JANE ROE v. TYKESHAE FOWLKES TUCKER, et al.
Civil Action No. 3:24CV145 (RCY)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division
June 30, 2025
Case 3:24-cv-00145-RCY Document 80 Filed 06/30/25 Page ID# 745
This is a
I. BACKGROUND
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court exercises great care to resolve any factual disputes and “competing, rational inferences” in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the Local Rules, the Court may accept those facts identified by the movant as undisputed to be admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion and supported by reference to record evidence.
A. Factual Background
1. Overview of Underlying Allegations
Plaintiff Jane Roe is an incarcerated woman who is currently housed by the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC“). See, e.g., Def.‘s Stmt. Undisp. Facts (“Def.‘s SUF“) ¶ 1, ECF No. 36. In 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to the unit where both Defendants were, at the time, employed: Central Virginia Correctional Unit #13 (“CVCU“). Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 7; Roe Aff. 1, ECF No. 46-1. CVCU is classified as a women‘s correctional field unit within VDOC, and, as of February of 2023, housed a total of 112 inmates. Pl.‘s Opp‘n Ex. 4, ECF No. 46-4 (VDOC Population Summary); Fowlkes Aff. Ex. I at 6, ECF No. 36-1 at 150-176.
On December 19, 2020, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by Defendant Okoli, when Okoli followed Plaintiff “into the showers, blocked her exit, pinned her against the shower door, and aggressive groped her breasts and buttocks. He then lowered his face mask and kissed Plaintiff on the mouth.” Roe v. Tucker, 2025 WL 41932 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2025); Def.‘s SUF ¶ 4 (citing Compl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 1); Roe Aff. 3-4. Plaintiff immediately told two other inmates about the assault. Roe Aff. 3-4. However, in the months following the assault, Plaintiff experienced “extreme depressive and anxious symptoms” due to the psychological trauma of the assault, and was placed on suicide watch. Id. at 4. As a result of her psychological symptoms, Plaintiff did not report Okoli‘s assault to CVCU staff until May of 2021. Id. However, Plaintiff‘s May report—made to a CVCU correctional officer named Officer Ross—was mishandled and never relayed to the CVCU Superintendent‘s Office. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 14; Roe Aff. 4-5.
Defendant Okoli began his employment with VDOC in 2012 at Sussex State Prison. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 5; Fowlkes Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 36-1; Fowlkes Aff. Ex. A at 2, ECF No. 36-1 at 13-25. From 2012 to 2020, Okoli received a single infraction for taking unapproved leave. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 8. Okoli had no history of “reprimands or disciplinary actions related to inappropriate conduct or fraternization with inmates.” Id. Upon his hire in 2012, Okoli completed Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA“) mandated training,1 which instructed employees as to the “offender‘s right to be free from sexual abuse and sexual harassment,” as well as VDOC‘s “Zero Tolerance Policy for sexual abuse and sexual harassment.”2 Id. ¶ 32; Fowlkes Aff. Ex. D at 2, ECF No. 36-1 at 47-51. Following this initial training, Okoli passed a PREA “in-service staff exam with a score of 95 out of 100.” Def.‘s SUF ¶ 32. Okoli completed additional PREA trainings each following year, each accompanied by a PREA in-service exam. Id. ¶ 33. Okoli passed each exam with a perfect score. Id.
Okoli applied for a position at CVCU in May of 2020. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 6. At the time that Okoli applied to work at CVCU, the CVCU employment application prompted applicants to disclose if they had ever (1) “engaged in sexual abuse in an institutional setting“; (2) “been convicted of engaging or attempting to engage in sexual activity . . . facilitated by force . . . or
Okoli underwent a performance review for his work at CVCU in October of 2020. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 10. Okoli‘s review was positive. Id. Per VDOC policy, following the review, Okoli was again asked to verify whether he had ever committed or been adjudicated of the sexual abuses enumerated in his employment application. Id. Okoli confirmed that he had not. Id.; Fowlkes Aff. Ex. B at 2, ECF No. 36-1 at 26-27.
