{1} This Opinion addresses an exception in the Workers’ Compensation Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1987) (as amended through 2006) (the Act), that permits compensation for injuries incurred in travel by employees when those injuries “aris[e] out of and in the course of employment.” Section 52-1-19. Eloy Doporto, Jr., 1 Mike Lucas, Jose Turrubiates, and Pete Rodriguez (collectively, Workers), oilfield workers employed by Permian Drilling Corporation (Permian), insured by American Home Assurance, were involved in an automobile accident while traveling to their work site, resulting in the death of Doporto and injuries tо the others. We conclude that the injuries suffered by Workers arose out of and in the course of their employment because the travel was mutually beneficial to employees and employer and Workers encountered special hazards unique to their employment while traveling, thus rendering Workers “traveling employees” whose injuries are compensable under the Act.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{2} Our review of the whole record developed before the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) supports the following statement of the factual background. Permian operates mobile drilling rigs throughout southeastern New Mexico and western Texas. The rigs are mobile and are moved to a new location after the drilling of a well is complete, generally every seven to eight days. The drill sites typically are located in rural areas, far from any town, making travel necessary. Crews travel to and from the drill site daily; if the site is extremely remote, however, the drilling company provides lodging. The rigs, operated twenty-four hours a day, are staffed by three crews working eight-hour shifts and a relief crew that replaces the оthers on their respective days off.
{3} Each crew consists of a driller and three to four crew members. The driller is responsible for hiring and supervising his crew, subject to Permian’s approval. The driller is obligated to have a full crew present at the drilling site at the beginning of the shift; an insufficient number of crew members results in an idle rig and imposes a significant financial burden on the company. To meet this responsibility, the industry practice is for drillers to transport their crews to the rig site, though Permian has no written policy requiring such. Permian requires drillers to maintain a valid driver’s licensе and automobile insurance, and compensates the drillers at the rate of twenty-five cents for each mile traveled to a rig site. Individual crew members are not compensated for their travel time, even if they choose to travel individually; they are paid hourly once they begin their scheduled shift. Permian’s crews may travel up to 4000 miles per month, or as much as 200 miles per day, to reach the mobile drilling rigs to which they are assigned, though Permian does not dictate the route they must travel nor the mode of transportation.
{4} Workers were members of аn oil well drilling crew employed by Permian. Rodriguez, the driller, customarily picked up the members of his crew — Doporto, Lucas, and Turrubiates — at their homes in Hobbs to transport them to the rig site in his vehicle. Rodriguez led weekly safety meetings with his crew on topics that included travel safety. The crew had been working extra shifts in the days prior to the accident. In the early morning of November 10, 2006, Rodriguez picked up his crew at their homes, and they
{5} Workers filed workers’ compensation claims under the Act, arguing that they were traveling employees injured in the course of their employment. Their claims were consolidated before a WCJ. The WCJ bifurcated the trial to decide the issue of compensability before determining benefit entitlements. After a trial on the merits and the submission of proposed findings of fact by each party, the WCJ entered written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a compensation order. The WCJ concluded that Workers were commuters, that the mileage payments to Rodriguez did not make him a traveling employee, and that the travel to the rig site was “not an incidental or integral part of Workers’ employment.” As a result, Workers’ claims were dismissed because their injuries did not occur within the course and scope of their employment and thus the injuries were not compensable under the Act.
{6} Workers appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in a memorandum оpinion, upheld the WCJ’s dismissal of Workers’ claims. Rodriguez v. Permian Drilling Corp., No. 29,435, slip op. at 13,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7} “All workers’ compensation cases are reviewed under a whole record standard of review.” Moya v. City of Albuquerque,
{8} If the facts are largely undisputed, as in this case, whether Workers’ injuries are compensable under the Act is a question of law. See Edens v. N.M. Health and Soc. Servs. Dep’t,
III. ANALYSIS
{9} New Mexico’s workers’ compensation scheme, codified in the Act, is designed “to compensate workers for injury arising out of and in the course of employmеnt.” Flores v. McKay Oil Corp.,
accidental injuries to workers and death resulting from accidental injury as a result of their employment and while at work in any place where their employer’s businessrequires their presence but shall not include injuries to any worker oсcurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties.
Section 52-1-19. An injury arises out of and in the course of employment if the injury was sustained “during the commission of an activity that is reasonable and foreseeable both as to its nature and manner of commission.” Ramirez,
{10} The Act excludes injuries incurred by an employee “while on [the] way to assume the duties of ... employment or after leaving such duties,” Ramirez,
{11} Recognized excеptions to the going and coming rule are numerous; we limit our discussion, however, to the single exception at issue in this appeal, that of the traveling employee. This exception was adopted, and thoroughly explained, by the Court of Appeals in Ramirez. Id. ¶ 11. Ramirez defined traveling employees as “employees for whom travel is an integral part of their jobs, such as those who travel to different locations to perform their duties, as differentiated from employees who commute daily from home to a single workplace.” Id. (internal quоtation marks and citation omitted).
{12} Traveling employees are distinct from “mere commuters” whose injuries are excluded from compensation under the Act. See Flores,
{13} The primary reason for the distinction between a commuter and a traveling employee is that travel undertaken by a traveling employee provides substantial benefit to both employee and emplоyer. “[T]he activity giving rise to the injury must confer some benefit on the employer.” Ramirez,
Id. ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).
