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Rodgers v. City of Loving
573 P.2d 240
N.M. Ct. App.
1977
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*1 P.2d RODGERS, Rodgers, Quentin Evelyn Compa Employers Insurance

American Company Employers

ny, Fire Insurance Compa Insurance American States Plaintiffs-Appellants,

ny, LOVING, Dale Hamilton and OF

CITY Williams, Defendants-Appellees.

James 2897.

No. New Mexico. Appeals

Court 29, 1977.

Nov. Sabin, Thompson,

R. E. Robert E. At- wood, Malone, Cooter, A., P. Mann & Ros- well, plaintiffs-appellants. Stout, Hobbs, and Dick A. Blen-

Lowell den, Carlsbad, defendants-appellees City and Dale Hamilton. Jay Caraway, W. Forbes and John M. Forbes, Carlsbad, for McCormick & defend- ant-appellee, James Williams. OPINION HERNANDEZ, Judge. appeal

This case involves an and a cross appeal. point The second of error on the appeal dispositive cross matter. *2 (d) defendants for the Whether activity sued the is not plaintiffs a mat- buildings their and ter wrongful usage; destruction of of common interruption of consequent contents and (e) Whether activity is inappropri- a verdict returned their business. on; place ate to the where it is carried City Loving of in their favor The defendant Dale Williams. and James (f) activity The value of the by the suit was dismissed from Hamilton community.” issue which will be the Court on an order of The second and third instructions above later. discussed nearly 519(1) are copies verbatim of § Hamilton, (an em- February On (Second) 520 of the Restatement of Torts § Loving) acting while City of ployee of orders, (aided Williams) was burn- under generally The rationale of the rule most grass on the weeds and dead which we question followed on mother, adjoins plain- which of Williams’ following: adopt, elect to is the spread plain- onto property. The fire tiffs’ potentialities of fire dangerous “The resulting in the destruction property, tiffs’ very early. recognized have been seem to interruption their of their of liability for Something approaching strict business. imposed upon land- apparently fire error on point The second * * early common law. holders trial court erred in appeal is that the cross giving the following instruction: [******] engaged “That defendants “The American courts . . have danger- abnormally

what is known as an consistently rejected rule, the older they engaged open activity when ous held, have in the absence legislation, city weeds in the limits of burning of that liability there is no for the escape of vicinity and in the of the build- fire where the defendant was not negli- Quentin Evelyn Rodg- ings owned gent. course, It is recognized, of that fire they strictly liable for ers and that dangerous thing, is a great and a amount if damage resulting therefrom even care required is in dealing with it. . burning care in the they exercised due utility But its great, is so and it is so operation. clearly use, sanctioned by universal [******] strict liability, even on the part of indus- enterprises, is not considered conve- abnormally carries on an “One who Prosser, nient or desirable.” W. The Law dangerous activity liability is (4th 1971) 77, of Torts ed. at 504. § person, harm the land or chattels resulting activity, another from the Even if we were to apply the rule of exercised the utmost care although he has liability strict as stated in 519 and § prevent such harm. (Second) Torts, of the Restatement su- [******] pra, the instant situation does present one of the factors necessary imposi- for the determining activity whether an is “In “inability tion: to eliminate the risk by the abnormally dangerous, following fac- exercise of reasonable care.” The trial tors are to be considered: giving court erred in the instruction on (a) activity Whether involves strict risk harm to the high degree of some others; land or chattels of person, To aid the trial court on the retrial of this (b) gravity of the harm Whether matter we will point comment on the first may likely result from it is to be appeal. error in the cross point This great; the doctrine sovereign immunity (c) elimina- precludes plaintiffs’ Whether the risk cannot be care; Loving. ted the exercise of reasonable 1974; “The February purpose modify of this act is to on fire occurred sovereign their suit the common-law

