Lead Opinion
{1} The New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1917, as amended through 2015), has never required employers to provide workers’ compensation coverage to farm and ranch laborers. These consolidated appeals require us to resolve whether this exclusion violates the rights of those workers under the Equal Protection Clause of Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution in light of the fact that other agricultural workers are not singled out for exclusion. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that, “in order to be legal,” ostensibly discriminatory classifications in social and economic legislation “must be founded upon real differences of situation or condition, which bear a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and reasonably justify a different rule” for the class that suffers the discrimination. Burch v. Foy,
{2} When litigants allege that the government has unconstitutionally discriminated against them, courts must decide the merits of the allegation because if proven, courts must resist shrinking from their responsibilities as an independent branch of government, andrefuse to perpetuate the discrimination-regardless of how long it has persisted-by safeguarding constitutional rights. Such is the constitutional responsibility of the courts. Griego v. Oliver,
I. BACKGROUND
{3} In 2012, Maria Angelica Aguirre worked as a chile picker in Doña Ana County for M.A. and Sons, Inc. (M.A. & Sons) for a weekly wage of approximately $300.
{4} In March 2013, Ms. Aguirre filed a workers’ compensation complaint seeking compensation for temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, medical benefits, and attorney fees. M.A. & Sons and its insurer, the Food Industry Self Insurance Fund of New Mexico (Self Insurance Fund), raised several defenses to Ms. Aguirre’s complaint, including the contention that her claims were barred by the farm and ranch laborer exclusion in Section 52-1-6(A), which provides that the Act “shall not apply to employers of. . . farm and ranch laborers.” In January 2014, Ms. Aguirre filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) to conclude that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion had been declared unconstitutional; therefore, it did not bar her case. To support her argument, Ms. Aguirre attached materials related to the 2012 judgment in Griego v. New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration, No. CV 2009-10130, a case that was brought by New Mexico farm laborers in the Second Judicial District Court. In Griego, the district court declared that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion violated the constitutional equal protection rights of the claimants in that case and entered an order against the Workers’ Compensation Administration (the Administration). The Administration then appealed the district court’s ruling on jurisdictional grounds and, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals dismissed the claim as moot, and further stated that because the Administration had not sought review of the constitutional issue, the Court would not “examine []or draw any conclusions about it,” other than to say that the Administration “cannot now escape the effect of unchallenged parts of the district court’s decision.” Griego v. N.M. Workers’ Comp. Admin., No. 32,120, mem. op. ¶¶ 1, 11 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (non-precedential). The WCJ took judicial notice of the materials from Griego and admitted them for purposes of Ms. Aguirre’s motion for partial summary judgment. The WCJ then denied her motion and dismissed her claim with prejudice on the basis of the farm and ranch laborer exclusion.
{5} In 2012, Noe Rodriguez worked as a dairy worker and herdsman at Brand West Dairy, earning just under $1000 every two weeks for working six days a week for eight hours per day. Mr. Rodriguez alleges that he was pushed up agаinst a door by a cow and then head-butted by the cow, which caused him to fall face first onto a cement floor. He alleges that he suffered a traumatic brain injury, a neck injury, and facial disfigurement
{6} In February 2013, Mr. Rodriguez filed a workers’ compensation complaint seeking compensation for temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, disfigurement, medical benefits, and attorney fees. In July 2013, the New Mexico Uninsured Employers’ Fund (the UEF), which acts as the insurer for businesses without workers’ compensation insurance, see § 52-1-9.1, moved to dismiss Mr. Rodriguez’s claims because of the farm and ranch laborer exclusion. Mr. Rodriguez responded by arguing that the WCJ was obligated to follow the district court’s ruling in Griego and that the exclusion was unconstitutional. He attached a large quantity of materials from Griego to his motion, some of which were admitted by the WCJ. The WC J granted the UEF’s motion and dismissed Mr. Rodriguez’s case based on the exclusion.
{7} Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-8(A) (1989), Ms. Aguirre and Mr. Rodriguez (collectively “W orkers”) appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, where their appeals were consolidated. Rodriguez v. Brand W. Dairy,
{8} The UEF appealed to this Court only on the issue of the Court of Appeals’ modified prospective application of its holding. Brand West Dairy, M.A. & Sons, and the Self Insurance Fund (collectively “Employers”) appealed to this Court to seek review of both the constitutional issue and the modified prospective application of the holding. We granted both petitions.
II. THE FARM AND RANCH LABORER EXCLUSION VIOLATES ARTICLE II, SECTION 18 OF THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION
{9} W orkers contend that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion contained in Section 52-1-6(A) violates their equal protection rights under the New Mexico Constitution and does not survive under any level of scrutiny. Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that no person “shall... be denied equal protection ofthe laws.” “Like its federal equivalent, this is essentially a mandate that similarly situated individuals be treated alike, absent a sufficient reason to justify the disparate treatment.” Wagner v. AGW Consultants,
{10} We review the constitutionality of legislation de novo. See Rodriguez v. Scotts Landscaping,
A. The farm and ranch laborer exclusion results in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals
{11} To determine whether the farm and ranch laborer exclusion in Section 52-1-6(A) violates Workers’ equal protection rights, we must first decide “whether the legislation at issue results in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals.” Madrid,
{12} In this case, we will first examine the’ Act’s text to ascertain its purposes. NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-1 (1990) states the Legislature’s intent that the Act “assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled' workers at a reasonable cost to ... employers . . . .” We have previously interpreted this provision to encompass three of the Act’s objectives: “(1) maximizing the limited recovery available to injured workers, in order to keep them and their families at least minimally financially secure; (2) minimizing costs to employers; and (3) ensuring a quick and efficient system.” Wagner,
{13} With these general principles in mind, we will also examine the structure and operation of the entire Act as an indicator of its purposes. See Oliver,
{14} We must also consider the history of New Mexico ’ s workers ’ compensation laws to fully understand their current exclusion of farm and ranch laborers. See Oliver,
{15} The exclusion now provides that “[t]he provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act shall not apply to employers of. . . farm and ranch laborers.” Section 52-1-6(A). Because a “literal interpretation” of this language would lead to “absurd results},]” the provision has long been applied only to workers employed as farm and ranch laborers and not to every individual employee working for an employer of farm and ranch laborers. Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc.,
{16} A worker is classified as a farm or ranch laborer for purposes of the Act when “the worker’s primary responsibility is performed on the farming premises and is an essential part of the cultivation of the crop}.]” Id. For instance, in Holguin, the Court of Appeals determined that a worker who primarily filled and stacked sacks of onions in an onion shed was not a farm laborer under Section 52-1-6(A).