{14} To determine whether an injury incurred while en route to the place of employment falls within the traveling employee exception to the going and coming rule, the Court of Appeals has utilized various factors. Ramirez set forth certain considerations relevant to determining whether an employee is a traveling employee for purposes of the Act. These considerаtions include “that an injury ... takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling the duties of employment or doing something incidental to it.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Flores, the Court of Appeals quoted as persuasive authority certain factors used by the Colorado Supreme Court to determine if an injury falls within the traveling employee exception:
(1) whether the travel occurred during working hours, (2) whether the travel occurred on or off the employer’s premises, (3) whether the travel was contemplated by the employment contract, and (4) whether the obligations or conditions of employment created a “zone of special danger” out of which the injury arose. Whether meeting one of the variables is sufficient, by itself, to create a special circumstance warranting recovery depends upon whether the evidence supporting that variable demonstrates a causal connection between the employment and the injury such that the travel to and from work arises out of and in the course of employment.
{15} A review of New Mexico caselaw reveals that our appellate courts have used two of the above-listed factors in particular to decide whether the traveling employee exception to the going and coming rule applies: the express or implied employment contract terms and the zone of special danger created by the required travel. In Barring-ton v. Johnn Drilling Co., we stated that the going and coming rule did not apply “where hazards of the journey may fairly be regarded as hazards of the service to be performed and are dependent on the nature and the circumstances of the particular employment; also where the employer contracts to and does furnish transportation to and from work.”
{16} Ramirez’ analysis focused on the terms of the employment contract, although its definition of a traveling employee indicated the special hazards faced by oil rig workers were given due consideration. The three plaintiffs in Ramirez were oil field workers assigned to a job site in western Texas, approximately 90 miles from Hobbs.
{17} Other jurisdictions likewise review the circumstances of employment when determining whether an injury incurred en route to an oil rig falls within the traveling employee exсeption to the going and coming rule. See Loffland Bros.,
{18} Some courts have focused their analysis specifically on the special hazards encountered by oil rig workers. The Ohio Supreme Court, in Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc., applied a special hazard test to a workers’ compensation claim by oil rig workers who worked at a fixed site
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and concluded that their injuries incurred when traveling to the rig site were covered.
{19} While we believe all of the above-stated factors are important considerations to be undertaken by the WCJ and reviewing courts, we find the “zone of special danger” or “special hazard” factor to be most significant to resolving this case.
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See Barrington,
{20} We now return to the record in this appeal and conclude that the facts of this ease indicate Workers fall squarely within the traveling employees exception because their travel provided a mutual benefit to the employer and employee and the conditions of employment placed the employees in a zone of special danger out of which the injury arose. The rig site to which Workers were traveling when the accident occurred was some sixty or seventy miles away from Workers’ residences in Hobbs, and lodging was not available at the rig site. Workers did not have a stationary work site but were required to move to another site every seven to eight days, preventing them from fixing their commute in relation to the rig site. Permian benefitted from having a mobile work crew that resided in a central location and could travel to different sites weekly without having to change residences. Permian incurred a substantial benefit by having its employees provide their own transportation, while subsidizing only the driller’s transрortation, rather than providing daily transportation for all employees. Rodriguez, the driller, was compensated for his mileage and was expected to arrive at the drilling site with a full crew and for having a valid license and proof of insurance on file with Permian. His crew was not compensated for their travel, but this is not required if the circumstances indicate the travel was for the purpose of fulfilling their duties of employment and benefit of the travel was incurred by the employer. 5 We conclude that these special characteristics аttendant to employment in the oil rig field satisfy the requirement that travel be mutually beneficial to employer and employee.
{21} The conditions of employment placed Workers in a zone of special danger from which arose their injuries. The long hours, long and varied travel time, and lack of choice in decreasing the commute gave rise to risks distinct from those of an average traveler on a public highway. Extensive travel is an integral part of the work of oil rig drillers and crew members, particularly for mobile rigs such as the ones on which Workers were employed, and as such distinguishes the travel to the rigs from a commute. The special hazards faced by Workers in their travel to and from the rig site were a requirement of their employment, and the accident giving rise to their claims would not have occurred but for the. required travel. We conclude that the WCJ erred in its application of the traveling employee exception of the going and coming rule to Workers, and that substantial evidence in the whole record supports the conclusion that Workers were injured in the course оf their employment. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
{22} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals and WCJ erred in their conclusion that Workers’ injuries are non-compensable under the Act. We reverse the Court of Appeals’ memorandum opinion and remand to the WCJ for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Petitioners concerned with Doporto's claim are Bill and Norma Corsaut as guardians of Doporto’s minor children.
. The Colorado Supreme Court articulated these factors in Madden v. Mountain West Fabricators, noting that contractual travel requirements could be express or implied, but that a key factor is "when such travel confers a benefit on the employer beyond the sole fact of the employee's arrival at work.”
. Ruckmaris definition of "fixed situs” distinguishes it from a situation in which travel is the job, e.g., traveling salesman, stating that a fixed-site employee “may be reassigned to a different work place monthly, weekly, or even daily.”
. Although certain states appear to apply the special hazard or special danger as a separate exception to the going and coming rule, see, e.g., Parks v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.,
. Permian argues that the stop at a local gas station en route to the rig site to purchase food and water when Workers were not directed to do so by their employer mandates affirmance of the WCJ’s order denying compensation. Even if the stop at the gas station were an unauthorized deviation, a point on which we pass no opinion, see, e.g., Parr v. N.M. State Highway Dep't,
. Because we conclude the injuries to Workers arose out of and in the course of their employment under the traveling employee exception, we do not address Rodriguez’ separate claim that the mileage payment meant that he was fulfilling a duty of his employment at the time he was injured. We note simply that the mileage payment adds further support to the conclusion that Rodriguez’ injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.