120 Cal. 541 | Cal. | 1898
The complaint in this action alleged that there was due from defendants to plaintiff for medical services $390.33, and prayed judgment in that sum. The answer denied the services, and denied the value of the services to have been “$390.33, or any other sum.” The pleadings were verified. When the cause was called for trial both parties announced themselves ready. The court then stated the title of the case to the reporter.
Counsel for defendants thereupon moved the court to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, and this motion was granted, the court saying that, while the pleadings brought the case within the jurisdiction of the court, the statement of counsel in opening his case, or in getting ready to open it, stated the amount due at a sum below the jurisdiction of the court; that a party is bound by the statement of his counsel, and the court had no jurisdiction.
In the first place, there seems to have been an oversight as to the amount claimed in the complaint. It was not $332.50, as stated by counsel for the plaintiff, but the amount there stated to be due, and for which judgment was demanded, was $390.33, and this amount was also stated in the denials of the answer. That both parties should have overlooked that fact is almost beyond comprehension. The error in the account furnished counsel for plaintiff, and upon which, he explained, he based the complaint, was, as stated to the court, three items of $15 each, amounting to $45, and this deducted from the amount stated in the complaint leaves $345.33; so that if the pleadings had been looked to a different state of facts would have appeared.
It was natural and proper, however, for the court to accept the statement of counsel, and to act upon it; but I think, nevertheless, that the court erred in dismissing the action.
No question was made as to the good faith of the plaintiff in
It is so well settled that the amount for which judgment is demanded in the complaint determines the jurisdiction of the court that no authorities need be cited. Any other rule would be fraught with uncertainties and mischiefs beyond the power of anticipation.
The order denying a new trial should be reversed and a new trial granted.
Belcher, C., and Chipman, C., concurred.
Tor the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the order denying a new trial is reversed and a new trial granted.
Harrison, J., Garoutte, J., Van Fleet, J.