Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp.

provisions of the harmonize all constitut

ion!;.]”8 Kathryn RODRIGUEZ, Respondent/Cross- the We find no conflict between two consti- Appellant, provisions. imposes tutional 6.2 Section § “the general tax on real estate. Under assembly by general may provide for law (f/k/a ) CORPORATION SUZUKI MOTOR partial from lands such relief taxation Company, Motor Ltd. and Amer- Suzuki blighted devoted to” rehabilitation of areas. Corporation, Appel- ican Motor Suzuki Nothing suggests § im- 6.2 tax lants/Cross-Respondents,

posed any is from other tax autho- different by rized the constitution. Section 7 is a grant specific power general to the assem- DUBIS, Respondent. Deborah land, including bly to tax abate taxes 6.2, imposed by purposes specified No. 78539. therein. Missouri, Supreme X, Our conclusion buttressed Art. En Banc.

3,§ provides which that “the methods of determining property value taxa- 1996. Dec. Replacement tax tion shall be fixed law.” Rehearing Denied Jan. explicitly distributions are tied the “dis- property,” an trict’s total assessed value of specifically

amount the constitution allows legislature legisla- All to determine.

ture has done in the TIF act is freeze the property purposes its

value of the for tax equalized period

initial value for the assessed plan. redevelopment

Conclusion

Replacement are tax revenues includable plan, adoption

in a TIF such

plan does not violate constitution. judgment circuit court is af-

firmed.

All concur. Gregory Corrigan, Gundlach, Cherriek,

Frank N. Jordan B. Louis, Starr, Cappuc- St. Kenneth Paul W. T. cio, Sehaerr, Phillips, Carter G. C. Gene Liverzani, Raphael, Christine A. Michael J. D.C., McEntire, Washington, Sawnie A. Houston, TX, Fiske, Jr., Robert B. Frances Bivens, City, appel- E. New York lants/cross-respondents. Graham, Wallach,

Maurice B. John S. Hoffman, Louis, Theodore H. St. Albert M. Pearson, III, Butler, Jr., E. Robert D. James Atlanta, GA, Dawson, Cheeley, Patrick A. Marietta, GA, Callis, Louis, Cheryl A. St. respondenf/cross-appellant. Jr., Reston, VA,