however, did not file doctrine plaintiffs fire, immunity providing permissive 28,1975. At the time of the July until pub- whereby method the state or a local 14-9-7, 1965 N.M.Laws Ch. body protect lic elect to itself and effect: employees personal officers from lia- be main- personal action shall “No *3 bility arising out of certain acts commit- against of this state any in tained during govern- performance ted the of municipality of any member or officer a mental activities and to proprietary and done, attempted to or any tort or act for compensate wrongfully the individuals done, authority of by the when done be harmed these actions.” of its in execution municipality or the cases, municipali- In all such the orders. 16 provides: Section or member responsible. Any be ty shall “The Li- Employees Public Officers and the may plead municipality of officer the ability apply any Act not does such bar of of this section in provisions against public a aris- employee officer or here- pending is now or whether it action ing before effective of the Pub- the date after commenced.” Employees Liability Act.” lic Officers and N.M.Laws, 3, 333, 1, the Chapter July 1 and The date of Act was effective §§ 1975, after the acts at issue had occurred. states: (The Act repealed Ch. § this act purpose The of 1. “Section N.M.Laws.) recovery a means for provide be shall death, or personal injury damages for of appellants cross contend that the em- damage, resulting from 3, N.M.Laws, Ch. and since §§ negligence, employee’s or ployer’s longer were in supra, no effect when this employ- of during the course occur [sic] suit filed and Public Officers and Em dis- state, county, city, for school ment ployees Liability apply, Act did not the institution, trict, district, public state sovereign law of immuni common doctrine officers, public corporation, or agency ty applied plaintiffs’ and was a bar suit. assistants, agents employ- deputies, not agree. We do ees.” rule, As a if general right is based may be maintained 3. Suits “Section statute, solely upon being no there such state, county, dis- city, the school against law, right at of repeal common institution, trict, district, public state right, the re statute abolishes unless state corporation of the agency, public or saving pealing statute includes clause or negli- involved for the persons has vested. right unless Southern Ser assistants, officers, deputies, gence Angeles County, Los Company vice employees or in the course agents such However, Cal.2d in however, no employment; provided, right litigant state the of a need this not state, run shall have vested but his claim must be contained district, district, city, state county, school IV, pending Article 34 of in a case. institution, agency corpo- public or public provides: New Mexico Constitution of “No liabili- unless there be the state ration right legislature act of the shall affect and cost to cover amount ty insurance remedy party, change of either judgment.” of such procedure, any pend rules of evidence or repealed effective of these sections case.” the 1959 1965 statutes All Since by Chapter repealed this ac July quoted above were before chapter however, the stat same case brought, tion was N.M.Laws. Em meaning Public Officers and within “pending included the not a case” utes 1-17, 1975 Act, when Liability Ch. the Constitution the statutes were ployees §§ purpose provision constitutional does repealed. 2 sets out the N.M.Laws. Section apply saving there is clause in act: of the SUTIN, Employees Judge Li- (specially concurring Public Officers the 1975 dissenting). nonetheless, Act; general rule is ability the new statute contin- where