Of course, Plaintiff‘s allegations paint a very different picture of Okoli—and the undisputed facts demonstrate that her story is not the only one of its kind amongst CVCU inmates. In June of 2021, other inmates lodged anonymous complaints against Okoli, which led to an institutional investigation against him. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 11; Roe Aff. 4-5. That investigation revealed at least five inmates apart from Plaintiff who had experienced sexual harassment and physical abuse by Okoli, ranging from sexual comments to rape. See generally Mem. Opp‘n Ex. 3, ECF No. 46-3 [hereinafter SIU Report]. Aside from Okoli‘s attack on Plaintiff in December of 2020, Okoli was accused of abuses occurring from February to June of 2021, although several inmates could not provide an approximate date of their encounters. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 12; SIU Report 2-6. The investigation revealed that Okoli‘s assaults on inmates largely occurred in locations known to be surveillance camera blind spots, such as the hallway outside the laundry room.3 E.g., SIU Report 2.
As noted supra, Plaintiff did not immediately report her attack. Id. at 3-4. And, once Roe did report her attack to Officer Ross in May of 2021, he failed to advance the report to the prison supervisors. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 14; Roe Aff. 4-5. In fact, the CVCU Superintendent‘s Office only found out about the allegations underlying this matter in July of 2021, while conducting its previously described investigation into other inmates’ complaints about Okoli. Roe Aff. 5.
After CVCU completed its investigation, it terminated Okoli‘s employment and reported its findings to the Commonwealth Attorney‘s Office. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 13; see Pl.‘s Opp‘n Ex. 2, ECF No. 46-2. However, no criminal charges were brought. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 13; Pl.‘s Opp‘n Ex. 2.
3. Defendant Fowlkes‘s Tenure at CVCU
Defendant Fowlkes began her position as the CVCU Superintendent on October 25, 2017. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 2. While she was Superintendent, Fowlkes headed all operations at CVCU, including PREA compliance procedures.4 Id. ¶¶ 2, 19. As implemented by Fowlkes, all CVCU staff members “receive[d] comprehensive, initial training on prevention, detection, response, reporting, investigation, and disciplinary sanctions related to sexual abuse” at the time of hire. Id. ¶ 21. CVCU staff members then received “annual, mandatory in-service training regarding PREA and5
Emphasize[d] that all VDOC employees are responsible for the detection, prevention, and reporting of known and suspected instances of sexual misconduct . . . . The training highlight[ed] that any staff members who fail to report violations may also be subjected to adverse employment action, up to and including termination of their employment.
Id. ¶ 34.
Prison staff were able to report actual or suspected misconduct “verbally, in writing, or through the established reporting hotline” reachable by picking up any of the facility‘s telephones and dialing #55. Fowlkes Aff. ¶¶ 27, 31. This number was advertised on posters throughout the facility. Id. ¶ 27. Finally, during meetings with CVCU staff and supervisors, Defendant Fowlkes “repeatedly emphasized all employees’ responsibilities under PREA, including the requirement to avoid fraternization, to avoid being in a one-on-one situation with inmates, and underscor[ed] the mandatory PREA reporting requirements for all staff.” Def.‘s SUF ¶ 48.
CVCU underwent regular audits of its PREA compliance. Id. ¶¶ 38-42. From 2015 through 2020, CVCU was found to comply with PREA requirements, and the auditors did not suggest any corrective actions. Id. ¶¶ 38-41. These PREA audits also included reviews of the facility‘s surveillance system, which was found to be “very adequate.” Id. ¶ 38. However, upon arriving at CVCU, Defendant Fowlkes completed an independent assessment of the security cameras’ coverage and discovered the blind spots described supra. Id. ¶ 43. While Defendant Fowlkes “wanted [the blind spots] to be corrected,” she lacked the unilateral authority to order and install additional cameras. Id. As such, Defendant Fowlkes submitted multiple requests for
Nevertheless, “[t]o mitigate any security risk posed by these blind spots,” Defendant Fowlkes promulgated several policies regarding the blind spots:
[W]henever inmates were present, an officer was to be stationed in the areas of the prison that lacked camera coverage, including the hallway outside of the laundry area in the basement. . . . CVCU employees [we]re directed not to spend unnecessary time with an offender of opposite sex when out of range of camera. And, unless there was an emergency, male officers were not allowed to enter inmate bathrooms or shower areas when those areas were occupied by inmates. Even when clearing those areas during rounds, male officers had to make a verbal announcement prior to entering.