Hugh Young, F. Thomas Sterchi, MO, City, N. L. Kansas Andrew D.C., Frey, Tager, Washington, Evan M. compensa- Council, tur, reduced the circuit court Liability Advisory Product amicus punitives to tory million and the award to $20 Inc. million. $20 McGrath, Jr., Brady, Phillip D. C. Dean Lockwood, II, D.C., H. Washington, Charles I. Cofer, VA, Margaret D. Arlington, L. Walter City, Matye, Kansas Lineberry, Joseph G. judge in trial erred argues that the Suzuki and Mfrs. Ass’n American Auto. amicus all references to excluding of and all evidence Mfrs., Inc. Intern. Auto. alcohol, Ass’n of in surfaced consumption of which the non-party wit- impeachment of contexts: two BENTON, Judge. nesses, negli- negligence/comparative and the Rodriguez. Dubis and gence Rodriguez Kathryn suffered Plaintiff C. injuries the automo permanent serious wlien Non-parties A riding rolled over she was bile which Following and County. verdict Warren con Generally, of alcohol evidence her, Corporation Motor judgment for Suzuki material to the relevant and sumption “is (“Suzuki”) alleging constitutional appealed, see, hear, perceive and ability to witness’s V, § This art. trial errors. Mo. Const. Conger, 854 S.W.2d v. observe.” Johnston of alcohol concludes that the evidence citing v. Ca (Mo.App.1993), State excluded, improperly consumption was (Mo.1974). ston, This 509 S.W.2d retrial, jury instructed to the should be on by cross-examination evidence is admissible only supported if punitive damages award Caston, testimony. independent or Reversed convincing evidence. clear and impairment of a Any possible S.W.2d and remanded. to her ability is relevant to recall witness’s 484; Johnston, credibility. 854 S.W.2d 11, 1990, February defendant Deborah On Co., 446-47 292 S.W. v. Armour & Sanders driving a Suzuki Samurai Dubis was ( Mo.App.1927). Rodriguez and plaintiff Highway with passengers. The vehicle Nunnally as Lisa proof, several wit offer of In Suzuki’s roadway, traveled right side left drinking wine before admitted nesses ditch, 14-inch-high a dirt and struck into the Nunnally feel Passenger admitted accident. cemetery driveway. of a headwall —the side barring ing “tipsy.” trial court erred The hotly disputed. happened was next What by the non- consumption of alcohol evidence passengers, the According to the driver and party witnesses. roadway, crossed returned to the Samurai line, Dubis turned and when the center B. Parties correct, rolled right the vehicle sharply to Suzuki, nev- According to the Samurai over. Instead, roadway. returned to er action, evidence Previously, negligence in a driveway cemetery launched impact with admis consumption was alcohol of a driver’s air, causing the Samurai the vehicle into of erratic only coupled if with evidence sible roll in the ditch. from other circumstance driving or some prod- of strict Rodriguez asserted claims that the driver’s might it be inferred which warranty, liability, negligence, breach ucts at the time impaired physical condition was Suzuki, against and a punitive damages Edwards, 398 Doisy v. of the accident. addition, against In negligence claim Dubis. (Mo. 1966), citing banc 849-50[3] S.W.2d Dubis, alleging against cross-claimed Suzuki 793,176 Chartrau, Mo.App. v. Cheatham negligence. (1944) Boehm v. St. S.W.2d Company, 368 S.W.2d Public Service Rodriguez’s damages at Louis found Bunch, (Mo.1963); million, at 100% to Su- assessing fault $30 McHaffie (Mo. appar 822, 831 Dubis, Rodriguez. In S.W.2d zuki, and 0% 0% drinking that evidence rationale was damages ent addition, punitive returned inflame improperly “prejudicially remitti- could million. On against for $60 Suzuki Barlow, However, strikingly in other cases with jury’s Strycharz sentiments.” (Mo 419,425 .App.1995). facts, of alcohol similar evidence James, In was admissible. Bohn v. a Doisy’s logic made more sense under or four beers that the defendant drank three system contributory negligence. Under on his breath was admissible and had alcohol system, liability essentially “all or was keep prop speeding and failure to a because Benda, nothing.” Gustafson driving. 573 er lookout exhibited erratic J., 1983)(Billings, concur Boehm, (Mo.App.1978). In ring). Any contributory negligence barred recovery by citing plaintiff. supra, hospital v. South- record alcoholic Walsh Co., town Motors driving admissible because a mo breath was 1969). Similarly, liability defendant’s through stop sign m.p.h. at 20 tor scooter damages. for all or none of the headlight burn stopping without and with no Gustaf son, 28; Prosser, Compar 661 S.W.2d at W. at ing driving. erratic 368 S.W.2d showed 465, Negligence, ative 51 Mich. L.Rev. 474 Cheatham, supra, that the 371. In evidence contributory neg Under a zero-sum defendant had alcohol breath was admissible ligence system, improper an focus on alcohol driving zig-zagging in a and wob because deserving plaintiffs, or evidence would bar bling driving. 