MIGUEL V. RODRIGUEZ v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Jаmes McDonough, EVERGLADES CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, R. PENDLETON, Assistant Warden, NADRIAN BRINSON, Correction Officer a.k.a. Brinston, EDNA FIGUEROA, a.k.a. Figueroa, Correction Officer, et al.
No. 05-14600, 05-14842
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 21, 2007
D. C. Docket No. 02-22677-CV-DLG [PUBLISH]
MIGUEL V. RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
James McDonough,
EVERGLADES CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
R. PENDLETON,
Assistant Warden,
NADRIAN BRINSON,
Correction Officer a.k.a. Brinston,
EDNA FIGUEROA,
a.k.a. Figueroa, Correction Officer, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 05-14842
D. C. Docket No. 02-22677-CV-DLG
MIGUEL V. RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants,
R. KUGLER,
Assistant Warden,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(November 21, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and COX, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Miguel V. Rodriguez, a Florida prisoner, filed this
Rodriguez‘s claim against Johnson went to trial. After Rodriguez presented his case in chief, Johnson moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted Johnson‘s motion, holding that he did not cause the Eighth Amendment violation because he did not have the final authority to order Rodriguez‘s release into the general prison population.
Rodriguez appeals both rulings. After oral argument and a thorough review of the recоrd, we vacate the judgment of the district court with respect to both Kugler and Johnson and remand both claims for further proceedings.
With respect to Kugler, we conclude that: (1) there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether he was subjectively aware that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) this appeal does not require us to address the reasonableness of Kugler‘s response to the risk of harm facing Rodriguez; and (3) there is evidence in the summary-judgment record from which a reasonable juror could find a causal connection between Kugler‘s actions and the Eighth
With respect to Johnson, we conclude that: (1) a reasonable juror could find, based on the evidence presented at trial, that Johnson was subjectively aware that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) this appeal does not require us to address the reasonableness of Johnson‘s response to the risk of harm facing Rodriguez; and (3) a reasonable juror could find, based on the evidence presented at trial, a causal connection between Johnson‘s actions and the Eighth Amendment violation.
I. FACTS
These are the facts taken in the light most favorable to Rodriguez, construing all reasonable inferences in his favor.2 In 2002, Rodriguez was an inmate at the Everglades Correctional Institution (ECI) in Miami, Florida. Raymond Kugler was the Assistant Warden for Operations at ECI and, in that capacity, shared responsibility for prison security. Charles Johnson was the Colonel of ECI and was, in that capacity, the chief of prison security.
During the winter of 2002, Rodriguez was under “close management,” which in ECI parlance means that he was segregated from the general prison
While under close management in early 2002, Rodriguez “learned that gang members at ECI wanted to kill [him].” Pl.‘s Decl. ¶ 4. Those who wanted to kill him were members of his former gang, the Latin Kings, which had a particularly strong presence at ECI. They wanted to kill Rodriguez as retribution for his having renounced his membership. On at least two occasions while under close management, Rodriguez verbally told Kugler “of the threat made against my life” by members of his former gang and “asked [Kugler] that I be transferred to another correctional institution for my protection.” Id. ¶ 5. Rodriguez‘s transfer request was “in addition to requesting that [I] be placed in protective custody.”4 Id. Kugler took no action with respect Rodriguez‘s allegations or his requests for protection.
Rodriguez also spoke to Johnson on a number of occasions regarding the
In addition to verbally expressing his security concerns to Kugler and Johnson, Rodriguez also filed with ECI a written form, known as an Inmate
Submitting an Inmate Request form is not the only way a prisoner at ECI may bring a security concern to the attention of the appropriate officials. Johnson, who (like Kugler) had frequent face-to-face contact with inmates at ECI, testified in his deposition that inmates may also bring their seсurity concerns directly to ECI officials through informal conversation. ECI officials knew what to do when faced with such concerns because ECI had in place an established protocol for
[If an inmate] comes to me and state[s] that he is in fear for his life, I am going to make him stand right there and I‘m going to call the shift supervisor and explain to the shift supervisor, “This inmate stated he‘s in fear for his life, please place him in administrative confinement until we do a protective management review.”