Id. ¶¶ 45, 47. These policies were reinforced through verbal instruction to staff members at the beginning of every shift. Id. ¶ 47.
Defendant Fowlkes‘s final day as CVCU Superintendent was December 25, 2020, when she was promoted to Warden at a different facility. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 3. However, she performed monthly rounds and completed CVCU paperwork as needed while her successor, Rebecca Young, transitioned into the role. Id.; Fowlkes Aff. ¶ 7. Rebecca Young finalized her transition sometime between March and May of 2021.5 Fowlkes Aff. ¶ 7; Roe Aff. ¶ 4.
Throughout her briefing and attached affidavit, Defendant Fowlkes firmly contends that she had no actual knowledge nor reason to know of Okoli‘s predatory behavior, Okoli‘s particular assault upon Plaintiff, or Officer Ross‘s mishandling of Plaintiff‘s initial report. E.g., Def.‘s SUF ¶¶ 14-17; Tucker Aff. ¶¶ 12, 14, 18, 33, 52.
Proceeding under a pseudonym, Plaintiff Roe filed the instant case against Defendants Fowlkes and Okoli on February 29, 2024. Compl., ECF No. 1. Both Defendants were served with the Complaint on March 5, 2024. Summons, ECF No. 12; Summons, ECF No. 13. Defendant Fowlkes filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 26, 2024, Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 16, and an Answer on September 27, 2024. ECF No. 28. Defendant Okoli never appeared, and on September 25, 2024, the Clerk entered Okoli‘s default. Clerk‘s Entry Default, ECF No. 25. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on January 7, 2025. Mem. Op., ECF No. 33; Order, ECF No. 34.
Defendant Fowlkes filed the instant Motion on January 21, 2025. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 35. On February 11, 2025, Roe filed her Memorandum in Opposition.6 Mem. Opp‘n, ECF No. 46. On February 21, 2025, Fowlkes filed her Reply in Further Support of Fowlkes‘s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Reply“). Reply, ECF No. 57. On March 3, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the instant Motion, during which it heard argument as to the existence of a genuine issue regarding Defendant Fowlkes‘s knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s predation.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The relevant inquiry in the summary judgment analysis is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual
Furthermore, to defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, “mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another,” or the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” concerning a material fact. Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Accordingly, to deny a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he disputed facts must be material to an issue necessary for the proper resolution of the case, and the quality and quantity of the evidence offered to create a question of fact must be adequate.” Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat‘l Cable Adver., LP, 57 F.3d 1317, 1323 (4th Cir. 1995). “Thus, if the evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, it may not be adequate to oppose entry of summary judgment.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is important to remember that a motion for summary judgment does not alter the parties’ ultimate burdens; therefore, a movant may properly demonstrate that summary judgment is warranted simply by demonstrating that the non-movant will not be able to discharge its burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (“In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant Fowlkes moves for summary judgement as to Counts Two and Three7 of the Complaint. In support, Defendant Fowlkes argues that Count Two cannot lie against her as a matter of law. Def.‘s Mem. Supp. 15, ECF No. 36. As to Count Three, Defendant Fowlkes chiefly argues that the undisputed record demonstrates that she was ignorant of any misconduct by Okoli or others during her tenure at CVCU. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff argues that, as a factual matter, Fowlkes had actual and constructive knowledge of her subordinate‘s conduct. See generally Mem. Opp‘n. The Court agrees with Defendant Fowlkes as to both points, which precludes the possibility of Plaintiff‘s success at trial. As such, Defendant Fowlkes is entitled to judgement as a matter of law, and the Court will grant her Motion and dismiss Defendant Fowlkes from the instant action.8
A. There is no Genuine Dispute as to Defendant Fowlkes‘s Lack of Actual or Constructive Knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s Conduct
After a review of the record and the parties’ oral arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiff‘s evidence is insufficient to allow a reasonable fact-finder to determine that Defendant Fowlkes had either actual or constructive knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s misconduct or any propensity for
A brief reminder as to the mechanics of
After a movant has made and supported its motion for summary judgement, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce competent evidence in support of its contradictory position. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 585-86. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment will only rebut the presumption of truth afforded to the movant‘s evidence if the opponent can show that a “genuine dispute” exists. Id.