{17} We hold that the farm and ranch laborers who are excluded by Section 52-1-. 6(A) are similarly situated to other employees of agricultural employers with respect to the purposes of the Act. In light of the purposes of the Act discussed above, we conclude that there is no unique characteristic that distinguishes injured farm and ranch laborers from other employees of agricultural employers, and such a distinction is not essential to accomplishing the Act’s purposes. Cf. Sachs,
{18} Employers argue that the Act’s classification of farm and ranch laborers is a “distinction . . . [which] does not come directly from the challenged legislation, but, instead, comes from the [Court of Appeals’] interpretation and application” of the exclusion.
{19} Contrary to Employers’ contention, our equal protection jurisprudence requires us to consider how courts have interpreted legislative language to define classifications created by a statute. For example, in Oliver we had to determine whether, when read as a whole, New Mexico’s marriage laws authorized or prohibited same-gender marriage, “despite the lack of an express legislative prohibition against same-gender marriage_”
{20} The Legislature’s failure to change or clarify judicial interpretations ofthe exclusion indicates its intent that the exclusion should be applied to a distinct subset of employees as defined by case law. In the context of the Act and its predecessors, this Court has long interpreted agricultural labor to include only workers whose primary responsibilities were directly related, not incidental, to agricultural pursuits.
{21} Employers next argue that New Mexico courts have already determined that farm and ranch laborers are not similarly situated to New Mexico workers in Holguin and Tanner who are not exempt from the Act. In other words, according to Employers, the Court of Appeals’ determination in those cases that some workers were farm and ranch laborers for purposes of Section 52-1-6(A) while others were not was tantamount to holding that workers who harvest crops or directly participate in farming activities are “not similarly situatеd” for equal protection, purposes to workers who perform tasks such as processing and packaging crops. This definition of “similarly situated” based on assigned tasks would eviscerate equal protection rights. Indeed, the logical extension of Employers’ argument is that no class defined by legislation can ever be similarly situated to individuals outside that class because those outside the class do not possess the trait that defines the class. “[S]imilarly situated cannot mean simply similar in the possession of the classifying trait. All members of any class are similarly situated in this respect and consequently, any classification whatsoever would be reasonable by this test.” N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL,
{22} Having decided that the exclusion creates differential treatment among similarly situated employees, we will now determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. See Breen,
B. Rational basis review is appropriate
{23} “There are three levels of equal protection review based on the New Mexico Constitution: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.” Id. “In analyzing which level of scrutiny should apply in an equal protection challenge, a court should look at all three levels to determine which is most appropriate based on the facts of the particular case.” Id. ¶ 15. “What level of scrutiny we use depends on the nature and importance of the individual interests asserted and the classifications created by the statute.” Wagner,
{24} The Act is general social and economic legislation, and the benefits that it confers do not rise to the level of important or fundamental rights. See Breen,
C. The exclusion fails rational basis review
{25} In Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque,
{26} However, for claims under the United States Constitution, we still follow the federal rational basis test, which only requires a reviewing court to divine “the existence of a conceivable rational basis” to uphold legislation against a constitutional challenge. Kane v. City of Albuquerque,
{27} In Trujillo, we rejected this version of the rational basis test and noted that critics had fairly characterized it as “toothless” and “a virtual rubb er-stamp [. ] ”
{28} Returning to the case before us, the classification of farm and ranch laborers must be upheld unless Workers prove it is “not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Wagner,
{29} For example, one approach available for challengers to prove the lack of a rational relationship under our test is by demonstrating that the classification is grossly over- or under-inclusive with respect to an articulated government purpose, such that the relationship between the classification and its purpose is too attenuated to be rational, and instead amounts to arbitrary discrimination. For example, in City of Cleburne, the United States Supreme Court applied a heightened rational basis standard similar to our test and struck down a zoning ordinance imposing special administrative hurdles on group homes for the intellectually and developmentally disabled. See
{30} The United States Supreme Court similarly has not found a rational relationship when a law is grossly over-inclusive in addressing a purported government interest. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
{31} We will now apply our rational basis test to this case. The following rationales have been articulated for the Section 52-1-6(A) classification of farm and ranch laborers: (1) cost savings for agricultural employers; (2) administrative convenience; (3) unique economic aspects of agriculture; (4) protection of New Mexico’s farming and ranching traditions; and (5) the application of tort law to workplace injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers. We hold that W orkers have demonstrated that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale sufficient to establish a rational relationship between the exclusion and any of these purposes.