176 manner showed erratic penalize blameless defendants. Hager McGlynn, In evi S.W.2d at 868. v. consumed three dence that the defendant adopted compre In 1983 Missouri a liqueur system scotch-and-waters and one was ad comparative hensive of fault. Gustaf son, key running light 661 S.W.2d at 16. The to this missible because a red and not system is that a decides the issues of applying driving. was 518 the brakes erratic appropriate per relative fault and assesses 173, (Mo.App.1974), 178 overruled on S.W.2d centages. Missouri Railroad Com grounds by other State ex rel. Sims v. Sand Pacific pany v. Company, & Kales 566 Whitehead ers, 718, (Mo.App.1994). In 886 S.W.2d 1978). Compara S.W.2d James, Hansen v. evidence that the driver upon principle tive fault is based of fair beverages consumed several alcoholic was ness, id., “equitable just.” and is more and inexplicably leaving admissible because Gustafson, 661 ap S.W.2d at 28. Since the road, utility pole, striking going down portionment damages of fault and is factual driving. an enbankment showed erratic nature, fully should be as informed 476,482 (Mo.App.1992). S.W.2d possible in order to determine the relative The cases are not even consistent parties. Page fault of the See W. Keeton et al., of blood alcohol content whether evidence Prosser and Keeton on the Law Torts of (5th ed.1984). legal above limit is admissible. In Laud comparative at 470 A Siem, system fault erdale v. evidence that the defendant can better accommodate alcohol contributory negligence sys legal evidence than a had blood alcohol content above the tem. de limit was excluded because accident plaintiff’s located in lane was not evi bris practical Doisy A reason to abandon the driving. dence of erratic S.W.2d application standard is that its is inconsistent (Mo.App.1987). Similarly, Bentley unpredictable at trial. In Broderson Crews, evidence of blood alcohol content Farthing, evidence that the consumed driver legal limit above the was excluded because glasses three of wine and had alcohol on her crossing center line was not erratic driv pulling breath was excluded because into the ing. (Mo.App.1981). 630 S.W.2d 106-07 path of not another vehicle did show “erratic However, in Diener v. Mid-American driving.” (Mo.App. 762 S.W.2d 550-51 Coaches, Inc., a blood alcohol test above the Strycharz, supra, In that evidence legal the driver limit was admissible because the defendant driver drank two beers line. 378 crossed the center S.W.2d had alcohol on his was be breath excluded Eaton, (Mo.1964). In Miller v. evidence cause the driver’s failure to swerve or see the feet) alcohol content above plaintiff (though the driver’s blood visible for 900 did not speed- driving. legal limit was admissible because show erratic 904 S.W.2d Wentzel, 1991); narrow, Bilzing v. curving rural roads was errat mg on driving. (Mo.App.1987). (Mo.App.1987); ic Jones Freese, (Mo.App. 456-57 inconsistency unpredictability The 1987)(2-1). Thus, Doisy standard was no surprising is not in view of the case law at all. standard original pronouncement confusion Doisy a head-on the rule. itself concerned plaintiff collision. offered evidence that: (1) highway patrolman liquor on smelled This Court declares a therefore new (2) breath; defendant’s car defendant’s cases: standard civil Evidence the center and continued left crossed line admissible, if of alcohol other feet, finally plaintiff 100-300 toward the wise relevant and material. This standard plaintiff right colliding with the on the shoul- First, applies in two when the situations. plaintiffs der of lane. proponent allege does not intoxication as an upheld This the trial court’s ex- independent negligence, act the evidence of alcohol breath be- clusion evidence may drinking part proof be other showing “no erratic cause there was cases, alleged. negligent acts In such con 849,850. driving.” Id. at negli sumption independent of alcohol as an crowning Doisy is that ambiguity it See, may not gent e.g., act be submitted. permits admission evidence not of alcohol Heffron, v. Bowman 318 S.W.2d 274 driving, only where there is but also erratic (Mo.1958). Nonetheless, against party unspecified “other Most circumstances.” consumption whom the evidence of alcohol is excep not this courts have even discussed may request limiting instruction. admitted Staddon, Parry v. 769 tion. See S.W.2d Hulewicz, Raskey Neb. v. 177 See However, in (Mo.App.1989). Sewell 814 n. (Ne (1970); 2d 8.07-2 N.W.2d NJI Company, v. MFA Mutual Insurance there instructions). “If defendant braska Nevertheless, evi driving. was no erratic pur limited emphasize wished to further the driver five or six dence that consumed evidence, request to pose of this it was free was admissible the driver had beers because jury’s limiting use of this an instruction the colli no recollection events before Corp., Synergy Tune v. Gas evidence.” circum The court the “other sion. invoked 1994). 10, 15 See also S.W.2d exception impairment. to stances” infer City ex rel. Public Service Co. State Kansas Likewise, 284, 290 (Mo.App.1980). S.W.2d Shain, 345 Mo. 134 S.W.2d