Johnson Dep. at 24.
Johnson explained that a “protective management review” entails having a sergeant “go and investigate” the inmate‘s claims. Such a review requires that the sergeant “get all the statements from everybody” that the inmate says he is having trouble with. Id. Once that process is complete, according to Johnson, if the prisoner‘s safety concerns are substantiаted, the appropriate prison officials “get[] together and we normally recommend he [the complaining inmate] be transferred from the institution.” Id. at 25.6 No protective management review was ever initiated in response to the safety concerns expressed by Rodriguez.
On April 3, 2002, a Classification Review meeting was held to determine whether Rodriguez was ready to be released from close management back into the
On the morning of April 10, 2002, only hours after having been transferred to the compound, Rodriguez was stabbed in the back and chest with a shank by Arnold Cleveland, an “enforcer”10 of the Latin Kings.
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that bound the district court and viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Rodriguez. See Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‘” Id. (quoting
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of judgment as a matter of law under
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, 114 S. Ct. at 1976 (citing various courts of appeals); see Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[I]t is well settled that a prison inmate has a constitutional right to be protected . . . from physical assault by other inmates.“). “[H]aving stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, 114 S. Ct. at 1977.
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he actually (subjectively) knows that an inmate is facing a substantial12 risk of serious harm, yet disregards that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively)
With regard to the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court in Farmer held that the prison “official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. The Court also held: “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981 (emphasis added). A prison official cannot avoid liability under the Eighth Amendment “by showing that ... he did not know the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” Id. at 843, 114 S. Ct. at 1982 (emphasis added). This is because “[t]he question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with
The Court in Farmer identified three ways that prison officials might avoid Eighth Amendment liability. Officials might show: (1) “that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger“; (2) “that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent“; or (3) that “they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S. Ct. at 1982-83.
Kugler and Johnson make two arguments on appeal. First, they maintain that they did not know any “facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger” and thus did not actually know that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Their argument in this regard, stated differently, is that the concerns expressed by Rodriguez were not specific enough to put them on actual notice of a risk of harm. Second, they maintain that Rodriguez cannot demonstrate the requisite causal connection because they did not, in their capacity at the April 3 meeting, have final authority to order Rodriguez‘s release from close management. All they
A. Summary Judgment to Kugler
1. Did Kugler Actually Know Rodriguez Faced a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm?
The district court determined that Rodriguez could not satisfy the subjective component of his Eighth Amendment claim and granted summary judgment to Kugler solely on this basis.14 Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Kugler because there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could find that Kugler actually knew that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm from his former gang members. Specifically, Rodriguez says, the summary-judgment record viewed in the light most favorable to him demonstrates that: (1) he verbally informed Kugler on at least two occasions that his life had been threаtened by members of his former gang and that, to avoid injury, he needed either to be transferred to another prison
Rodriguez submitted a declaration in opposition to Kugler‘s summary-judgment motion in which he stated that “While in Close Management (“CM“) at ECI prior to the April 10, 2002 stabbing incident, I learned that gang members at ECI wanted to kill me.” Pl.‘s Decl. ¶ 4. Viewed in the light most favorable to Rodriguez, this evidence gives rise to an inference that he received threats on his life, from members of his former gang, prior to the stabbing. Rodriguez stated in his declaration that “verbally on at least two separate occasions [prior to the April 10 stabbing]” “I informed [Kugler] of the threat made against my life and asked that I be transferred to another correctionаl institution for my protection.” Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added). Again, viewed in the light most favorable to Rodriguez, the reasonable inference created by this evidence is that the threat of which Rodriguez twice informed Kugler was the gang-related threat referenced in the preceding paragraph of his declaration, the threat we can infer from Rodriguez‘s knowledge that “gang members at ECI wanted to kill [him].” We think that this evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
