Appellant, Julio Rodriguez, was indicted for armed robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon. After a jury trial, he was acquitted of those charges, but was found guilty of the lesser included offense of *383 robbery. He appeals from his robbery conviction, contending that the trial court erred by allowing the government to elicit prejudicial testimony from police officers about their prior contacts with him, by refusing to impose sanctions on the government for failing to preserve an item of evidence, and by instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery even though the evidence, in his view, did not support such an instruction. We affirm.
I
A. The Robbery and Its Aftermath
William Woodson testified that Rodriguez and another man, Angel Lopez, robbed him on the morning of June 28, 1996. On that day Woodson had gone to an apartment on Columbia Road, N.W., in order to buy some crack cocaine from Lopez. While Woodson waited for Lopez to get the cocaine, Rodriguez entered the room and, apparently still angry over a prior argument, punched Woodson in the chest and threatened him with what Wood-son described as a “scratch awl.” Rodriguez and Lopez then took from him a pouch or “fanny pack,” a broken watch, a belt, a pair of sandals, a paycheck, and $60 in cash.
After the robbers left, Mr. Woodson picked up his glasses and some personal papers which had fallen on the floor, and then he too left the building. When Wood-son described the robbery to some people on the street, one of them told him which way the robbers had fled. Woodson headed in that direction, and a few minutes later he found Rodriguez and Lopez at the corner of 15th and Irving Streets, N.W. He asked for his money back, but they refused to return it. Rodriguez taunted him by waving a piece of paper in his face which he later concluded was possibly his stolen paycheck.
Quickly recognizing that the two men would not return his money, Mr. Woodson went back to the apartment where the robbery had occurred, looking for his keys. This time his quest was successful: a woman whom he had seen there earlier gave him the keys but said she knew nothing about the robbery. Woodson left the apartment again, intending to walk home.
Luckily, Mr. Woodson saw a police car less than a block away. He flagged it down and told the officers inside — Emilia-na Rodriguez, Harry Weeks, and Emilio Martinez — the details of the robbery. The officers testified that Woodson was disheveled and barefoot (the robbers had taken his sandals) and appeared to be nervous and “panicking,” but not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He described the robbers to the officers, stating that one of them appeared to be Cuban and the other Puerto Rican. Upon hearing these descriptions, the officers recalled seeing Rodriguez, Lopez, and another Hispanic man named Tartabull, wave to their patrol car as it drove past them earlier that morning. These men were known to some members of the police force as “the Cubans.” Suspecting them, the officers broadcast a lookout for three Hispanic males.
Shortly thereafter, another officer, Edward Soto, detained Lopez and Tartabull in a nearby alley. Mr. Woodson was taken there and identified Lopez as one of the robbers. Lopez had in his possession Woodson’s sandals and pouch, which contained the broken watch, and was carrying an awl in his pocket. 1 The pouch’s fasten *384 ing device was broken when the police recovered it from Lopez. While on the scene, the police photographed the awl, the sandals, the watch, and the pouch. They kept the awl but returned the other items to Mr. Woodson, who testified that he later threw away the pouch because the clasp had been broken during the robbery. On the basis of Mr. Woodson’s identification, Lopez was placed under arrest, but Tarta-bull was released after Mr. Woodson told the officers that he was not the second robber. Accompanied by Mr. Woodson, the police continued looking for the second robber that morning, but they were unsuccessful.
About a month after the robbery, Wood-son went to the police station to look at an array of photographs, which included a picture of Rodriguez because the police suspected that he might have been involved. Woodson identified Rodriguez from the array as one of the robbers, and the police arrested him three days later.
Lopez and Rodriguez were later jointly indicted as co-defendants. Shortly before trial, however, Lopez entered a plea of guilty to robbery, and Rodriguez was tried alone.
B. Testimony about Prior Contacts
During a pre-trial hearing, some police officers testified that Rodriguez was well known to officers patrolling his neighborhood and that they had had contact with him on other occasions prior to the day of the robbery. Concerned that evidence of these prior contacts with the police might suggest to the jury that Rodriguez had a prior criminal record or at least a criminal disposition, defense counsel requested a ruling in limine to prohibit the government from eliciting such testimony at trial. The court denied the motion, stating:
Police officers walk beats every day.... [Tjhey know people from the police Boys’ Club, they know shop owners. Police officers see and know a lot of people; that doesn’t mean that they arrested the person. So I don’t think that the prejudicial [effect] outweighs the probative [value].