Parry, supra, showing a test a blood alcohol Co., (Mo.1939); Ins. Scott v. Missouri legal limit was admissible content below (banc 1950). Mo. S.W.2d action was not because failure take evasive when intoxi- The second situation occurs driving, but other circumstances erratic was act alleged independent is cation as an inferring impairment. case negligence. Assuming a submissible Aubuchon, evi In Krenski v. circumstantial made, for the intoxication is a basis verdict alcohol, dence that the defendant smelled directing jury MAI 5 th instruction. See flushed, speech, was un slurred his was 17.21. feet, eyes steady on his and had bloodshot swerving speeding, admissible because serves to appropriate jury The instruction n Moreover, oncoming into lane of back and forth any prejudice. diminish undue traffic, hitting parked car was not preju- ways possible other lessen there are driving, impaired but showed an erratic example, can voir For dire dice. (Mo. 721, 727 physical condition. 841 S.W.2d jurors on alcohol potential about their views App.1992). consumption. Examination of witnesses and by place the alcohol only pattern argument is that al- counsel can in the cases jury. consumption in for the Accord- every trial on ad- context most court determination of alcohol ingly, affirmed on as to discussions of evidence or exclusion has been mission progeny its are consumption, Doisy factual appeal, despite these wide variances. Weller, Stojkovic overruled. But see ger/plaintiff Rodriguez’s alcohol comparative negligence. on the issue of her In against its crossclaim the driver Rodriguez’s petition In answer its Dubis, alleged Suzuki intoxication as an inde proof, offer of Suzuki asserted the affirma- pendent negligence. act of Suzuki is entitled comparative negligence by tive defense of directing jury to a verdict instruction if it “plaintiff’s traveling decision to and act of presents substantial evidence—viewed operated by an vehicle intoxicated driver.” light most favorable to support Suzuki—to its See, e.g., McHaffie, citing 891 S.W.2d at theory negligence. Spring of Dubis’ See Miller, 733 S.W.2d.at 34. Suzuki did not City Transportation Authority, Kansas Area allege Rodriguez’s intoxication an inde- 224, 225 pendent negligence, argued act of but met this Suzuki burden its offers of drinking impacted her decision to enter and proof consumption. that showed alcohol Du- remain in the vehicle an with intoxicated drinking bis herself admitted two full and driver. sampler glasses three of wine—about one- Rodriguez’s half Suzuki is entitled to submit (passen- bottle total—before the accident comparative negligence ger Nunnally may to the under the testified that Dubis have sampler just appropriate comparative had or fault instruction if it glasses, four five not drinking; production. three Dubis admits can meet its burden of and that “a beers, couple 225; probably, Spring, is all she MAI 5 th 32.05. [Dubis] handle”). could Highway Troop- by offering Patrol Suzuki met this burden the fol- er testified that he smelled lowing: Rodriguez consuming intoxicants on admitted alco- hospital Dubis’ breath at the vehicle, more than an hol entering with Dubis before hour and a half after the accident. Rodriguez’s blood alcohol content was (com- about .11 at the time of the accident also showing Suzuki offered evidence alco- pared prima legal to the .10 facie level of hol legal as a cause the dam- intoxication). § 577.037RSMo 1991. ages. expert Suzuki’s noted a lack of steer- ing prior to collision with the headwall. The It is for the trier of fact to determine the expert eyewitness referred to an statement weight plaintiff’s of such alcohol evidence on shoulder, that Dubis’ vehicle drifted onto the decision to travel with an intoxicated driver. roadway, back onto the and then left the However, allege because Suzuki does not roadway a second colliding time before with Rodriguez’s independent intoxication as an Trooper the headwall. The found no evi- negligence, act Rodriguez may request braking steering dence of or maneuvers be- limiting instruction. fore collision with the headwall. Dubis ad- driving right mitted off the side of the road II. onto the and continuing shoulder off the road argues Suzuki this Court should re- (about seconds) for 92-100 feet 1.2-1.3 with- quire convincing proof clear and as the stan- out attempting stop ever or slow down. punitive damages—an likely dard for issue actually Not until she impact felt an with the recur on retrial. cemetery driveway attempt did she a steer- ing Further, dry correction. the road was case, only this instruction on In obstruction, impediment oncoming with no or proof preponderance burden of was the Finally, traffic to force her off the road. standard, gen articulated expert physical medical testified that the evi- proof regular eral burden of instruction for dence impaired was more consistent with an Use, civil claims. See Notes on MAI 5 th driver. Suzuki was entitled to a instruc- 3.01; Alcolac, Inc., 42, Elam v. 765 S.W.2d tion on negligence. Dubis’ intoxication as (Mo.App.1988); City 224 Kansas v. Keene See MAI 5 th 17.21. 360, (Mo. Corporation, 855 S.W.2d 377 banc 1993) J., (Holstein, concurring); MAI 3.01 (1964). punitive damages, In order to award