{32} First, Workers have demonstrated that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale showing a rational relationship between the exclusion’s classification of farm and ranch laborers and a purported interest in reducing overhead costs to the New Mexico agricultural industry. According to Employers, the exclusion is intended to reduce costs to farmers and consumers by saving the cost of providing workers’ compensation insurance to farm and ranch laborers. On appeal, amicus curiae New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau (the Bureau) introduced Fiscal Impact Reports (FIRs) to support the argument that the exclusion saves overhеad costs for farm and ranch employers. See FIR for H.B. 80 (Jan. 19, 2007) (2007 FIR), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/07%20Reg ular/ firs/HB0080.pdf (last viewed June 1, 2016); FIR for H.B. 62 (Feb. 5, 2009) (2009 FIR), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/ Sessions/09%20Regular/firs/HB0062.pdf(last viewed June 1, 2016). Employers also contend that this Court’s analysis in Wagner requires us to consider lowering costs to employers as a legitimate government purpose to effectuate the Legislature’s intent that the Act be interpreted to balance the rights of employers and employees. See § 52-5-1. However, the statement in Wagner that reducing employer costs is a purpose of the Act referred to reducing employer costs within the workers’ compensation system; it did not stand for the self-contradictory proposition that one of the Act’s purposes is to reduce costs for employers by exempting them from the Act entirely. See
{33} As to the more general cost savings argument, W orkers have met their burden by demonstrating that there is neither firm legal rationale nor evidence in the record to establish a rational relationship between this purpose and the differential treatment of farm and ranch laborers under the Act. This Court has previously recognized that while “lowering employer costs” is a “valid legislative goal” of the Act, rational basis review, at a minimum, still requires that a cost-saving classification “be based upon some substantial or real distinction, and not artificial or irrelevant differences.” Schirmer v. Homestake Mining Co.,
{34} Similarly, other jurisdictions have agreed that while cost savings are a legitimate government interest, they cannot be achieved through arbitrary means because if they were the “sole reason for disparate treatment},] . . . cost containment alone could justify nearly every legislative enactment without regard for . . . equal protection.” Caldwell v. MACo Workers’ Comp. Tr.,
{35} Likewise, in this case, even assuming that agricultural operations would face additional costs without the exclusion, these cost savings are only achieved through arbitrary discrimination against farm and ranch laborers. The exclusion does not apply to farm and ranch employers, but rather to employees whose primary job responsibilities fit the definition of “farm and ranch laborers” under Section 52-1-6(A). See Holguin,
{36} Second, Workers have met their burden by demonstrating that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale showing that the classification of farm and ranch laborers is rationally related to unique administrative challenges created by workers’ compensation claims from those workers. According to Employers, farm and ranch laborers are “often seasonal and, as such, are inherently transient.” Employers argue that the transience of these workers creates unique difficulties for insurers, including not knowing where to send benefit checks and not knowing where to provide the worker with medical care. Additionally, Employers contend that “some farm and ranch workers . . . are undocumented,” which makes them “difficult to locate” and prone to “avoid[ing] contact with governmental authorities,” and administering their claims would therefore present a challenge. In support of this argument, the Bureau cites the
{37} However, the Administration later contradicted its earlier positions through stipulations entered in Griego.
{38} Worlcers have demonstrated that the exclusion does not rationally relate to administrative convenience in the workers’ compensation system. The Section 52-1-6(A) exclusion is grossly under- and over-inclusive with respect to the purported government interest of avoiding administrative difficulties in the workers’ compensation system so that it is not rationally related to the goal of ensuring the Act’s quick and efficient administration. See Wagner,
{39} Additionally, it is unclear why concerns regarding administrative difficulties raised by seasonal or temporary laborers should bar all farm and ranch laborers from the Act when some of those employees work year-round for the same employer. The exclusion is, in this sense, so grossly over-inclusive as to undermine any rational relationship between the exclusion and administrative convenience. In this case, for example, Mr. Rodriguez asserts that he worked full-time for Brand West Dairy for four years prior to his injury. The proponents of the exclusion do not explain why his claim, or other similar claims brought by full-time farm and ranch laborers, would be more difficult to administer than a claim brought by a full-time employee in any other industry.
{40} In conclusion, the combined under- and over-exclusiveness of the farm and ranch laborer exclusion renders it so attenuated from the purported government interest of administrative convenience as to be arbitrary discrimination.
{41} Third, Workers have demonstrated that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale to support a rational relationship between federal regulations of agricultural prices and differential treatment of farm and ranch laborers under the Act. To support this rationale, the Bureau cites 7 U.S.C. § 608c (2012), which sets certain minimum prices for milk and other dairy products, and 7 U.S.C. § 1421 (2012), under which the United States Secretary of Agriculture may sometimes set price supports for agricultural commodities. Notably, the provisions set minimum prices or price supports in excess of minimum prices for agricultural products. This belies any implication that federal regulations hold down the prices of agricultural commodities, because the price regulations cited by the Bureau are designed to provide special assistance to farmers by stabilizing markets for agricultural commodities. The Bureau also asserts that farmers are generally “price-takers,” which means that they have little ability to increase prices and must generally accept prevailing market rates, and that without the exclusion, New Mexico farmers would be at a competitive disadvantage.
