub.H.B. dissent remedial, view, Roes, in are entitled to my to since the merely amendments be well as trial court under as discovery initially pre-existing, ordered current, actionable pre-existing should be entitled to redress law. The Roes wrong. claims; they should be able to presented cognizable The Roes have 80}
{¶ known, discovery possible, truth must as far as pursue on their claims. “The (1964), justice law case.” v. Antill provide enable the each State 61, 64, majority’s approach 548. The St. 26 O.O.2d N.E.2d the Roes’ effectively rights the standard of review herein eviscerates applied every legal argument. recognize This court should the value possible examine provides. recogni that Civ.R. 26 Without this protective the numerous orders they fully are tion, plaintiffs legal arguments the Roes and other lose before agree majori I cannot with the narrow construction the developed. Accordingly, 395, 715 Hosp. v. Warren ty assigns now Biddle Gen. N.E.2d 518. initial objection discovery, the Roes have the Commensurate with establishing sought. Relevance should be
burden of
relevance
records
started
favoring discovery.
correctly
The trial court
flexibility,
with
approached
records need
premise
suspected
reports
with the
that the
child-abuse
and medical
permit
during
at trial to
examination
necessarily
be admissible
request
making
not a
which the Roes
process.
clearly
This is
situation
relationship
the Roes’
totally
tangential
Even a
between
irrelevant records.
*15
sought
and
lead to
evidence satisfies the
claims
admissible
requirement.
relevance
enjoys
discovery.
A trial
in the
of
regulation
court
broad discretion
Lumber,
518,
Whitt
Ohio
in
The standard of
matters is
abuse of
discovery
normally
review
discretion.
management
While the
of
is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard,
the
of
questions
privilege
questions
of
existence of a
law and are
de
sought
privileged
reviewed
novo. Whether the information
is confidential and
is
question
disclosure is a
of law that
reviewed de novo. This is a correct
in deciding pure question
characterization of the standard of review
a
of law. In
determining
pure legal question,
appellate
may properly
the
court
substitute
However,
case,
of the trial
judgment
its
court.
the instant
pure
the
fact,
legal question
it
has been resolved.
is
the third-
undisputed
party/nonparty records are confidential. This case does
turn
upon
miscon
communication). Thus,
struction or
of
misapplication
(privileged
R.C. 2317.02
view,
my
erroneously
court
appellate
reviewed the trial court’s order
review,
utilizing
very
de novo
and this court’s
recent decision Med. Mut. of
Schlotterer,
181,
release their medical records to their insurer waived the physician-patient
of a civil
brought by
context
fraud action
the insurer against the
physician.
correctly
The court
applied
de novo standard of review to
determine whether the information sought by the insurer was confidential and
Ohio,
privileged.
181,
ty interests in confidentiality, the trial court charged should be* with weighing competing This interests. weighing competing interests is balancing of facts judge’s interests best suited for the trial determination. From policy perspective, application of an abuse-of-discretion standard would be consis- tent with the trial widely court’s recognized accepted discretion to regulate It process. would also consistent with generally recognized trial proposition court is knowledgeable most informed and about the unique of a circumstances case is in and thus the best position evaluate and decide these Accordingly, issues. court the trial should be afforded proper in balancing deference interests at trial competing stake. The court could properly conclude that the Roes’ to seek right redress and need to protect
417 confidentiality by predators outweigh victimized adult sexual children who are court that there is an erroneous suggestion by appellate concerns. The is not true. simply of law de novo review on this record interpretation requiring determination, nor should it be legal interests is not a Weighing countervailing facts, Rather, lead to the balancing as such. it is a which characterized wit, injured by rights, is other outweighed conclusion party’s right to redress. view, in majority, my permit appellate creates new law will is, they their own what judgment opinions
courts to substitute their
—that
—for
as
managing
discovery process by characterizing
would have done in
this case
in
court
a
order.
appellate
one which the
conducts de novo review the
of disclosure” of redacted medical records should be all about a
“propriety
Biddle,
interest,”
to a
construction of
86 Ohio
“countervailing
pursuant
proper
402,
applicability
St.3d at
which necessary protect “disclosure is or further a interest that countervailing 395, outweighs patient’s confidentiality.” interest 715 N.E.2d I paragraph syllabus. two of the conclude that this is one of those “special Biddle, situations.” In this court acknowledged, physician’s report ‘is “[WJhen law, prescribed by made the manner he of course has committed no breach of ” * * his patient liability toward *and no could result.’ Id. at (1920), 224, 228, quoting N.E.2d Simonsen v. Swenson 104 Neb. 177 N.W. However, by liability the claims set forth the Roes are should simply i.e., fulfilled, statutory result when the duties are not opposite injury occurs— results. holds, absolutely nothing There is Biddle that much less suggests,
that the
“propriety
disclosure” should be decided as matter of law. Biddle
only
appellate
was the
case that the
court relied
for this
other
upon
proposition,
than Alcorn v. Franciscan
Mt.