Not every disagreement as to the facts constitutes a “genuine” dispute. E.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. For instance, as the Court described supra, “[a] party ‘cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.‘” Stone, 105 F.3d at 191.
When it comes to evidence regarding a witness‘s state of mind, courts have often observed that such evidence typically “entails the drawing of factual inferences as to which reasonable men
Plaintiff may only succeed in her claims against Defendant Fowlkes by showing Fowlkes had actual or constructive knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s predatory conduct prior to his attack on Plaintiff. Of course, actual knowledge is satisfied by a showing of subjective awareness of a fact. Knowledge, Black‘s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); accord Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Suluma, 140 S. Ct. 768, 777 (2020). Conversely, one has constructive knowledge of a fact if it is ascertainable through reasonable diligence or care. Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 175 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus, even when an individual has no actual knowledge of a fact, the law might impute knowledge to that individual where he or she should have known of it. See id.
Without actual evidence12 contradicting Defendant Fowlkes‘s multiple sworn assertions of ignorance, Plaintiff‘s argument is tantamount to a naked insistence that Defendant Fowlkes is lying, which is insufficient to demonstrate a genuine dispute of fact. 10A Wright & Miller, supra, § 2727.1; see also Levesy v. Scolese, 2023 WL 5835763, at *2 n.7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 7, 2023) (determining that a plaintiff‘s unsupported assertion that an affiant was “lying about her behavior” constituted a conclusory allegation, and was therefore “insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact“) (citing Reddy v. Buttar, 38 F.4th 393, 403 (4th Cir. 2022)); Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding, in the context of an employment discrimination claim, “[t]o avoid summary judgment in favor of [the employer], [the employee] must do more than simply allege that the [affiants] are lying about their real reason for terminating him—under
The Court similarly finds that there is no genuine issue as to Defendant Fowlkes‘s lack of constructive knowledge. The undisputed record demonstrates that all ancillary facts of which Fowlkes was aware, including Okoli‘s professional record, performance reviews, and PREA training, tend to indicate that Okoli was a law-abiding employee. As stated by Fowlkes in her affidavit, she “had no reason to believe that a supervisory officer with over 8 years of experience within VDOC, no prior formal disciplinary actions, no criminal record, and who had received extensive, repeated training on his obligations under PREA, might be sexually abusing or harassing inmates at CVCU.” Fowlkes Aff. ¶ 52.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Okoli‘s reputation was so well-known amongst inmates that, “in the proper exercise of [her] official responsibilities, [Fowlkes] should have known [about it].” Mem. Opp‘n 10 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (4th Cir. 1987)). However, Plaintiff‘s assertion is not grounded in any evidence before this Court. Plaintiff does not describe, for instance, which aspect of Defendant Fowlkes‘s responsibilities would have caused her to confront Okoli‘s reputation. The Court cannot find any evidence in the record demonstrating that Defendant Fowlkes would have had the responsibility or need to inquire as to the inmates’ impressions of correctional officers. And, as described above, Okoli‘s record gave Fowlkes no reason to suspect his danger. As such, the undisputed record demonstrates that Fowlkes had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of Okoli‘s misconduct.
Because the summary judgment standard considers a plaintiff‘s ability to bear its ultimate burden, the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have often stated that the standard of
If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may [enter a] . . . judgment as a matter of law.