{42} However, only a small minority of-states still allow the complete exemption of farm workers from workers’ compensation. For instance, just among states bordering New Mexico, neither Arizоna nor Colorado treats farm and ranch laborers differently than any other workers for purposes of workers’ compensation, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 23-901 to -1104 (1964, as amended through 2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 8-40-101 to -55-104 (West 1990, as amended through 2014), and Oklahoma and Utah both require limited mandatory coverage that is designed to exclude only small farms and family farms, see Okla. Stat. tit. 85A, § 2(18)(b) (2013) (excluding farms with an annual payroll of less than $100,000); Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(5) (2016) (excluding farms with an annual payroll of less than $50,000, which does not include payroll payments to members of the families owning the small farms). However, farmers and ranchers from these neighboring states, as well as a significant minority of New Mexico farmers and ranchers who have elected to provide coverage to their workers under Section 52-l-6(B), are subject to the same price regulations and compete in the same markets as New Mexico farmers who
{43} Fourth, Workers have also met their burden in demonstrating that there is neither firm legal rationale nor evidence in the record to support a rational relationship between the differential classification of farm and ranch laborers under the Act and the government purpose of helping New Mexico’s small, rural farms and protecting their traditions. To support this purported justification, the Bureau cites statistics which show that a great majority of New Mexico’s farms are small, family-run operations, and demonstrate that the average New Mexico farm carries a thin or negative profit margin. However, the Act is only mandatory for private employers of three or more workers, see § 52-1-2, and therefore the exclusion only benefits farms and ranches that employ three or more employees. According to the 2012 Census of Agriculture created by the United States Department of Agriculture, 1,864 of the 24,721 “farms” in New Mexico employ three or more workers, which means that only approximately the largest 7.5% of farms in New Mexico benefit from the exclusion. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 2012 Census of Agriculture: United States Summary and State Data, Vol. 1 at Tables 1 & 7 (May 2014), available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/ 2012/Full_Report/Volume_l,_ Chapter_ l_US/usvl.pdf (last reviewed June 1, 2016). Therefore, the exclusion does not even apply to approximately 92.5% of the farms in the state because they have fewer than three employees. Furthermore, the additional costs to thе remaining 7.5% would be proportional to the number of employees and would not fall disproportionately on smaller operations because workers’ compensation is payroll-based. Finally, the Bureau contends that the exclusion protects “the culture of ‘neighboring’ — in which farmers and ranchers help perform work on their neighbors’ farms and ranches,” which it claims “is a critical part of the culture of rural communities,” and preserves the tradition of children or other family members performing “farm and ranch duties as chores.” However, volunteer or unpaid workers are generally not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, see Jelso v. World Balloon Corp.,
{44} Fifth and finally, Workers have proved that there is no legitimate government interest in subjecting only workplace injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers to the common law tort system, while any other workplace injury suffered by an employee of an agricultural employer goes through the workers’ compensation system. Because all workers subject to the Act lose any common law negligence claims that they may have had otherwise, see § 52-l-6(D), (E), the Bureau argues that the Legislature merely intended to preserve the availability of tort remedies for workplace injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers. The Bureau also claims that the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from the workers’ compensation system and their employers’ ability to voluntarily elect into or out of the system is beneficial to both parties.
However, contrary to these assertions, the trade-off between common law negligence claims and no-fault remedies under the Act, see Salazar,
III. OUR HOLDING IN THIS CASE WILL APPLY ON A MODIFIED PROSPECTIVE BASIS
{45} The UEF, Employers, and various amici urge this Court to enter a prospective or modified prospective holding in this case that the exclusion is unconstitutional. Under our prospectivity analysis, we first presume that a new civil rule operates retroactively, but that presumption may then be overcome by “a sufficiently weighty combination” of the three factors described by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
{46} Under the first Chevron factor, we consider the degree to which our decision in this case “establish[es] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” Marckstadt v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
{47} Further, substantial reliance interests would be upset by retroactive application of our holding here. The farm and ranch laborer exclusion primarily affects contracts between employers and employees in the workplace. See Beavers,
{48} Additionally, we do not agree with Workers’ argument that it was unreasonable and a risk for employers to continue to rely on the exclusion rather than purchasing insurance that would cover farm and ranch laborers after the district court’s final judgment in Griego in 2012. By following this reasoning, we would effectively bind all farm and ranch employers to a single district court decision to which they were not parties. See Rule 12-405(A)-(C) NMRA (unpublished opinions are non-precedential); NMSA 1978, § 44-6-12 (1975) (No declaratory judgment “shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.”). Accordingly, we hold that the first Chevron factor weighs heavily in favor of prospective application of our holding in this case.
{49} Under the second Chevron factor, we must “weigh the merits and demerits” of retroactive application “by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Marckstadt,
{50} Under the third Chevron factor, we must “weigh[] the inequity imposed by retroactive application” to determine whether the “decision . . . could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively . . . .” Marckstadt,
{51} Weighing the Chevron factors together, we conclude that the reliance interests of employers combined with the practical difficulties that would result from retroactive application are sufficient to overcome our presumption of retroactivity in this case. Accordingly, we hold that the Act’s farm and ranch laborer exclusion is unconstitutional and direct that our holding be prospectively applied to any injury that manifests after the date that our mandate issues in this case pursuant to Rule 12-402(B). See Montell v. Orndorff,
IV. CONCLUSION
{52} We remand these consolidated cases to their respective WCJs for resolution without reliance on the farm and ranch laborer exclusion in Section 52-l-6(A). We also order that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy,
{53} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
Notes
M.A. & Sons disputes that Ms. Aguirre was its “employee” under the Act. However, for the purposes of this appeal, they agree that we should treat Ms. Aguirre as though she would otherwise be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits except for the Section 52-1-6(A) exclusion.