Hamilton
No.
Hosp.
Airy Campus,
App.
C-
¶
060061,
creating
right
that construction to Biddle: Fair v. St.
majority
cited
do not attribute
522, 527,
106;
Richards
App.3d
Elizabeth Med.
136 Ohio
Ctr.
¶
another
serious
136 Ohio
at
patient, sustaining
Fair
of
of
brought
negligence
N.E.2d 106.
and his wife
claims
and loss
(“SEMC”).
524,
against
hospital
consortium
Id. at
frame the privilege
appeal.”
issues for
Id. at
{¶ has
an exception
Court
carved out
in certain
physician-patient privilege
cases, Johnston,
overruled,”
has
it
supra,
been
determined that the facts of
Fair,
the Fairs’ case fell “within the
articulated in Biddle.”
exception
136 Ohio
App.3d
order
30 redacted
granting
action.
ing surgeries performed by
wrongful-death
the doctor
the context of
Richards,
823,
testimonial
communications. The First District
physician
statute,
Court of
noted that the
Appeals
operative reports
protected by
were
it
but
further noted
“the
afforded under R.C. 2317.02 is not
*18
Supreme
protected
absolute. The Ohio
Court has held that the
of such
circumstances,
communications
such
to
appropriate
under certain
as
further a
interest that
interest in
countervailing
outweighs
nonparty patient’s
the
Richards,
823,
{¶ 95} noted, “It First District is difficult to how else the imagine negligent-eredential- claim ing investigated disputed could have been without the documents.” Id. at ¶ Further, 6. the to plaintiffs impeach deposition testimony intended the doctor’s significant with the documents. It was to the First District that the plaintiffs presented impeachment argument specificity. their with Id. The distinguished authority upon First District the which the doctor (Feb.
relied,
13, 1991),
C-89053,
Wozniak Kombrink
1st Dist. No.
1991 WL
case,
17213. In that
the
the
plaintiff sought nonparty
impeach
medical records
court,
of an
witness.
In
of
trial
testimony
expert
reversing
judgment
the
the
the
that
disclosing
patient’s identity
First District determined
the risk of
the
out
weighed
plaintiff
impeaching
expert,
plaintiff
the benefit to the
the
since the
had “less
means to obtain the
information.” 162
App.3d
intrusive
same
¶
patient
psychiatric
¶
Alcorn,
holding hospital may privileged that a disclose otherwise records where ‘disclo- necessary protect countervailing outweighs sure is or further a interest that ” ¶ confidentiality.’ interest Id. at 9. The First District next patient’s law,” subject propriety question noted of disclosure is de novo “[t]he only authority proposition review. Id. The for this of law as noted above was Biddle, which not hold that the of disclosure is a of law. propriety question does “[ajbsent Fair, upon In reliance the First District determined that * * * patient, prevented medical records of the the Alcorns would have been patient’s dangerous from was aware of the proving hospital] proclivities [the a breach of on the prevented establishing part therefore ¶ Id. at 11. court trial court took hospital.” every practical noted beyond measure to ensure that the records would not be disclosed the require- discovery. ments for Id. at 13. hospital argued scope also was too broad.
Again,
question
the First District noted that while “the initial
was a
law,
management
discovery process
solely
matter of
was
within the
*19
¶
Notably,
discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 15.
no abuse of discretion was
¶
in the
of
trial
at
granting
discovery
found
the
court’s
order.
Id.
of the management
discovery process
subject
of the
is
to an abuse-of-discretion
standard,
questions
subject
Cepeda,
while
to de novo review.
¶
sought
billing
defendants’
statements to establish
alleged
the doctor’s
motive to
supplement
by
his income
performing unnecessary procedures
patients
on
with
¶
the doctor’s finances were irrelevant and an
privacy.
invasion of
The court
reiterated,
review the trial court’s
“[W]e
decisions on the
management
discov-
* * *
ery matters
an
under
abuse of discretion standard.
The complaining party
must establish a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion that materially preju-
* * *
party.
discretion,
dices the
Absent
abuse of
an appellate court
overturn the trial court’s ruling
“seek to broaden Biddle’s
holding
apply
any
case where
is sought
disclosure
to aid a private
against
lawsuit
a doctor who has been
malpractice.”
accused of
*20
422
¶
(Black-
added.)