Because a motion for summary judgment requires the Court to consider the burden-bearer‘s ultimate ability to make its case, a plaintiff, when faced with a motion for summary judgment by the defendant, must provide the Court with all of their material evidence. 10A Wright & Miller § 2727 (“The nonmovant is not entitled to a trial on the basis of a hope that he can produce some
Plaintiff‘s affirmative evidence of Defendant Fowlkes‘s knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s conduct prior to her assault consists of: (1) Plaintiff‘s affidavit, in which she describes Defendant Okoli‘s predatory reputation amongst CVCU inmates, Roe Aff. 3-4; and (2) a public record demonstrating the relatively small size of CVCU, Mem. Opp‘n Ex. 4, ECF No. 46-4. If this case were to proceed to trial, Plaintiff would ask a jury to find, based on these two pieces of evidence alone, that Defendant Fowlkes had either actual or constructive knowledge of Okoli‘s reputation prior to his assault on Plaintiff. Hoschar, 739 F.3d at 175.
Plaintiff does not provide any meat for these evidentiary bones. For instance, Plaintiff provides no cognizable theory as to how or when Defendant Fowlkes might have gained knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s reputation. Similarly, as to evidence of Defendant Fowlkes‘s constructive knowledge, Plaintiff wholly fails to present the Court with any information about Defendant Fowlkes‘s responsibilities—much less identify which of those responsibilities, if performed reasonably, would have occasioned her to learn of Okoli‘s reputation. Id.
At the April 3 hearing, counsel for Plaintiff speculated that Officer Ross‘s testimony might develop these theories. However, as stated by the Court from the bench, and as noted supra, a litigant may not reserve evidence for trial in the face of a summary judgment motion. Plaintiff is “not entitled to a trial on the basis of a hope” that further evidence might develop. 10A Wright &
The Court finds that Plaintiff‘s limited evidence does not provide a legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find that Defendant Fowlkes had knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s conduct or predatory nature prior to her assault. Plaintiff‘s tenuous inferences presented in an attempt to undermine this apparent lack of knowledge would ask the jury to engage in impermissible speculation and conjecture. Bus. Dev. Corp., 428 F.2d at 453. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet her burden at trial as to Defendant Fowlkes‘s knowledge—actual or constructive. For this reason, too, the Court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Fowlkes‘s knowledge (or lack thereof), and will treat the matter as settled for purposes of the instant motion.
B. Count Two Fails to State a Claim against Defendant Fowlkes
Invoking
Defendant Fowlkes argues that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the substantive due process right which stems from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are applicable to the case at bar. Def.‘s Mem. Supp. 15-16. Plaintiff does not address this argument in her briefing, see generally Mem. Opp‘n, and based on its own review of the facts and law, the Court agrees with Defendant Fowlkes. Thus, the Court will grant Defendant Fowlkes‘s Motion as to Count Two.
Section 1983 is “not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, the § 1983 analysis “begins by identifying the specific constitutional
1. Plaintiff Does Not Establish a Fourth Amendment Violation
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable intrusions upon legitimate expectations of privacy. E.g., Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff‘s briefing does not elucidate the intrusion about which she complains. See Mem. Opp‘n 8-15, ECF No. 46. Her Complaint, however, alleges that Defendants “intruded or caused the intrusion into [Plaintiff‘s] . . . personal privacy, bodily security, and integrity.” Compl. ¶¶ 60-63. The only such intrusion alleged by Plaintiff in her Complaint is the assault by Okoli. See generally id.
In the prison context, an inmate has a “right to bodily privacy” under the Fourth Amendment, which is violated upon “the involuntary exposure of [her] genitals in the presence of the opposite sex,” often in the context of body cavity or strip searches. Wilkins v. Upton, 639 F. App‘x 941, 944 (2016) (citing Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981)). All other intrusions upon an inmate‘s bodily integrity, however, are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. Id. (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984)).
Plaintiff alleges sexual assault by Defendant Okoli; however, her allegations do not involve the involuntary exposure of her genitals. Compl. ¶¶ 26-31. Plaintiff‘s briefing on the instant Motion likewise reveals no such exposure. See generally Mem. Opp‘n. As such, Plaintiff does not state a violation of the Fourth Amendment, nor does the evidence presented in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment independently establish such a violation. Plaintiff cannot rest her § 1983 claim on an otherwise unalleged and unsupported constitutional violation.