The dissent places substantial emphasis on Williams v. Cooper,
Employers do not directly argue that the Griego stipulation should be rejected, but do refer to the “lack of a developed factual record that contains findings that were truly litigated between the parties and made by an independent fact finder.” We agree, and therefore do not treat these facts as if Employers have stipulated to them. However, we have considered this stipulation with respect to the administrative convenience rationale because the Administration’s statements in Griego regarding the feasibility of administering these claims for farm and ranch laborers directly relate to earlier statements attributed to the Administration in the FIRs. These are legislative facts that “do not concern individual parties” in this case, but are rather a “non-evidentiary sourcef]” of universally- applicable information to help us “determine the content of law and policy.” Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
{54} Since 1917, when the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (1917, as amended through 2015), was originally enacted, the Legislature has allowed employers of farm and ranch laborers to decide for themselves whether to participate in the workers’ compensation scheme. See NMSA 1978, § 52-l-6(A)-(B) (1990); Laws 1917, ch. 83 §§ 2, 10. For nearly 100 years, the Legislature has maintained its view that the best policy for New Mexico is that each farm and ranch employing more than three workers decides for itself whether to incur the costs of workers’ compensation or to face the costs of potential tort liability. To that end, Section 52-l-6(A) excludes employers of farm and ranch laborers from the Legislature’s requirement subjecting employers of three or more workers to the provisions of the WCA.
{55} Today, the majority opinion exercises this Court’s power of judicial review and holds that this 99-year-old statutory scheme violates the New Mexico Constitution. By invalidating Section 52-l-6(A)’s exclusion of farms and ranches from mandatory participation in the state workers’ compensation scheme, the majority opinion has supplanted the Legislature’s view of what, all things considered, is best for New Mexico. But this Court has neither the necessary facts nor the institutional mission to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature regarding what is best for any particular industry within the State’s economy.
{56} The farm-and-ranch exclusion may be perceived as unfair, unwise, or improvident in its treatment of laborers who work for farms and ranches electing exemption from the WCA, but this Court may exercise its greatest power to invalidate a statute only if the statute contravenes the federal Constitution or the New Mexico Constitution. This case raises no federal claim, and, under well-established law, the Legislature’s decision to allow employers of farm and ranch laborers to decide for themselves whether to be subject to the WCA or to face tort liability does not violate any right guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution. Because Section 52-1-6 is socioeconomic legislation, the Worker-Respondents have a right against the disparate treatment allowed by this statute only if the statute does not rationally further a legitimate legislative purpose. The Worker-Respondents simply cannot make that showing. By enacting Section 52-1-6, the Legislature designed a statutory scheme that rationally controls costs for New Mexico farms and ranches. The statute creates a choice which allows these employers to elect the option that entails the lowest expected costs, and 29% of New Mexico farms and ranches (including many of the largest agricultural firms in the State) have elected to provide workers’ compensation. This statute survives an equal protection challenge. Additionally, by nullifying the Legislature’s statutory scheme, the majority opinion threatens to detrimentally impact small, economically fragile farms in New Mexico. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I. SECTION 5 2 -1 - 6 ( A ) IS CONSTITUTIONAL
{57} This is not a complex case. Noe Rodriguez and Maria Aguirre were injured on the job. Rodriguez and Aguirre were employed by a ranch and a farm, respectively, that had elected not to provide workers’ compensation benefits and which, under Section 52-1-6(A), were not required to do so. Rodriguez and Aguirre claim that the Legislature’s exclusion of employers of farm and ranch laborers from mandatory participation in the workers’ compensation scheme violates their rights to equal protection under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution.
{58} Equal protection doctrine requires that Rodriguez and Aguirre “first prove that they are similarly situated to another group but are treated dissimilarly.” Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch.,
{59} Upon a showing of dissimilar treatment, this Court determines what level of scrutiny applies to the challenged legislation. Breen,
{60} In considering the Legislature’s purpose when enacting and maintaining Section 52-l-6(A)’s farm-and-ranch exclusion, the record evidence and legislative history indicate that the Legislature was motivated to contain regulatory costs incurred by economically precarious farms and ranches in New Mexico. For instance, in 2009, the Legislature considered bills that would have removed the WCA’s exclusion for employers of farm and ranch laborers. See H.B. 62, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009); S.B. 9, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009). In considering these bills, the Legislature had available the Fiscal Impact Report (FIR) for House Bill 62. Members of the House Business and Industry Committee relied on the FIR in rejecting House Bill 62 by a vote of 10-2.
{61} According to the FIR for House Bill 62, the “N.M. Department of Agriculture stated the proposed legislation would introduce a significant financial strain on the farming and ranching part of the industry.” FIR for H.B. 62, at 3 (Feb. 05, 2009) (2009 FIR). The FIR also included cost projections to farm and ranch employers submitted by the Workers’ Compensation Administration, the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI), and New Mexico State University agricultural economists. See id. The Workers’ Compensation Administration had projected the annual cost of the bill “to farm and ranch employers to be an additional $ 10.5 million annually. . . [which] represents a cost increase of approximately 1.5 percent.” Id. The NCCI had similarly estimated that House Bill 62 “would increase New Mexico payroll costs by 0.4 percent and increase premiums up to 1.1 percent.” Id. The FIR additionally indicated that, according to Workers’ Compensation Administration data, the average cost per claim was approximately $16,876. Id. In contrast, the FIR reported that the average net income per farm in the 2002 census of agriculture was $ 19,373 — only slightly more than the average cost per workers’ compensation claim. Id. Indeed, in 2012, the average net cash income from farming operations in New Mexico was only $9,501. See United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2015 State Agricultural Overview New Mexico, http://tinyurl.com/jjpx7ch (last viewed June 28,2016). Therefore, legislative facts demonstrate a legislative concern to maintain Section 52-1-6(A) in order to contain costs incurred by fiscally vulnerable farms and ranches. See Oh'ver,
{62} Under rational basis review, the Legislature’s purpose to safeguard farms and
{63} The only remaining question, then, is whether Section 52-1 -6(A) is rationally related to the legitimаte purpose of insulating New Mexico farms and ranches from additional costs. It is. Section 52-l-6(A), in conjunction with Subsection (B), creates an architecture by which employers in the agricultural industry choose which costs they incur. There are costs involved with being subject to the WCA. Those costs include insurance premiums and fees collected pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 52-5-19 (2004). Yet, despite these costs, there are good reasons why a farm or ranch would voluntarily elect to be subject to the WCA, as permitted by Section 52-l-6(B). The WCA provides a predictable schedule of benefits and makes those benefits the exclusive remedy for an injured worker. As the record in this case reflects, “[tjhere is a benefit to having insurance in place to take care of the injured worker and it might be an incentive to get a higher quality worker if they are aware of the benefits. Employers are no longer exposed to possible tort lawsuits.” Griego v. N.M. Workers' Comp. Admin., No. CV 2009-10130, 20, ¶ 141 (N.M. 2nd Jud. D., Oct. 17, 2011) (final pretrial order).