(Emphasis “balancing mon, J., notes that Biddle used dissenting). The dissent can whether a medical records patient’s interest’ test to determine ‘countervailing ¶ a trial dissent that “before argued to third Id. 32. The party.” be disclosed test, court must the trial court and this balancing court apply [Biddle’s] to the According interest is.” Id. specially plaintiff-patient’s define what the dissent, joined understanding has the more relaxed Majority Opinion “the right injured patients to obtain non- judicially Biddle and found a created punish wrong information to patients’ privileged confidential medical party added.) (Blackmon, J., Id. at 34 by patient’s (Emphasis inflicted doctor.” * * * “remedies which would not dissenting). dissenting judge prefers The over what was characterized as the destroy nonparty patients’ privacy” by majority Richards and Fair. “super attorney general” concept espoused Id. it of the dissent in that leads the Perhaps language Cepeda is the
majority interpreted by appellate to conclude that Biddle has been courts as information, creating right reading but a close of these cases privileged the trial courts conducted a proper weighing countervailing reveals right interests and did not find an absolute to confidential records. These courts circumstances, merely special the narrow as should be recognized exception permitted under Biddle. majority The herein overlooks the fact that the documents to redacting children, all patient-identifying (only
remove
information
of those who are
as is
Jane) preserves
purpose
privilege.
privilege
The
should terminate
public peril begins,
plaintiff,
where the
whether uncovered
individual
class
plaintiff, prosecuting attorney,
attorney general.
privilege
should not
yield
reporting requirements
be absolute and should
to the
of the child-abuse-
reporting
privilege
statutes. The
should be construed
it is in
narrowly because
of the search for truth.
derogation
majority
mistakenly
also
relies on Jackson v.
110
Greger,
488,
St.3d N.E.2d (rejecting three-part test for implied attorney-client waiver of articulated in Rhay Hearn v. (E.D.Wash.1975), 574), F.R.D. requiring to reverse the trial court’s order Planned produce majority Parenthood to the redacted medical records. The does in a conclusory suggesting any exceptions physician- so statement patient privilege Assembly are for the General to address. This statement ignores exception that what the Roes seek is not an to physician-patient privilege, privilege. any but redacted records that violate no Once personal records, identifying patients requested discovery is redacted from the will Jackson, physician-patient privilege. involving invade the case the attor- *21 ney-client privilege, does not implicate production the of medical records under protective the order in this case. Jackson, In a client sued her criminal-defense attorney legal
{¶ 109}
malpractice after a court
concluded
the client’s
criminal
guilty plea
the
charge precluded, based on
estoppel,
collateral
her claim under Section
Title
against
city
Id.,
U.S.Code
the
and officers who arrested her.
110 Ohio
¶
488,
previous holding in
that special
Biddle
may
situations
occur in which the interests
of a patient, physician,
party,
third
public may
the
outweigh
patient’s
privilege
protecting his or her
fact,
medical records.
recently, this court
analyzed
favorably
applied Biddle in Hageman v. Southwest Gen. Health
Ctr.,
¶13.
119 Ohio
Jackson dealt with the manner in which the holder of privilege could waive the privilege through his or her own conduct. Biddle and its progeny have not hinged on whether the conduct of nonparty patients rather, waived privilege; these weighed cases the competing interests at stake to determine whether the privileged information should be disclosed. Although the majority concludes that a narrow construction of Biddle nondisclosure,
compels I disagree. by asserted Planned Parent- hood law, derogation of the common which must strictly be construed it. against The Roes have set forth claims that special constitute circumstances necessitating disclosure. The third-party/nonparty’s privacy rights are not invad- ed or imperiled with proper redactions. Redactions can be achieved using (Health the proper Act) HIPAA Insurance Portability and Accountability stan- dards to ensure patient confidentiality. The trial court ordered and can continue every take practical reasonable and measure to ensure that patients’ An additional discovery. requirement beyond will not be disclosed records upon confidentiality imposed order and a of the records sealing is the safeguard parties. confidentiality patient the fact that in all this debate is Lost (And case, in this physician. not the patient, protection is for records of who children, age under the those exclusively about talking arewe permitted not be defendants should exploitation.) victims of sexual thereof) (or lack conduct professional their questioning a civil suit frustrate privilege. asserting physician-patient justified compelling interest record, public private both On this child, Jane, right have the Roes, 14-year-old parents as
discovery. The *22 An statutory duties. injury multiple and breach of claims for multiple pursue to discover opportunity permitted should be plaintiffs or plaintiff individual eye a blind turning a of pattern ignoring that demonstrate may records and/or issue a relation to the may indeed bear direct redacted records child abuse. Such warranting thus x-eprehensible, was Planned Parenthood’s conduct of whether a pattern, such expose the Roes’ lawsuit x-eveal damages. Should punitive of, demanding and accounta- simultaneously by learning a benefit public derives from sexual fail to vulnerable children for, protect who bility providers medical predators. a may present that this case expressed court concern appellate 115}
{¶
for harm
Planned Parenthood
jury may
punish
a
decide to
situation wherein
346,
(2007),
v.