With regard to Rodriguez‘s verbal complaints, Kugler said in his deposition that he did not remember having any conversation with Rodriguez in which Rodriguez mentioned the threats to his life or his need for a transfer or protective custody. Kugler‘s denial flatly contradicts Rodriguez‘s allegations. Besides denying that such conversations ever took place, Kugler alsо challenges the sufficiency of Rodriguez‘s declaration on the ground that it does not “furnish any specifics as to who was posing the alleged threats.” Appellees’ Br. at 6 (emphasis added). Kugler‘s challenge to the declaration in this respect is without merit, however, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Farmer: “Nor may a prison official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that ... he did not know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S. Ct. at 1982 (emphasis added). We conclude that Rodriguez‘s declaration testimony, coupled with Kugler‘s inability to recall any security-related conversations with Rodriguez, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether Kugler had subjective knowledge that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious
With regard to the submission of Rodriguez‘s February 18, 2002, Inmate Request Form — in which he stated that he had “a problem with another inmate in this compound,” that he had “submitted a request for protection,” and that he “want[ed] to know ... whether you are going to give me a transfer” — Kugler testified in his deposition that, although he would ordinarily have received a security-related Inmate Request form like Rodriguez‘s, he never saw the one submitted by Rodriguez. Kugler‘s testimony that he would ordinarily have received such a form, coupled with his express denial that he received the one submitted on February 18, leads us to conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether Kugler was aware of the Inmate Request form prior to the attack. This dispute of fact, in turn, is relevant to the question whether Kugler had subjective knowledge that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm.15
“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S. Ct. at 1982-83. More succinctly, “prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id. at 845, 114 S. Ct. at 1983. We have said that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment if he responds to a known risk “in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358. An official responds to a known risk in an objectively unreasonable manner if “he knew of ways to reduce the harm but knowingly declined to act” or if “he knew of ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to act.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583.
Rodriguez argues on appeal that Kugler responded to the threatened risk of harm in an objectively unreasonable manner. But the district court, given that it granted summary judgment to Kugler solely on the basis that Kugler lacked subjective knowledge of the risk, stopped short of addressing this question. Moreover, Kugler does not argue on appeal that his response was reasonable; rather, Kugler argues only that he had no subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm, and/or that he was not the cause. Because it is not necessary for us to
do so, we decline to address the objective component of Rodriguez‘s Eighth Amendment claim. We accordingly leаve to the district court on remand the task of considering this issue in the first instance.3. Did Kugler Cause Rodriguez‘s Injury?
In granting summary judgment to Kugler, the district court did not consider whether Kugler caused the Eighth Amendment violation. The court did not need to consider that question because it determined that there was not enough evidence to show that Kugler actually knew about the substantial risk of serious harm facing Rodriguez. On appeal, however, Kugler asks us to affirm the district court‘s judgment on the ground that he did not cause the violation. For the reasons stated below with respect to Johnson, we reject Kugler‘s argument because the record contains evidence from which a reasonable juror could find a causal connection between Kugler‘s actions and the Eighth Amendment violation.
B. Judgment as a Matter of Law to Johnson
1. Did Johnson Actually Know Rodriguez Faced a Substantial Risk of Harm?
Johnson argues that he did not actually know that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Johnson says that Rodriguez‘s complaints were too vague to trigger his
Rodriguez testified at trial that he first spoke with Johnson about his fear of being released into the compound on March 28. On that date, Rodriguez told Johnson “[t]hat I was afraid for my life and that I didn‘t want to go out to the compound and that he should give me protection and give me a transfer” to another institution. Trial Tr. I at 104-105. Rodriguez spoke to Johnson again at the April 3 Classification Review meeting. At that meeting Rodriguez “told the colonel that I didn‘t want to be released to the compound because . . . I was afraid that other inmates would attack me, that I wanted for him to give me a protection and a transfer.” Id. at 105. On at least one occasion, Rodriguez specifically told Johnson that some member or members of the Latin Kings had issued a death threat against him. Id. at 123. Rodriguez “told him [Johnson] that I was a . . . retired gang member and that the Lаtin Kings wanted to attack me because I didn‘t
Johnson argues that no reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence that Rodriguez communicated to Johnson “specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists.” Appellees’ Br. at 17. We disagree.
