117 Mo. App. 678 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1906
(after stating the facts.)
“It is now perfectly well settled that the plaintiff, may recover damages for an injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s own negligence exposed him to the risk of injury, if such injury was more immediately caused by the defendant’s omission, after becoming aware of the plaintiff’s danger, to use ordinary care for the purpose of avoiding injury to him. We know of no court of last resort in which this rule is any longer disputed; although the same rule, in substance, but inaccurately stated, has been made the subject of strenuous controversy. But, furthermore, the plaintiff should recover, notwithstanding his own negligence exposed him to the risk of injury, if the injury of which he complains was more immediately caused by the omission of the defendant, after having such notice of the plaintiff’s danger as would put a prudent man upon his guard, to use ordinary care for the purpose of avoiding such injury. " It is not necessary that the defendant Should actually know of the danger to which the plaintiff is exposed. It is enough if, having sufficient notice to put a prudent man on the alert, he does not take such precautions as a prudent man would take under similar notice. This rule is almost universally accepted. The most reckless presistence, on the part of one exposed to danger, will not justify another in consciously refraining from using care to avoid injury to him. This qualification of the doctrine of contributory negilence, often called The rule in Davis v. Mann;’ from the leading case on this subject has been much criticised. But those criticisms turn mainly upon the language used by Naron Parke in that case, which is, perhaps, too broad, and which has not been here adopted although it has been literally repeated in the highest court of England, as well as in that of the United States. It is possible, too, that the application of the principle in Davis v. Mann
This statement of the principle is approvingly quoted by this court in Klockenbrink v. Railroad, 81 Mo. App. 1. c. 356; and the opinion of this court was approved and the principle declared to be the settled law of the Supreme Court in Klockenbrink v. Railroad, 172 Mo. 678, 72 S. W. 900. Expressions are to be found in some recent opinions of the Supreme Court' which seem to qualify or restrict the application of this principle, but there is no case to be found in.our Supreme Court reports that authoritatively overturns or in any wise weakens this salutary principle of the., law. The plaintiff’s evidence tends to show that had tfie motorman discharged the duty he was under, both at common law and under the ordinance offered in evidence, to keep a watch ahead and on the first appearance of danger use reasonable care to check or stop his car to avoid colliding with plaintiff’s wagon, the accident would not have happened. We think, on this evidence, plaintiff was entitled to have his case submitted to the jury.
“1. The court instructs the jury that if they believe •from the evidence that the plaintiff was driving on Nineteenth street of the city of St. Louis, on the twenty-first day of June, 1903, and that while he was crossing the tracks of the .defendant, the St. Louis Transit Company, at the intersection of Nineteenth street with Olive street of the said city, plaintiff’s vehicle was struck by a car operated by defendant, the St. Louis Transit Company, on account of the failure of the motorman of the said
The instruction ignores the defense of contributory negligence pleaded in the answer, but we think this omission was cured by the following instructions given1 for defendant:
“10. Although the jury may find from the evidence that defendant’s, the St. Louis Transit Company’s, agents in charge of the car did fail to sound any bell or gong on said car, and did not stop or slow up said car and avert the collision, and did not keep a watch for persons on or approaching the track, and did not stop the car in the shortest time and space possible after the first appearance of danger, still, if you find from the evidence that plaintiff saw the approaching car, or, by looking, could have seen said car in time to have kept the horse and wagon off the track and avoid the collision, and failed to see or heed what he saw, then the plaintiff cannot recover and your verdict must be for the said defendant.
“11. If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were caused .by the mutual and concurring negligence of plaintiff and the defendant’s, the St. Louis Transit Company’s, motorman in charge of said car, and that the negligence of either, without the concurrence of the negligence of the other, would not have caused the injury, then your verdict must be for the said defendant.”
“12. If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff was driving a wagon south on Nineteenth street, and that Nineteenth street was crossed by the railroad tracks of the defendant, St. Louis Transit Company, laid
With these instructions before them, the jury could not have lost sight of the defense of concurring or contributory negligence. Plaintiff’s instruction correctly declares the principle of what is commonly called the “last fair chance doctrine” and was appropriate under the evidence in the case. It is insisted, however, that as there is no evidence in the record that the-car conld have been stopped sooner than it was, or as to the distance in which it could have been stopped, it was improper to submit to the jury to find whether1 or not the car could have been stopped, in time to have avoided the injury. The two witnesses, on the front platform with the motorman, testified that they saw the horse on the track one-half block (one hundred and fifty feet) from the crossing. If they saw the horse, the motorman also saw him or would have seen him, if he had looked, as it was his duty to do. These two witnesses also testified that the motorman did not begin to apply the brakes until the car had run from seventy-five to one hundred feet from the point where they first saw the horse on the track; and all the evidence shows that the car did not run its full length after it struck the wagon. On this evidence, the inference is irresistible that had the motorman applied
Discovering no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.