{64} In other words, Subsections (A) and (B) allocate to each farm and ranch the choice whether to pay the costs of being subject to the WCA or to face potential tort liability. The Legislature’s allocation of this choice to each farm and ranch is rationally related to its goal to contain the costs for the farming and ranching industry because each farm and ranch is in the best position to know whether it would be more cost-effective to participate in the workers’ compensation scheme or to incur the risk of tort liability and associated litigation costs. New Mexico farms and ranches that employ more than three employees vary greatly in the number of employees hired, the positions hired for, other fixed and marginal costs, products produced, annual sales, and profitability. See, e.g., United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2015 State Agricultural Overview New Mexico, http://tinyurl.com/jjpx7ch (last viewed June 28, 2016); see also 2014 New Mexico Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, 18, http://tinyurl.com/zahewua (last viewed June 28, 2016). Because of that variety, it is far from arbitrary for the Legislature to allow each farm and ranch to decide for itself whether to pay the costs оf the W CA or to risk tort liability. Each farm and ranch will very likely elect the option that entails the lowest expected costs, thereby furthering the Legislature’s legitimate goal to support New Mexico’s economically precarious farms and ranches.
{65} In fact, the record demonstrates that 29% of farms and ranches that employ more than three workers have voluntarily elected to be subject to the WCA. This Court heard at oral argument that, of the farms and
II. THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRS IN CONCLUDING THAT SECTION 52-1-6(A) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
{66} The majority opinion asserts that it “remain[s] highly deferential to the Legislature by presitming the constitutionality of social and economic legislation.” Maj. Op. ¶ 27. But it is difficult to see how. Instead of interpreting Section 52-1-6 according to its plain language and then employing the traditional doctrine of rational basis review, the majority opinion does something quite different. First, the majority opinion misinterprets Section 52-1-6 to create a distinction that the Legislature neither drew nor intended. Maj. Op. ¶¶ 15-20. The majority opinion then misapplies rational basis scrutiny to hold Section 52-l-6(A) unconstitutional and relies on inapposite case law to support that holding. Maj. Op. ¶¶ 28-3 3. Such analysis is neither deferential to the Legislature nor willing to presume the constitutionality of social and economic legislation. And the majority opinion departs from the reasoning and the traditional equal protection analysis employed by myriad other state appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court to uphold analogous farm-and-ranch exceptions to mandatory workers’ compensation statutes against identical state and federal constitutional challenges.
A. The majority opinion misinterprets Section 52-1-6 in concluding that the statute is unconstitutional
{67} This Court may not interpret a statute in ways that render it constitutionally
{68} According to the majority opinion, Section 52-1-6(A) draws a line between, on the one hand, “farm and ranch laborers,” and, on the other hand, all other employees of farms and ranches. Maj. Op. ¶¶ 15-20. Not every employee of a farm or ranch is a “farm and ranch laborer.” Some larger farms and ranches also hire, for example, staffwho work primarily in the packaging of crops, sales, and administration. The majority opinion interprets Section 52-1-6(A) to allow farms and ranches to exclude “farm and ranch laborers” from workers’ compensation, but not other employees, such as administrative or sales staff. Maj. Op. ¶¶ 15-20. The majority opinion concludes that distinction is irrational and, therefore, holds that Section 52-1-6(A) violates the New Mexico Constitution. Maj. Op. ¶¶ 28-33.
{69} Irrespective of whether it would be irrational for the Legislature to allow farms and ranches to exclude “farm and ranch laborers” from workers’ compensation while not permitting farms and ranches to exclude other employees, this is not a distinction that the Legislature drew. The distinction that the majority opinion focuses on is simply not in the statute. “The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.” NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-19 (1997). And the text of Section 52-l-6(A) does not remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to permit farms and ranches to exclude laborers who primarily work with the crops and livestock, but not other employees.
{70} Rather, Section 52-l-6(A) indicates that the Legislature permits farms and ranches to exclude themselves from mandatory participation in the workers’ compensation scheme. The statute unambiguously provides an exemption for employers, not certain subsets of their employees. Section 52-1-6 plainly states that “[t]he provision of the [WCA] . . . shall not apply to employers of... farm and ranch laborers.” § 52-1-6(A). The statute also says “employers of. . . farm and ranch laborers” can make “[a]n election to be subject to the [WCA].” § 52-l-6(B). Accordingly, the statute’s exclusion from mandatory participation in the workers’ compensation scheme applies to employers, and the choice to participate also resides with employers. See § 52-l-6(A)-(B).