During her opening statement, the prosecutor said that the arresting officers had had “prior contacts” with Rodriguez and that they knew him “from the area” and “from this particular neighborhood.” After summarizing the facts of the robbery and Mr. Woodson’s report to the police, the prosecutor continued: “So what they [the officers] did, ladies and gentlemen, is, based on their knowledge of Mr. Rodriguez, they located a photograph of Mr. Rodriguez and inserted it into a photo array of nine photographs.” Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s emphasis on the fact that “these police officers know my client,” but the court overruled the objection.
During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from three officers about their prior contacts with appellant. The first one to testify, Officer Emiliana Rodriguez, stated that she knew appellant and Lopez “from the area” and that she had “had prior contacts with them.” Defense counsel objected to these references as gratuitous and prejudicial. The court offered to give the jury a limiting instruction that “just because someone has prior contact, it doesn’t mean it’s under adverse circumstances,” but counsel declined the offer. The court warned the prosecutor, however, to “be careful” so as not to give the impression to the jury that “these previous *385 contacts were an arrest type or stop and search type.” The prosecutor assured the court that she had instructed the officers “not to say anything about the nature of their contacts and only to limit it to the most neutral terms, that they have seen them in the area and they have just had prior contact with them....”
Later in the trial, Officer Soto testified that he “knew [Rodriguez] from the area and ... had had contact [with him] the prior day.” Defense counsel again objected, but the court overruled the objection, reasoning that “contact” with a police officer “doesn’t mean it’s adverse circumstances.” Officer Soto then said that he knew Tartabull was Cuban and that Tarta-bull “was in the company of Mr. Julio Rodriguez [appellant] on [June] 27th,” the day before the robbery.
Finally, Officer Martinez testified that he knew Rodriguez, Tartabull, and Lopez “just from the area, from patrolling the area. I have patrolled the same area for seven years. I’m quite familiar with just about everyone in the area.” When asked when his last contact with Rodriguez occurred before June 28 (the date of the robbery), Martinez replied, “June 27th, the day before.” Martinez then stated that Officer Soto had reported over the radio on the morning of the robbery that he “had two subjects stopped,” Lopez and Tartabull, and that “one of them they had stopped the day before, one of the Cubans.”
The defense presented no evidence.
II
Rodriguez maintains that the testimony about his prior contacts with the police was irrelevant and, because it was akin to evidence of other crimes, unduly prejudicial. He therefore contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this testimony to be heard by the jury.
A trial judge has “broad discretion to determine the substance, form, and quantum of evidence which is to be presented to a jury.”
Johnson v. United States,
Our first consideration is whether the evidence of prior contacts was relevant. Relevant evidence is simply “that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable” than it would be without the evidence.
Punch v. United States,
It is unrealistic to expect the government to truncate its case-in-chief by utilizing only bare bones testimony about an arrest team stopping a citizen merely because of the word from an officer far away. The arrest need not be tersely described for the jury as a non sequitur, an event that erupted out of the blue.
Id.
at 207.
Accord, e.g., Butler v. United States,
Especially pertinent is our decision in
Perritt v. United States,
[J]uries in criminal cases, before being called upon to decide the awesome question of guilt or innocence, are entitled to know more of the circumstances which culminate in a courtroom identification — an event which, standing alone, often means very little to a conscientious and intelligent juror, who routinely expects the witnesses to identify the defendant in court and who may not attach great weight to such an identification in the absence of corroboration.
Id.
at 337-338 (emphasis added in
Perritt),
quoting
Clemons v. United States,
133 U.S.App. D.C. 27, 40,
The principal issue thus becomes whether the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. When relevant evidence is challenged on the ground of unfair prejudice, it may be excluded only if “the danger of unfair prej-
*387
udiee
substantially
outweigh[s][its] probative value.... ”
Johnson v. United States,
Preliminarily, we must consider whether the prior contacts testimony in this case should be considered evidence of other crimes or bad acts, as appellant contends.