The remainder of Count Two cites violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl. ¶ 62. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit violations of substantive due process. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 (1998). A litigant articulates such a violation by alleging “an abuse of executive power . . . clearly unjustified by any legitimate objective of law enforcement.” Id. (“The Due Process Clause . . . was intended to prevent [the] government ‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.‘” (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992))).
The Supreme Court, however, has consistently instructed that substantive due process rights cannot serve as a catch-all category for governmental conduct that is more specifically controlled by a different amendment. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. Thus, “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 842 (internal citation omitted).
Per the Supreme Court‘s instruction, Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action based on the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment if the alleged violations are more explicitly addressed by a different amendment. Id. As the Court analyzes in full below, Plaintiff‘s claims of sexual assault and willful indifference are well-covered by the rubric of the Eighth Amendment, such that applying the prohibitions of substantive due process would violate the Supreme Court‘s express admonition. See infra Part III.C. Thus, Count Two fails insofar as it purports to stem from a substantive due process violation. Because Plaintiff fails to attach Count Two‘s invocation of
C. Defendant Fowlkes is Entitled to Summary Judgment as to Count Three
Count Three also invokes
While the parties’ arguments focus on Defendant Fowlkes‘s liability as it relates to her alleged failure to intervene with respect to Defendant Okoli‘s sexually abusive conduct, see, e.g., Mem. Opp‘n 1, the briefing and record suggest two additional possibly violative failures by Defendant Fowlkes: her alleged failure to adequately address surveillance camera blind spots, id. at 10, and her alleged failure to adequately train subordinates as to the PREA reporting procedures, id. at 11. The Court analyzes each possible avenue of liability in turn.
1. Failure to Intervene as to Okoli
Plaintiff‘s case against Defendant Fowlkes chiefly relies on her theory that Fowlkes had either constructive or actual knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s propensity for sexual abuse but failed to intervene. See Mem. Opp‘n 1–3. In the instant Motion, Defendant Fowlkes vigorously contends that she had neither constructive nor actual knowledge and therefore cannot be held liable for her inaction. Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 1–2. As set forth at length above, see supra Part III.A., the Court
a. Section 1983 Supervisory Liability
In certain circumstances, supervisors may be held liable under
The Fourth Circuit has articulated three elements to establish
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor‘s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor‘s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal quotations omitted). This standard places a heavy burden of proof upon a plaintiff,
for a supervisor cannot be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable occurrence within the area of his responsibilities. Nor can he reasonably be expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct.
A supervisor‘s continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses, however, provides an independent basis for finding he either was deliberately indifferent or acquiesced in the constitutionally offensive conduct of his subordinates.
Id. (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372–73).
i. Predicate constitutional violation by Okoli
Before addressing the elements of Defendant Fowlkes‘s liability, the Court clarifies that Defendant Okoli‘s assault did, indeed, violate Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment rights. “The
The
Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendant Okoli, a prison guard, sexually assaulted Plaintiff and at least four other inmates. See generally SIU Report, ECF No. 46-3. Defendant Okoli has accordingly violated the Eighth Amendment rights of Plaintiff and any other inmate he assaulted.