inapplicable I specially judg- concur in reversal of the that it of the old statute policy basic ues the ment and dissent on is, language though even That repeals. judgment against reversal of the Williams. unqualified, be statute repealing aof Quentin Rodgers Plaintiffs are Eve- statute is previous substance if the lyn Rodgers (Rodgers), owners of one, regard- it will be the new continued fire, destroyed by and three insurance carri- statute, and of the old an extension ed as who paid Rodgers proper- ers pending although not vested or rights ty damage and for loss of earn- prior subrogated, insurers were ings. The Public Offi- will not abate. in a case paid, rights the amount to all of the Liability Act continued Employees cers and recovery Rodgers against defendants. sovereign limited waiver policy of Rodgers sought recovery in ex- 1 and Chapter immunity §§ found *4 policies. limits of the insurance cess Haley, McLain v. N.M.Laws. (1949); Thomp- Loving (Lov- City State v. defendants 327, 207 P.2d 1013 (Hamilton), ing), Dale Hamilton its Police (1933); 229, P.2d 1030 Cor- son, N.M. Chief, (Williams). and James Williams Wil- 504, 32 P. Territory, 7 N.M. tesy v. liams is the son of the owner of the proper- Kuchel, 32 (1893); Alameda v. A.L.R. ty adjacent Rodgers, which is and on City 195 P.2d 17 Cal.2d property Hamilton and Williams liability Loving is therefore grass burned dead and weeds. This weed coverage. extent of its burning Rodgers’ proper- fire caused the ty. The owner of the Williams’ is moved that Hamilton The defendant party not a defendant. The action was the basis that he on he be dismissed dismissed the court the Hamilton was Chap provisions suit exempt from 14-9-7, morning of trial because N.M.S. § 14-9-7, The trial court supra. ter 3) (Repl.Vol. applicable. A.1953 ap did not Appellants his motion. granted all plaintiffs awarded sum 14-9-7, dismissal. Section peal Hamilton’s judgment was entered. not supra, but repealed supra, appeal judgment Plaintiffs from the 1-17. continued §§ plaintiffs from an order that denied addi- the trial court contend Appellants tur, alternative, or in the a new trial on the correctly consequently ruled damages. Loving cross-appealed issue of without limita- solely responsible is judgment and from the order de- from Appel- to the amount tion as its motion N.O.V. Defendant Wil- nying provisions of the cross-appeal. mistaken. None liams did not lants are 14-9-7, repeal be- supra, survived its of § complaint is based on two the- Plaintiffs’ were continued provisions of its cause none (1) liability: negligence of defend- ories Lia- Employees Public Officers in the (2) liability strict of defendants. ants bility Act. appeal, Loving contends that the trial On submitting erred in the case to the court is re- judgment of the district theory that defendants were jury on the for a new is remanded versed and the case exercised the strictly they liable even if in the in- the error because of burning operation. Wil- utmost care structions. did not this contention and did liams make ORDERED. IT IS SO rely Loving. not on the brief of Neither cross-appeal did Williams to reverse the of the trial court. Williams seeks judgment LOPEZ, J., concurs. judgment below. As far only to affirm concerned, is left SUTIN, J., and dissents. as Williams is Court specially concurs review on issue of nothing with strict This strict liability is limited to the Hays, liability. Kimberly, harm, Inc. kind of the possibility of which (1975); Dow, Novak v. activity makes the abnormally dangerous. court’s in the sum of liability, allowed. Dominguez, 58 N.M. and he remains liable for Williams is bound on negligence (1970); unless additur is Hendrix v. the trial strict Section 520 exercise of reasonable are to be considered: (c) inability to eliminate the normally dangerous, In determining [******] reads whether an pertinent care; following activity part: risk factors is ab- (d) extent activity which the is not a liability A. The doctrine of strict matter usage; of common applicable Loving. (e) inappropriateness of the activity to morning February At 10 A.M. place on; where it is carried burning Hamilton and Williams were (f) extent to which its value to the com- on the grass dead and weeds Williams’ munity outweighed by dangerous immediately Rodg- to the west of property, attributes. cleaning The two men were property. ers’ part clean-up cam- as 520, prior Sections 519 and to reassess paign by Loving during initiated the winter designated “abnormally dangerous ment ac of 1973-74. Hamilton had the fire truck tivities” as “ultrahazardous activities.” We present and used the water to control the looked askance at these former sections be *5 surrounding the walls of spray fire and to cause these Restatement ignored rules buildings prevent spread to of fire. At relation activity to surrounding cir noon, property Hamilton left the Williams’ cumstances. Burgess, 575, Otero v. 84 N.M. appointment in Carlsbad. Wil- to attend an 505 P.2d 1251 (Ct.App.1973). Section liams at the location of the fire remained 520(e), supra, does consider “inappropriate policed minutes and approximately for 90 activity place ness of the to the where it is by collecting Rodg- the area hot coals. The carried on” as a factor to be considered in property by during ers’ was consumed fire determining whether an activity is abnor day. of the same the afternoon We, mally dangerous. therefore, accept 519 and 520 as the subject. law on this §§ This not an accidental fire or one was See, by stranger trespasser. caused “The doctrine stems English from an Liability property of one on whose acciden- case, Fletcher, Rylands 330, L.R. 3 H.L. damages originates spread tal fire for from frequently given launching as the case thereof, (1951). 18 A.L.R.2d 1081 This was doctrine, old ‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non ” See, purpose. a lawful a fire set for Liabili- (Use your laedas.’ own in such a purposely lawfully ty spread of fire injure another). manner as not to that of kindled, (1952). In 24 A.L.R.2d 241 either Hise, Thigpen v. Skousen & case, Loving liable for caused It is clear by spread of the fire to from the cases cited in Annot. A.L.R.2d controlling it. negligent if it was another (1952) that American decisions have uniformly repudiated the applicability of liability, plaintiffs of strict On the issue Rylands the doctrine of v. Fletcher inten- to 2d, 519 and rely on Restatement of Torts §§ (id. 254). tional fire cases New Mexico has 519 reads: Section problem. not been confronted with this (1) abnormally who carries on an One activity subject liability is It dangerous liability has been held that strict is person, justified recovery for harm to the land or chattels caused resulting activity, blasting operations, Thigpen, supra, of another from the where- although he has exercised the utmost care as this Court has held that liability strict prevent applicable dynamite the harm. was not when

