CORETTA RODDEY v. KPMG L.L.P., et al.
22-CV-7405 (VSB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
April 14, 2025
VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge
Appearances:
Laura Elizabeth Bellini
Gregory Calliste, Jr.
Phillips and Associates
New York, NY and Middletown, NJ
Counsel for Plaintiff
Justine Leigh Abrams
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.
Morristown, NJ
Counsel for Defendants
VERNON S. BRODERICK, United States District Judge:
Plаintiff Coretta Roddey (“Plaintiff” or “Roddey“) filed this lawsuit against Defendants Sabrina Donnelly, Jonathan Edgerton, Julie Molitor, Jonathan Wyatt, Yvonne Garcia, Timothy Phelps, and Allison Sumrow (collectively, “Individual Defendants“), and KPMG L.L.P. (“KPMG” or together with Individual Defendants, “Defendants“), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII“),
I. Factual Background1
On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff, who is an African American woman, was hired by KPMG as a Manager of Transformational Delivery and Consulting. (Doc. 27 (“Am. Compl.“) ¶ 74.) Plaintiff‘s role was based out of KPMG‘s New York office. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff‘s оffer letter stated that “by March 27, 2022, [Roddey] must relocate [her] residence to the New York City area and be able to work full time in the New York City area.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff lived in Georgia at the time she was hired but was planning to relocate to New York. (Doc. 51 (“Pl. 56.1“) ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff‘s role, amongst other things, included supporting business development activities, delivering advisory methodologies, developing relationships with client executives, and leading the KPMG team in delivery of services and client support. (Am. Compl. ¶ 79.)
Plaintiff began working for KPMG on September 27, 2021. (Id. ¶ 77.) Plaintiff worked remotely from Georgia due to KPMG‘s Covid-19 remote wоrk policy, which did not permit
On October 7, 2021, Plaintiff met with her supervisor, Sabrina Donnelly, who informed her that she was being proposed for a project based out of St. Louis, Missouri. (Id. ¶ 81.) Plaintiff informed Donnelly that she had safety concerns about the assignment due to the unrest in the area following the death of George Floyd and the subsequent deрloyment of the National Guard. (Id. ¶¶ 83-84.) Plaintiff also reached out to various other supervisors to communicate her concerns. (Id. ¶¶ 88, 94.) Nonetheless, an email was sent introducing Plaintiff to the St. Louis team. (Id. ¶ 91.) Around this time, Donnelly assured Plaintiff that her name was being proposed to manage KPMG‘s Goldman Sachs and American Express accounts. (Id. ¶ 95.) Plaintiff then learned that her name was not put forward to manage the Goldman Sachs and American Express accounts. (Id. ¶¶ 96, 98.)
Plaintiff began to feel concerned about lack of opportunity and transparеncy from her supervisors. She sent out various introductory emails to KPMG executives, introducing herself as a new hire and requesting opportunities to engage with business development initiatives. (Id. ¶¶ 102-05.) Plaintiff did not receive any responses. (Id. ¶ 107.) Plaintiff observed that similarly situated managers, none of whom were African American, were receiving opportunities and support. (Id. ¶ 118.)
Around mid-October, Plaintiff met with Allison Sumrow, a Financial Services Resource Manager, and told her that “she was the only African American female” manager in financial services based in New York, and she wanted to be “treated fаirly [and given] the same
On October 22, 2021, Plaintiff was informed that she would be given a role with the Goldman Sachs Carbon Project (“Carbon Project“), although she did not receive the onboarding paperwork. (Id. ¶¶ 140-41.) On November 5, 2021, Jonathan Edgerton, a Principal of Operations and Compliance Risk, indicated he was involved with the onboarding process and asked when Plaintiff would be in New York. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 142.) Plaintiff confirmed that she would be in New York and ready to join the Carbon Project team. (Id. ¶ 143.) In mid-November, Plaintiff was informed that she had not been selected for the Carbon Project position. (Id. ¶ 148.)