Next, only likely Suzuki contends that the trial needed to believe “more excluding passen- court erred in propositions evidence of than not” the of fact submitted 110 erroneously by increasing damages. tion tarnished punitive See

in the instruction on Center, proof. plaintiffs burden of 828 DePaul Health S.W.2d Wollen v. 1992). (Mo. Preponderance banc already requires higher this Id. Missouri disputes. in civil minimum standard types of proof in several civil standard of Kramer, 745, 755, 102

Santosky v. 455 U.S. Keene, at 377. cases. See (1982). 1388, 1395, In 71 L.Ed.2d 599 S.Ct. Optometry, Inc.—-with Menaugh v. Resler damages imposed for Punitive “are citing precedent no discussion and little punishment deterrence.” purpose of —this rejected higher proof standard of Greene, rel. Smith v. S.W.2d State ex submissions, relying on “our normal punitive 1973). Menaugh, also of civil submission requirements J., (Robertson, concurring); 71 at 76 S.W.2d cases.” Keene, damages at 378. Punitive requiring the clear thus are like other cases proof function of the standard proof: the reme convincing standard of the risk of error between is to “allocate extraordinary that it should dy or harsh is so impor litigants and to indicate the relative Keene, only sparingly. applied be Ad attached to the ultimate decision.” tance Texas, 418, 423, dington 441 U.S. 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d requires majority of states clear growing A convincing specifically is clear and standard punitive convincing dam- evidence before used Mutual ages can considered. See be Pacific Haslip, 23 n. 499 U.S. involving allegations of fraud Insurance in civil cases Life L.Ed.2d 1 1046 n. wrongdoing 111 S.Ct. quasi-criminal or some other (1991). Twenty-four states have at stake n. by the defendant. The interests convincing adopted standard more a clear are deemed be in those cases the District of Co- money and statute.1 states and loss of Six than mere substantial judicial adopted the standard accordingly lumbia have jurisdictions reduce some punitive state does not allow having reputa- his decision.2 One risk to defendant (1996 requires court statute the trial Cum.Supp.); South Dakota’s § Alaska 1. Ala.Code 6-11-20 (1994 Supp); convincing to de- apply § Cal. Civ. standard Cum. to termine, a clear Stat. 09.17.020 3294(a) (West Cum.Supp.); damages § Ga. punitive can be submit- Code before (Michie Cum. Code Ann. 51-12-5.1 jury, a reasonable whether there is ted to the 5/2-1115.05(b) § Supp.); willful, ch. 735 Ill.Rev.Stat. wan- that there has been basis to believe (West § Cum.Supp.); Ann. 34-4- Ind.Code 1996 by S.D. conduct the defendant. ton or malicious (Bums Cum.Supp.); Iowa Code Aim. 1996 34-2 (1987). § The Su- Codified Laws Ann. 21-1-4.1 (West 1987); § 60- § Kan. Stat. Ann. 668A.1 held that this does preme of South Dakota 411.184(2) 3701(c) (1994); § Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. not, require by implication, a to use a clear 1992); (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Minn.Stat. standard, prepon- convincing a rather than 549.20.1(a) (1994); § § Ann. 11—1— Miss.Code standard, determining derance of evidence 65(l)(a) (1996 Cum.Supp.); Mont.Code Ann. punitive damages. Flockhart