549 U.S.
Philip Morris USA Williams
nonparties.
caused to
See
1057,
clearly
the cart before the
places
{¶ Campbell so, majority suggests doing 2151.421. under former R.C. just 539, damages, not discuss did Burton Laws, II, 3500, 2744.03, Part 2744.02 and and that R.C. liability, of the word interpretation expansive limit the court’s April effective by a section imposed liability only expressly when “liability” to civil conclusion, view, my is this difficulty with Revised Code. The obvious liability political of a 2744.03 address the 2744.02 and revisions of R.C. these brought against not been clearly This case has injury or death. subdivision a private individuals or private are either All defendants subdivision. political Parenthood. Planned corporation, com- there was no concludes that because majority Additionally, abuse, duty, having the statute that created child report
mon-law breach, damages. for punitive cannot allow damages for its authorized explicitly intent first, legislative overlooks the completely this conclusion I believe that vulnerable, amendments, protection to wit: its the statute and creating clearly prevent intent legislative and children. The victimized women *23 crime, and injury, exploitation. further of and characteristics principles basic majority opinion overlooks relation of “liability upon is based It a of torts principle
tort law. is basic (5th Ed.1984) Keeton, 5. “Torts Law of Torts Prosser & with others.” persons law by upon parties and imposed of duties fixed consists of the breach * * * way in a acting for usually tort-feasor is held liable itself.” Id. “The of torts is at 6. law “[T]he standard of care.” Id. from a reasonable departs * * * harmful, unreasonable, from the socially or with acts which are concerned a violation at 7. The Roes assert community as a whole.” Id. of view of the point child, Jane, duty by and the arises both minor owed to them and their duty of to Jane. relationship the defendant’s of law and operation holds, that there is no majority and the argues, Planned Parenthood damages were punitive 2151.421 because damages under R.C. right punitive 2151.99, and the amended sections expressly provided 2151.421(A) of a misde- guilty is Yet whoever violates R.C. unconstitutional. a criminal partakes of wrong When the claimed degree. meanor of the fourth Punitive in a civil suit. nature, justice wrongdoer brought should be public sound justice, upon but concept on some abstract damages do not rest safety which in this instance seeks to and health of children policy, promote encourage reporting importance of abuse. We must take into account the by mandatory a failure to underlying public policy jeopardized reporter’s Morris, Philip As dissent in “There is little report. Justice Stevens noted his sanction, justification difference between the for a criminal such as a fine or and an award of imprisonment, punitive damages.” term Id. S.Ct. 1057,166 J., (Stevens, dissenting). L.Ed.2d 940 It cannot be overlooked that the Roes have also malice and alleged child, disregard rights
wanton for their and those of their minor Jane. In cases shown, in which malice is is a rule so right punitive damages deeply rooted in Ohio law that this court should not permitted exception carve out thereto claims governing brought under former R.C. 2151.421. Punitive damages coin, always criminal, have been two sides of the same which punitive, one of public, and the other of which is in substance civil. private and Criminal statutes should serve as guideposts imposition for the of civil tort duties. Further, 2151.421(G) (H) sections R.C. and the support former finding remedy sections, that a civil for punitive damages is available. These by i.e., a civil recognizing immunity for reporters under the “whistleblowers”— redress, statute —do implication recognize right to civil including punitive damages against mandatory reporters those who fail to known report suspect- reading ed abuse. This recognizes statute that each section should be construed connection with other every part promote or section to a harmonious whole. inquiry Here, The ultimate is to legislative ascertain the intent. intent is to encourage reporting, provide immunity civil for those who make a faith, report good false and also hold liable those who fail in their protect children such as view, Jane who are victims of sexual predators. my this intent was clear even before H.B. presume 280. We should that the General Assembly did not intend the absurd operation results from the of the statute reached by majority, which in effect nonreporters. shields certainly Jane is member the class that the statute is designed to protect. underlying purpose of the statute is to afford her the full panoply of damages civil when a breach is established. A provider, regardless medical the area in which the physician specializes, individual obviously fiduciary has a *24 with relationship patient his or her warranting compliance with the standard of care of all required physicians the medical community large. Although majority abuse, concludes there was no common-law to duty report child always there has abuse, been common-law to report serious crime. Child sexual battery, rape and are serious crimes. majority opinion The rendered today protect does more to the adult Parenthood) (i.e.,
defendants Planned than sexually abused children. The opinion guide to their minor children and protect to parents’ rights undermines likewise and its discretion trial court exercised properly their medical treatment. their claims. Mandato- they might pursue to the Roes so granted discovery The Roes should and demanded. encouraged, expected, must be ry reporting them. the law affords to seek remedies effectively opportunity denied the * * * statute, just A 1.47(C) it that: presumed “In provides: enacting nor reason- just is neither today is intended.” The result and reasonable result able. L.L.P., Gehring; J.