“Plaintiff became concerned that [] KPMG simply did not want to put an African American face on it‘s (then) available projects” to her detriment. (Id. ¶ 158.) Plaintiff raised her concerns on a call with the Head of Diversity for KPMG on November 14, 2021. (Id. ¶ 159.) Plaintiff‘s concerns were communicated to the Ethics & Compliance Department, to whom Plaintiff provided evidence of her claims. (Id. ¶¶ 164-66.) On November 18, 2021, Plaintiff was informed that her “concerns and emails were being referred to the Ethics & Compliance department and that an investigation was (allegedly) being opened.” (Id. ¶ 173.) On January 27, 2022, Plaintiff reached out to raise another concern about “being excluded from the on-site annual advisory training, in retaliation, although she signed up in October 2021.” (Id. ¶¶ 186-88.) That same day, Plaintiff was informed that KPMG could not substantiate her allegations. (Id. ¶ 193.)
On March 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“). (Id. ¶ 15.) On June 3, 2022, the EEOC issued a Noticе of Right to Sue. (Id.)
II. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on August 30, 2022. (Doc. 1.) On November 22, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff then amended her complaint on December 7, 2022. (Am. Compl.) On December 8, 2022, I denied Defendants’ original motion to dismiss as moot. (Doc. 29.)
Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for partial summary judgment, on December 20, 2022. (Doc. 34.) Plaintiff filed her opposition brief on January 31, 2023. (Doc. 50.) Defendants filed their reply brief on February 14, 2023. (Doc. 53.)
A. 12(b)(2)
“On a motion to dismiss pursuant to
To survive a motion to dismiss under
In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts аlleged in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor. Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007). A complaint need not make “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. A complaint is “deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the complaint.” Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Defendants move to dismiss all claims against the Individual Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. In determining whether personal jurisdiction exists, courts “engage in a two-part analysis, first determining whether there is a statutory basis for exercising personal jurisdiction, and second deciding whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.” BWP, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thе statutory portion of the analysis “is determined by the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing, inter alia,
1. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)
Pursuant to
None of the Individual Defendants lived, worked, or owned property in New York, nor were any of the Individual Defendants based out of KPMG‘s New York office at any point during Plaintiff‘s tenure with KPMG. (See Docs. 12-18.) Plaintiff relies on the Individual Defendants’ roles in managing Plaintiff, who was ostensibly based out of KPMG‘s New York office, to establish that the Individual Defendants transacted business in New York. This argument falls short because Plaintiff did not live or work in New York. When Plaintiff was hired, she was assigned to KPMG‘s New York office and was planning to relocate to New York City from her home in Georgia. (See Tran Decl. ¶ 3; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 2.) However, as KPMG‘s Covid-19 protocols were still in effect, Plaintiff worked remotely and never relocated to New York. (Tran Decl. ¶ 5; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 36 (“Though Plaintiff attempted to go to her office in New York, Plaintiff was specifically advised, on multiple occasions, that she should not physically visit KPMG‘S New York office due (only) to KPMG‘s ongoing pandemic protocols“).) Other than two instances in which Plaintiff went to the New York office, she
The Individual Defendants’ interactions with Plaintiff occurred while Plaintiff lived and worked in Georgia. Plaintiff states that she visited New York twice, but she does not allege that any of the events outlined in the Amended Complaint took place during either visit to New York, or that she interacted with any of the Individual Defendants during her visits to New York. (See Doc. 52, Ex. B (“Roddey Decl.“) ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff‘s intent to move to New York, coupled with the prospect of working in-person out of KPMG‘s New York office in the future, does not suffice to establish that Individual Defendants transacted business in New York. Cf. Troma Ent., Inc. v. Centennial Pictures Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Personal jurisdiction has to be predicated on defendants’ actions, not plaintiff‘s.“). Although it is true that Plaintiff‘s work phone number had a New York area code and her email signature reproduced KPMG‘s New York office address, “courts applying New York law have declined to extend jurisdiction over defendants simply on the basis of telephone calls and other communications sent to New York.” DirecTV Latin Am., LLC v. Park 610, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 405, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff‘s situation is even more attenuated since she neither received calls while she was in New York, nor did she physically work in New York.