3H place appropriate under sur- were saved an action already stored in an com- existing. then Ote- menced. No rounding proceedings circumstances further can be ro, supra. that an intentional fire had under a We hold statute which has been re- Rich, purpose, pealed.” which is land for a lawful Coffin v. 45 Me. on one’s usage, not “an Am.Dec. 559 activity of common is We do not have to because, activity” determine dangerous repealed whether the statutes abnormally incompatible. then were surrounding They circumstances have been laid under the could have been started rest. existing, the fire reasonable care. Under

and controlled with We must determine whether POELA was rule, was not Loving in effect applicable to this case. liability. doctrine of strict Section reads: 5-13-16 palpable I it was concur that error apply any does not [POELA] on strict instruct the public employee officer or aris- ing before the effective date of the [POE- Loving liable for in ex- B. is LA], coverage. cess of insurance important It is note that restric- Plaintiffs, legisla- reason of claimed does not apply public body.” tion to “a It is entanglements, contend tive limited to “a public employee.” officer or amount in excess of its insur- liable for an Gallagher Metro., Etc., Albuquerque 14-9-7, coverage. They claim that ance N.M. (Ct.App.1977), cert. 3) and (Repl.Vol. 5-6-20 N.M.S.A.1953 §§ den., 567 P.2d 485 in 5-6-21, (Repl.Vol. pt. N.M.S.A.1953 volved a tort action defendant. 14-9-7, adopted 1) incompatible; are June, The accident occurred 1974. POE- dismissing as court in Hamilton LA was effective July 1975. The com defendant, Loving’s removed sover- party plaint (shown August filed made it liable for the immunity and eign record, opinion). not These facts are identi Montoya under employees acts of its cal with those in the instant case. With Albuquerque, applicability POELA, reference to fetched doctrine to (1970). This is a far the court said: merito- arguments present and *6 Employees The Public Officers Act rious. sovereign modifies common law immuni- expressly repealed These statutes through 5-13-17, ty. Sections 5-13-1 1975, ch. in 1975. Laws legislature (Repl.Vol. pt. Supp. N.M.S.A.1953 relating to 18, Act Governmental § 1975). to apply This act does not claims as “Public Officers and Liability, Tort cited arising date of before the effective Act,” (POELA), Liability 5- Employees §§ 5-13-16, The supra. act. act Section 13-1, (Repl.Vol. 2, pt. seq., N.M.S.A.1953 et apply does not to this case because its The effective date of this Supp.). July effective 1975. date was See The July complaint 1975. Act was [Emphasis Laws 17. ch. add- § 28, 1975. July filed on P.2d at ed.] [563 105] filed, 14-9-7 complaint When Without or citation of explanation au- 5-6-21, 5-6-20, supra, were re- and §§ thority, this effect Court held in that: repeal of pealed. express The a statute apply any The does not to claim [POELA] it Operationally, is deemed destroys it. against any public body, public officer or Beckwith v. Cactus never have existed. employee when the accident or tort was Corporation, 84 Drilling committed July before 1975. Sutin, (Ct.App.1972), J. concur- 5-13-16, supra, the Prior ring. can be doubt Section Claims “There section, to a apply . . . defeated all is clear. It does repeal of the statute former, a except against public body. local It does not rights those under officer by judgment, apply “public vested to claims a already had become Loving plaintiff but employee.” applies upon POELA shall demand not to Hamilton. defendant waive the amount any judg- ment recovered the state which Hamilton as a The trial court dismissed was not by liability covered insurance. dis- properly He was party defendant. pri- the tort was committed missed because any is liable for amount recovered 1, 1975. July or to in excess of insurance coverage. Otherwise, controlled the trial POELA case. C. Defendant Williams is liable for addi- tional damages by way of additur. judgment in excess (1) allows POELA present following questions Plaintiffs coverage. of insurance for review: modify purpose of POELA was (a) Was there substantial evidence to sovereign im law doctrine