Crabbe, James, Hurley, Brian E. and Robert Brown & Jr., A. P.L.L., L. William Creighton Richard Muething Klekamp, & Keating, L.P.A., White, Co., Miller; Meyer & Getgey M. Posey, and Charles Bunch, appellants. Nicholas E. Thomas, Pease, L.L.P., R. Sater, Buckley, Daniel J. Michael
Vorys, Seymour & Richards, P. Kulewicz, K. Maureen Langsam, K. Dorothea John J. Suzanne Shimmer, Jacobson, for Mahle, T. and Barbara Bison D. Alexandra Tracey, Jacob appellees. E. Deters, and William County Prosecuting Attorney, T. Hamilton
Joseph Hutzel, County Rachel A. Warren Prosecuting Attorney; Assistant Breyer, Chief White, County Prosecuting Donald W. Clermont Prosecuting Attorney; and Deters, County T. Hamilton Joseph for amici curiae Attorney, urging reversal Hutzel, County Prosecuting Attorney, Attorney, Rachel A. Warren Prosecuting White, Prosecuting Attorney. County and Donald W. Clermont Smith, Offices, P.C., K. Kirkpatrick; Law and Joel J. and Mañee Kirkpatrick Congress from the State reversal for amici curiae members U.S. urging Ohio. Law, L.L.C., R. Defense Fund and Langdon; and David and Alliance
Langdon Willke, Shafer, for amici curiae Dr. and Mrs. Jack Jeffrey urging A. reversal Reform, University, for Bioethics at Cedarville Center for Bioethical Center Values, Lawyers for Group, Citizens Media Cleveland Community Citizens for Life, Life, Life, Life, Dayton Right Right Columbus Right Cleveland First, Policy, Institute for Life Issues Family Healthy Beginnings, Principled Voters, Alliance, Institute, American, Christian Mission: NE Ohio Values Ohio East, Alliance, Life, Right Pregnancy Center Prayer Ohio Governmental West, to Life of County, Right to Life of Butler Greater Pregnancy Right Center Center, Cincinnati, Foundation, Touch Sanctity Pregnancy of Life The Reach Out Love, Ministries, Life, County Right Way the World Warren Influencing Women the Nation. *25 Eckler, L.L.P., Sferra, Purdue,
Bricker & Anne Marie and Bridget urging Association, affirmance for amici curiae Medical the Ohio State the American Association, Medical and the American College Gynecolo- Obstetricians and gists. Teller,
Katz, L.P.A., Brant & Hild and Laura A. affir- Hinegardner, urging Psychological mance for amicus curiae the Ohio Association.
Collis, Collis, L.L.C., Smiles, Collis, Terri-Lynne Smiles & B. Y. Elizabeth affirmance for urging Psychiatric Physicians amicus curiae the Ohio Association. Foundation, Inc., Davis, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio L. Carrie Gamso, Jeffrey M. affirmance for amici urging curiae Ohio Chapter Pediatrics, Academy American Academy Family Physicians, Society Medicine, Workers, Adolescent National Association of Social National Center for Law, Law, Youth Center for Adolescent Health & The Ohio Now Education and Fund, Legal Network, Ohio Domestic Violence, Violence Action Ohio Domestic Weave, Cycle, Break The Inc. Engine Corporation, Appellant, State ex rel. International Truck &
v. Industrial
Appellees.
al.,
Commission of Ohio et
Engine Corp.
ex
State
rel. Internatl. Truck &
[Cite as
Comm.,
Indus.
Ohio St.3d
Truck & Engine Corporation prevailed Moritz administratively and at the court appeals, and ITE appealed. has