In addition to Plaintiff‘s overarching claim that she was based out of KPMG‘s New York office, Plaintiff asserts that in early November, after she was told she would be given a role with the Goldman Sachs Carbon Project, Defendant Edgerton stated in an email that he was involved with the project‘s onboarding and requested information about when Plaintiff would be in New York. (Am. Compl. ¶ 142.) Plaintiff responded that she wоuld be present in New York and ready to be onsite for the project. (Id. ¶ 143.) In mid-November, Plaintiff was informed that she
Because Plaintiff fails to establish that the Individual Dеfendants transacted business in New York within the meaning of
A court in New York may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act outside of New York “causing injury to person or property” in New York, so long as the person “(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.”
Plaintiff asserts that the alleged tortious acts of the Individual Defendants caused her injury in New York. “Courts determining whether there is injury in New York sufficient to warrant
The distinction here is that Plaintiff performed her employment duties in Georgia, not New York. By the logic of DiStefano, the original event of the termination of Plaintiff‘s employment from KPMG occurred in Georgia, not New York, as would the original event of any othеr instance of discrimination alleged by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff notes KPMG has its principal place of business in New York, and that key decisions, such as the termination of her employment, were funneled through that office. (Doc. 50 at 18.) Defendants do not dispute that general jurisdiction exists over KPMG. The question is whether I can properly exercise specific jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, none of whom lived in New York or worked out of KPMG‘s New York office. (See Docs. 12-18.) Allegations about KPMG as a company do not suffice to support jurisdiction over individuаls that were employed by KPMG. As Plaintiff fails to establish that the Individual Defendants committed tortious acts causing injury to a person or property in New York, I need not reach the sub-requirements of
Because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege the existence of specific jurisdiction under either
B. Jurisdictional Discovery & Amendment
Because I have found that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege the existence of personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff seeks leave to (i) сonduct jurisdictional
“It is within a district court‘s discretion to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to conduct jurisdictional discovery.” Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). “While discovery on the jurisdictional question is sometimes appropriate when there is a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff must first make a threshold showing that there is some basis for the assertion of jurisdiction.” Daval Steel Prods. v. M.V. Juraj Dalmatinac, 718 F. Supp. 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a plaintiff fails to allege facts that would support a colorable claim of jurisdiction, see id., or identify a genuine issue of jurisdictional fact, see Daventree, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 761, that plaintiff should not be entitled “to use the court processes to attempt to find support for having commenced the litigation,” Daval Steel, 718 F. Supp. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because I find that Plaintiff fails to make a threshold showing that there is some basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff‘s request for jurisdictional discovery is DENIED.
Plaintiff also seeks an opportunity to amend the First Amended Complaint to “cure any deficiencies . . . should the court require further allegations related to jurisdiction.” (Doc. 50 at 25.) Although courts “should freely give leave” to amend pleadings “when justice so requires,”
Plaintiff does not state what allegations she would add to the complaint, nor does she attach a proposed second amended complaint. Absent any indication of what substantive changes Plaintiff seeks to make, I am unable to assess whether the proposed amendment meets the standard established by
C. NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims
Defendants argue that Counts Five through Ten of the Amended Complaint, all of which arise under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL, should be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot show that the alleged misconduct occurred in New York. (See Doc. 35 at 19-23.) In the alternative, Defendants move for partial summary judgment оn Plaintiff‘s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims on the same grounds. (See id. at 23-25.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ alleged discrimination and retaliation had an impact on her in New York sufficient to state a claim under NYCHRL and NYSHRL. (See Doc. 50 at 21-23.)
Since the parties completed briefing, there have been important developments in the case law surrounding the application of the NYCHRL and NYSHRL to nonresidents of New York.
Whether a nonresident plaintiff not yet employed in New York City or State satisfies the impact requirement of the New York City Human Rights Law or the New York State Human Rights Law if the plaintiff pleads and later proves that an employer deprived the plaintiff of a New York City- or State-based job opportunity on discriminatory grounds.
Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 58 F.4th 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2023), certified question accepted, 203 N.E.3d 630 (N.Y. 2023), certified question answered, 235 N.E.3d 351 (N.Y. 2024).