the common support jury’s damages verdict on recovery against a munity by permitting $10,000.00? the inadequate amount of as well as body governmental public answer is It “no.” provided permissive acts. proprietary whereby public the state or a local method (b) If substantial evidence sustains an so, if it desires to do elect to body may, damages $10,000.00, award of in excess of itself from 5 — 13— protect Section appellate can the grant additur? The 2. “yes.” answer is itself, body protect may To local elect purchase liability insurance or it (a) There was no substantial evidence to liability, elect to itself to otherwise support inadequate jury verdict insurance, (1) filing a apart from its $10,000.00. written notice of its election with de- Rodgers suffered loss fire of a build- superintendent and the partment of finance antique and the contents of a bar and insurance, (2) by fixing the actual shop, together earnings. with loss of liability up to a maximum of amount of presented evidence on the issue of negligent conduct. Section 5-13-8(B) 5-13-5(B). judg- “When a by plaintiffs and defendants took four . . . sufficient ment becomes final forms: budg- shall be money pay evidence, Plaintiffs introduced in eted, judgment ex- if the amount objection, without the General Alarm Fire of the local coverage the insurance ceeds Report Loving’s Fire Chief. It showed body has public body public or if the local building an estimated loss of subjected liability pursu- itself to otherwise $6,000.00. an estimated interior 5-13-7. Section ant [POELA].” report This by Loving an admission [Emphasis added.] *7 that the estimated loss was twice the pur- It Loving chose the first elective. amount of the verdict of the jury. $25,000.00 liability insurance. It chased of (2) Rodgers testified as to the value of liability. If subject elect to itself to did not fire, building the before and after the the $25,000.00 Loving the exceeds inventory value of the and fixtures of the excess amount. budget pay the shall fire, Loving bar before and after the the sovereign im- grant Loving POELA did inventory antique shop value of the of the amounts in excess of munity for all fire, after the the before and value of the legislature did not coverage. The insurance personal property premises, stored on the body from public to relieve a local intend $37,929.02. which The all of totaled insur- amounts of insurance liability where small companies paid Rodgers ance for the actual legislature If the coverage were obtained. loss, $29,100.00, the the sum an value of of intended, have re-enacted so it would had amount almost three times the amount of repealed. provided Act It 5-6-21 of the jury the verdict. that: earn- (3) Rodgers proved loss of business The companies insurance were subrogat $4,343.95, $4,000.00 which was ings of ed to rights Rodgers against defendants companies. one of the insurance paid $33,100.00. in the sum “Subrogation is a cleaning and proved consequential He also device one party is substituted for re- costs of guarding $762.27 $510.32 another.” Fireman’s F.A. Ins. Cos. v. Phil spectively. Carter, A., Inc., lips, &R. tax Rodgers’ income (4) Loving produced (1976). P.2d 72 The insurance companies val- depreciated the that established return had an independent claim de the $14,000.00. Depreciat- building at the ue of $33,100.00 fendants in the amount of paid was not an is not cash value. It value ed Rodgers. They were entitled to recover because by Rodgers of cash value admission if they produced defendants sub tax returns were unrelated the income support stantial evidence to their claim. Mertens, damages. Law of Fd. issue The that jury found Williams was negligent 23.04, Taxation, p. 13 Vol. Income strict To recover event, any depreciated In value (1968). for the payments Rodgers, the insurance Even if jury excess of the verdict. was in companies establish must the extent cash value value showed a depreciated damage. Casualty Hardware Mut. Co. $14,000.00, the con- the value of less than Baldus, Ill.App. N.E.2d business building, the loss of tents of consequential costs would es- earnings, statutory to be in excess form of tablish a fire standard jury verdict. policy provides company “. . Rodgers insures .to the extent support there Was substantial evidence cash property actual value of the at $10,000.00? only verdict of jury a ” loss, the time of . . Section 58-8- property qualified to ex- Owners 10(f), 2). (Repl.Vol. pt. N.M.S.A.1953 opinion property. as to the press an value of paid Rodgers insurers for Ackerman, 82 N.M. City Albuquerque property destroyed actual cash value of the However, opinion P.2d 63 fire, with together for loss of expert lay person of a or an evidence payments earnings. These were the maxi- disregarded by the or in jury be in whole coverage mum the insurance policies. Phillips if uncontradieted. part even payments not made as an act of Smith, (Ct.App. mistake, compromise, or in collusion with Heesen, 1974); Lopez v. Rodgers. On his own claim dam- conclusive, Rodgers’ testimony is not ages, proved also by Rodgers insurers controlling It is to be binding jury. on a fire, the value of the destroyed by credibility. testi- weighed Rodgers’ for its together consequential damages with standing alone would allow mony earnings, loss of exceeded the paid amount $10,000.00on the only a verdict of to return Rodgers. Rodgers’ them to tes- opinion loss. timony, in the context of independent However, in- presented where evidence is insurance companies, stands establish a opinion evidence to dependent a different It position. was sufficient fact, and the figure as a matter of damage support recovery by the insurers uncontradicted, wide lati- evidence paid. amounts arriving granted at tude Opinion evidence is a weak link disappears. Undisputed evidence figure *8 necessary chain of evidence to establish accepted as true. Morris Cart- must be fact when the claim is made by party the It wright, 258 P.2d 719 opinion. who the rendered It is a self-serv- it arbitrarily rejected be if is not may not jury give statement and the can the subject to reasonable doubts. Samora Bradford, opinion weight as such it believes it is enti- (Ct.App. 1970). testimony tled Rodgers’ to receive. But