whether to award 42.005(1) 27-1-221(5) (1996); § § (1995); Nev.Rev.Stat. 473, (S.D.1991). Wyant, 467 N.W.2d 475 (West 1996 Stat. Ann. 2A:15-5.12 NJ. 1D-I5(b) (Michie Cum.Supp.); § Gen.Stat. N.C. Co., 150 Ins. v. Nationwide 2. See Linthicum Life (1996); 1995); § 32-03.2-11.1 N.D. Cent.Code 675, 326, 332, (1986); Masaki P.2d 681 Ariz. 723 (Baldwin’s 2315.21(C)(3) §Ann. Ohio Rev.Code 1, 780 P.2d Corp., Haw. Motors 71 v. General 23, (West 1994); § 9.1 1997 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 566, (1989); Raymond, A.2d 494 Tuttle v. 575 (1991); § Cum.Supp.); 30.925 Or.Rev.Stat. Owens-Illinois, 1353, (Me.1985); Inc. 1363 (Law Co-op.1995 § 15-33-135 S.C.Code Ann. (1992); 420, 633, Zenobia, 657 Md. 601 A.2d 325 Cum.Supp.); & Rem.Code Arm. Texas Civ. Prac. 896, Hodges Company, 833 S.W.2d v. S.C. & 41.003(a) (West Cum.Supp.); § Utah Code Toof 1997 Co., (Tenn.1992); Wangen 97 v. Ford Motor 78-18-l(l)(a) (1992). §Ann. (1980); 260, 437, Jona 294 N.W.2d Wis.2d damages punitive to three times Florida limits Breeden, 665 A.2d Co. v. than Woodner damages, compensatory unless the amount of Ex v. National (D.C.App.1995). But see lessen prove and convinc- can more clear claimant Co., 776 P.2d 108 N.M. cess Ins. (1989); 768.73(l)(b) § Ann. ing (West Fla. Stat. evidence. Corp., Rail v. Consolidated Jackson Cum.Supp.). (App. 1321 n. 5 N.J.Super. Div.1988); A.2d beyond requires proof a reasonable Colorado Corp., 508 Martin v. Johns-Manville damages support punitive claim. doubt to (1985). 13-25-127(2) (1989). n. 14 A.2d Pa. Colo.Rev.Stat.

HI all,3 by barring its discretion damages at and two others do not abused consumption. principal their alcohol civil cases.4 most trial court erred opinion decides that damages are punitive Because ex regarding alcohol general on the rule based harsh, traordinary and this Court concludes of drinks an the number —that higher proof required: standard prior to the event eyewitness has consumed claims, punitive damage For common law credibility. not This rule does is relevant convincing evidence must meet the clear and drinking automatically mean that evidence proof. To the extent of its dis standard hand, in, preju- gets the other however. On proof punitive cussion of the standard of automatically is not excluded.1 dicial evidence damages, Memmgh is overruled. evidence, however, Unfairly prejudicial evi- tendency inherently has the dence that change in This the common law re an on an im- induce a to decide issue trial, pro requirements which are lates basis, proper can be excluded at the discre- apply prospectively only. Bark cedural and tion of the trial court.2 County, er v. Louis 340 Mo. St. The clear and 377-78 vantage point The trial court has the best convincing proof punitive standard prejudice, and from which to evaluate unfair case, damages apply shall to this all cases only if there exists evidence we can reverse 1, 1997, February begins trial after

which court its discretion in that the trial abused pending proper and all cases in which very diffi- making that evaluation.3 This is a objection preserved. has been Hartman cult of review to overcome. The standard Hartman, by Hartman v. only if ruling trial be overturned court’s will 1991); Gustafson, it is: logic circum-