ii. Defendant Fowlkes‘s knowledge
With the predicate constitutional violation in mind, the Court considers if Defendant Fowlkes‘s conduct, in relation to Okoli‘s assault upon Plaintiff, leads to
The record before the Court undisputedly demonstrates that Okoli posed a pervasive risk to Plaintiff and the other CVCU inmates; in fact, in the mere eleven months between his first day and the eventual investigation into his conduct, he was reported to have sexually assaulted at least five inmates. Def.‘s SUF ¶ 12; see generally SIU Report, ECF No. 46-3. And, even when his actions did not amount to assault, Okoli made frequent sexual advances upon the inmates. SIU Report 2; Mem. Opp‘n 7; Roe Aff. 2. Such predatory and unrelenting conduct surely constitutes the kind of “pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury” contemplated by
The Court has already found that the undisputed record demonstrates that Defendant Fowlkes had no subjective knowledge nor constructive knowledge of Defendant Okoli‘s conduct. Supra Part III.A. Thus, Plaintiff‘s theory of
b. Direct Eighth Amendment Liability
A prison supervisor‘s inaction in the face of a subordinate‘s misconduct may also directly violate the
The second element requires Plaintiff to show that, prior to Okoli‘s assault on Plaintiff, Fowlkes was subjectively aware that Okoli posed “an excessive risk” to inmates. Danser, 772 F.3d at 347; Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004). This standard is a rigorous one and only discharged upon a showing that the official was subjectively “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists,” and that the official actually drew such an inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. While subjective awareness may be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence, Makdessi, 798 F.3d at 133, such evidence must nevertheless amount to a showing of actual knowledge, Danser, 772 F.3d at 347. Unlike the standard under
The undisputed record, as analyzed by the Court supra Part III.A., quickly resolves both remaining elements in Defendant Fowlkes‘s favor. Fowlkes had no subjective knowledge of Okoli‘s predatory behavior, nor any reason to believe he posed a risk to inmates. Thus, this claim fails on the second element. Further, as to element three, Fowlkes‘s nonresponse cannot be considered patently inadequate without the attending requisite knowledge. Thus, as a matter of law, Fowlkes could not have been deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk of constitutional
2. Failure to Address Blind Spots
Plaintiff‘s next theory of liability stems from the known blind spots in the CVCU security camera coverage, which were exploited by Okoli and other correctional officers to abuse inmates. Roe. Aff. 4; Mem. Opp‘n 10; see also Def.‘s SUF ¶ 43. Plaintiff argues that this abuse was “well-known throughout the prison,” and, as such, a reasonable jury could find Defendant Fowlkes liable for failing to correct the blind spots. Mem. Opp‘n 10. The Court finds that, while Defendant Fowlkes was aware of the blind spots, she took adequate corrective action. As such, she is neither liable under a theory of supervisory liability nor direct liability.
a. Section 1983 Supervisory Liability
As described above, to succeed on a theory of
A supervisor‘s response (or non-response) satisfies the second element of
Here, Fowlkes‘s response to the camera blind spots did not amount to total inaction. Upon discovering the blind spots, Fowlkes submitted a request for more cameras and promulgated a number of preventative policies, which required that:
whenever inmates were present, an officer was to be stationed in the areas of the prison that lacked camera coverage, including the hallway outside of the laundry area in the basement. . . . CVCU employees [we]re directed not to spend unnecessary time with an offender of opposite sex when out of range of camera. And, unless there was an emergency, male officers were not allowed to enter inmate bathrooms or shower areas when those areas were occupied by inmates. Even when clearing those areas during rounds, male officers had to make a verbal announcement prior to entering.
Def.‘s SUF ¶ 45. These polices were also verbally conveyed to CVCU employees at the beginning of every shift. Id. ¶ 47.
Fowlkes‘s fulsome and consistently reinforced preventative polices strike the Court as highly proactive, far from the sort of half-hearted, plainly ineffective, or uncritical action which would demonstrate deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Cox, 828 F.3d at 303 (affirming a denial of summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim where correctional officers disregarded supervisor‘s advice and confronted inmates who were threatening the plaintiff, putting the plaintiff
Absent actually increasing the coverage of the surveillance cameras, which Fowlkes could not do without VDOC granting her request, promulgating and enforcing policies such as those described above appears to be the most reasonable solution to the problem. Thus, this theory of liability fails on the second element of
Paradoxically, Plaintiff asserts that Okoli acted with Fowlkes‘s tacit authorization when he exploited the lack of surveillance cameras in the showers and assaulted Plaintiff, but she does not dispute the substance of Fowlkes‘s promulgated policies, which directly prohibited Okoli‘s presence in the showers. Mem. Opp‘n 4–5, 9. Fowlkes could not have “authorized” conduct which she forbade. Rather, Okoli‘s conduct is precisely the kind of “deliberate criminal act[] of [a] properly trained employee” that, absent specific reason to anticipate, cannot be attributed to a supervisor. Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372–373. For this same reason, Plaintiff‘s case fails to satisfy the third element of
Thus, the undisputed record before the Court demonstrates that
For many of the same reasons, Fowlkes‘s failure to correct the camera blind spots did not directly violate Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment rights. As previously explained, a prison official directly violates the
Again, the Court notes that the relevant injury—Okoli‘s exploitation of the camera blind spots to sexually assault Plaintiff—is, necessarily, an objectively serious violation of Plaintiff‘s rights. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 118; Jackson v. Holley, 666 F. App‘x 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016); Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1143. However, without deciding if the presence of the camera blind spots by themselves created an “excessive risk” of sexual assault, Danser, 772 F.3d at 347, the Court finds that this theory fails because Defendant Fowlkes‘s response was not patently inadequate.