3
This court has held on several occasions that evidence of prior contacts with the police does not necessarily amount to evidence of other crimes or bad acts.
See, e.g., Chappelle v. United States,
Also significant is Rodriguez’s refusal of a curative instruction limiting the impact of the prior contacts testimony. Since defense counsel rejected the trial court’s offer to give such an instruction, which could have mitigated any likely prejudice, we view with some skepticism his present claim that the court erred by admitting the evidence. “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion when prejudice can be cured by an instruction to the jury, and a corrective instruction is offered but de-dined.”
Smith v. United States,
Somewhat more troublesome is Officer Soto’s testimony referring to his “stop” of Lopez and Tartabull, which at least suggests an adversarial encounter rather than a more neutral “contact.” Such an inference could be, at least arguably, sufficient to bring this testimony within the category of evidence of other crimes. We conclude in this instance, however, that it did not. The reference to the “stop” was elicited during Officer Soto’s description of the events immediately prior to the arrest of Lopez, and during the search for Rodriguez (unsuccessful, as it turned out, until a month later) for the robbery for which he was on trial. The only reference to Rodriguez was as follows:
Q. [by the prosecutor]: Do you know Tartabull?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. How do you know Tartabull?
A. Tartabull was in the company of Mr. Julio Rodriguez on the date of the 27th [the day before the robbery]. They were together.
Q. And at the time that you stopped Lopez and Tartabull ... was Mr. Rodriguez anywhere around?
A. No.
While this testimony might have caused some prejudice to Lopez if he had been on trial, we fail to see how it could have prejudiced Rodriguez, since it made clear that Rodriguez was not even present during the “stop.” We think that this testimony, considered in context, was at worst “a permissible explication of the events
*388
which led up to appellant’s arrest,”
Ford,
In any event, we think the likelihood of prejudice was slight. As the government points out, the evidence established that both Lopez and Rodriguez (along with the complainant, William Woodson) were present in a “crack house” when the robbery took place, a fact which strikes us as considerably more prejudicial than the mere mention of prior “contacts,” or even a prior “stop” (which did not involve appellant Rodriguez). Moreover, the jury acquitted Rodriguez of both charged offenses, including armed robbery, and found him guilty of only the lesser included offense of (unarmed) robbery. The government maintains, and we agree, that this verdict shows that the jury “carefully sift[ed]” the evidence without being unduly influenced by any reference to his prior contacts with the police.
For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion and no legal error in the trial court’s refusal to exclude the evidence about prior contacts. 5
Ill
On the morning of the robbery, the officers who arrested Lopez returned most of Woodson’s personal possessions to him, including his pouch. In particular, the officers testified that they returned his sandals because he was barefoot, and his pouch because he said he needed it to carry other items of personal property. Mr. Woodson brought his sandals and watch to trial, but, because the clasp on the pouch was broken, he threw it away soon after the police gave it back to him. He testified that the pouch was in good condition before the robbery, but that the clasp was broken when it was returned to him after the police recovered it from Lopez. In her summation to the jury, the prosecutor argued that the damaged condition of the pouch supported the government’s allegation that a robbery had occurred, rather than a consensual exchange as claimed by Rodriguez. 6
*389 Under D.C.Code § 5-119.02 (2001), police officers are required to preserve stolen property that comes into their possession. The officers in this case testified that, although they knew of the requirements of this statute and the general order implementing it, they returned Woodson’s belongings to him because they believed that photographing them would suffice. Before trial, defense counsel moved for sanctions against the government and sought an order precluding the government from introducing pictures of the pouch or even the tangible objects that had been preserved. The trial judge refused to impose sanctions because he concluded that the police had not willfully or deliberately lost the evidence, but that their failure to comply with the statute “was due more to inadvertence .... I would have to find that they deliberately did this to gain an advantage to your client’s disadvantage before I would be in a position to issue some sanctions.” Rodriguez now contends that this ruling was error.
Any decision to impose sanctions for the loss or destruction of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court.