Johnson relies exclusively on our decision in Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003), to support his argument that Rodriguez‘s complaints were too vague to put Johnson on actual notice of a substantial risk of harm. Carter does not help Johnson. In Carter an inmate was stabbed with a shank by a fellow inmate with whom he had been placed. The inmate then sued various prison officials under the
Here, unlike in Carter, Rodriguez told Johnson the following specific information: (1) that he was а former Latin King who decided to renounce his membership; (2) that members of the Latin Kings had threatened to kill him when he returned to the compound in retaliation for his renunciation; (3) that the compound at ECI was heavily populated with Latin Kings; and (4) that, in order to prevent an attempt on his life, he needed either to be transferred to another institution or to be placed in protective custody. These are the things that the
Accordingly, we conclude that there was a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to find for [Rodriguez]” on the subjective component of his
2. Did Johnson Respond Reasonably to the Known Risk?
As he did with respect to Kugler, Rodriguez argues on appeal that Johnson responded to the threatened risk of harm in an objectively unreasonable manner. But (as in the case of Kugler) the district court did not address this question, given that it granted judgment as a matter of law to Johnson solely on the basis that Johnson did not cause the
The district court granted Johnson judgment as a matter of law solely on the basis of its determination that Johnson did not cause the
For purposes of determining whether Johnson caused the
Applying the concept of causation spelled out in Williams, we held in LaMarca v. Turner that a plaintiff demonstrates the “necessary causal link” in this context where he is able to show that the prison official (1) “had the means substantially to improve” the inmate‘s safety, (2) “knew that the actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide [the inmate] with reasonable protection from violence,” and (3) had “other means [] available to him which he nevertheless disregarded.” 995 F.2d at 1539. Here, the record evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that the “necessary causal link” has been established.18
Second, a reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence that Johnson “knew that the actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide [the inmate] with reasonable protection from violence.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1539. The evidence in this case supports such an inference because the only action Johnson took in response to Rodriguez‘s requests for protection was to recommend that Rodriguez be returned to the compound — where he would have no protection at all from the Latin Kings who had threatened his life.
Third, the fact that ECI had an established protocol for handling an inmate‘s
We are satisfied that the evidence in this case is sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find the “necessary causal link” between Johnson‘s actions and Rodriguez‘s injury.19 Because we are unable to say that “there [was] no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to find for [Rodriguez]” on the issue of causation,
For the reasons stated above, we vacate both the summary judgment entered in favor of Kugler and the judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of Johnson and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
I respectfully dissent from the court‘s opinion because Miguel Rodriguez failed to present any evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the conduct of Colonel Johnson or Assistant Warden Kugler caused his injury. I would therefore affirm the district court‘s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Kugler1 and judgment as a matter of law in favor of Johnson.
I discern two holdings in the court‘s opinion. First, the court disagrees with what it characterizes as the district court‘s “narrow view of causation” and holds that “the ‘critical’ question is whether Johnson was ‘in a position to take steps that could have averted the stаbbing incident . . . but, through [deliberate] indifference, failed to do so.‘” (Maj. Op. at 26) (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1384 (11th Cir. 1982)). I will refer to this holding as the “primary holding.”