314 mistaken, (authorities damage was has been It confirmed stand alone. not

does omitted). made insurers by payments corroborated testimony When the value. cash of actual A consistently applied like rule has been corroborated, the is adequately a witness by us where a remittitur or a new trial is impeachment to even is not witness sought upon a excess claimed award. on a statements made though untrue yet not awarded Additur has been v. Industrial Com- matter. Fish collateral New appellate Mexico court. mission, Ariz.App. inadequacy or Excess of the award alone does improper not reflect an motive the Rodgers that contention Defendants’ jury. evi- widely Verdicts differ where the tax return does by his income impeached damage precisely dence of the same. testimony as to value the not discredit his Jurors, per- though conscientious in their property. the err; they can over- formance of duties companies established The insurance damage fig- or estimate underestimate $33,100.00. This fact can- figure damage say ure. Were we to the verdict that itself jury being as doubt- be discarded motive, improper an every indicated case Plaintiffs in- speculative. nature or ful in susceptible would be a remittitur or addi- policy insurance evidence troduced tur But on reversal. in the instant case $25,000.00. coverage of Loving that showed to support jury’s there is no evidence at a jury arrived reasoning By what damages. compe- verdict on Yet there is plain- for all figure damage persuasive tent and that merits evidence an cannot because we remains a secret tiffs increased award. by the processes of the mental used inquire Unfortunately, court did not in- jury. jury “subrogation.” struct the on The jury that the insur- evidence is substantial position plaintiffs did not know $33,- companies suffered ance in this case. The trial record does not re- 100.00, damages of suffered Rodgers jury Rodg- flect knew that before earnings $1,616.54 for loss of above damages exceeding ers recover for could his reimbursement, costs, cleaning insurance coverage, compa- the insurance security expenses. payments nies must first be reimbursed for support evidence There Rodgers. made on instruction dam- $10,000.00. only Defend- verdict of jury’s ages plaintiffs entity. as one treated produced any nor no argument ants made 1 on Instruction No. the issues of the case contrary. to the evidence out, phrases yet has and sentences inked Perhaps clear readable. the instruc- case, appellate can (b) an In tions were not sent room. grant additur. The verdict of the 10 to stood corollary is a theory “additur” plaintiffs. Perhaps favor of the the jury “remittitur,” the former to increase compromised damage figure in order to verdict, inadequate the latter to decrease an conclude the case. applicable rule verdict. excessive through Whether improper motive or It is the same. additur and remittitur on damages, mistake in the measure of Blackwell, 77 so stated in Hammond jury’s palpable verdict was error. P.2d as there believes is a vast difference follows: between reduction an excessive verdict will not be dis- inadequate award An of an inadequate and an increase verdict appears unless it appeal turbed on Schiedt, on Dimick v. relies U.S. passion, prejudice, have resulted from cor- 55 S.Ct. L.Ed. A.L.R. influence some partiality, undue motive, The court under where there has held that cause rupt or the measure of Seventh Amendment the Constitution of palpable error been