{71} Instead of following the plain text of the statute, the majority opinion adopts an erroneous reading offered by the Court of Appeals in Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc.,
{72} Contrary to the majority opinion’s suggestion, its interpretation of Section 52-1-6(A) is not the only interpretation that avoids the absurd result. Section 52-1-6(A) should be read not as allowing the exclusion of only farm and ranch laborers from the mandatory provisions of the WCA, but rather as allowing the exclusion of employers whose workforce is mainly comprised of farm and ranch laborers. In other words, if an employer mainly employs farm and ranch laborers (i.e., if an employer is a farm or a ranch), then under Subsections (A) and (B), that employer is not required to participate in the workers’ compensation scheme, although it may voluntarily elect to do so.
{73} Not only is this interpretation available to avoid the absurd result the majority opinion envisions, it also reflects this Court’s precedent. This Court has previously determined that the farm-and-ranch exclusion protects a farmer or rancher against workers’ compensation claims brought by employees who are not farm and ranch laborers. See Williams v. Cooper,
{74} Based on the text of the statute and our own precedent, this Court is compelled to read Section 52-1-6(A) as allowing the exclusion, not of farm and ranch laborers themselves, but of employers whose workforce is mainly comprised of farm and ranch laborers. This interpretation faithfully adheres to the text of Section 52-1-6(A). It effectuates the Legislature’s purpose to contain costs incurredbyNew Mexico’s farms and ranches. It avoids the absurd result of permitting any employer from excluding itself from the provisions of the WCA by hiring a few farm or ranch laborers. It follows this Court’s previous readings of the statute. See Williams,
{75} Yet, for unconvincing reasons, the majority opinion adopts an alternative reading. First, the majority opinion relies on Griego v. Oliver to support its view that, contrary to the plain text of the statute, it may nevertheless adopt Cueto’s dubious interpretation in order to hold the statute unconstitutiоnal. Maj. Op. ¶ 19 (citing Oliver,
{76} Second, the majority opinion’s reliance on Koger v. A.T. Woods, Inc. is misplaced. See Maj. Op. ¶ 20 (citing
{77} Third, the majority opinion erroneously grounds its interpretation on legislative silence. See Maj. Op. ¶ 20. Notwithstanding this Court’s own precedent, the majority opinion notes that the Cueto Court of Appeals interpreted Section 52-1 - 6(A) to allow the exclusion of only farm and ranch laborers from workers’ compensation coverage. The majority opinion then reasons that, because the Legislature did not subsequently amend the statute, the Legislature therefore intended a meaning different than what the text of the statute expressly provides. Maj. Op. ¶ 20 (citing Cueto,
{78} Inferences based on the Legislature’s silence subsequent to a court’s decision are an exceptionally weak method of statutory interpretation. See Zuber v. Allen,
{79} Even if it were sound to interpret Section 52-l-6(A) by drawing conclusions from the Legislature’s silence following Cueto, this is not a case where silence speaks volumes. In Cueto, the Court of Appeals enforced Section 52-l-6(A)’s exclusion, denying that a farmworker had a cause of action for workers’ compensation. Cueto,
B. The majority opinion relies on inapposite if not questionable case law to conclude that the Legislature acted arbitrarily
{80} Based on its interpretation of Section 52-1-6(A), the majority opinion concludes that the Legislature cannot allow farms and ranches to exclude farm and ranch laborers
{81} Assuming arguendo that Section 52-1 -6(A) means what the majority opinion reads it to mean and that the Legislature allocated a choice to farms and ranches only with respect to their laborers, the statute is still not unconstitutional. This Court has already deferred to similar instances of legislative line-drawing with respect to the farm-and-ranch exclusion. In Williams, which rejected the workers’ compensation claim of a non-ranch laborer injured while performing non-ranch work for a rancher, this Court recognized that it was bound to defer to the Legislature’s policy, even as we perceived that the line drawing was harsh.
{82} What legal basis does the majority opinion have for taking the opposite approach? The majority opinion cites a single New Mexico case to support its view that the Legislature could not draw the line which the majority imputes to it: Schirmer v. Homestake Mining Co. See Maj. Op. ¶ 33 (citing Schirmer,
{83} But Schirmer was almost certainly incorrect when decided. See Coleman v. United Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc.,
{84} In any event, Schirmer is distinguishable. Even if the Legislature drew a line between farm and ranch laborers who may be excluded from mandatory workers’ compensation and other agribusiness employees for whom coverage is required, that distinction would not be arbitrary in the same way that the 10-year repose statute in Schirmer is arbitrary. Section 52-l-6(A), unlike any statute of repose, does not itself necessarily bar some set of claims. In fact, Section 52-1-6(A) does not necessarily bar any claim. Rather, the statute allows, and has always allowed, each farm and ranch in New Mexico to decide for itself whether to provide workers’ compensаtion coverage for its employees who are farm and ranch laborers.
{85} Further, the distinction that the majority opinion imputes to the Legislature is not arbitrarily related to the permissible legislative goal of containing costs for farms and ranches. Unlike the largest firms in agribusiness, not every farm or ranch in New Mexico employs a variety of workers. Many smaller farms and ranches in our State may only employ workers who could only be classified as “farm or ranch laborers.” To contain costs for those smaller operations, the Legislature may permissibly allow each farm and ranch to choose whether to participate in the workers’ compensation scheme. Again, because of the great diversity of farms and ranches operating in New Mexico’s agricultural industry,
{86} Therefore, Schirmer, even if it were not bad law, is so distinguishable as to provide no support for the majority opinion’s conclusion. The majority opinion treats Section 52-1-6(A) as though it furthered cost savings for farms and ranches by, for example, necessarily excluding workers’ compensation claims of left-handed farm and ranch laborers. But the legislation under review is nothing like that. The arbitrariness that the majority opinion perceives is simply not present either in the interpretation that the majority opinion imputes to the Legislature or in the statutory scheme that the Legislature actually enacted.
