141 P.3d 1057 | Idaho | 2006
Appellant John Doe and respondent Jane Roe married, moved out of state, separated, produced the child at issue in this appeal, and then divorced. Upon the petition of Roe and her father, filed about sixteen months after the divorce, the magistrate division of the district court terminated the father’s parental rights in the child. The magistrate judge found that the father had abandoned the child by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship without just cause, see I.C. § 16-2005(a) (Michie 2002),
I.
Appellant John Doe (father) and respondent Jane Roe (mother) married in January 2001. The couple lived in Lewiston, Idaho, at the time but moved about 1,400 miles south to Phoenix, Arizona, that May. The couple separated two months later and in September 2001 the mother filed for divorce. In January 2002, the couple’s daughter was born. Mother and father remained separated. Mother and daughter moved back to Lewiston in March 2002, and in December 2002 an Arizona court issued a decree of divorce, the terms of which were stipulated to by the parties. Mother was granted sole custody of daughter, and father was granted supervised monthly visitation in Idaho, which visits were to last between three and six hours each. Father was to pay the costs associated with traveling to the Gem State for these visits. The divorce decree also mandated that father would pay about $328 per month in child support, in addition to an amount (about $2,600) that had apparently accrued over the eight months prior to the decree. The decree also required father to maintain health insurance for his daughter.
In May 2004 mother and her father, respondent John Roe (grandfather), petitioned the magistrate division of the district court in Nez Perce County for an order terminating father’s parental rights. In the petition, grandfather also sought to adopt the daughter. The petition alleged that father had abandoned daughter by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship. Specifically, the petition alleged that father had not provided reasonable support or regular personal contact for more than six months. See I.C. § 16-2005(a) (where grandparent seeks termination and to adopt the minor child, willful failure of the parent to maintain a normal parental relationship for six months shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment).
After hearings on the petition, the magistrate judge issued an order terminating father’s parental rights. The court found the record contained clear and convincing evidence that father had failed to maintain a normal parental relationship by failing to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact. The court also determined that terminating father’s parental rights was in both his and his daughter’s best interests. The court noted that father had failed to voluntarily pay the amounts he owed; rather, any support had to be extracted by garnishment of his wages. He had another job that he failed to disclose to the State of Arizona, apparently to avoid garnishment of those wages. The court also noted that father had not paid the amount of child support that was in arrears. This “negligible contribution,” the court wrote, did not reflect a sincere desire to support daughter and was evidence of willfulness.
The court noted that father had no contact with daughter between October 2003 and November 2004, and that there was only sporadic contact before then. Father had attempted to visit daughter in January and
II.
The abandonment statute, I.C. § 16-2005(a), which was in effect in May 2004, when the Roes filed their petition, provided that the court may terminate the parent-child relationship where it finds that:
[t]he parent has abandoned the child by having willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact; failure of the parent to maintain this relationship without just cause for a period of one (1) year shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment under this section. Provided further, that where termination is sought by a grandparent seeking to adopt the child, willful failure of the parent to maintain a normal parental relationship as provided herein, without just cause, for six (6) months shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment.
The court must also consider whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 810, 992 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1999). No hard-and-fast rule controls the question of whether a parent has abandoned his or her child; instead, “[ejach case must be decided on its own particular facts.” Crum v. Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 111 Idaho 407, 409, 725 P.2d 112, 114 (1986) (citing Clark v. Jelinek, 90 Idaho 592, 599, 414 P.2d 892, 895 (1966)). No universally applicable “normal parental relationship” exists; whether such relationship exists depends on the circumstances of each case. Maier v. Matthews, 97 Idaho 99, 104, 540 P.2d 284, 289 (1975).
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002) (quoting Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978)). Our Legislature acknowledges the importance of maintaining the parent-child relationship, as well: “Implicit in [Title 16, Chapter 20] is the philosophy that wherever possible family life should be strengthened and preserved — ” I.C. § 16-2001 (2002).
The magistrate judge failed to consider relevant evidence on the issue of just cause. To begin, the distance between the parties made visitation difficult. Fourteen hundred miles separates Phoenix and Lewiston. It was mother who moved back to Lewiston. Father testified that he was “scrounging by paycheck to paycheck.” He was in debt up to his ears, and he apparently had difficulty even paying rent at times. Father also testified that he missed seven months of work in two years due to injury. But the judge did not note in his decision that father missed seven months of work due to injury, nor did he discuss father’s ability to pay relative to his income and expenses. The court’s reasonable support calculus did not include father’s financial situation beyond his income— the court looked only at income, amount owed, and amount paid. There was no discussion of the financial and logistical difficulties with traveling from Phoenix to Lewiston. The judge also failed to consider the fact that daughter’s young age tends to lessen the meaningfulness of cards and letters, let alone phone conversations. Daughter was one year old in 2003 and two in 2004. The judge made no finding about the reason why father was unable to obtain health insurance for daughter.
We think it fairly obvious — particularly when a fundamental liberty interest is at stake — that courts cannot ignore relevant, admissible evidence of an issue the Legislature has deemed relevant to the abandonment inquiry. See, e.g., Doe v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 (2002); Maier v. Matthews, 97 Idaho at 104, 540 P.2d at 289 (magistrate’s interpretation of “normal parental relationship” did not adequately consider “extremely difficult position” in which father was placed; record indicated that mother had thwarted father’s attempts to visit child and that father believed exercising visitation would have been detrimental to child based on father’s relationship with mother). In light of the evidence of just cause, which was produced but apparently not considered, we are compelled to reverse the order terminating father’s rights.
III.
The magistrate’s order terminating father’s parental rights is reversed. Costs to appellant.
. This statute has since been amended. See 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 391, sec. 40, 1298. All references to the parental termination statutes will be to the pre-2005 version unless otherwise noted.
. It does not appear that mother alleged father willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship for more than one year, as is required when a grandparent is not the party seeking to terminate the parental rights and adopt the child. See I.C. § 16-2005(1)(a).
. This philosophy remains in the current I.C. § 16-2001(2).
. There was apparently conflicting evidence relating to why father was unable to obtain health insurance for daughter once she was dropped from father's plan in January 2004. The magistrate judge noted that father contacted an attorney to attempt to obtain the documentation necessary to obtain insurance for her, but left it at that.
. In his order the judge noted that father's parents, who live in the Lewiston area, had not done anything to visit daughter, never asked about her, and never gave her any cards or gifts. We’re not entirely sure what import this finding had on the outcome, but it is wholly irrelevant to father’s parental rights.