315 States, court, finding the United a federal a manent injury health, or the value of a inadequate personal verdict in an action for life. The damages are not liquidated and injuries negligence, power is due without there can be no fixed measure of damage. by refusing grant plain- to add to it This Court step cannot in and take the accept tiff a new trial if the defendant will place of jury. Wide latitude is allowed suffi- an increase which the court deems the fact finder in fixing the amount of the cient. Baca, 734, award. Baca v. (Ct.App.1970); 997 Campbell, Powers v. 79 binding Amendment is not Seventh 302, (1968). 442 P.2d 792 The same states, thereof, on the and as a result Dim proper relief is in property cases, rejected severely ick has been and criticized. based solely opinion evidence, on in which Company, Pacific Jehl v. Southern 66 Cal.2d permitted wide latitude in 821, 276, arriv- Cal.Rptr. (1967); 427 59 ing at a damage figure. Phillips Smith, Coopera Drummond Mid-West Growers supra. cases, retrial, In such on Nev., (1975). verdict Corp., tive 542 P.2d 198 Gen greater can be or Halvorson, smaller. Nei- zel v. 248 Minn. 80 N.W.2d appellate ther the nor the (1957); Swanson, trial court Caudel v. should N.C. be allowed 249, 103 replace (1958); jury. Bodon v. S.E.2d Suhrm ann, (1958); 8 Utah 2d A new trial on the issue of damages only Manger, Fisch v. 24 N.J. 130 A.2d 815 proper would not be in the instant case damages because the are certain liqui- court, plaintiffs In the trial moved for dated, not to be fixed by jury, but to be additur, alternative, or in the newa trial on determined and by fixed the court. damages only. the issue of The motion was Rodgers and the companies insurance set- appealed denied. Plaintiffs from this order tled the fire loss. The paid amount by the request grant this Court to the relief. companies liquidated became A new trial on the damages only issue of damages recoverable the insurance com- granted by can be this Court when the panies. Banking Baker, C. H. Brown Co. v. damages involved are uncertain and the Mo.App. S.W. 454 Buel v. only determination of the amount is the Co., Kansas Life Ins. Blackwell, issue involved. Hammond v. su- quotes P. the following: pra. generally “There are three conditions ‘liquidated,’ “The word in the sense of the . . precedent which must be ful- (with rule relied on counsel” respect to filled before a new trial can be limited to satisfaction) accord and “signifies damages. assessment of First it must the amount claimed has been ascertained clearly appear that the issues are severable agreed on or by operation fixed distinct, danger and that there is no law.” damages cannot be accurately assessed The court general held that ap- rule presentation absent a full of evidence on plies only to claims that liquidated are both Second, before can be undisputed. “Liquidated damages” are determined, separately or rather redeter- agreed law, those upon, fixed suscep- mined, liability the issue of must have been being tible of made certain mathemati- clearly Finally, overriding settled. con- factors, cal calculations from known while parties sideration of fairness to the must be “unliquidated” are those which cannot be assured; or, in the negative, prej- stated made certain one party alone. Cochrane either party.” Pope udice must result Forbes, 267 Mass. 166 N.E. 752 Sheehan, Try, “Try, Again . .” (1929); Foundation, Loyola Robinson v. Proposal Scope A to Limit of New Inc., 236 154 (Fla.App.1970). So.2d Texas, Mary’s Trials in Law St. Journal The insurers’ claims were liquidated and This proper personal injury relief is undisputed. “Where the ques- amount pain suffering, cases that involve per- tion is undisputed liquidated, and the *10 316 sum, jury it will in has been stand the shoes the even if for a lesser