Davis v. United States,
In a case with very similar facts, this court upheld the denial of a defense request for sanctions. In
Marshall v. United States,
We reach the same conclusion here; indeed, we see no meaningful difference between this case and Marshall. Although the police should have retained the recovered stolen items (with the possible exception of the sandals, of which the barefoot Mr. Woodson had an immediate need), there is nothing in the record to suggest that their actions were anything other than a good faith effort to aid a citizen in distress. They were admittedly aware that they were required by a statute and a general order to hold on to the stolen *390 items, but they testified that they thought they were complying with the statute and the general order by taking photographs of them. While the court’s finding that the return of the stolen items to Mr. Woodson was due to “inadvertence” was not quite correct, we think the record supports the conclusion that the police did not deliberately return the stolen items to Mr. Woodson in order to “gain an advantage” over the defense. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police acted in bad faith. Moreover, we are satisfied that the materiality of the pouch with the broken clasp was no less “speculative” than the materiality of the rain-soaked purse in Marshall, and that its absence had no significant impact on the outcome of the case. We conclude that Marshall is close enough to the present case on its facts to be dispositive of this claim of error. In the circumstances presented here, the police action does not, under cases such as Montgomery and Cotton, require the imposition of sanctions.
IV
At the government’s request, and over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on robbery as a lesser included offense of armed robbery. Rodriguez contends on appeal that the court erred by giving this instruction. He maintains that a jury could not reasonably acquit him of armed robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon yet find him guilty of (unarmed) robbery. We disagree.
A lesser included offense instruction is warranted when “(1) all elements of the lesser offense are included within the offense charged, and (2) there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the lesser charge.”
Rease v. United States,
In this case Mr. Woodson testified that it was Rodriguez who threatened him with the awl during the course of the robbery. The weapon, however, was found on Lopez when he was arrested, and there was no evidence that anyone other than Woodson ever saw Rodriguez in possession of the awl. A crime scene search officer testified that she had been unable to recover any fingerprints from the awl, and defense counsel pointed out to the jury in his closing argument that “none of Mr. Rodriguez’s fingerprints were on it.” The jury therefore could rationally credit Woodson’s testimony that Rodriguez was one of the robbers, but reject his testimony that it was Rodriguez who brandished the weapon. It is, of course, well established that a jury may credit part of a witness’ testimony while disbelieving another part.
See, e.g., Shuler v. United States,
V
The judgment of conviction is
Affirmed.
Notes
. Officer Soto testified that when he first stopped Lopez and Tartabull in the alley, he directed them both "that if they had any weapons, to take them out of their pockets and drop them to the ground.” Lopez then “pulled out a sharp object” from his right *384 rear pocket and threw it on the ground near his feet. A few minutes later, when Mr. Woodson arrived with the other officers, his attention was called to this object (still on the ground), and he identified it as the weapon used in the robbery.
. The court stated that the testimony indicated "how [the police] knew this man; otherwise, they would not have been in the same position to pick out a picture to place in the array.” Rodriguez relies on cases suggesting that such testimony is improperly admitted when it is offered merely to explain why the police took certain actions in arriving at the suspect whom they eventually arrested, including why they placed his photograph in the array. These cases are distinguishable because they deal with the admission of hear
*386
say evidence and with whether the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule should apply.
See United States v. Evans,
342 U.S.App. D.C. 189,
. "[T]he law in the District of Columbia is that evidence tending to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit crime is not admissible for that purpose, but may be admitted if the government shows that the importance of the evidence to proving a material fact in issue outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”
Wilson v. United States,
. There was also a brief mention in Soto's report, as recounted by Martinez, that “one of them” — i.e., Lopez or Tartabull — had been "stopped the day before,” apparently by Soto. Nothing was made of this remark, however, and we do not find it sufficiently prejudicial, viewed in context, to warrant reversal, especially since it did not refer to Rodriguez.
. In his reply brief, Rodriguez cites
Old Chief v. United States,
. The defense theory of the case was that no robbery occurred at all, and that the encounter between Mr. Woodson and Messrs. Lopez and Rodriguez was actually an exchange of property (sandals, watch, etc.) for crack cocaine.
.
United States
v.
Sinclair,
144 U.S.App. D.C. 13, 15,