clearly against of the court and is so stances then before the III. arbitrary as to shock the and unreasonable judgment of the circuit court is re- justice and indicate a lack of sense versed and the cause for a new remanded consideration; people if careful reasonable opinion. trial consistent with this propriety action can differ about the court, trial then it cannot be taken HOLSTEIN, C.J., PRICE, LIMBAUGH, said that the trial court abused its discre- COVINGTON, JJ., ROBERTSON and tion.4 concur. logical court to exclude It was for the trial WHITE, J., separate opinion dissents in unfairly prejudicial the evidence that sev- filed. nonparties had consumed some wine the eral WHITE, Judge, dissenting. nonparty day and that one of the accident nonpar- nonparty feeling “tipsy.” I These respectfully dissent. As to the witness witnesses, company plaintiff had in the of the I cannot find that the trial court ties been 1984) (Mo. (holding expert's Kingsley, that banc 3. See Miller v. 194 Neb. (1975). N.W.2d testimony sufficiently tech- was not based on nique danger prejudice inherent to overcome of (1996); Fisher 4. N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. 507:16 expert); status as an Gant v. created his Inc., Props., Arden-Mayfair, Inc. v. 106 Wash.2d Hanks, (Mo.App.1981) 614 S.W.2d 726 P.2d plaintiff (holding in that defendant's concern for Williams, inflammatory personal injury action was not "so 652 S.W.2d 1. See State (Mo. 1983). prejudicial banc “The fact that such evidence as to amount to abuse of discre- or might prejudicial dispositive.” tion”). be is not Gibson, 2. 636 S.W.2d 956 See State Gibson, S.W.2d at 958. 3. 1982). Although dispositive prejudice is not the issue, require process all relevant "due does not prohibit be nor the refusal State, evidence to received 4. Richardson highly prejudicial of albeit relevant evidence.” See, e.g., Taylor, Id. at 958. State v. plaintiff consumption of alcohol is sufficient.

and the defendant-driver. The was dence passenger general conjunction rule a defendant-driver’s vehicle. The in with the plaintiff rolled The The vehicle over. sued that has in discretion the trial court deter- corporate basis unfairly prejudi- the defendants on the of mining whether is evidence liability product and on adequate against the defendant-driver protection ensures the cial negligence. corporate basis of The the de- improper consump- of use evidence of alcohol against the defen- fendants cross-claimed tion. of negligent operation the dant-driver however, disagree, reversing I with the the affirmative automobile asserted de- grounds us on the that we are case before contributory against negligence of fense the overruling Doisy. apply a rule To retroac- plaintiff. Both the and the de- cross-claim tively clearly in within this manner is our consumption. fense were based on alcohol today’s I but would declare rule to power,5 nonparties that the drink- The evidence were operate prospectively only. or not Whether leading ing inherently danger has of the the overruling precedent pro- we announce the plaintiff