jury’s verdict is they a number of cases recognized plaintiff in believe the deserved more. held or in- power has the to damages liquidated appellate court Where the are the figure.” higher to the verdict proven, crease the discretion is allowed. The 267 Court’s duty A.L.R.2d have Annot. 56 court and Court to award or amount of verdict proven increase power plaintiffs grant to the amount to fail- parties refusal or over either judgment inadequate. when verdict is An additur addition, 56 A.L.R.2d power consent to act appellate ure to court has same Vt. Raleigh, 128 Quesnel v. court, In judgment as the trial render (1969), said: the court A.2d or have which the trial court could should capa- Papertsian, v. 309 N.Y. liquidated are rendered. O’Connor damages When 465, 131 by accurate measure- N.E.2d 56 A.L.R.2d 206 ble of correction law, Feld, error (Mo.1963). rules of In within fixed Caen v. 371 S.W.2d 209 ment Cole, and should be remedied supra, question verdict can where the amount in appeal. trial court or on undisputed liquidated, either in the the appellate with court remanded to district court Cannon, Tenn.App., In Kaiser v. in judgment directions to amend (1975), the court said: S.W.2d clude the additur. permitted have jurisdictions A number of only liquidat- companies are Rodgers where additur omitted). In cases (Authorities $24,716.54, such ed. entitled to an additur of for a prov- argument be that the against can no total Wil- there is invaded because jury liams. ince more properly awarded have

jury could This case should be remanded to the trial provided than plaintiff judg- court with directions amend the the additur. Rodgers ment award plain- plaintiffs’ position, support $33,100.00. In insurance carriers following discussed tiffs cited and Angerman, Colo.App. Cole cases: D. against Cross-claims defendants su- (1972); Manger, Fisch each other were not decided below. Co., supra; Pacific pra; Jehl Southern against filed a cross-claim Williams Lov- Coopera- v. Mid-West Growers Drummond ing seeking indemnity for all loss or dam- authorities Corp., supra. tive Additional ages Loving primarily suffered because were cited. that allowed additur liable for loss or suffered response was that only Williams’ Rodgers. plaintiffs’ motion for denial of

granting or filed a cross-claim Wil- of the trial in the discretion additur rested indemnity liams for the alternative for that no clear abuse urged court and contribution. had on Reliance is was shown. discretion These cross-claims not submitted (1958) in Appeal and Error § 5A C.J.S. nor otherwise decided the trial there “Ordinarily, it is stated court. fore, by an verdict will not be disturbed ground that the dam court on the appellate yet Williams seek relief Lov- especially inadequate, ages awarded are on his cross-claim. approved by has the amount been

where refusing set court as

the trial This rule inadequacy.” aside for

verdict has

applies in those cases where fixing amount of dam

wide latitude Nei wants more.

ages, plaintiff and the appellate nor trial court

ther the

Case Details

Case Name: Rodgers v. City of Loving
Court Name: New Mexico Court of Appeals
Date Published: Nov 29, 1977
Citation: 573 P.2d 240
Docket Number: 2897
Court Abbreviation: N.M. Ct. App.
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