In Syeed, Plaintiff Nafeesa Syeed, a “South Asian-American woman,” alleged that she was subjected to race and sex discrimination while working as a reporter in Defendant Bloomberg‘s Washington, DC bureau and while unsuccessfully applying for jobs in Bloomberg‘s New York bureau. Syeed, 235 N.E.3d at 352-53. At least one of the New York jobs Syeеd applied for was filled by someone with less education and experience than Syeed, a decision that a manager characterized as a choice not to convert the job into a “diversity slot.” Id. The district court dismissed Syeed‘s claims, relying on Hoffman v. Parade Publications, 933 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 2010), to hold that Syeed did not feel the impact of the alleged discrimination in New York while she was living in Washington, DC. See Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 568 F. Supp. 3d 314, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), vacated and remanded, No. 22-1251, 2024 WL 2813563 (2d Cir. June 3, 2024).
In Hoffman, the New York Court of Appeals held that the city and state human rights laws protect those “who inhabit or are ‘persons in’ the City of New York” or, if a nonresident, an individual who felt the impact of the discriminatory conduct in New Yоrk. 933 N.E.2d at 746-47. The Hoffman court found that the plaintiff, who lived and worked in Georgia, but who worked for a New York-based company, attended quarterly meetings in New York, and was
On March 14, 2024, the New York Court of Appeals answered the certified question, holding that “the New York City and New York State Human Rights Laws each protect nonresidents who are not yet employed in the city or state but who proactively sought an actual city- or state-based job opportunity.” Syeed, 235 N.E.3d at 352. The Court of Appeals in Syeed court did not disavow Hoffman‘s impact test. See id. at 355. Instead, the court distinguished a discriminatory termination case, like Hoffman, from a failure to hire or promote case, like Syeed, based on the logic that in the latter category, the “prospective employee personally feels the impact of a discriminatory refusal to promote or hire in New York City or State, because that is where the person wished to work (and perhaps relocate) and where they were denied the chance to do so.” Id. Under Syeed, a prospective New York inhabitant or employee fits within the NYCHRL and NYSHRL‘s protection, as “the legislaturе and city council [could not have] intended to give New York employers a license to discriminate against nonresident prospective employees.” Id. at 356.
Here, Roddey alleges that she suffered discriminatory treatment and retaliatory termination, as in Hoffman, not a failure to hire or promote, as in Syeed. See Syeed, 235 N.E.3d at 355 (“For purposes of the impact test, a failure to hire or promote case is distinct from a discriminatory termination case, like Hoffman.“). However, that does not end the inquiry because the underlying logic of Syeed is that the failure to hire denied the plaintiff the opportunity to live and work in Nеw York, which she was actively seeking to do. Here, the same is true of Roddey. On September 16, 2021, while living in Georgia, Roddey was hired to work in KPMG‘s New York office. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) KPMG instructed Roddey to work remotely for
At least one district court has addressed whether Syeed‘s holding should encompass a discriminatory termination case where the plaintiff was denied the opportunity to work in New York. In Shiber v. Centerview Partners LLC, the plaintiff began working remotely for the defendant company from her home in New Jersey due to the Covid-19 pandemic, but she understood that she would be required to work in-person in the New York City office once the pandemic policy was lifted. No. 21-CV-3649, 2024 WL 3274420, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2024). Her employment was terminated while the remote work policy was still in effect, and she brought a discriminatory termination claim under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL. See id. The court held that “there is no reason to conclude that New York employers should be permitted to discriminate against an employee . . . who was terminated before she had the chance to work in New York and who would have worked in New York but for the termination.” Shiber, 2024 WL 3274420, at *4; accord Shaughnessy v. Scotiabank, No. 22-CV-10870, 2024 WL 1350083, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024); eSHARES, Inc. v. Talton, No. 22-CV-10987, 2025 WL 936921, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2025).
As in Shiber, Roddey would have been required to work in-person from KPMG‘s New York office once their Covid-19 remote work policy was lifted. Thus, Roddey was denied the opportunity to live and work in New York by KPMG‘s alleged discrimination, including the termination of Roddey‘s emрloyment. I agree with the Shiber court‘s finding that under Syeed,
V. Conclusion
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff‘s claims against Sabrina Donnelly, Jonathan Edgerton, Julie Molitor, Jonathan Wyatt, Yvonne Garcia, Timothy Phelps, and Allison Sumrow for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, as to Plaintiff‘s NYCHRL and NYSHRL claims is DENIED. Plaintiff‘s requests to conduct jurisdictional discovery and amend her First Amended Complaint are DENIED.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Doc. 34.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 14, 2025
New York, New York
Vernon S. Broderick
United States District Judge