C. The mаjority opinion’s application of a more stringent version of rational basis review confuses equal protection doctrine
{87} Lastly, I disagree with the majority opinion’s application of the so-called “modern articulation” of the rational basis test that this Court first referenced in Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque. See
{88} After Wagner, the “modern articulation” of rational basis review was buried for some years. Since that decision, this Court has employed rational basis review without reference to this heightened standard both in analyzing federal and state constitutional claims. See Kane,
{89} As best as I can discern, the difference between the traditional and the “modern” versions of rational basis review lies in what is required to demonstrate that a legislative classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Corn,
{90} By contrast, the majority opinion states that a statutory classification must be supported either by a “firm legal rationale” or “evidence in the record.” Maj. Op. ¶ 28. The majority opinion reasons that this standard separates N ew Mexico ’ s form of rational basis review for state equal protection claims from rational basis review for federal constitutional claims. See Maj. Op. ¶¶ 25-27. But it is not clear why the equal protection guarantee of the New Mexico Constitution should grant this Court more discretion to invalidate socioeconomic legislation than the federal constitutional analogue. UnderNew Mexico’s interstitial approach to determining state constitutional claims that have federal analogues (such as equal protection), this Court departs from the federal constitutional analysis only if the federal analysis is flawed or undeveloped or if there are characteristics distinctive to New Mexico that warrant a different constitutional analysis. State v. Gomez,
{91} There are additional problems with the majority opinion’s use of the “modern, articulation” of rational basis review. To repeat Justice Bosson’s observation in Wagner, the majority opinion does not explain what differentiates a “firm legal rationale” from any conceivable basis in the traditional form of rational basis review, as the bench and bar know it. The majority opinion even seemingly retreats from its own “evidence in the record” condition, as the majority opinion allows a justification for a statutory classification to be supported by outside-of-the-record, legislative facts of which a court can take judicial notice. See Maj. Op. ¶ 28. So, we are left with “firm legal rationale” as the only condition in the heightened standard that separates the “modern articulation” of rational basis review from its traditional counterpart. And there is simply no indication of what would constitute a “firm legal rationale” or how a “firm legal rationale” differs from any conceivable basis justifying a legislative choice. By requiring a “firm legal rationale,” the majority opinion overlooks that when the Legislature enacts socioeconomic legislation, the classifications and distinctions it creates may simply be the result of compromise and “are often impossible of explanation in strictly legal terms.” Romero,
{92} Further, the majority opinion’s explanation of the “evidence in the record” condition is in tension with its requirement for a “firm legal rationale.” By permitting a court to consider sua sponte legislative facts outside of the record, the so-called heightened standard suggests that a court may, in fact, attempt to conceive of any permissible legislative purpose that the statute under review rationally serves. Hence, there is nothing to the “modern articulation” that should separate it from traditional rational basis review, and because Section 52-1-6(A) conceivably serves the legislative purpose of cost containment, it survives rational basis review.
{93} Instead of explaining the “modern articulation,” the maj ority opinion simply uses the words “firm legal rationale” as a license to determine that Section 52-1-6(A) is unconstitutional because it is “underinclusive” with respect to its putative purpose. Maj. Op. ¶¶ 29-35. According to the majority opinion, because Section 52-1-6(A) allows for the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers (but not other farm and ranch employees) from workers’ compensation coverage, it is underinclusive with respect to the permissible legislative purpose of cost containment. See Maj. Op. ¶¶ 32-35. The majority opinion implies that if the Legislature really had wanted to control costs for New Mexico’s farms and ranches, it would have allowed farms and ranches to exclude all of their employees, not just their farm and ranch laborers. See id. The irony, of course, is that this is exactly what the Legislature did. But, again assuming the majority opinion’s statutory interpretation arguendo, such underinclusiveness does not call into question the constitutionality of the statute.
{94} It is the longstanding law of rational basis scrutiny — both in the federal and state constitutiоnal context — that a legislative body, when enacting socioeconomic legislation, can solve a problem piecemeal and that such underinclusiveness with respect to that purpose poses no constitutional flaw.
{95} Tobe sure, a tailoring analysis can be useful to discern whether the Legislature created a discriminatory classification with animus toward a particular, discrete group and disguised that animus with a socioeconomic rationale. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans,
{96} The majority opinion’s inspection for underinclusiveness does not even justify its holding. Here, the majority opinion’s tailoring analysis simply does not result in a conclusion that the Legislature, since 1917, has acted with animus toward farm and ranch laborers. A statutory scheme that permits 29% of farms and ranches- — most of which are large firms, likely employing hundreds of farm and ranch laborers — to voluntarily provide workers’ compensation coverage to their employees is-not a statute that harbors an ulterior motive to discriminate against farm and ranch workers. Neither the statutory scheme nor the record indicates that for 99 years the Legislature has acted with an impermissible,
III. CONCLUSION
{97} The law of statutory interpretation and the law governing judicial review of legislation safeguard the separation ofpowers. This Court may not contort these areas of law to nullify validly-enacted legislation simply because we happen to believe that a statute is unfair or that its unfairness outweighs any other consideration that bears on the Legislature’s decision. While I understand the unfairness that may be perceived in the treatment of laborers who work for farms and ranches'electing exemption from the WCA, I also understand the burden that may fall upon small New Mexico farms and ranches in having to incur regulatory costs more easily borne by their large competitors in the agricultural industry. The Legislature enacted a statutory scheme that encompasses both employer and employee concerns and is eminently constitutional. I respectfully dissent.
As the majority opinion notes, materials related to Griego v. New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration were attached by Aguirre before the Workers’ Compensation Judge and accordingly form a part of the record in this case. See Maj. Op., ¶ 4.
See, e.g., Collins v. Day,
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,