Critically here, a prison official satisfies the demands of the
Finally, Plaintiff‘s Complaint alleges that Defendant Fowlkes violated Plaintiff‘s rights by failing to “ensure that officers were properly trained to handle disclosures of sexual assault and harassment based on [PREA] guidelines” which led to the initial mishandling of Plaintiff‘s complaint regarding her assault. Compl. ¶ 71; Mem. Opp‘n 10–11. Defendant Fowlkes argues that the record fails to demonstrate a specific inadequacy in the CVCU PREA training. Def.‘s Mem. Supp. 26. In response, Plaintiff asserts that such inadequacy is made clear by Officer Ross‘s failure to advance Plaintiff‘s report. Mem. Opp‘n 11. Again, however, the Court agrees with Defendant Fowlkes.
a. Section 1983 Supervisory Liability
To succeed under a failure to train theory by way of
(1) the subordinates actually violated the plaintiff‘s constitutional or statutory rights; (2) the supervisor failed to train properly the subordinates[,] thus illustrating a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of the persons with whom the subordinates come into contact; and (3) this failure to train actually caused the subordinates to violate the plaintiff‘s rights.
Brown v. Mitchell, 308 F. Supp. 2d 682, 701–02 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
The Court presumes without deciding that the mishandling of Plaintiff‘s complaint constituted a violation of her constitutional rights.16 Even still, Plaintiff‘s claim against Fowlkes again fails on the second element. A supervisor‘s failure to train employees incurs
Here, the undisputed record reveals no such deficiency. The record before the Court demonstrates that all CVCU staff members received upon hiring comprehensive training regarding their PREA obligations, which was refreshed each year by “annual, mandatory in-service training.” Def.‘s SUF ¶ 22. This training emphasized the obligation of prison staff to detect, prevent, and report “known and suspected instances of sexual misconduct” and advised that “any staff members who fail to report violations may also be subjected to adverse employment action, up to and including termination of their employment.” Def.‘s SUF ¶ 34. For instance, the 2020 in-service curriculum advised attendees that “[a]ll staff, contractors and volunteers are required to report any
The record does not reveal any particular deficiency in CVCU‘s training program, nor does Plaintiff highlight one. Mem. Opp‘n 11. Rather, Plaintiff insists that the inadequacy of the program is made plain by the facts of the instant case, i.e., Officer Ross‘s undisputed mishandling of Plaintiff‘s initial complaint. Id. However, an isolated instance of a subordinate failing to abide by training procedures can hardly be construed as evidence of the supervisor‘s deliberate indifference. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. . . . [A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official‘s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.“). And, the record provides no reason to believe that Officer Ross‘s failure was part of a pattern of unreported complaints of which Fowlkes might have been aware. See Mem. Opp‘n 10 (listing only Officer Ross‘s failure as an example of the ineffectiveness of the CVCU PREA training).
Because the record before the Court lacks any evidence to support a reasonable finding that CVCU‘s PREA reporting training program was inadequate, this claim against Fowlkes also fails.
b. Direct Eighth Amendment Liability
As the Court has articulated twice before, a prison official only violates an inmate‘s rights for deliberate indifference where the prison official had actual knowledge of an excessive risk of constitutional injury. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Presuming again that Officer Ross‘s failure to
As a result of the foregoing, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact which would require submission to a jury. Further, because the undisputed record demonstrates that Defendant Fowlkes is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all ascertainable theories of
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Count Two fails to state a claim and Defendant Fowlkes is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count Three, the Court will grant the Defendant Fowlkes‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: June 30, 2025
Richmond, Virginia
/s/
Roderick C. Young
United States District Judge