jury to the conclusion that both the only case-by-case is spectively analysis.6 drinking. and the defendant-driver had been adopted test to We have a three-factor facili- By excluding this trial court evidence the was this tate analysis.7 ensuring corporate that the defendants met First, question the “must estab- decision negligence establishing burden of the their principle overruling ... lish a new of law parties independent evidence concern- the past question clear There is no ing nonparties. Considering activities precedent.”8 Doisy to that this decision overrules the ex- complete context the in which this evidence separate tent that it created a standard for offered, only the of which the was nuances admission of of alcohol con- the discern, truly court could it does not trial negligence sumption in cases. automobile justice the trial shock the sense that court a new “This Court therefore declares stan- drinking of found these references to the the dard for in civil cases: Evidence of companions unfairly prejudicial nonparty admissible, if alcohol is other- defendant-driver, plaintiff, as well as the relevant and material.”9 wise concerning negligence. the issue of witnesses, party agree I with factor is whether retroactive As to the second opinion Doisy application pur- that will or retard the principal standard of enhance An driving” pose or effect of over- “erratic “other circumstances” the new rule.10 retroactively ruling it proved apply applied difficult to in the courtroom. case is when Doisy legitimate, legal of circumstances intent of however. controls outcome consump- occurring prior to date of the decision.11 there is evidence of alcohol When ease, concerning any negligence always though the ef- it is not Even decision tion ultimately unfairly prejudicial overruling precedent fect of admissible because jury. specific, general emerged has Doisy attempted to em- case trend effect point. Following concerning purpose and effect new phasize this decisions treat- purpose Doisy creating Rules with substantive ed a new standard auto- rules. retroactively agree applied are as well as negligence I with the effect mobile eases. procedural are opinion separate that rule is Rules that principal not prospectively.12 necessary applied prospectively that rule on evi- are general only.13 may of final decision define de- Id. “[C]ourts decision, is, the effect of a whether or clare Op. 9. operate only.” prospectively not it shall Koebel Co., & Mo. v. Tieman Coal Material Sumners, 701 724. 10. S.W.2d at (1935) (citing Great Northern Co., Refining Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Annotation, Shapiro, Overruling 11. S.R. Deci- (1932)). U.S. 53 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed. 360 sion-Application, 10 A.L.R.3d Sumners, 6. Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d at 725. 12. 1985). opinion. Op. 110. also this at 13. Id. See 7. Id. at 724. I thirty years precedent. would rights par- rules define of Substantive the overturn judgment trial court and ties, affirm the of the the of cause of action such as elements Doisy prospec- overruling the announce Evidentiary gener- or a are defense.14 rules tively only. ally procedural, they to be considered machinery carrying relate more to “the convincing standard for As to the clear today on Our decision does not the suit.”15 punitive damages, again apply I would the change ability parties bring to causes the only. principal prospectively new rule negligence involving of action for automo- change in opinion that this common states Overruling Doisy change

biles. the does trial, requirements at which law “relates to of the admission of evidence once mechanics only.” apply prospectively procedural and are courtroom, parties are inside the however. on, principal goes how- agree. opinion I clearly procedural. This This factor case is retroactively ever, the to this apply to rule announcing in favor of the new rule militates it pending cases. While is case and other only. prospectively rule in power to announce a new within our manner, appropriate I do not it is to this feel requires balancing of: The third factor procedural the new do so when rule acted in with the the trial court accordance may of those be affected interest who at the controlling law time. law, change weighing degree parties may to which have relied

upon hardship old rule and

might parties result to those from the ret- operation rule

rospective of the new against possible par- hardship to those Publishing Carolyn TUFT Pulitzer ties would be denied who the benefit Appellants/Cross- Company, new rule.16 Respondents, presented Both trial cases at their relying Doisy. on appeal Neither LOUIS, Respondent/Cross- CITY OF ST. expected side that this overturn Court would Appellant. Doisy thirty years after of reliance on the requested case. side Neither this Court Nos. 68872. argument do so. The of the defendants Appeals, Missouri Court they

this that the offered case was District, Eastern “amply Doisy at satisfied” trial standard. Division Two. To for a new we are reverse trial because Doisy June 1996. overruling is a windfall for the defen- dants, they argue. which and one for did not Rehearing Transfer Motion and/or 1, 1996. Aug. Supreme Court Denied compli- its The trial court made decision Supreme Transferred to Case Doisy controlling ance when it with was the 17, 1996. Sept. wrongful law. If reverse this for the we case evidence, holding we that the exclusion of are Retransferred to Court Case trial abused its discretion. It seems court 21, 1997. Appeals Jan. how incongruous to admit “inconsistent Opinion Original Reinstated Doisy unpredictable” proved standard 28, 1997. Jan. trial, single trial court be and then out this that it under Doi- for the conclusion reached - sy. cannot hold trial court to also We foreseeing that we would standard Sumners, 724. Shepherd Cooperative Consumers Associa- 701 S.W.2d at tion, Id.

Case Details

Case Name: Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp.

Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri

Date Published: Dec 17, 1996

Citation: 936 S.W.2d 104

Docket Number: 78539

Court Abbreviation: Mo.