Second, the court holds that the Defendants’ power to place Rodriguez in temporary administrative confinement, pending a management review protocol, establishes the necessary causation. I will refer to this holding as “the alternative holding.” Both holdings lack precedential support in this circuit, and I will discuss
1. The Primary Holding
“Evidence that an individual defendant had neither the authority nor the resources to prevent the deprivation is material to [the causation analysis].” Id. at 1375. The court acknowledges that “[n]either Kugler nor Johnson had final authority (either individually or jointly) to order Rodriguez‘s release from close management.” (Maj. Op. at 10.) That authority rested with the state classification
The court relies upon Williams, 689 F.2d 1370, and LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993), in holding that a “plaintiff demonstrates the ‘necessary causal link’ in this context where he is able to show that the prison official (1) ‘had the means substantially to improve’ the inmate‘s safety, (2) ‘knew that the actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide [the inmate] with reasonable protection from violence,’ and (3) had ‘other means [] available to him which he nevertheless disregarded.‘” (Maj. Op. at 27) (quoting LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1539). Both Williams and LaMarca involved systematic deficiencies in a prison‘s protection of inmates. Neither case supports this court‘s holding on causation. The Williams court emphasized the importance of the causation element:
By contrast, the critical causation issue here must be whether each individual defendant was in a position to take steps that could have averted the stabbing incident at Holman but, through callous indifference, failed to do so. Resolution of this issue necessarily entails a very individualized approach, taking into account the duties, discretion and means of each defendant.
There can be no duty, the breach of which is actionable, to do that which is beyond the power, authority, or means of the charged party. One may be callously indifferent to the fate of prisoners and yet not be liable for their injuries. Those whose callous indifference results in liability are those under a duty — possessed of authority and means — to prevent the injury.
Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384 (footnote omitted). In LaMarca, the defendant Turner
In short, instead of requiring some proof of an affirmative causal connection, as our precedent requires, the court holds that Rodriguez need only demonstrate that Johnson or Kugler failed to take steps to could have averted the stabbing.2 The court fails to consider whether the classification team gave any weight to Johnson‘s or Kugler‘s recommendation that Rodriguez be released to the
2. The Alternative Holding
The court also holds that Johnson‘s and Kugler‘s failure to order temporary administrative confinement, pending a protective management review, caused Rodriguez‘s injury: “[W]e respectfully submit that proof of causation in this case does not turn on the ultimate placement or classification decision with respect to Rodriguez. . . . Whether Rodriguez would have faced a similar danger upоn his ultimate release into the general population, if that were the ultimate decision of the state classification team, is a matter for another day and another case.” (Maj. Op. at 29-30 n.20.) The court seems to be saying that this particular injury at this
“For damages to be proximately caused by a constitutional tort, a plaintiff must show that, except for that constitutional tort, such injuries and damages would not have occurred and further that such injuries and damages were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the tortious acts or omissions in issue.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000). “Under traditional tort principles, causation has two required elements: cause-in-fact and legal or proximate cause. . . . To establish cause-in-fact, the plaintiff must show that except for the constitutional tort, such injuries and damages would not have occurred.” Id. at 1168 n.16 (citation omitted).
Ignoring these basic principles of causation, the court holds that a reasonable jury could find that Johnson or Kugler caused Rodriguez‘s injury, since either or both of them could have placed Rodriguez in administrative confinement while the state classification team conducted a protective management review to determine if his classification should change. This analysis fails the cause-in-fact test. Nothing in the record indicates how long this administrative confinement might have lasted (though it would clearly be only a temporary confinement) or what the result of the protective management review might have been. Rodriguez
To buttress its holding that Johnson and Kugler had “power to control prisoner placement,” the court relies on the Supreme Court case of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). In Farmer, the defendants argued that they had no power to control placement of the plaintiff, an inmate who had recently been transferred to an out-of-state prison. However, an affidavit from one defendant admitted that the plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation at the out-of-state prison pursuant to a “request” from their office. On this evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that “the record gives at least a suggestion” that the
I would affirm the district court.